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They [indigenous people] know they have their rights and nobody can ignore them 
without being punished. They know they have a voice and it is being heard (Defensoria 
del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman) (DDP) representative) (NSI4R1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If I could make a call to … Petro[peru] and the state, to come see this problem, because 
they have put information on [the] internet saying that the problem is over but we know it 
[isn]’t and we see things coming down from the gorge and we want them to come again 
even if only to visit us and explain why they left us behind. That’s what I want to ask you, 
that you … could make this call from … Cuninico town, that some state organisation come 
to give us a hand because we haven’t heard from them. Why did they leave us? They 
abandoned us (Cuninico resident IRC13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brothers, I ask you … please make this reach the government. Make them concerned about 
us. Pity us. That they’ll have a Christian heart. So that we can survive. We don’t want to 
die, we want to live. We have our lands here to cultivate. When the mothers and the fathers 
die, who is going to look [after] it? Do they want the kids to suffer? (Cuninico resident 
IRC9). 
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Photograph 0.1: ‘Pluspetrol = murder’ Graffiti in Iquitos1  
 
Photograph 0.2: Cuninico indigenous emergency workers at the remediation site (summer 
2014).2 
                                                          
1 Source: see Acknowledgements Footnote 3. 
2 Source: see Acknowledgements Footnote 3. 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis has explored how effectively citizens and other stakeholders (community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) in Peru’s Loreto Region have 
been able to hold the oil company Petroperu accountable for environmental pollution. To do this, 
a theoretical framework called the political ecology of voice (PEV) has been developed which can 
be defined as an investigation into a specific temporal political, economic, social, and geographical 
environment in which citizens and other stakeholders voice over an environmental issue. Semi-
structured interviews were concentrated predominantly on two oil-based communities; Barrio 
Florido adjacent to the Iquitos refinery, and Cuninico situated near the North Peruvian oil pipeline. 
The PEV theoretical framework has revealed many fascinating issues within the Loreto Region. 
Poor rural development, economic poverty, political disinterest and racialised class consciousness 
mean that both communities lack access to state institutions or their representatives to voice. 
Meanwhile, Petroperu strictly controls their access and relationship which resulted in no means of 
communication for Cuninico prior to a 2014 oil spill and limited dialogue for Barrio Florido. 
Citizen poverty and their economic dependency on Petroperu has also strengthened its power and 
influence over these communities allowing them to establish a climate of fear thus weakening 
citizen willingness to voice. For CBO/NGO state/resource extraction industry (REI) access and 
engagement, this can be positively co-operative (stemming from the former’s mutual aims and/or 
conciliatory support) or negatively obstructive (resulting from the former’s scrutiny-based voice) 
with those in the latter affected through state-orchestrated anti-NGO rhetoric and REI 
fragmentation of indigenous federations. Despite this, these actors perform many useful 
educational and accountability based roles which strengthen citizen voice. However, their 
involvement does not always guarantee success due to their own visions which can impact their 
representation of citizen voice. Overall, the PEV environment for Loreton stakeholders can be 
described as restrictive, intolerant and suppressive, particularly for citizens who must rely on the 
support of collective voice actors to hold REIs accountable for pollution. 
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Moloqua: community hall 
Motonaves or lanchas: larger, slow, cargo and passenger carrying ferries with a capacity of 100 
tons or more of cargo and space for roughly 100 passengers 
Oleoducto Norperuano: North Peruvian pipeline  
Oleoducto Ramal Norte: Ramal Norte pipeline 
Otro: other 
Plantain: cooking banana 
Portala: porridge 
Posta: (medical) post 
Provincia: Provincial (government) 
Pueblo: community  
Quechua: the largest indigenous people of Peru and an indigenous language 
Rio: river  
Selva: rainforest 
Serrano: person of the Highlands 
Sierra: mountain highland region  
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Soles: Peru’s national currency 
Subgerencia: local government 
Subgerencia de indigenas: regional government intercultural department   
Teniente: Lieutenant  
Tuk Tuk or motocaro: rickshaw 
Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana: National University of the Peruvian Amazon 
Urarina: indigenous people who inhabit the Chambirai, Corrientes and Urituyacu river basins 
Yucca: a shrub, also known as cassava, native to South America and a major staple food  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research problem: The inequality of environmental pollution between nations 
and citizens 
 
While the dawn of the Twenty-First Century has seen many advances in medicine, technology and 
science, humanity continues to search for and understand its role and relationship with “Mother 
Nature.” Is the world merely a resource basket from which we exploit and take what we need for 
humanity’s survival and development? If we exploit resources, how much should we extract or is 
exhausting a resource permissible? Should humans instead play a more custodial role that seeks to 
safeguard and nurture the environment for future generations and thus limit our development 
levels? Though it is impossible to state the right or wrong answers to these questions 
unequivocally, the changes to the human – natural world relationship has two significant 
interconnected consequences; environmental change and environmental pollution.  
 
Their interconnectedness can be clearly understood if one considers environmental 
pollution at various spatial scales i.e. local, regional and global (see Wapner 1994 pp. 177-179). 
Crucially, over time, local and regional environmental problems have the potential to become 
global issues despite only initially affecting a circumscribed area (ibid. p. 179; see also Wingvist 
2014 p. 5) and by doing so can help alter the Earth’s climate.4  It is an exploration into the factors 
behind increased levels of environmental pollution, specifically oil, in certain countries, which is 
the core focus of this thesis. 
 
Page (2002 pp. 32-33) briefly discusses the causes of climate change and concludes that no 
one state is responsible for most pollution that drives climate change and no single state will bear 
the brunt of the environmental impact. ‘Rather, the causes and effects, costs and benefits, of 
                                                          
4 A report by Sida’s Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change cites Mitchell (2009), who provides several 
reasons why this can happen. Firstly, an environmental problem like watercourse pollution, acid rain or marine 
pollution originating in a single country can become an international concern once these impacts cross a national 
border and are detected (Wingvist 2014 p. 5). ‘Secondly, activities resulting in negative impacts on global commons 
(e.g. atmospheric ozone depletion or climate change), become an international problem once the impacts are 
discovered and concerns start to grow.’ Thirdly, an environmental impact at the local level ‘can become a regional or 
international problem if it occurs in many countries’ (ibid. author’s emphasis). 
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climate change (as well as many other environmental changes) cannot be entirely explained in 
terms of national states’ (ibid. p. 33). On the face of it, these remarks appear to summarise aptly 
how climate change and environmental degradation are driven by a high anthropogenic impact 
(see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2013; Committee on Climate Change 
2016). Yet, though no single state is to blame, responsibility can be placed with a set of nation 
states (advanced economies) whilst another group (emerging market and developing economies, 
EMaDEs) bear the brunt of environmental pollution.  
 
The evidence is striking. Within EMaDEs, pollution ‘is the leading cause of death’ with 
‘[e]xposure to polluted soil, water and air (both indoor and outdoor) result[ing] in 8.4 million 
deaths in 2012’ (Global Alliance on Health and Pollution (GAHP) no date p. 1; see also Briggs 
2003; World Health Organisation (WHO) 2014; Landrigan and Fuller 2015). Though the clear 
majority of deaths are attributable to insidious forms of pollution, especially household air (WHO 
2014), 18 per cent of the 8.4 million deaths are related to contaminated sites (10 per cent) and 
water, sanitation and hygiene (8 per cent) problems (GAHP no date p. 2), an unspecified number 
of which stem from pollution caused through natural resource extraction, including oil.   
 
More specific statistics from the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) 
and International Tanker Owners’ Pollution Federation (ITOPF) have shown a reduction in the 
number of onshore and offshore oil spills since the early period of the Twenty-First Century when 
figures first became available (IOGP 2009 pp. 23-25; 2015 pp. 47-52) and accidental marine-based 
transport oil spills since the 1970s (ITOPF no date).5 However, recent IOGP statistics for each 
global region (Africa, Asia/Australasia, Europe, Former Soviet Union (Russia), Middle East, 
North America and Central and South America) show a disparity based upon oil spill numbers and 
quantity of onshore oil spilt (Tables 1.1, 1.2). Over the period 2003-2014, the main three oil spill 
regions were South and Central America (nine years with the highest spill numbers), North 
America (11 years with the second highest spill numbers) and Africa (11 years with the third 
highest spill numbers) (Table 1.1). These regions also featured prominently in oil spilt levels; 
                                                          
5 According to the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), one should treat these figures with caution as ‘a 
general lack of information prevents a thorough evaluation of true current levels of oil pollution at sea’ (Camphuysen 
no date p. 7). An indicator of this can be seen from the 2009 article by Ferraro et al. which was the first study to 
present a comprehensive review on the level of marine-based pollution in European waters.  
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Africa had the highest volume spilt for six years with the second highest level for a further five 
years, Central and South America had three years apiece for the first and second highest levels and 
North America is ranked in third place for six years (Table 1.2).6  
 
Overall one can see from these tables that EMaDE producers based within Africa and Latin 
America suffer from far higher frequencies and magnitudes of oil spills in comparison to other 
producers (aside from North America). In Africa, a key illustration is Nigeria’s oil-producing 
Niger Delta region, which has witnessed severe environmental contamination from oil spills for 
several decades e.g. in 2014 alone, more than 550 spills occurred (Amnesty International 2015)7 
and a similar picture is visible in Latin American oil producers such as Ecuador and Peru. 
 
Ecuador’s oil pollution ‘has been characterised as “one of the largest environmental 
disasters in history” by Rainforest Action Network …’ (Business & Human Rights Resource 
Centre no date) where oil extraction saw ‘as many as 16 million gallons of spilled crude’ and an 
estimated 18 billion gallons of produced water (Feige 2008). In Peru’s north-east oil producing 
Loreto Region, 90 oil spills occurred between 2009-2011 in just two oil Block areas (Hance 2011) 
while the North Peruvian oil pipeline (Oleoducto Norperuano) which transports crude from Loreto 
to the Pacific coast saw five spills in 2014 and seven spills in 2016 (Law in Action no date) detailed 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 82. Why do these EMaDE countries suffer increased levels of 
environmental pollution, particularly oil pollution, in comparison to advanced economy 
producers? This question lies at the heart of this thesis’ research aims and questions outlined below.  
 
                                                          
6 Unfortunately, data for Russia and the Middle East are unavailable for many of these years, which makes Table 1.2’s 
data less accurate. 
7 For further statistics see Gonzalez (2016a). 
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Table 1.1: IOGP figures for number of oil spills – by region (2003-2014) (IOGP 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011a, b; 
2013; 2014; 2015). 
 Years Africa Asia/ 
Australasia 
Europe Russia Middle East North 
America 
South & 
Central 
America 
Number of 
oil spills  
(where data 
is available) 
2003* 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007** 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
687 
759 
753 
758 
1.6 
1.3 
1.4 
1.2 
1.4 
1.45 
1.99 
0.9 
679 
464 
189 
262 
0.3 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.16 
0.25 
0.1 
360 
303 
256 
373 
0.5 
0.8 
1.1 
0.3 
0.4 
0.48 
0.50 
0.4 
875 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
0.2 
n/a 
n/a 
0.1 
0.26 
3.76 
3.1 
474 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1.0 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.38 
0.26 
0.4 
2176 
1203 
1065 
1310 
1.8 
1.9 
1.7 
1.6 
1.7 
2.10 
2.51 
2.0 
2757 
2779 
1502 
1603 
6.3 
6.2 
7.3 
8.2 
9.0 
0.43 
0.40 
0.4 
Key: Highest spill figures per year; second highest spill figures per year; third highest spill figures per year 
*Measured in raw statistical figures 
**Measured in spills per million tonnes of oil equivalent production (> 1 barrel (bbl)) 
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Table 1.2: IOGP figures for quantity of reported oil spill onshore – by region (2003-2014) (IOGP 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 
2010; 2011a, b; 2013; 2014; 2015). 
 Years Africa Asia/ 
Australasia 
Europe Russia Middle East North 
America 
South & 
Central 
America 
Quantity of 
reported of 
oil spilled 
onshore 
(where data 
is available) 
2003* 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007** 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
1394 
1274 
1770 
7216 
61.1 
27 
30.5 
6 
26.1 
55.53 
8.02 
54.3 
274 
234 
64 
121 
0.5 
0.3 
1 
9 
0.4 
1.10 
8.01 
1.8 
7 
90 
8 
206 
5.8 
0.9 
1.5 
0 
7.6 
15.24 
0.04 
13.9 
765 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
0.2 
2.05 
n/a 
6.7 
1541 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
6.7 
75.4 
n/a 
12.3 
4.86 
0.12 
1.3 
2375 
899 
542 
1533 
7.4 
4.1 
3.6 
4 
5.3 
4.46 
1.06 
5.5 
1289 
1883 
2755 
3137 
19.8 
19.2 
9.3 
0 
31.7 
1.40 
0.91 
5.9 
Key: Highest spill volumes per year; second highest spill volumes per year; third highest spill volumes per year 
*Measured in tonnes 
**Measured in tonnes per million tonnes
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1.2 Research aims, questions and study originality   
 
The key aim of this research is to improve our understanding of, and the reasons behind, the 
increased number of oil spill/pollution incidents for African and Latin American oil-producing 
countries. To achieve this, an innovative theoretical framework called the political ecology of 
voice (PEV) has been designed to investigate how effectively stakeholders (including citizens, 
community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) have 
been able to hold resource extraction industries (REIs) to account for environmental pollution.  
This framework’s holistic and multi-faceted approach combining the theoretical framework of 
political ecology with the theory of voice proposed by Albert Hirschman (1970; 1978; 1981; 
1982; 1995) can evaluate the voice options available to stakeholders through a study of the 
PEV environment in which they operate. This includes exploration of political freedom, 
societal influences (race, discrimination), economic means and access (geographical, 
technological). This constitutes a key part of the originality of this thesis since political ecology 
and Hirschman’s theory of voice action have never been integrated together in this way or the 
latter’s voice theory applied within the context of environmental pollution problems. 
 
What do we mean by accountability and how does voice relate to this term? In relation 
to accountability in an environmental context, this thesis utilises the term laid out by the United 
Nations in the Glossary of Environment Statistics (1997): ‘Accountability is the responsibility 
for the deterioration of the natural environment, implying the allocation of environmental costs 
to the economic activities that cause such deterioration’ (United Nations 1997 p. 1). Hirschman 
originally noted in the consumer-industry context that voice ‘is an attempt at changing the 
practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organisation to which 
one belongs’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 30). Therefore, one can understand the action of voice as an 
act of protest. In this context, it is as an attempt to allocate responsibility for environmental 
costs attributable to economic actor(s) so that an objectionable state of affairs (i.e. a pollution 
event) ends and a possible change in operational practice occurs.  
 
The action of voice itself, outlined in the “typology of protest voice” (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.8), shows how this can occur through active or passive forms that are, in turn, 
subdivided into more specific forms of voice action (e.g. radical voice, or unorthodox informal 
voice). A study of the PEV environment in which this voice action occurs can show why a 
particular manifestation of vocal protest is undertaken. In turn, this will help evaluate the ability 
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of different voice stakeholders to hold REIs accountable for pollution issues. The term ‘voice 
stakeholders’ underscores how this research also explores voice in non-protest forms. Different 
types of voice stakeholders or actors are visible, including individual (citizen) voice, collective 
(CBO/NGO) voice and institutional (government/REI) voice.8 Together, the different voice 
actions and actors constitute the typology of protest voice. It is this study of voice action which 
differentiates PEV from third generation post-structural political ecology and its 
acknowledgement of and research into discourse (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
 
This thesis explores PEV in Peru’s oil-producing Loreto Region, which has been the 
site of long-term oil production. What makes Loreto so invaluable for PEV are the 
unfortunately high number of documented oil spills and connected social protests which thus 
presented many opportunities to engage with a study of voice in this context. Moreover, unlike 
its oil-producing neighbour, Ecuador, which continues to generate a significant body of 
research on the country’s oil politics, management and wider impacts,9  there has been little 
systematic and detailed study of Loreto’s oil production within academia. Part of the reason 
behind using Loreto as a case-study of PEV was to help fill this literature gap and 
counterbalance the level of academic and wider media attention which the situation in Ecuador 
receives.  
 
The overarching research question aims to evaluate the extent to which Peruvian 
Loreton stakeholders can effectively voice and hold REIs, specifically Petroperu, accountable 
for environmental issues through a study of political (power), social (position in society), 
economic (financial means) and access-based (geographical remoteness from key decision-
making mechanisms, lack of ICT access) issues. Encompassing this, several important sub-
questions have formed the basis of fieldwork data collection. These are: 
 What is Peru’s national political environment’s freedom of voice level for 
stakeholders i.e. permissible level of voice? Are stakeholders constrained in any 
way by Peruvian laws or consultative (or lack thereof) mechanisms? 
                                                          
8  Unfortunately, despite insider fieldwork connections, I was unable to access any REI institutional voice 
representatives. This has meant that the voice of oil companies is largely absent from the thesis. However, I was 
able to interview several former oil workers (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). 
9 For books see for example; Gerlach (2003); Sawyer (2004); Martin (2011); Barrett (2014) and Vasquez (2014). 
For articles see Centre for Economic and Social Rights (1994); Kimerling (1995; 1996); San Sebastián et al. 
(2001); Lyons (2004) and Gomez (2015). 
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 What level of state presence and engagement with civil society exists in Loreto, 
particularly with remote oil-producing areas? How does this impact upon the use 
of voice by stakeholders? 
 What impact do societal influences e.g. discrimination, different ontological views 
have upon the interactions and relationships between state and citizens, citizens 
and business and citizens and other actors (CBOs, NGOs)?  
 Are REIs deliberately utilising sub-standard operational practices in 
geographically remote locations and/or against citizens who do not have the 
knowledge or the means to challenge them? 
 Are REIs withholding or controlling the ability of stakeholder voices to be 
effectively used in decision-making mechanisms?  
 What are the REIs legal obligations surrounding consultation and communication 
with stakeholders and what is the on the ground reality in Loreto? 
 What impact and influence do collective-voice organisations (CBOs and NGOs) 
have on citizen voice? 
 
1.3 Research methodology 
 
The research for these various sub-questions was generated through a three-and-a-half-month 
fieldwork trip to Loreto from March-June 2015. A multi-method qualitative methodology was 
utilised incorporating semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and micro-geography analysis. 
Altogether, 110 interviews were undertaken with 105 different participants10 from various 
Loreton voice actor groups, including citizens from two case-study communities affected by 
oil contamination, other citizen voices of interest including university academics, students, 
legal professionals and former oil workers and collective (CBO, NGO) and institutional 
(government) voice representatives. The multitude of different interview participants constitute 
the various individual, collective and institutional voice groups.  
 
Pre-fieldwork contact was made with several NGO representatives who were not only 
interviewed in Loreto but provided valuable information on Loreton oil politics, other useful 
contacts and possible case-study communities to investigate. The latter factor was important as 
I hoped that the possibility of travelling to indigenous communities with these non-threatening 
                                                          
10 As implied, several participants were interviewed more than once. See Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Footnote 90.  
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collective voice organisations rather than institutional representatives would help develop 
greater trust and willingness for citizens to communicate in interviews, aided by a recruitment 
of local Loreton interpreters (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2.4). 
 
As fieldwork progressed and my knowledge of the Loreton situation improved, my 
work coalesced into a focus on the state-controlled oil company, Petroperu, and the experiences 
of two of its oil-based communities. The first was Barrio Florido, a non-indigenous mestizo 
(mixed-race) pueblo (community) adjacent to Petroperu’s Iquitos (the Loreton Regional 
capital) refinery and Cuninico, a Cocama indigenous11 rainforest community situated on the 
banks of the Rio (river) Marañón and near the Oleoducto Norperuano in the Marañón Cuenca 
(river basin) (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2.1). Their voices form the heart of this research (see 
Chapter Four, Section 4.2.2 and Chapters 5-8). 
 
To assess my data, a weak form of inductive (or conventional) content analysis was 
used, coded through NVivo electronic software via a range of concepts, categories and 
propositions (together called typologies). A pre-fieldwork storyline of analyst-based typologies 
was set up to provide a rough framework for my interview coding. As analysis continued, these 
analyst-based typologies were confirmed, divided, expanded, built-upon, re-defined and 
removed into a post-fieldwork storyline which also accommodated indigenous typologies 
originating from the SSI data. The coding process was supported through my use of extension, 
bridging and surfacing techniques along with a focus on negative cases and surprising findings 
(see Chapter Four, Section 4.3).  
 
1.4 Reasons for undertaking this research  
 
The interest in this topic stems from my MA in War Studies at King’s College London, where 
I undertook a module examining the role of natural resource conflict. This immediately 
fascinated me as it was something which I had never studied or thought about before. The first 
essay for that module explored the role of oil in the prolongation of conflict, which I based 
around the experiences of three African countries (Angola, Nigeria and Sudan), whilst the 
second essay investigated the extent to which resource conflict is driven by local claims versus 
national interest via Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Nigerian and Peruvian case studies. My passion and 
                                                          
11 An indigenous people numbering approximately 10,000-15,000 who predominantly reside in the Loreton 
Amazonian basin along several rivers including the Marañón, Nucuray, Pastaza and Urituyacu. 
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talent for this work helped generate my first two publications in the Journal of Peace, Conflict 
and Development (Gonzalez 2010; 2011) based around these essays, and I subsequently 
continued to pursue my research interest in this field alongside secondary school history and 
music teaching for two years. This culminated in my two most recently published papers 
(Gonzalez 2016a; 2016b), which centred on Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the issues and possible 
policy solutions to the social conflict, its lack of socio-economic development and wider state 
corruption (the natural resource curse). These papers were extensively redrafted during my 
PhD work, thus benefiting from my Peruvian experience and the conceptual and comparative 
insights being developed from this thesis and the associated writing and prose improvements.   
 
All this research helped propel me to decide to undertake a PhD to study this topic in 
greater depth, which I think was driven by a sense of anger at the injustice face by marginalised 
peoples and the world’s poor. Over the course of this initial research, I had been particularly 
fascinated by the impact of oil extraction upon the relationships among state, society and 
business and why certain oil-producing countries in Africa and Latin America continue to 
suffer greater levels of social conflict and environmental degradation. I feel an emotive 
connection to the latter continent owing to my father’s Venezuelan indigenous heritage and I 
have always wanted to visit this continent to connect with this part of my culture. The study of 
PEV within Peru’s Amazon basin has given me an opportunity to do this. It’s clear that at some 
level, my positionality incorporates an underlying shared emotive and cultural insider 
connection to the continent and its indiengous peoples despite my more obvious exterior 
connatations. However, analysis of my role as a researcher highlights that I’m not part of any 
one stakeholder group that encompasses my research but instead have a reflexive positionality 
which recognises the temporally fluid and unique contextual situations which research can 
create (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4). 
 
1.5 Summary and structure of the thesis 
 
Overall, through PEV, this thesis presents a remarkable study into how effectively Loreton 
stakeholders can hold REIs, particularly Petroperu, accountable for environmental pollution. 
This incorporates an exploration into the relationships among Loreton stakeholders, the state 
and REIs as well as the relationships between citizens and other stakeholders (CBOs, NGOs) 
themselves. By doing so, it is hoped that further insight into the causes of increased African 
and Latin American oil pollution will become clear. 
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Chapter Two provides a literature review exploring the causes of environmental 
degradation in EMaDEs, split into eight major sections. A brief introduction narrates the 
literature themes explored within this thesis; this leads into two interlinked parts that examine 
the causes behind increased EMaDE pollution; power inequality and the dominance of western 
socio-economic processes (Section 2.1) and environmental governance (Section 2.2). This 
narrative is summarised before introducing PEV (Section 2.3), which is explored in several 
parts. It starts with an investigation into wider literature surrounding citizens and environmental 
management (Section 2.4) before Section 2.5 shows why voice can be situated within the 
political ecology framework. Section 2.6 introduces Albert Hirschman’s exit and voice 
theories, which are subsequently reconceptualised within an environmental pollution context; 
Section 2.6.1 for exit and Section 2.6.2 for voice, the latter forming the basis for PEV. This is 
followed by an exploration of how the contextual factors surrounding the application of voice 
by citizens and other stakeholders can be combined with certain elements of political ecology 
(specifically, power, scale, space and time) to form PEV and a discussion of how PEV is 
differentiated from third generation post-structural political ecology (Section 2.7). Section 2.8 
sets out the typology of protest voice which explores different forms of voice action and its 
actors before a brief conclusion summarises this section (Section 2.9). 
 
Chapter Three provides a detailed contextual overview of Peru’s oil history and the 
choice of it and Loreto as a case study. Section 3.1 sets out my academic journey and the 
changes to fieldwork location in the first year of study, which helped lead to Peru’s Loreto 
Region. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 are interlinked parts that delve into the country’s oil 
history; the first from 1900 to the early 1980s while the second explores Peru’s contemporary 
oil history from the mid-1980s to the present-day. Finally, Section 3.4 sketches out Loreto as 
a case study in greater detail, including its geographical terrain, political administration and oil 
economy. 
 
Chapter Four then explains the methodology adopted for the research. It begins by 
summarising the quantitative and qualitative research methods and philosophies (Section 4.1), 
before setting out the researcher’s use of multi-method qualitative research incorporating SSIs 
and micro-geography analysis (Section 4.2). Several sub-sections lay out other important 
considerations, including the use of gatekeepers and choice of fieldwork sites (Section 4.2.1), 
gathering data and data levels (Section 4.2.2), interview questions (Section 4.2.3), use of audio 
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recording devices, interpreters, translators and researcher’s positionality (Section 4.2.3) and 
ethical reflections (Section 4.2.5). Lastly, Section 4.3 discusses qualitative data analysis and 
the methods used to undertake this.  
 
Chapter Five is the first of four analysis chapters based upon the primary fieldwork. 
Chapter Five sets out PEV in the wider Peruvian physical and emotive world by exploring the 
freedom of voice and societal influences on this action. Section 5.1 investigates the freedom 
for stakeholders to voice through an evaluative study of the Peruvian state and the laws and 
regulations surrounding voice. Section 5.2 details the mechanisms and societal influences 
within Peruvian society, split into two smaller sub-sections; Section 5.2.1 studies the impact of 
class, discrimination and race whilst Section 2.5.2 lays out the impact of bureaucracy and the 
role of amiguismo (cronyism) before a concluding section (Section 5.3). 
 
Chapter Six moves into PEV analysis of the feasibility of Loreton stakeholder 
engagement with the government. Section 6.1 which is split into four smaller sub-sections 
details the state’s engagement, presence and relationships with Barrio Florido and Cuninico. 
The first (Section 6.1.1) appraises selva (rainforest) civil society development for the two 
pueblos, the response by state officials to public requests for development and the 
consequences that the poor public transport network has for selva communities. Section 6.2.2 
delves into politicians’ engagement with selva-based pueblos through the experiences found 
within Barrio Florido and Cuninico. The two resulting overarching impacts from the situation 
are then explored (Section 6.1.3). Together, they help to frame citizen access to the state and 
dialogue and voice actions for both communities in relation to the contamination events 
described in Section 6.1.4. Section 6.2 moves into a study of collective voice-based access and 
relationships with the state before the conclusion in Section 6.3 draws together the various 
points raised for citizens and other collective voice stakeholders in relation to the state PEV 
environment.  
 
Chapter Seven moves into an evaluation of Loreton stakeholder engagement with 
Petroperu. It commences with Section 7.1, that provides an overview of REI presence in the 
Loreton selva and their historic and contemporary access arrangements for citizens before 
narrowing onto the Petroperu situation. This is followed by Section 7.2, that investigates 
Cuninico’s relationship and ability to voice with Petroperu with focus on a 2014 oil pollution 
event and their treatment during and after the spill. In a similar vein, Section 7.3 sets out Barrio 
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Florido’s relationship with the oil company, and how their day to day relationship influences 
citizens voice during environmental pollution and other critical incidents. The penultimate 
section (7.4) tackles collective-voice REI access and engagement before Section 7.5 ties 
together the preceding sections into a conclusion.  
 
Chapter Eight, the final analysis chapter, investigates the shaping and moulding of 
citizen voice by Petroperu and collective-voice-based stakeholders. This has been split into 
four sections, the first detailing REI strategies. Section 8.1 highlights REIs suppression of voice 
through economic, development and other threats in Barrio Florido and Cuninico before 
Section 8.2 explores REI fragmentation of CBO voice. The penultimate section (8.3) details 
the impact and influence that collective voice organisations (CBO, NGO groups) have on 
citizen voice, their voice strength, chosen action(s) and access to the state and/or REIs. Chapter 
Nine is the main conclusion of the thesis, which has been split into ten sections. Sections 9.1 
to 9.6 answer the various research sub-questions outlined in Section 1.2 of this introduction 
and which lead into a summary (Section 9.7) of Peruvian Loreton stakeholders PEV and the 
main research question. Section 9.8 evaluates the effectiveness of PEV and wider 
methodological issues before a penultimate section details my self-reflection upon this 
research’s outcome (Section 9.9). Lastly, Section 9.10 provides a brief discussion of possible 
future research directions for PEV.12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Before the thesis proceeds, a brief note on punctuation and grammar. Singular quotation marks are used when 
citing references and double punctuation marks are used for interviewees and when referring to “so-called” words 
or phrases. All Spanish words are in italic font and are immediately defined in brackets or in a footnote and are 
listed in the Glossary of Spanish terms. Rounded brackets are used throughout the thesis except in instances where 
I have inserted words or definitions into a quote in which case square brackets are used. Lastly, all measurements 
are provided in metric and written out in full.  
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Chapter 2 Sustaining the unsustainable; the causes of 
environmental pollution 
 
Chapter 1 has sketched out the rationale behind this thesis’s research into the increased 
frequency of oil spills for African and Latin American producers, one specific pollutant that 
typifies higher levels of EMaDE pollution.  Initially, my reading was focused on understanding 
the impact that global mechanisms have on this issue. This involved a study of the operational 
difficulties within the international political system (including the dominance of realist 
international politics) and the apparent onset of (economic and cultural) globalisation and their 
subsequent effects on supranational environmental governance. Gradually, my reading moved 
into a more detailed study of where responsibility can be placed within these global 
mechanisms incorporating research into ecological distribution conflicts, ecological 
footprinting and externalities and why, which comprised enquiry into geographical distance, 
environmental racism, post-ecologism, neoliberalism, sustainable development and the role 
and relationship between specific actors (states, NGOs, international financial institutions 
(IFIs), transnational companies (TNCs) and consumers). The possible theoretical solutions to 
these international mechanisms was also broached via exploration into the work of green 
political theorists, social and shallow ecologists and survivalist and ecopolitical theorists. 
 
This analysis originally led me to consider research into advanced economy consumer 
accountability options for oil TNCs revolving around ethical purchase behaviour and/or 
transnational ICT-based coalition movements. Whilst these ideas were discontinued owing to 
their impracticability and the time constraints of the PhD, the reading surrounding consumer 
accountability of business led me to examine Albert Hirschman’s (1970) theories of exit and 
voice, which now forms part of the theoretical bedrock of this thesis. The function of voice vis-
à-vis environmental problems saw me return to analysis of political ecology and the creation 
of PEV, which was bolstered through research into participatory development and participatory 
conservation. 
 
  The impact of global mechanisms and the causes of increased EMaDE pollution are, 
nevertheless, very important factors which merit discussion and as such appear within two 
interliked sections: power inequality and the dominance of western socio-economic processes 
(Section 2.1). Their impact will then be traced within Section 2.2, exploring environmental 
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governance before a summary (Section 2.3) leads into the final parts of this chapter (Sections 
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8) which sets out my own PEV theoretical framework to explore oil 
pollution issues. 
 
2.1 Power inequality and the dominance of western socio-economic processes   
 
An investigation into the notion of power is hugely important for exploration into 
environmental pollution. As Peet, Robbins and Watts (2011 p. 31) identify, ‘[e]nvironmental 
problems (and their possible solutions) are inevitably entangled with questions of power and 
governance.’ A state’s ability to regulate environmental problems is dependent on its levels of 
power and influence which can be measured and explored through consideration of a state’s 
position in, and modus operandi of, the international political system.  
 
For neo-realists 13  (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2006 p. 72), the state’s pursuit of 
hegemonic power indicates an anarchic political system where power is unequally distributed 
and advanced economies, particularly the United States, remain dominant (Nadelmann 1990 p. 
484; Vogler 2000 p. 209, cited in Redclift 2002 p. 75). This has helped establish an ongoing 
process of cultural and economic globalisation, the ‘only game in town’ (Bluhdorn and Welsh 
2007 p. 190) with the latter’s advanced economy development model (described shortly) seen 
by many social scientists as exclusively serving advanced economy corporate interests (Barber 
1992; 1995; Foller 1999 p. 58; Barnet and Cavanagh 2003; Clarke 2003 pp. 71-73; Korten 
2003 p. 39; Mander 2003 p. 2; Soete and Weehuizen 2003 p. 12).  
 
 However, institutionalist14 scholars are critical of hegemonic powers’ role (Young 1989 
pp. 65-66; 1990 p. 341), instead seeing an emerging global governance system indicating a 
‘nobody in charge process’ (Myers 1988 p. 413; see also Lipschutz 1997 p. 96). Meanwhile 
evidence of the hotly debated and contested nature of globalisation (Soete and Weehuzien 2003 
                                                          
13 The realist school argues that states are sovereign and consequently autonomous of each other and ‘are bound 
only by forcible → coercion or their own → consent’ (Slaughter 2011 p. 1 author’s emphasis). More specifically, 
neo or structural realists believe that the lack of a higher international authority compels states to pursue power as 
‘there is no guarantee that one will not attack another’ (Mearsheimer 2006 p. 72). This contrasts with classical 
realists who suggest state pursuit of power is caused by human nature (see Morgenthau and Thompson1993). 
14 Institutionalists share many realist assumptions about the international political system but believe that state co-
operation is possible through ‘institutions – defined as a set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making 
procedures that shape expectations – [which] can overcome the uncertainty that undermines co-operation’ 
(Slaughter 2011 pp. 2-3; see also Jonsson and Tallberg (2001) for detailed analysis on different varieties of 
institutionalism).  
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p. 7) can be seen in the global-local relationship explored by postmodernists 15  (the 
“glocalisation” and “globalisation as hybridisation” concepts), development geographers 
(strengthening of cultural boundaries) and political ecologists (“place”, territorialisation and 
“globalised local” resource extraction sites) (Friedman 1995; Robertson 1995; Pieterse 1995; 
Hall 1997; Watts 2000a; Voisey and O’Riordan 2001; Biersack 2006 p. 16; Greenberg 2006).  
 
 Therefore, despite advanced economy power, a transformative system (Rosenau 1995 
p. 17) of global governance has been established, encapsulating a multilevel and ‘crowded 
[and] dynamic’ (Soete and Weehuizen 2003 p. 39) multiactor16 system where states have lost 
‘some of their earlier dominance’ (Rosenau 1995 p. 39) to these actors who can now construct 
international politics and economics (Rosenau 1999 pp. 295-296; Clarke 2003 p. 71; Higgott, 
Underhill and Bieler 2000; Rixecker and Tipense-Matua 2003 p. 253; Dingwerth and Pattberg 
2006; Weiss, Seyle and Coolidge 2013).  
 
Despite state power loss in this multi-centric and multi-level political system, advanced 
economies have retained influence by entrenching their economic values (capitalism, 
neoliberalism and consumerism) into the global economic system. This idea draws upon 
political geographers like O’Lear (2010 p. 8) who have examined the concept of scale and the 
‘relationships among actors and places and … [the] systems of rules or values that emerge to 
shape these relationships’ and their transference from non-local places and actors. Political 
ecologists’ work is also important as they perceive the creation of a “globalised local” discourse 
occurring via a dominant advanced economy discourse (Lohmann 1995; Shiva 1995) and the 
establishment of a liberal international economic order (LIEO).  
 
The contemporary political and economic influence of advanced economy countries 
can be understood if one considers the colonial European-based empires which symbolised and 
were an instrument of their power. The LIEO has continued this through the creation of IFIs 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank) which provided the USA and UK with 
investment and trade influence (Young 2002 p. 20). 
                                                          
15 There is no general definition of postmodernism which can be written here as the term is instead used in various 
contexts with several meanings (Devetak 1999 p. 62). In this international relations context, it can be understood 
as ‘an attempt to avoid slipping into totalising views of epistemology and ontology and technical applications of 
theory to practice’ and ‘must be willing to question self-evident truths about the ‘real world’ and the agents of 
change’ (ibid. p. 73).  
16 These include CBOs, IFIs, NGOs, TNCs (Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000 pp. 1-2) and more specifically 
REIs. 
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Social scientists argue that part of globalisation’s success has been its ability to expand 
the market and advanced economy economic principles to swathes of the planet where it never 
previously existed (Korten 1995 p. 12; Retallack 2003 p. 202). The dominance of these ideas 
is not ‘through any “inherent” power of the ideas themselves’ (Heynen et al. 2007a p. 7) but 
instead explained through political mechanisms like IFIs that propel their entrenchment as the 
colonial ‘norm’ (Pieterse 2001 p. 165; see also Goldsmith, E. 2003; Shiva 2003 p. 204). IFI’s 
almost religious fervour towards advanced economy-based development (George and Sabelli 
1994) has been matched by the political pressure they have exerted on EMaDEs to follow their 
unilateral “advice” effectively (Kay 1989 p. 12; Goldman 2001a p. 509; 2001b p. 193; Mander 
2003 pp. 10-11; Retallack 2003 p. 195; North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1483).  
 
Two key IFI policies illustrate LIEO ideals; their Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) and acceptance of advanced economy-centric, growth-based sustainable development 
(Engel 1990 p. 10; Kothari 1990 p. 27; Schor 1995; Worster 1995; Bryant and Bailey 1997; 
Helm 2000; Broadhead 2002; Reed 2002 p. 206; Bello 2003 p. 127; Clarke 2003 pp. 73-75; 
Willis 2005 p. 52; Bluhdorn and Welsh 2007; Heynen et al. 2007a p. 7; Fuchs and Boll 2011). 
For Bluhdorn and Welsh (2007), these indicate the entering of a “post-ecological” age in which 
‘the management of the inability and unwillingness to become sustainable has taken centre 
ground’ (p. 192 authors emphasis) through acceptance of capitalism within sustainable 
development and the non-negotiability of democratic consumer capitalism (ibid. pp. 187, 198). 
More recently, Bluhdorn (2013 p. 20) noted that though urgent changes to capitalist consumer 
society have never been as widely accepted within mainstream societal discourse, this has 
failed to soften the defence of socio-economic structures and lifestyles that encompass this 
post-ecological paradox. The key reason behind this is power; EMaDEs lack power to influence 
or challenge the LIEO.  
 
The crucial issue is to now consider the LIEO’s environmental impact. Certain 
institutionalist and realist scholars have defended LIEO processes from “misplaced” criticism 
over free trade and growth impacts (Porter and Brown 1991 p. 142; Bhagwati 1993 p. 43; 2004; 
Payne 1995 p. 49; Vogler 2011 p. 16). However, social scientists including political ecologists 
and political economists spell out the damaging environmental “entropy” (Frank 2006) which 
the LIEO socio-economic values and processes continue to have (Hirschman 1992 p. 135; 
Hildyard 1995 pp. 29-30; Sachs 1995 p. 4; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Hajer and Fischer 1999 p. 
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5; Heynen et al. 2007b p. 289; Shiva 2008; Labban 2011 p. 332; Peet, Robbins and Watts 
2011b). Two brief illustrations show this, highlighting the role of power and other connected 
impacts.  
 
Firstly, IFI SAP deregulation of environmental policy helped create short-term profit 
maximisation, severe environmental abuses and a lack of environmental regulatory oversight 
which in turn led to a “race to the bottom” over environmental standards17 (felt particularly by 
countries rich in natural resources), issues which continue under a Twenty-First Century neo-
extractivism policy approach in Latin America (Collinson 1996; Dore 1996; Kaimowitz 1996 
p. 20; Reed 2002; Clarke 2003 pp. 73-75; Retallack 2003; Sobhani and Retallack 2003; North 
and Grinspun 2016). This not only allowed TNCs, (especially REIs) to engage in 
environmentally harmful actions that would be illegal in advanced economies and/or would 
incur heavy financial penalties (Retallack 2003 p. 193) but the race to the bottom gave greater 
power to corporate interests, particularly TNCs to veto environmental regulatory 
improvements (Hirschman 1978 p. 100; North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1495). The impact of 
these unequal state-business power relations is an important point, not only due to the potential 
environmental repercussions and the level of influence the latter has over environmental 
governance (discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3) but also raises the prospect of power 
inequality in relationships with other stakeholders e.g. citizens, a point discussed shortly and 
one visible within the analysis chapters (see Chapter 7, Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5).  
 
Secondly, environmental costs of development remain unfairly distributed between 
advanced economies and EMaDEs through environmental externalities. Bhaskar and Glyn 
(1995) define these as environmental bads ‘inflicted by consumers and firms upon other agents 
in the economy’ (p. 3) due to the failure of the capitalist price system to incorporate social, 
environmental and long-term costs associated with production and consumption that can see 
consumers shielded from market production costs (Beckenbach 1994 p. 97; Princen 1997; 
Labban 2011 p. 332). Crucially, they ‘are often what the rich and powerful do to the weak and 
hungry’ (Bhaskar and Glyn 1995 p. 4) and are a symptom of “ecological distribution conflicts.”  
 
                                                          
17 See Herrmann (1995 p. 286), Korten (1995 pp. 129-130), Goldsmith, A. (2003 p. 141) and Kelly (no date) for 
a Mexico “maquiladoras” example. 
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Environmental justice movement scholars argue that at national and global levels, most 
environmental degradation is caused by advanced economies and affluent societal members 
who have helped lead to a major increase in transboundary problems which disproportionately 
impact the world’s poor (Korten 1995; Ehresman and Stevis 2011; Agyeman, Bullard and 
Evans 2003a pp. 1-2; Blowers 2003 p. 70; McLaren 2003; Rees and Westra 2003; Bluhdorn 
and Welsh 2007). Ecological footprinting studies show a disparity in livelihood impacts 
between advanced economies and EMaDEs and the former’s overconsumption, which remains 
the primary driver of climate change and environmental pollution (Schor 1995; Sen 1995; 
Mitchell 1996; Wackernagel and Rees 1996; Princen 1999; Fuchs and Lorek 2002; Rees and 
Westra 2003; Horton 2006 p. 128; Wilk 2006; Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010). 
 
Various authors imply that part of the problem lies in the relationship between 
producers and consumers with the latter’s geographical isolation and wealth protecting them 
from its negative consequences or necessary social responses (Gould, Schnaiberg and 
Weinberg 1996 p. 34, cited in Blowers 2003 p. 70; Rees and Westra 2003 p. 107), a term 
Princen (1997) calls distancing. Geographical distance leaves advanced economies and their 
societies in a powerful position where individual and collective responsibility for pollution 
caused through lifestyle choices and economic processes is never fully tackled. As Princen 
(1997 p. 249) notes, ‘no established principle of distribution would hold individuals responsible 
for the consequences of their actions when they are so removed that the individuals can have 
no effect.’ 
 
However, this argument cannot alone answer Blowers’ (2003) conclusion that certain 
people and places suffer (p. 70 emphasis added). It is useful to draw upon Princen’s (1997) 
work on the political economy of degradation (p. 236) and efforts by business leaders to 
establish frontier economies’ which shows how ‘short-term, cut-and-run, mine-and-depart 
behaviour’ leads to externalities (ibid. p. 237) particularly for EMaDEs and the most 
marginalised citizens that ‘have little clout’ (ibid. p. 238) or opportunity (Tilly 1978 p. 55) to 
make their concerns known. For Princen (1997 p. 237), this is caused by jurisdictional 
discontinuity and the operation of businesses, particularly TNCs across international borders 
which limits the levels of redress that can be achieved by aggrieved parties over an 
environmental issue due to ‘myriad legal, cultural and political obstacles.’ As Sachs (2009 p. 
23) concludes, ‘[t]hrough transnationalisation, capital is in the position to escape any links of 
loyalty to a particular society.’ Here one can see issues of power inequality between citizens, 
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particularly marginalised citizens, and TNCs and the difficulties that the former may face in 
holding the latter accountable for environmental pollution issues, though one must 
acknowledge the important role which the media (especially civil society media) and social 
media can now play in spanning this distance and providing information (see Clark 2003 p. 85; 
Hintz 2006). 
 
 These points are extremely important for this thesis and are connected to the 
environmental justice movement’s efforts to investigate how environmental racism can help 
explain environmental injustice (Wright 2003; see also Cole and Foster 2001; Agbola and Alabi 
2003; Eady 2003; Faber and McCarthy 2003; Martinez-Alier 2003; Walker 2012; Nurse 2016). 
Environmental racism suggests that the most politically oppressed members of society are the 
ones ‘being selectively victimised to the greatest extent by corporate interests’ (Johnston 1994 
p. 11, cited in Faber and McCarthy 2003 p. 39 author italics). In reality, corporate interests 
adopt less stringent environmental regulations if it is politically expedient to do so as the less 
political power a community commands, the fewer resources it has to defend its inhabitants. 
This implies that their awareness of, and mobilisation against, ecological issues, is lower (Faber 
and McCarthy 2003 p. 39).  
 
The evidence is compelling. A US case study highlights how ethnic minority citizens 
suffered higher environmental degradation than white communities in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s (Chavis and Lee 1987; Goldman and Fitton 1994; Lavelle and Coyle 1992; Eady 2003; 
Wright 2003). Most significantly for this thesis, environmental racism can also be found in 
EMaDEs including Nigeria, South Africa and Philippines, alongside the historical narrative of 
the Amazonian rubber boom in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru (Vitug 1993 p. 144; Hvalkof 2000; 
Forero and Woodgate 2002 pp. 250-251; Agbola and Alabi 2003; Roberts 2003; Wright 2003; 
Van Valen 2013). As Newell (2005 p. 543) notes, the geographical isolation and/or closer 
proximity to areas of mineral wealth will often see poorer communities in the front line of REI 
activity and ‘are most likely to be among the victims of irresponsible investment in sectors 
such as mining, oil extraction and logging.’ This is clearly visible in Petroperu’s treatment of 
the Cocama Cuninico community but also the impoverished Barrio Florido pueblo (see Chapter 
7, Sections 7.2, 7.3). 
 
 Overall, the literature has generated several concluding points. Crucially, drawing upon 
political ecologists (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Roberts and Parks 2007), one can see multiple 
43 
 
forms of inequality applied to interlinked political, economic, social and environmental 
problems at multiple scales with environmental change neither ‘neutral’ (Bryant and Bailey 
1997 p. 28) nor distributed fairly (ibid. p. 34). Globalisation, SAP and LIEO impacts have not 
been a drive towards progress but are instead ‘an ongoing struggle between rich and poor 
countries over the balance of dominance, dependence, and autonomy with which countries, 
especially the … [EMaDEs], would be left’ (Hawkins 1993 p. 233). While advanced 
economies, like EMaDEs, suffer from environmental racism, the impact is worse for the latter, 
who are already receiving a higher level of environmental pollution. This can make 
accountability a difficult process, especially for marginalised citizens. How does this 
multifaceted inequality affect environmental governance at national and international levels? 
The next section will explore these issues surrounding power and their impact on 
environmental governance. 
 
2.2 Environmental governance  
 
Academics have debated the validity of using the nation-state system in relation to 
environmental governance. Some political ecologists, for instance, argue that the nation state 
is a hindrance to environmental governance (White 1993). Dallimer and Strange (2015) explain 
this through boundary relationships (habitat/ecosystem and socio-political entities) that suggest 
increased costs and likelihood of conflict stemming from socio-political boundaries and their 
major influence on ecosystem management (as geographically shaped political mechanisms) 
despite serving no ecological function (pp. 132-133; see also Greenberg 1998). 
 
For this researcher, the state remains crucial due to its essential governance role within 
the multi-centric and multi-level political system (the only actor capable of unifying the various 
components of Twenty-First Century environmental governance, including the direct or 
indirect governance of important intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United 
Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)), the only actor responsible 
for ensuring environmental integrity and the only actor with the necessary human and financial 
resources to implement scientific and technical projects to determine, monitor and preserve the 
global environment (Porter and Brown 1991; Liftin 1993; Hermmann 1995 p. 287; Kimerling 
1995 pp. 307-309; Campbell and Hushagen 2002; O’Neill 2009; Berg 2010; Chasek, Downie 
and Brown 2010 p. 53). 
 
44 
 
 Yet, the operation of states within a multi-centric and multi-level political system and 
LIEO have two interlinked impacts, particularly on EMaDEs and environmental regulation. 
Firstly, social scientists contend that the state protects the global economy and is mobilised to 
become the ‘representative or guardian of the interests of global markets’ (Kutting 2011 p. 3) 
and promote market-based regulatory measures (Brenner and Theodore 2007 p. 154; see also 
Ribot 1993 p. 27; Schmitz 2007 p. 2). The liberalisation of trade is likely to undermine 
environmental regulation and quality (McCarthy 2007), particularly in EMaDEs, where severe 
social and economic constraints compromise their ability to formulate competent 
environmental policy (Costi 2003 p. 296).   
 
 Secondly, EMaDEs often have weaker state structures, which makes them more 
susceptible (even collectively) to powerful national and international actors and individuals 
who can wield high degrees of influence and shape government policy decisions (Blaikie 1985; 
Nadelmann 1990 p. 483; Bayart 1993; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Anderberg 1999 pp. 139-140; 
Hyden 1999 p. 153; Falkner 2009; Rodgers et al. 1999; Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010).18  
 
 Though Payne (1995 pp. 43-45) counters the claim that some groups have greater 
influence than others, clearly certain non-state actors’ power (TNCs) can often supersede other 
actors (NGOs). Porter and Brown (1991 p. 42) argue that strong environmental groups can 
overcome vested interests surrounding global environmental issues through translation into 
electoral influence. Yet, as the USA shows, the $1 billion a year investment by conservative 
economic interests to deny climate science and fund conservative political elements (Brulle 
2014; Goldenberg 2013; 2015) not only underscores NGO financial disparity to achieve this 
but also the former’s requirement to only ‘avert international [environmental] action rather than 
… get consensus for it’ (Porter and Brown 1991 p. 65). 
 
Alongside the transboundary nature of pollution problems, these issues have led 
institutionalists, Foucauldian and social scientists, including political ecologists and green 
political theorists, to suggest that countries should collectively regulate environmental 
problems at regional or international levels (termed supranational environmental governance) 
(Young 1989; 1990; Goodin 1992 p. 5; White 1993; Nitsch 1994 p. 24; Amalric 1995; Bhaskar 
                                                          
18 However, despite their more robust state structures, advanced economies also suffer these pressures (Goldsmith, 
E. 2003 p. 33). 
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and Glyn 1995; Ekins and Jacobs 1995; Fuchs and Lorek 2002; Chasek, Downie and Brown 
2010; Death 2010). 19 Nevertheless, other literature has laid out issues with supranational 
environmental governance which can be broken down into five key interlinked concerns. 
 
Firstly, some social scientists argue that diplomatic efforts to secure individual national 
development advantages cause environmental concerns to be treated as ‘bargaining chips’ 
(Sachs 1995 pp. 12-13), with a chief focus placed on protecting each nation from the costs of 
global environmental degradation (Porter and Brown 1991; Banuri 1995 p. 64). Many authors 
highlight how the vested interests of advanced economies surrounding environmental 
governance and LIEO maintenance, combined with their greater power, means that 
environmental summits become victories for advanced economies over EMaDEs and prevents 
states behaving in the same way in relation to supranational environmental governance (i.e. 
curbing climate change and pollution) (Hildyard 1995; Lohmann 1995 p. 158; Miller 1995; 
Conca and Dabelko 1998 p. 9; Death 2010). 
 
Secondly, advanced economy reluctance to relinquish their political and economic 
privileges voluntarily has generated EMaDE distrust over supranational environmental 
governance which helps explain why co-operative agreements have been difficult to attain and 
sustain in world politics (Porter and Brown 1991 p. 127; Lipschutz and Conca 1993 p. 332; 
Sutcliffe 1995 p. 255; Conca and Dabelko 1998 p. 9; Robert and Parks 2007; Fehling, Nelson 
and Venkatapuram 2013; Kroll 2015; Loewe and Rippin 2015; Carty and Le Comte 2016), 
evident in many recent agreements e.g. 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015-2030, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. Consequently, due to conflicting policy objectives (Montgomery 1991 pp. 17-
18), it is clear to see why a single international environmental agency is ‘quite improbable’ 
(Lipschutz 1997 p. 85). 
 
Thirdly, the multi-centric and multi-level political system has also transformed the 
applications of environmental governance mechanisms, particularly for business. Their more 
visible presence in international politics since the 1980s via representative groups (e.g. the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development) and Corporate Social Responsibility 
                                                          
19 There are differences in opinion over the use of regional regimes (Young 1989 p. 122) versus an international 
body (White 1993 p. 167). 
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(CSR) schemes, has strengthened and legitimised the corporate sector’s role in global 
environmental policy making (Prout 1983 p. 42; Myers 1988; Falkner 2009; Clapp 2011 p. 48). 
 
Whilst environmental management is vital for business survival (Friedman 1992 p. 92), 
Myers (1988) believes that TNCs can play a constructive role in natural resource sectors (p. 
411) ‘because these actors are not just a source of problems but also an integral part of 
solutions’ (Holme and Watts 2000, cited in Clapp 2011 p. 48). Not all share this view. Giving 
TNCs a strong voice at the table will lead to diluted agreements because industry has an interest 
in ensuring that regulation is not stringent (Fuchs 2005; Bruno 2002, cited in Clapp 2011 p. 
48), an outcome pursued through international relations lobbying and the shaping of public 
discourses surrounding environmental problems (Falkner 2009 pp. 9-10).  
 
Others view their influence via privatised self-regulation as a clear indication of their 
new decision-making ability vis-à-vis nation states which allows them to delay or avoid the 
imposition of other rules which may be stricter, compulsory or less convenient for the company 
(thereby weakening international environmental and human rights law) and significantly 
reducing independent policy monitoring (Kimerling 1996 pp. 62, 67; Newell 2005; Utting 
2005; Ford 2011 p. 38; Kutting 2011 p. 2). Business self-regulation is reliant on business 
leaders’ moral insight (as to what specific situations require) and moral commitment (to act in 
accord with appropriate norms even when this is in direct opposition to significant economic 
interests). This conflicts with their primary profit and growth drivers, the latter placing 
increasing demands on resources that can contribute directly to environmental degradation 
(Reed 2002 p. 218; Ford 2011 p. 35). 
 
 However, even with the creation of supranational environmental governance regulatory 
frameworks at various spatial scales, two further difficulties can limit their practical 
implementation. Fourthly, efforts to improve compliance through benefit increases (to 
outweigh costs) and through greater non-compliance penalties will still not prevent 
supranational environmental governance compliance mechanisms from being an incomplete 
mechanism that will allow non-compliance (Young 1989 p. 62; Heyes 2000). An illustration 
can be seen in the case of the South Pacific island state of Kiribati, which despite being a 
member of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and a signatory of 
various environmental treaties aimed at establishing a protective regime for the South Pacific 
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region,20 ‘has generally neglected the domestication of the provisions of these treaties [i.e. 
incorporating them into their domestic laws], a necessary requirement for … making them 
enforceable’ and ‘has often failed to submit its periodic reports to the treaty monitoring bodies 
as and when due’ (Olowu 2007 p. 266). 
 
Fifth and finally, successful supranational environmental governance depends on the 
nature of the environmental activity in question and its vulnerability to international 
suppression efforts by states, with the most difficult problems hinging around those with a 
resilient and substantial consumer demand that is ‘not readily substituted for by alternative 
activities or products’ (Nadelmann 1990 p. 486). One can see this through food consumption; 
though fair trade and organic producers have expanded their production, cheap and convenient 
fast food and nutrient poor processed food continues to grow coming ‘at the cost of 
environmental degradation and social injustice’ (Isenhour 2011 p. 12; see also Dragusanu, 
Giovannucci and Nunn 2014; Fisher 2015; Soil Association Certification no date). This is 
visible in the spoiling and squandering of one-third of the world’s food production before its 
consumption, a problem contributing to almost 1 billion people around the world going hungry 
(Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 2015; no date). It is also applicable to oil production 
and resulting environmental problems; substantial advanced economy consumer demand 
combined with limited alternatives (public transport, electric vehicles) maintains the necessity 
for oil production. 
 
Overall, the new directions of environmental governance (CSR) and issues surrounding 
supranational environmental governance have divided academics between those that see an 
evolving non-state governance system increasingly making decisions for states and helping 
establish neoliberal governance via self-regulatory voluntarist regimes (Mathews 1997; 
McCarthy and Prudham 2004 p. 276; Himley 2008 p. 442) and those who counter suggestions 
of business control of the global environmental agenda (Falkner 2011). For this researcher, the 
Twenty-First Century will see mixed or hybrid systems of governance involving states and 
non-state authorities in the creation and maintenance of decision-making procedures (Clapp 
1998 p. 295, cited in Ford 2011 p. 37; see also O’Neill 2009 p. 194), a modus operandi which 
                                                          
20 This is a regional umbrella organisation for 21 Pacific island member countries and four countries with direct 
interests in the region (Olowu 2007 p. 264; see p. 265 for list of treaties).  
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poses greater problems for EMaDE environmental management due to their weaker political 
power and voice at the negotiating table. 
 
2.3 Summarising the situation and the political ecology of voice (PEV) 
 
Overall, several interconnected factors stemming from inequality can cause environmental 
pollution to become more frequent and have a greater impact in EMaDEs. Though advanced 
economies international power has been curtailed since the colonial period, the LIEO has 
cemented their economic processes, leaving EMaDEs struggling to challenge or influence this 
system. This has helped usher in a post-ecological age of unsustainability visible in the high 
advanced economy consumption levels which externalise environmental costs and generate 
significant levels of transboundary pollution. As the resulting ecological distribution conflicts 
indicate, these adversely impact the world’s poor located in EMaDEs.  
 
At the same time, LIEO IFI actors and economic processes have imposed a certain 
development mode on EMaDEs which has caused increased environmental pollution through 
lax environmental regulation, accentuated in turn by weaker state structures. Business power 
in these countries is subsequently strengthened. State efforts to implement supranational 
environmental governance mechanisms are hampered by objective differences between 
advanced economies and EMaDEs whilst the hybrid governance system has diluted the role of 
states and increased business power to shape the environmental regulatory agenda.  
 
Lastly, environmental racism shows that poor and marginalised citizens will face higher 
levels of environmental pollution from economic actors and may struggle to hold them 
accountable for these issues, particularly with industries like REIs that may utilise short-term 
national contracts. It is important to stress that higher levels of oil pollution, found in African 
and Latin American oil producing regions (Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Ecuador’s Napo, Oriente 
and Sucumbios Provinces and Peru’s Loreto Region), are also home to significantly large 
indigenous and traditional community populations, which thus makes environmental racism a 
significant factor for this research (see Minority Rights Group International (MRG) no date a; 
no date b; no date c). The question of accountability and power inequality between citizens and 
business offers fascinating scope for research as it may shed new light on the causes of 
increased environmental pollution in EMaDEs, particularly surrounding REI projects.  
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This thesis has built on this idea by creating PEV, an innovative theoretical framework 
which combines a political ecology framework with the theory of voice developed by Albert 
Hirschman (1970). ‘PEV can be defined as the study of a specific temporal, [political,] 
economic, social, and geographical environment in which various stakeholders [citizens, CBOs 
and NGOs] utilise their voice over an environmental issue’ (Gonzalez 2015 p. 467). By 
drawing together these temporally influenced factors, a comprehensive theoretical framework 
is established which will study the feasibility of stakeholder voice actions surrounding their 
accountability of economic actors for environmental pollution.  
 
These final sections will explore the creation of PEV. Section 2.4 will start by 
establishing the literature surrounding citizen accountability of business and wider research on 
the relationship between citizens, the state and business vis-à-vis environmental management 
before setting out why voice can be situated so successfully within political ecology (Section 
2.5). Section 2.6 explores Hirschman’s theories of exit and voice before showing why voice 
can be successfully integrated into an environmental context. This is followed by an 
exploration of how the contextual factors surrounding the application of voice by citizens can 
be combined with certain elements of political ecology (specifically, power, scale, space and 
time) to form PEV (Section 2.7). This leads into a detailed discussion on the typology of protest 
voice (Section 2.8) before a brief conclusion summarises this section (Section 2.9).  
 
2.4 Citizens and environmental management 
 
The feasibility of citizen accountability of industry and wider citizen relationships with 
business and state has been examined by a vast array of literature. Broadly, scholars have 
focused on the important relationships between companies and local communities that host 
their industry (Madeley 1999; Evans, Goodman and Lansbury 2002). More specifically, 
research has explored the participatory relationships21  between industry managers and local 
people in environmental and developmental situations, including citizen accountability of CSR 
practices (Cragg and Greenbaum 2002; Newell 2005; Utting 2008; Yakovleva and Vazquez-
Brust 2012; Bixler et al. 2015). This is part of a wider debate on the meaning of participation, 
the degree to which stakeholders are engaged and the nature rather than the degree of 
                                                          
21 Cornwall (2008) provides a useful characterisation or description of the term particpation: ‘An infinitely 
malleable concept, ‘participation’ can be used to evoke – and to signify – almost anything that involves people’ 
(p. 269). 
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participation in areas such as science, technology and democracy (Arnstein 1969; Stiefel and 
Wolfe 1994; Pretty 1995; Rowe and Frewer 2000; Cummings 2001; Fung 2006; Lawrence 
2006; Cornwall 2008).  
 
The weakening of state-centric natural resource management has given rise to the 
establishment of participatory conservation practices in which non-state actors are now 
involved in natural resource conservation decisions (Bixler et al. 2015 p. 166). Areas of 
contemporary study include community-based natural resource management and conservation 
and the difficulties surrounding their implementation, governance interactions between actors 
involved in environmental management, efforts by local communities to gain access and power 
over natural resource management, and the process of negotiation between local communities 
and companies (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Howitt 2001; 
Nhantumbo, Norfolk and Perira 2003; Andersson 2004; Brosius, Lowenhaupt Tsing and Zerner 
2005; Chirenje, Giliba and Musamba 2013; Le Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 2013). Linked 
to this have been studies examining businesses being held accountable by local people (e.g. via 
‘community-driven regulation’ (CDR)) (O’Rourke 2004) and consumers through ethical 
purchase behaviour (Smith 1990) and via Hirschman’s (1970) theories of exit and voice 
discussed shortly.  
 
In some research areas, particularly surrounding participatory approaches, there are 
clear links with voice through the efforts at understanding the level and nature of engagement 
(Bixler et al. 2015) between different actors (IFIs, national governments and NGOs), each with 
their own agendas and participatory interpretations which influence practical application (ibid. 
p. 165) and the study of the opportunity of individual freedom in pursuit of developmental 
outcomes (Sen 2001). Since voice can be understood as a form or act of participation, the 
research on this topic is very relevant. 
 
Crucially, Cornwall (2008) argues that ‘participation is ultimately about power and 
control’ (p. 271). For instance, Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation split into its three rungs 
(citizen power, tokenism and non-participation) reveals how token consultation activities are 
often used by development organisations as a way to legitimise and provide moral authority to 
decisions already taken (ibid. p. 270). ‘Being involved in a process is not equivalent to having 
a voice’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 278). Evidence of this is clear in Chapter Five, Section 5.1 detailing 
Peru’s hydrocarbon consultation mechanisms.  
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Equally, Pretty’s (1995) typology of participation shows how participation can go from 
negative or bad participatory forms such as manipulative participation (e.g. the inclusion of 
token representatives with no real power) or passive participation (people participating in a 
process where they are told what has been decided or already happened) into more positive 
forms like consultative participation (participation occurring through consultation) or 
interactive participation (incorporating structured learning so that local people partake in joint 
analysis and action plan development before eventually taking over control of local decisions). 
Power and control is thus more equitable within more positive forms of participation.  
 
In a similar vein, Farrington et al. (1993) discuss participation in relation to depth and 
breadth: “deep” engagement sees participants involved in all stages of a given activity or 
“shallow” if they are only informed or consulted. “Wide” engagement incorporates a whole 
range of people or conversely has “narrow” participation involving only a handful of people or 
particular interest groups. Power and control become evident in understanding precisely ‘who 
participates’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 276 author’s emphasis) (e.g. only elite male community 
members) and who has perhaps been excluded (e.g. the young, women) (ibid.) and the depth 
to which this participation occurs.22 Examples of how these participatory approaches operate 
can be seen in Chapter 8, Section 8.3 detailing collective voice stakeholder impact on citizen 
voice.  
 
However, the generalised nature of these participatory governance theories requires 
greater placement ‘within the contours of place-based institutional and environmental histories’ 
as ‘institutional factors shape outcomes and these vary across a wide spectrum’ (Bixler et al. 
2015 p. 177). As (Reed 2008 p. 2426) notes, research needs to better understand and prioritise 
the factors ‘that make stakeholder participation lead to stronger and more durable decisions in 
different contexts’ including those surrounding socio-cultural and biophysical differences. A 
stronger theoretical approach can examine these influences and their impact on participation 
i.e. voice directly, with PEV offering one such approach.  
 
                                                          
22 One must note that while deep and wide participatory approaches would appear to be the best forms of 
participation, they can be ‘virtually impossible to achieve or so cumbersome and time-consuming that everyone 
begins to lose interest’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 276). Instead, an ‘optimum participation’ mode must be found that 
balances between depth and inclusion dependent upon the situation at hand (ibid. author’s emphasis). 
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In other studies, voice-related issues emerge out of other investigatory themes (e.g. in 
discussion on the development of Bolivian gas extraction) (Hinojosa et al. 2015 pp. 111-113) 
or through the application of different theoretical perspectives (e.g. the diffusion process) (Le 
Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 2013) which make voice appear to be a by-product of other 
influences or a subsidiary aspect of research. This is by no means a criticism of this vital 
research, which has improved our understanding of the difficulties surrounding environmental 
management, the implications of poor governance and the relationship and interaction between 
actors. Instead, PEV allows voice to become the research’s central focus by mapping out and 
uncovering the complexities surrounding its application, and ‘its placement within institutional 
and environmental histories’ (Gonzalez 2015 p. 467). The importance of these institutional and 
environmental histories and questions of power and governance for voice application requires 
accommodation within a multi-faceted theoretical framework and political ecology offers the 
most relevant theoretical site.  
 
2.5 Situating voice within political ecology 
 
‘We consciously seek to avoid disciplining political ecology …. To the contrary, 
we encourage the flourishing of political ecology to include the fullest possible 
range of approaches’ (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003 p.  3).   
 
A definition of political ecology is ‘ill-advised’ (Greenberg and Park 1994 p. 8) as it has been 
used in so many different ways ‘that there is little overlap in meaning’ (Newmann 2005 p. 3; 
see also Biersack 1999 p. 11). The array of modifiers and approaches shows this, seeing it 
described as a “research agenda” (Bryant 1992), an “approach” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a; 
Warren, Batterby and Osbahr 2001), a “development discourse” (Peet and Watts 1996) and a 
“perspective” (Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayer and Wangari 1996) alongside sub-fields that include 
critical, feminist, third world and urban political ecology (Rocheleau 1995; Rocheleau, 
Thomas-Slayer and Wangari 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Sayre 1999; Forsyth 2003; Heynen 
2013; Ioris 2012; 2014a).23  Despite the lack of a ‘‘grand theory,’ a meta-narrative, or a 
comprehensive theoretical underpinning’ (Khan 2013 p. 460), there are still ‘some family 
resemblances [that] need not share a common core’ (Greenberg and Park 1994 p. 8) but provide 
a degree of coherence to the field while still leaving space for exploration (Neumann 2005 p. 
10).  
                                                          
23 See also Bryant (2015a) and Perreault, Bridge and McCarthy (2015) for a broad range of approaches.  
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 First generation political ecology can be traced back to the work of Blaikie (1985) and 
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987a; 1987b; 1987c; 1987d; 1987e), which laid the seeds through 
efforts at understanding how soil erosion and degradation are not solely environmental 
processes but ones influenced by human activity effects. The 1987 text defined it as a merger 
of ecological and political economy concerns, the latter used in a broad but Marxist sense 
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a p. 17; Newmann 2005 p. 9; Paulson, Gezon and Watts 2005 p. 
27; Watts 2015 p. 34) and can be understood in this thesis to refer to the politics of 
environmental problems without specific debate of ecology (Forsyth 2003 p. 4). The centre of 
analysis in this early work was on power and ‘regimes of accumulation’ incorporating a focus 
on accumulation patterns, ‘access to and control of resources and changing class structure’ 
(Watts 2015 p. 34 author’s emphasis; see also Biersack 2006 p. 3). 
 
 Political ecology has continued to evolve into a second generational form that has been 
influenced by “post” theoretical trends (e.g. post-Marxism), ‘cross-fertilisation’ with other 
academic fields e.g. environmental history, green justice, race theory, and deployment in 
advanced economy settings (Watts 2015 p. 34; see also Biersack 2006 p. 4; Escobar 2010 p. 
91).24 This second generation political ecology gives important consideration to economic, 
political and social structures and their institutions, and how these impact the human 
construction, management and transformation of already humanised ‘natural’ ecosystems 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997; Newmann 2005; Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Ioris 2011; Peet, 
Robbins and Watts 2011b; Watts 2015 pp. 32-35). There are four key elements that have not 
only helped advance first-generation political ecology but also require greater analysis due to 
their significance for voice and thus PEV, namely power, scale, space and time. 
 
One of the most significant attributes of second generation political ecology is that it 
characteristically views ‘ecological systems as power laden rather than politically inert’ 
(Robbins 2012 p. 13) and reveals tensions between social actor groups struggling for access 
and use of natural resources (Simsik 2002). This underlines its recognition of the diverse nature 
of (authoritative) power and how it defines, facilitates, manages and controls human-
environmental interactions in contexts like resource extraction and land ownership (Bryant 
                                                          
24 The early period of the Twenty-First Century has also witnessed a third generation of political ecology (see 
Escobar 2010) though ‘orientations from the second phase are still dominant’ (ibid. p. 91). This third generation 
political ecology is discussed shortly in relation to discourse.  
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1998; Simsik 2002; Neumann 2005; Bridge 2011; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Bixler 2013; 
Batterbury 2015) and this has led to a focus on actors including the state (Ioris 2013; 2014b), 
non-state actors (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Khan 2013) and businesses (Orssatto and Clegg 
1999; Bebbington and Bury 2013). 
 
Crucially however, power relations between the actors are often unequal (Tan-Mullins 
2007). One can see this between business actors and their relationships with citizens (Cragg 
and Greenbaum 2002; Himley 2008) and are thus linked to conflicts over forms of access and 
control of natural resources, particularly in EMaDEs, where new resource ownership and user 
rights have often been violently forced upon local communities (Le Billon 2003 p. 69; see also 
Simsik 2002) and the power implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods 
(Watts 2000b p. 257). Crucially, one must consider the relationship between economic actors 
and citizens and the extent to which businesses can manage and control citizen access to 
decision-making mechanisms concerning natural resource management and environmental 
problems.  
 
Similarly, participatory relationships between citizens and NGOs can see citizens 
struggle to hold NGOs accountable due to the obvious lack of accountability options. 
Communities cannot withdraw funding like donors and cannot impose conditionalities like 
governments (Najam 1996 pp. 345-347) and effectively lack power to force ‘downward 
accountability’ (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). Here, thought must again be given to 
accountability and power relationships and the support and influence given by these non-state 
actors to citizens vis-a-vis their voice action(s). 
 
Finally, inequality is also visible in the use of power by the state. As noted in Section 
2.3, the state’s prioritisation of industrial interests lends power to dominant actors and social 
groups at the expense of other actors whose interests are marginalised if they threaten those of 
the dominant group (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a p. 17; Nash and Lewis 2006). Consequently, 
one finds that in environmental situations that affect a state’s economy and society, it will 
respond through a ‘state-fix’ that applies ‘only within the limits of the hegemonic political 
priorities that shape environmental statehood’ (Ioris 2014b p. 15; see also Ioris 2014c). 
Consequently, the state’s diffusion of power, influence and access to specific actors and social 
groups influences the ability and likelihood of citizens and CBO/NGO groups holding 
55 
 
economic actors accountable for pollution incidents. Political ecologists’ research into the 
retention and use of state power is hugely important and highlighted within PEV.  
 
Turning from a direct examination of power, there are other factors that can limit 
stakeholder efforts for environmental accountability. Lipschitz (1997) highlights how at a 
macro-level, individual choice and action are constrained by an array of spatial, economic, 
social and historical contextual forces (p. 89) that prevent changing the habit-driven 
characteristics of people in specific social and political contexts (ibid. pp. 90-91). Scale, space 
and time are also important aspects of political ecology and PEV.  
 
Scale is significant25 due to its relationship to power, a so-called ‘politics of scale’ 
(Lebel, Garden and Imamura 2005) and is thus critical in efforts to identify the occurrence and 
causes of environmental degradation (Newmann 2005 p. 76). Research surrounding the 
question of spatial power explores “frontiers” (Karlsson 2011) and “territories” (M’Gonigle 
1999; Greenberg 2006 pp. 126-129; Baird 2009) with conclusions showing that the state 
imposes administrative and territorial hierarchies in its effort to control resources and protected 
areas (Greenberg 2006 p. 127; see also Sneddon 2003; Molle 2007; Baird 2009; Neumann 
2009). 
 
Spatial-power dynamics often involve a concentration of power in the centre which 
leaves territorial power dispersed through social forms in villages, markets and community 
halls (M’Gonigle 1999 p. 17). This type of power simplification for state control (Karlsson 
2011) indicates the state’s ability to ‘junk, rejig, recalibrate, modify, and transform the existing 
scale division’ to defend and consolidate its authority and ‘to define the scalar scaffold against 
which solutions to ecological problems are framed’ (Boyle 2002 p. 191).  
 
 A challenge for communities living in these spatially remote localities, particularly 
those on the peripheries of mainstream society who wish for greater rights or self-
determination, is to overcome potential state reluctance to devolve and share power and support 
scale-specific institutions (Silvern 1999; Finley-Brook 2016 p. 351), e.g. protected area 
management (Baird 2009), an indication of how social inequalities surrounding access and 
                                                          
25 See Natter and Zierhofer (2002), Brown and Purcell (2005) and Neumann (2009) on the political ecology of 
scale. 
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unequal power relations are mapped and (re-)produced via spatial categories (Dietz, Engles, 
and Pye 2015; Larson et al. 2016). Other social processes and interests originating from 
different spatial scales will converge in a ‘clash of scale’ and unfold within different local level 
spaces (Natter and Zierhoefer 2002 p. 226; see also Paasi 2003 p. 112). 
 
Consequently, one must consider the impact these spatial power relations have on 
citizen access to state decision and consultation mechanisms, which is particularly important 
for remotely situated citizens. Fossil fuel sites, for example, are often spatially remote, a 
situation which can help amplify REI power which is borne through their control of specific 
areas of land (Bridge 2011 p. 319). ‘[T]he control of space is a fundamental source of social 
power’ (Paasi 2003 p. 112). This raises potential implications for citizens located within or 
surrounding these sites or spaces as their possible spatial remoteness “away” from the state will 
further increase REI power in their relationship and interaction with citizens. The 
interconnection between power and scale unfolding in different geographical spaces is 
therefore an important point. Indeed, the analysis chapters (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1 and 
Chapter 7, Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) highlight this within Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s 
relationship with the state and Petroperu. 
 
Lastly, tied to these discussions is an awareness that the relationships among economic, 
political, social and spatial processes and their impact on the environment change over time 
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987c; Batterbury and Bebbington 1999 p. 281) and are mere 
‘moments in temporal trajectories’ (Mathevet et al. 2015 p. 2). Political ecologists have 
attempted to describe the spatial and temporal impact of capitalism (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 
3) and the progressive incorporation of EMaDEs into the LIEO, which provides a crucial 
understanding of ‘contemporary patterns of human-environmental interaction and associated 
power relations’ (Bryant 1998 p. 85) and is particularly important when investigating 
environmental problems in modified or engineered environments (Mathevet et al. 2015 p. 1). 
This makes it partly historical (Davis 2015; Mathevet et al. 2015) and has indeed led to a 
historical sub-field of political ecology.26 
 
Acknowledging the historical element within this research is important given that some 
factors influencing environmental degradation are only visible over long periods of time 
                                                          
26 See Carney (2001) and Hecht (2013).  
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(Batterbury and Bebbington 1999 p. 281). One can see that the distribution of power changes 
markedly over time. 27  The influence/power/position of people also changes; for instance, 
Hvalkof (2006 p. 197) shows how the indigenous Peruvian Ashénika people of Gran Pajonal 
transformed from exploited colonial labourers to active political agents. Contemporary 
political ecology reflects this by recognising the speed of human ingenuity and technological 
transformations which have made nature unrecognisable (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 5; 
Berglund 2006 p. 99). 
 
Political ecology has continued to adapt and evolve through three generational phases. 
In the latest third generation, political ecology has engaged ‘with certain ideas and concepts 
derived from post-structuralism28 and discourse theory29’ (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 13). Given 
the focus on Hirschman’s voice theory, the latter is of interest so that one can see precisely how 
PEV differentiates from third generation post-structural political ecology.   
 
In his 2002 Liberation Ecologies book chapter, Arturo Escobar sets out a post-structural 
political ecology. It is a reflection of the ‘growing belief that nature is socially constructed’ 
(different from saying that “there is no real nature out there”) but goes further by insisting ‘that 
the constructs of political economy and ecology as specifically modern forms of knowledge, 
as well as their objects of study, must be analysed discursively’ (ibid. p. 46). Power analysis 
occurs by indicating the significant role of discourse and political presentation of the facts 
(Bixler et al. 2015 p. 168). For example, global discourses are described as ‘knowledge 
regimes’ (Adger et al. 2001 p. 683) or ‘“regulatory knowledge”’ (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 11) 
which are ‘often created, owned and advanced by socially and culturally defined groups 
(operating at the global, national and local levels)’ (Bixler et al. 2015 pp. 168-169). Crucially, 
‘[s]ocial groups that have been most successful at perpetuating and popularising their discourse 
are those that have the power and the means to do so’ (ibid. p. 169). Political ecologists provide 
examples of sustainable development and participatory conservation and development (see 
                                                          
27 See Silvern (1999 pp. 644-645) for a United States example. 
28 ‘Poststructuralism treats language not as a reflection of ‘reality’ but as constitutive of it’ (Escobar 2010 p. 93). 
29 ‘A discourse contains a corpus of expressions in which we find homogeneity in message as well as in expressive 
means. Homogeneity message implies that the expressions share a certain knowledge and perception of the 
phenomenon in question, and there may also be shared beliefs concerning causes of problems and appropriate 
responses’ (Adger et al. 2001 p. 685). It is ‘the articulation of knowledge and power, of statements and visibilities 
and the expressible. Discourse is the process through which social reality comes into being’ (Escobar 2002 p. 46). 
They can vary among ‘often competing, even conflicting’ gender, class, racial, cultural and other differing 
interests (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 14).  
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Watts 1993; Escobar 2002; Bixler et al. 2015) but there are others (see Adger et al. 2001). 
These forms of modern western development discourse can be described as hegemonic 
discourses as they dominate thinking and have been adapted into institutional arrangements 
(Adger et al. 2001 p. 685).  
 
Thus, third generation, post-structural political ecology suggests that we need ‘a new 
language’ (Escobar 2002 p. 61) to speak of the new post-industrial and postmodern society 
(Escobar 1994 cited in Escobar 2002 p. 60). Within post-structural political ecology, there is a 
recognition that the discourse underpinning the theoretical framework must accommodate the 
reinvention of nature seen in the new era of post-industrial and post-modern society. A form 
of voice via discourse is therefore present within political ecology by focusing on theories and 
ideologies and the impact these have on the human construction of nature. This extends into 
efforts at exploring and making visible the ‘suppression of subaltern knowledges’ (Escobar 
2010 p. 100). 
 
Post-structural third generation political ecology utilises ‘relational ontologies’ (see 
Braun 2008 cited Escobar 2010 p. 100) to explore the modern binarisms like nature (domain 
of objects) and culture (domain of subjects) and can work with indigenous, traditional and other 
community oriented groups. It ‘constitutes an attempt to develop a way to talk about emergent 
forms of politics that are not based on homogenised conceptions of indigeneity, race or 
essentialised cultures or identities’ (Escobar 2010 p. 100; see also Escobar 2008) categorised 
as ‘challenging or alternative discourses’ (Adger et al. 2001 p. 685). In this way third generation 
political ecology becomes ‘a political ecology of difference, or ... a political ontology’ (Escobar 
2010 p. 100) which seeks to engage practically with ‘with new movements, organisations, and 
institutions of civil society, challenging conventional notions of development, politics, 
democracy, and sustainability’ (Peets and Watts 2002 p. 3). A ‘space is created in which a 
range of beliefs, logs, and discourses can be valorised’ (ibid. p. 16).  
 
Within third generation political ecology, there is consequently an effort to give voice 
to subaltern peoples and ontological ideas which do not proscribe to modern/western concepts 
surrounding society and nature. Indeed, in a political ecology paper examining poverty and 
development in the Amazon, Ioris (2016 p. 180) made clear that ‘[a] decisive element of the 
research was the commitment to give voice to forest-dependent poor in order to articulate their 
concerns over degradation and deforestation.’ 
59 
 
 
Accordingly, the PEV theoretical framework has not been developed to fulfil a vacuum 
where voice is not present in political ecology. Third generation, post-structural political 
ecology explores forms of voice through discourse (acknowledging the impact that the current 
dominant discourse is having on nature and society relations and the management of the 
environment) and relational ontologies (making visible and giving voice to other marginalised 
voices). Dependent upon the context of study, PEV can also help give voice to marginalised 
communities and make their knowledge and worlds visible.   
 
Where PEV is different is in its efforts to understand how and why a particular voice 
articulation occurs, i.e. the action of voicing itself through active or passive means, and what 
this says about the multiplicity of voice actor(s) 30  operating in a specific contextual 
environment and time-frame. Analysis of this PEV environment, incorporating access, spatial 
and (vertical/horizontal) power relationships between different actors will uncover the voice 
motives and potential difficulties which actors face in achieving a predetermined outcome, e.g. 
for citizens, an end to a particular pollution event. Therefore, like wider political ecology, it 
wrestles with ‘management questions’, particularly the form and access to public and private 
regulatory apparatus but also ‘institutions and organisations in the context of shifting 
configurations of state and market roles’ (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 9). PEV investigations will 
also help to show the strength of different voices, how some voices are listened to and ignored 
(between but also within different voice actor groups) and what this reveals about their ability 
to have dialogue with horizontal and vertical voice actors. Consequently, PEV can be 
considered as a discourse on the action of voicing itself explored through political ecology.  
One must add that there is a form of connection to post-structural political ecology; these 
pollution incidents will say something about environmental management and the impact which 
these theoretical discourses will be having on the natural world. PEV extends this by looking 
at how, through voice, different actors react to these events and seek redress.  
 
Overall, the focus on the various interconnected elements of political ecology (power, 
scale, space and time) reveal the most important areas to integrate with Hirschman’s voice 
theory in an environmental context. PEV, like political ecology can be seen to be borne from 
                                                          
30 The main voice actors are citizen (or individual) voice, collective voice (CBO/NGO groups) and institutional 
voice (business, government) (see Section 2.8). 
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efforts to promote and contribute to positive social, ecological and structural political change 
and justice (Bridge, McCarthy and Perreault 2015 p. 8; Bryant 2015b p. 22) and to fight against 
the way that politics, economics, culture and ecology can come together unjustly (Bryant 
2015b) and help cause environmental pollution. In this manner, the study of voice has a natural 
academic home within political ecology. The integration of Hirschman’s concept of voice with 
political ecology allows it to become the central objective of research through this theoretical 
framework. 
 
2.6 Albert Hirschman’s exit and voice, and reconceptualisation with an 
environmental scenario 
 
‘Gaining voice is a struggle but so too is giving voice’ (Bryant 2015b p. 23). 
 
Albert Hirschman set out his relevant theories in Exit, voice and loyalty: responses to decline 
in firms, organisations and states (1970) which were subsequently re-examined (see 
Hirschman 1978; 1981; 1982; 1995). His initial investigation centred on economic actors, 
whose ‘repairable lapses’ away ‘from efficient, rational, law-abiding … behaviour’ 
(Hirschman 1970 p. 1 author’s emphasis) can be corrected through a recuperation mechanism 
(ibid. p. 3). While these repairable lapses can occur ‘[u]nder any economic, social, or political 
system’ that affects firms and individuals (ibid. p. 1), economists have remained unconcerned 
with them due to the competitive (economic) mechanism of recuperation (ibid. p. 3). Instead, 
Hirschman suggested that an alternative mechanism through exit and voice ‘can come into play 
either when the competitive mechanism is unavailable or as a complement to it’ (ibid.). 
 
The exit option often occurs when consumers are willing to stop buying a firm’s 
products due to a reduction in quality or members leave an organisation (Hirschman 1970).31 
It is described as a neat (‘one either exits or one does not’) (ibid. p. 15), impersonal (no face-
to-face confrontation between customer and firm), indirect (a firm’s recovery comes through 
the economic ‘Invisible Hand’ as an unintended by-product of the customer’s decision to shift) 
(ibid. pp. 15-16) and typically private and silent decision and activity (Hirschman 1995 p. 34). 
It can be summarised as ‘a fairly crude, binary response’ (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 471).  
 
                                                          
31 Exit from a firm is not solely down to product deterioration but also due to initial consumer over-estimation of 
product quality in the first place (Barry 1974 p. 90). 
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Rather than exit ‘from an objectionable state of affairs’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 30), voice 
sees customer’s or organisation member’s express dissatisfaction (ibid. p. 4) via individual or 
collective petition or through other types of action or protest ‘to mobilise public opinion’ (ibid. 
p. 30). It is ‘messy’ due to the different gradients that encompass voice (‘all the way from faint 
grumbling to violent protest’), public (articulating one’s critical opinion openly) and overall is 
‘direct and straightforward rather than roundabout’ (ibid. p. 16).  
 
In a subsequent text, Hirschman (1981) went on to provide four further important 
characteristics of voice: (1) it ‘is rich and modulated …. Convey[ing] more information than 
exit’; (2) ‘is exuberant’ and can be ‘enjoyed for its own sake’ especially when used in the public 
interest; (3) ‘is hazardous’ as relevant organisations attempt to silence those voicing through 
retaliation or extending special favours; and (4) ‘is treacherous’ as generally a few will voice 
on behalf of a larger group, which can lead to achieved changes occurring ‘primarily in the 
interests of the articulate few’ (p. 244). One can see interrelation between these strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
It is precisely because voice can convey so large and varied an array of information 
(item 1) that those who actually do the voicing can pick and choose and emphasise 
those items useful to their own interests (item 4); and it is because voice can become so 
joyful and exuberant an activity (item 2) that organisations faced with this sort of 
dangerous thrust become resourceful in deflecting and stunting it through effort at 
retaliation and corruption (item 3) (ibid.). 
 
Figure 2.1 provides a rough summary of organisations classified in relation to the 
absence or presence of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970 p. 120). There are minimal cases where 
exit and voice play important roles but some examples are in the top left-hand corner e.g. some 
business clients will attempt, via voice, to influence a firm’s policy directly instead of choosing 
exit, though this remains an option (ibid. p. 121). In contrast, probably no organisation is 
‘wholly immune to … exit or voice’ with those listed in the bottom-right hand corner less 
viable long-term. In these instances, exit and voice are only utilised when deterioration is 
highly advanced or recovery is either impossible or desired (ibid.).  
 
Initially, Hirschman saw exit more closely interlined with economics (ibid. p. 15) (as 
economists remain biased toward the use of exit rather than voice) (ibid p. 17) and voice aligned 
with politics and public actions (ibid. p. 15; Hirschman 1982 p. 65) though there was later 
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acknowledgement that this was not exclusive. 32  On this point, one can mention a useful 
revision to Hirschman’s theories by Barry (1974), who saw them as actions that were ‘each … 
one side of a dichotomy’ (p. 97). This involves ‘[o]ne choice … between exit (leaving) and 
non-exit (staying)’ and another ‘between voice (activity, participation) and silence (inactivity, 
non-participation)’ (ibid. p. 91) and one further category of ‘exit plus voice’ in which ‘someone 
campaigns for improvements after leaving’ (ibid. p. 92).33 In the previous two sections, this 
revision helps set out Hirschman’s original theories in greater clarity and detail, especially 
when re-contextualising the theories into an environmental pollution scenario. Indeed, 
Hirschman’s exit and voice theories have been widely contextually analysed, highlighting how 
his theories serve as useful evaluative tools (Picciotto 2015).34 The next two sub-sections set 
out their possibility of application within an environmental pollutant scenario.  
 
Figure 2.1: The elusive optimal mix of exit and voice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Hirschman 1970 p. 121). 
 
 
                                                          
32 On consumer voice see Hirschman (1982 p. 65). On social exit see Hirschman (1981 p. 223; 1992 pp. 78, 96). 
33 See Birch (1974 p. 77) for a public/private school illustration.  
34 See Lindell (2010a; b) on the African informal economy and street traders; Lucero (2008) on indigenous 
political representation in the Andes, Flew (2009) on media citizenship, Ramana (2013) on nuclear policy, 
Picciotto (2015) for exit and voice as evaluative mechanisms and Craw (2017) on the impact of sub-local 
governance on the conditions for residents’ exercise of voice. 
Organisations whose 
members react strongly 
via 
Exit 
Yes No 
Voice 
Voluntary associations, competitive 
political parties, and some business 
enterprises, for example, those 
selling output to a few buyers 
Yes 
Family, tribe, nation, church, parties 
in non-totalitarian one-party systems  
No 
Competitive business enterprise in 
relation to customers  
 
Parties in totalitarian one-party 
systems, terrorist groups, and 
criminal gangs  
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2.6.1 Exit in an environmental pollutant context 
 
In this context, exit or ‘distancing’ (Zuindeau 2009 p. 155), can be especially problematic for 
citizens. Firstly, exit is tied to the concept of loyalty (see Figure 2.2), which is similar to trust 
(Hirschman 1992 pp. 80-81) and ‘marks the attachment of the individual or the group to a 
product, an organisation, or a territory’ (Zuindeau 2009 p. 156; see also Picciotto 2015 p. 8). 
However, loyalty is not a singular concept and should instead be viewed as a quad-faceted idea 
(loyalty to a product or loyalty to a family, organisation or tribe and reformist and passive 
loyalty) dependent on its contextual application which has an impact on the use of exit and thus 
by extension voice.  
 
Dowding et al. (2000 p. 476) suggest a visible difference between loyalty to a product 
and to an organisation, family or tribe ‘which may be thought of as a ‘group’ which one 
identifies’ with. This is a critical distinction because group loyalty influences citizens’ choice 
of exit vis-à-vis environmental problems. Its strength, dependent on the amount one has 
invested in that object and its ties to our personal history (including loyalty to a nation, local 
community or geographic region), may prevent people exiting and distancing themselves from 
a particular location (ibid. p. 477; see also Hirschman 1995 p. 38). In a similar way, a family 
may be reluctant to leave their land despite environmental deterioration because it has been in 
their household for several generations (Blaikie 1985 pp. 26-27). The importance of contextual 
accuracy and impact on exit can be understood when one examines Graham and Keeley’s 
(1992) discussion of passive and reformist loyalty which is borne out of the importance of the 
particular issue at hand; reformist loyalty ‘is shown by attempting to correct and reverse the 
process of organisational deterioration [i.e. through voice], while passive loyalty implies 
remaining silent’ (p. 197; see also Birch 1974 p. 75). 
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Figure 2.2: Birch’s version of Hirschman’s loyalty concept  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Birch 1974 p. 73). 
 
The underlying influences on people’s loyalty have been researched by Groves (2015) 
and Zuindeau (2009) whose focus on exit and voice in the face of environmental risks led to a 
study on “attachments” and four key variables for generalised analysis which 
 
exert an important role in the intensity and forms of behaviour of voice and exit; the 
scale of potential damage associated with the environmental problem; the possible 
complementarity between environmental issues and other issues, particularly 
economic; the geographical area of the environmental problem; the degree of 
uncertainty inherent in the problem (p. 162 author’s emphasis).  
 
It is the second variable which can explain why people can be unwilling to exit.35 Individuals 
and groups may have emotional attachments to their environment incorporating interpersonal 
relationships, relationships between local residents and an industry and life-world attachments 
that are historical as well as social (Castán Broto 2013 p. 4; Groves 2015 pp. 855-859). If the 
second variable is negative, a pollution event may see a person take into consideration their 
health and those of their family versus staying silent to defend their economic interests, even 
disputing other legitimate critical voices (Zuindeau 2009 p. 162). While distancing oneself 
from the problem is a tactic, it then becomes a question of comparing well-being advantages 
and economic costs (possible monetary loss on a house sale, daily transportation expenditure) 
caused by distance alongside delocalisation-relocalisation costs (ibid.; see also Soete and 
                                                          
35 If the complementarity is positive, exit behaviour ‘will be high if one fears that the situation will deteriorate 
more, whereas it will be more limited if one expects … [future improvement] (attitude of patience).’ However, if 
the complementarity is negative but applies to others instead, voice use will be higher, but in positions where 
obstacles to voice are present (e.g. being a minority citizen), exit is favoured (Zuindeau 2009 p. 162). 
No loyalty Exit (in silence) 
Decline in quality 
Voice (while 
staying) 
Loyalty 
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Weehuizen 2003 p. 27), factors that those with deeper-rooted localised ethical, cultural and 
spiritual connections will take very seriously. 
 
Consequently, it is probable that a strong range of economic and social attachments to 
a geographical area will increase one’s loyalty and help limit exit from a negative 
environmental scenario (dependent on the temporal context discussed shortly), increasing the 
likelihood of voice. This is particularly acute for marginalised citizens or groups as the ability 
or possibility to exit remains unequally distributed due to income and wealth (Hirschman 1978 
pp. 95-96; Blaikie 1985 p. 6), an issue for both case-study communities (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.1.1). Indeed, the use of exit by those who can financially afford to do so allows it to become 
an example of the ‘tyranny of small decisions’ as they fail to consider the affliction of a public 
bad (Hirschman 1992 p. 80; see also Hirschman 1978 pp. 96-101; 1981 p. 243). Though private 
self-interest may extend as far as one’s family (Dobson and Bell 2006 p. 2; Rousseau 2012), 
this may not cover one’s community, a modern-day indicator of private sphere dominance 
(work, home and family) over the public sphere ‘practices of public service, citizen 
participation, loyalty to the community, and activity for the common good’ (Barry 2006 pp. 
36-37). 
 
Furthermore, the exit decision has two consequences on voice. Firstly, it will ‘drive 
out’ voice (Hirschman 1970 p. 76) or deprive its potential carriers (Hirschman 1995 p. 13) as 
the ‘alert’ who may have voiced, exit instead, leaving the ‘inert’ to suffer in silence (Dowding 
et al. 2000 p. 472), a situation labelled ‘silent non-exit’ (Barry 1974 p. 91).36 Exit use in 
advanced economy societies with greater environmental impact is an evasion of their 
responsibilities and the “politics of obligation” (Smith 1998). Exit could also see the 
continuation of pollution that could grow in magnitude and/or affect other people that were 
unable to exit (so called ‘cumulative decline’) (Hirschman 1992 p. 90). Zuindeau’s (2009 p. 
163) third variable (the geographical scope of the problem) attests to this issue by suggesting 
that the greater the geographic scope and magnitude of the problem, the more difficult it is to 
exit. 
 
Secondly, Hirschman originally saw consumer exit often taken only in light of the 
prospective effectiveness of voice use (Hirschman 1970 p. 37) which can and should 
                                                          
36 However, silent non-exit can also be understood as a form of passive voice protest (see Section 2.8). 
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complement and occasionally supersede exit (Hirschman 1981 p. 214). If consumers are 
sufficiently convinced of the effectiveness of voice, people ‘may well postpone exit’ as once 
you have exited, you have lost the opportunity to use voice from within (Hirschman 1970 p. 
105 my emphasis) but not vice versa (ibid. p. 37).37 Combined with the influence of group and 
reformist loyalty and life-world attachments outlined earlier, it suggests that in an 
environmental pollution scenario, exit is a last resort action, which is particularly true if one 
considers the temporal aspect of loyalty and voice. In this instance, loyalty will hold exit at bay 
and activate voice (ibid. p. 78) due to the influential impact of a person’s time horizon (Graham 
and Keeley 1992 p. 198; Castán Broto 2013 p. 10). It is thus unlikely that a citizen would 
relocate abruptly to a different location at the first sign of environmental degradation without 
first voicing concerns and allowing time for implementing a solution.   
 
Overall, exit in this environmental pollutant scenario is constrained by strong group and 
reformist loyalty stemming from a complex array of individual attachments. While it can be 
utilised by citizens with the financial means to do so, this can damage the voices of those left 
behind and fail to prevent the continuation of the pollution issue. In its relationship to voice, it 
can be a last resort action, taken only after a period of time has elapsed in which voice has 
failed to garner a solution or when a person’s group loyalty and attachments to their present 
location are weaker. Therefore, while exit has been shown to be implausible and difficult 
surrounding environmental problems, voice offers greater scope in this setting.   
 
2.6.2 Voice in an environmental pollutant context 
 
‘[T]he use of voice can suddenly become a most sought after, fulfilling activity, in fact, 
the ultimate justification of human existence’ (Hirschman 1981 p. 215). 
 
Hirschman originally noted that individual customers have different perceptions on the 
appreciation of quality for products (Hirschman 1970 p. 48), a situation partly attributable to 
consumer ignorance (Hirschman 1981 p. 219). While this may impact a person’s willingness 
to use their voice in several ways (i.e. a cheap poor quality consumer product may not see 
consumers’ voice or it might be used for products of which a consumer has expert knowledge), 
                                                          
37 At the moment of exit, Kolarska and Aldrich (1980) discuss how people can do so whilst voicing, ‘attempting 
to convince others in the organisation [or equally, a community] to join them, appealing to leaders to correct 
problems, and so forth’ (p. 44). This vocal exit forms one element of the typology of protest voice dicussed in 
Section 2.8. 
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the situation in relation to citizens and environmental quality is very different. Despite voice 
being a costly option (conditioned by the influence and bargaining power of customers and 
members within a firm they buy from or organisation of which they are part) (Hirschman 1970 
p. 40), wider contextual application is crucial. Thus, the action will have an ‘occasional edge’ 
over exit in situations affecting public happiness (Hirschman 1981 p. 217) or public interest 
(Hirschman 1982 pp. 6-7) such as a food hazard, automobile safety problem (Hirschman 1981 
p. 217; see also Hirschman 1998 p. 20) or conceivably an environmental problem.  
 
The public interest surrounding the environment is clear; many democratic states 
incorporate a right to a healthy environment in their constitutions while various UN agencies 
have adopted similar positions (UN 2007; Knox no date) reinforcing the civilised world’s 
understanding that citizens deserve an environment that permits adequate and dignified life 
conditions (United Nations Environment Programme 1972 Principle 1).  
 
There are possible constraints to a citizen’s willingness to voice. The first is the degree 
of “uncertainty” within the prospects for successful advocacy of a public policy (Hirschman 
1981 p. 216). In effect, citizens will negate the uncertainty and participate through the 
investment of their resources if they feel strongly about the desired outcome (Dahl 1961 p. 274; 
Hirschman 1981 p. 216) or equally be dissuaded from taking part if they feel less strongly about 
the issue. Secondly, the “free rider” phenomenon may see a public good enjoyed ‘by all 
regardless of prior participation’ (Hirschman 1982 p. 78) and consequently may see an 
individual withhold or understate their contribution in the belief that others will exert 
themselves on their behalf (Hirschman 1971 pp. 4-5; 1982 p. 78) while they enjoy the results 
(Hirschman 1981 p. 81). Finally, an individual’s confidence in success has a huge impact on 
their willingness to attempt to influence decisions (Dahl 1961 p. 286). Those individuals with 
high confidence are more likely to attempt action than citizens whose confidence is constrained 
by a wide array of emotive factors (ibid. pp. 286-287), 38 which can lead to cases of ‘self-
exclusion’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 279 author’s emphasis). One finds, therefore, that participation 
and political confidence ‘evidently reinforce one another’ (Dahl 1961 p. 287).  
 
                                                          
38 These include a citizen who feels ‘that people like him have no say about what the government does … or that 
the politics and government are too complicated for him to understand what is going on, or that local officials 
don’t care much for what he thinks’ (Dahl 1961 p. 287; see also Cornwall 2008 p. 279). 
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However, in an environmental pollution context, these constraints can be negated. For 
citizens, themselves, voice is highly relevant for an environmental problem as ‘everyone has a 
strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 53). This 
issue contains a varying degree of public interest (context dependent i.e. severity) that will help 
negate free riding, especially if the pollution has been occurring for an extended period of time 
and/or directly affects a wide group of people and will certainly cause a strong degree of feeling 
over desired outcomes (i.e. ending pollution) that would help outweigh people’s possible 
participatory uncertainty. Indeed, Barry’s (1974) formulaic assessment of Hirschman’s 
theories shows that voice will occur when ‘the expected value of the quality resulting from the 
exercise of the optimal amount of voice minus the cost of exercising it is higher than the value 
of the best that can be obtained without using voice’ (p. 91); in other words, whether the use 
and cost of exercising voice will lead to better public interest improvements (i.e. ending a 
pollution event) compared to any improvements that might be obtained without using voice. 
Consequently, public participation through voice empowers citizens as they seek a stronger 
role in decisions that affect their lives (Zimmerman and Rappaport 1988, cited in Laurian 2004 
p. 53) and this applies wholly to the environment and instances of pollution.  
 
Lastly, one must draw attention to the exploration of voice in political/public action 
scenarios. The typology of protest voice in Section 2.8 describes the different voice actors and 
forms of voice action that can be utilised, but here one can start by discussing “collective” and 
“individual” voice alongside “horizontal” and “vertical” voices, all of which are interlinked 
and help reinforce the connection between voice and environmental problems. Hirschman 
(1992) suggested that the functioning and formation of voice depend on the ‘potential for 
collective action’ (p. 79 my emphasis; see also Hirschman 1995 p. 12) where an individual’s 
intention to act contributes to the pursuit of a common goal (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473; Tilly 
1978 p. 7). Individual voice refers to ‘actions where the intention of the individual in acting is 
to bring about the desired effect solely through that action’ (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473). 
 
This, in turn, is linked to the division of voice between horizontal and vertical settings 
(O’Donnell 1986; Le Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 2013; Ravnborg and Gomez 2015). 
Horizontal voice refers to communication with similar actors who share some form of 
collective identity at the same level whilst vertical voice encompasses dialogue with actors at 
different levels e.g. industry manager or government (O’Donnell 1986 p. 251; Ravnborg and 
69 
 
Gomez 2015 p. 73). Significantly, in (democratic) politics, vertical voice is often collective 
(O’Donnell 1986 p. 251) due to the frequent hostile state and society forces that help lead to 
solidarity and joint action (Hirschman 1984 p. 28), a strategy utilised by the poor and powerless 
and the rich and powerful albeit for different reasons (Tilly 1978 pp. 75-76).39 Nevertheless, 
horizontal voice can be more important as it remains a necessary precondition for vertical voice 
(O’Donnell 1986 p. 251; Ravnborg and Gomez 2015 p. 73). 
 
The collective action approach would be applicable to environmental problems, not 
only due to the potential number of people affected by the pollution, but also because 
environmental problems are dealt with through vertical political channels that would lend 
themselves to the strengths of collective voice. Individuals dealing with a vertical hierarchy 
and their probable lack of power vis-à-vis states and business elites know that they will not be 
able to ‘achieve powerful speech, a legitimate, known, recognised, authorised and authoritative 
voice’ (Bourdieu 1986 p. 301) without collectively pooling their voice in an indirect fashion. 
 
Nonetheless, ‘use of individual voice depends upon their belief in its expected efficacy’ 
(Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473) which highlights that voice analysis must specify its ‘contextual 
assumptions’ (O’Donnell 1986 p. 250) and the outcomes it will have. The penultimate section 
sets out the contextual environment for voice, and reveals that its use by citizens and other 
collective voice actors is dependent on and influenced by specific temporal, political, 
economic, social and geographical factors that are studied by political ecologists, thus 
formulating a “political ecology of voice.”  
 
2.7 The contextual factors that influence citizens and other stakeholders 
exercising voice  
 
Though the previous section established that the functioning and formation of voice depend on 
the prospects for collective action, a citizen’s ability to do this rests partly ‘upon their legal 
rights’ in their country (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473), a reflection that voice can be hazardous 
where organisations (and the state) try and silence protests (Hirschman 1981 p. 244).  
 
                                                          
39 ‘Relatively poor and powerless groups which have already mobilised are more likely to act collectively by 
claiming new rights, privileges, and advantages’ while ‘the rich and powerful are more likely to act collectively 
in defence of what they already have’ (Tilly 1978 pp. 75-76). 
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O’Donnell’s (1986 p. 252) vertical and horizontal divisions are based on this 
assumption; the possibility of almost unrestricted horizontal voice is identifiable with 
democratic and non-repressive contexts which also permit the exercise of collective vertical 
voice. The application of citizen voice is directly affected by the national political environment 
in which they live and operate, and their ‘opportunity’ (Tilly 1978 p. 55; van Deth 1997 p. 1) 
for this action. This can be understood as ‘the relationship between the population’s interest 
and the current state of the world around it’ (Tilly 1978 p. 55), particularly in relation to 
political freedoms (Sen 2001), and ‘the opportunities for citizens to cooperate’ and form 
associations and organisations (van Deth 1997 p. 1). Therefore, one finds that authoritarian 
versus democratic political contexts have a key influence on voice.  
 
  To gain power and stability (Hirschman 1992 p. 82), extreme authoritarian regimes 
will try and limit participatory encounters (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994 p. 6) by ‘collaps[ing] … 
public and private society’ (Yashar 1997 p. 242) and ‘close institutional mediations between 
state and society’ (Hochstetler 1997 p. 199) through the suppression of vertical and horizontal 
voice. This will convert ‘citizens into isolated, wholly private, and narrowly self-centred 
individuals’ (Hirschman 1992 p. 82). Illustrations include the Former Soviet Union’s Great 
Terror (Kuromiya 2007), the Guatemalan civil-war (1960-1996) (Yashar 1997; Ball, Kobrak 
and Spirer 1999) and political violence in Peru during the 1980s and 1990s (Garcia 2005; Burt 
2007). Meanwhile, in democracies, stronger civic and legal laws mean that ‘[v]oice and 
equality are central to democratic participation’ (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 1) 
through fair and free elections and expression (Fox 1997 p. 391), and citizen rights to organise 
to defend their own interests without fear of punishment or external interference (ibid. p. 392). 
As Hirschman (1982 pp. 4-5) summarises, ‘it is easier to participate in a public protest when 
one only loses time through the act of participation than when one thereby risks losing one’s 
head.’ Moreover, the state’s political system and societal freedom has significant impacts on 
the ability of citizens and collective voice actors to hold economic actors accountable for 
pollution. An example is Burma, where the former authoritarian regime’s business as usual 
(Bryant 1996) approach to environmental management left environmental politics as a type of 
resistance politics leaving few options for dissent (Doyle and Simpson 2006) (a situation which 
has changed since the 2015 general election, the country’s first openly-contested election since 
1990).  
 
71 
 
The links between voice and political ecology are clearly visible here. Individual and 
collective voice capacity are based upon the retention or unequal distribution of power by the 
state to particular social groups or actors. Consequently, PEV must analyse the wider national 
political environment in which the environmental pollution is occurring to establish the 
permitted levels of citizen voice; a democratic country will tolerate a higher level (or ceiling) 
than an authoritarian one (Hirschman 1981 p. 224).40 
 
Even so, a study of voice from this state political perspective cannot generalise 
countries simplistically into advanced economies and EMaDEs. For instance, while all Latin 
American countries ‘share a common basis in law, language, history, culture, sociology, 
colonial experience, and overall political patterns that enable us to discuss the region in general 
terms ….’ (Wiarda and Kline 2001 p. 1) each has a specific environment encompassing 
different laws and regulations, distinct social stratas, income levels and opportunities, customs 
and values etc. in which citizens live and apply their voice. This is a vital point; though 
hydrocarbon conflicts around the world may have similar causes and effects, each case must 
be analysed in relation ‘to its very specific …. socio[-]political and economic scenario’ 
(Vasquez 2014 p. xvii), a conclusion also applicable to other relevant events such as 
development project outcomes (Ballet and Randrianalijaona 2014 p. 218). Therefore, 
investigations into voice use surrounding environmental pollution issues cannot be generalised, 
a point which is made clear in the Methodology Chapter and this thesis’s focus on Peru’s Loreto 
Region and Petroperu (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2). 
 
Yet even within a democracy, voice opportunity does not guarantee success; rather 
(voice) opportunity relates to the term “potential” (Callaghy 1994 p. 240, cited in Meagher 
2010 p. 53) which is formed by several other factors besides the wider national political 
environment. For citizen voice to be effective, individuals will need to possess reserves of 
political influence that they can call upon when sufficiently aroused (Hirschman 1970 pp. 70-
71). Though political influence is not a precondition to voice over consumer products, for 
environmental pollution issues, it’s key for two interlinked reasons.  Firstly, the wider (albeit 
variable) collective scalar impact of environmental problems and the range of actors involved 
                                                          
40 However, there will be a ceiling limit as ‘there are levels of exit (disintegration) and voice (disruption) beyond 
which it is impossible for an organisation to exist as an organisation’ (Hirschman 1981 p. 224). One must also 
note that there must be some ‘minimal or floor level of exit and voice in order to receive the necessary feedback 
about performance’ (ibid. author’s emphasis; see also Hirschman 1992 p. 93), the latter posing a dilemma in 
authoritarian countries due to suppressive tendencies. 
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(IFIs, NGOs, government, industry) highlights that the influence of an individual citizen voice 
rests greatly upon their political influence and ability to engage with these actors. While 
horizontal voice is seen by some to be far less costly, ‘and has psychological benefits of 
expressing, [and] sharing’, context dependent, 41  vertical voice is costlier, ‘and has some 
psychological costs (the stress of speaking critically to superiors)’ (Soete and Weehuizen 2003 
p. 27) suggesting that citizens with stronger political influence will stand a greater chance of 
success.  
 
In this public interest context, the idea of ‘[n]early every citizen in the community 
[having] access to unused political resources’ (Dahl 1961 p. 309) is erroneous on the basis that 
a person’s reserves of political influence depend upon their societal position. Thorp and 
Paredes (2010 p. 2) label this “group or horizontal inequalities”, which refers to ‘inequalities 
between groups of people, rather than simply between individuals.’ Thus, Sen’s (2001) 
instrumental freedom of social opportunity is important given that the arrangements societies 
make for education, healthcare etc., ensure more effective participation in economic and 
political matters e.g. illiteracy can hinder political participation by preventing newspaper 
reading, written communication with others (p. 39) or holding actors accountable through the 
legal system. 
 
Socio-demographic research show that participation is costly due to the time, effort, 
and money required (Dahl 1961 p. 273; Hirschman 1981 p. 214; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995 pp. 288-303; Laurian 2004 p. 55). Those with more political confidence (Dahl 1961 pp. 
286-293) and resources are more likely to bear these participatory costs (Dahl 1961 p. 274; 
Lyons and Lowery 1986, cited in Laurian 2004 p. 55), leaving high-income and upper-middle-
class citizens as the most effective interest groups in local politics (Dahl 1961 pp. 273, 282-
283; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 188, cited in Laurian 2004 p. 55). Sen (2001) 
typifies this as “economic facilities” which will depend on the individual’s level of resources 
owned or available for use (pp. 38-39), which by extension includes opportunity to voice, 
though the author cautions against making generalised links between income (and other 
resources) and individual achievements and freedoms on the other owing to various social and 
economic circumstances that affect individuals (ibid. see ch. 4-5). 
                                                          
41 Dowding et al. (2000 p. 472) note that horizontal voice is costly in certain circumstances; ‘complaining about 
the government under repressive regimes, for example.’ 
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In socially unequal countries, e.g. in Latin America, these issues are particularly 
striking. Here, large inequities remain ‘in relation to the number of people who have political 
decision-making power’ and ‘who benefit from the rule of law’, with historically entrenched 
patterns of clientelism and corruption necessitating a strong position and thus voice in society 
in order to advance one’s interests (Vasquez 2014 p. 47; see also Wiarda and Kline 2001 p. 
36). At the same time, there is a ‘persistent devaluation of indigenous people, women, the poor, 
and the young, all of whom confront objective barriers to participation in the institutional 
context of a state and a democracy’ (Vilas 1997 p. 8). Consequently, low rankings of EMaDEs 
on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index reflect the ‘little confidence’ that 
citizens have in ‘fair and effective government institutions’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47). Poor 
government trust levels (Wiarda and Kline 2001 pp. 46-47) can, in turn, impact upon an 
individual’s willingness to voice, i.e. high trust is essential to help foster higher levels of 
participation (Docherty, Goodlad and Paddison 2001) though this has been contested (Gamson 
1968; Carreira, Machado and Vasconcelos 2016). 
 
Therefore, voice application by those in more marginalised societal positions becomes 
extremely difficult. This is particularly true for indigenous peoples, who have borne the brunt 
of European colonisation, seen exclusion in cultural, political and economic spheres (Varese 
1996; Selverston 1997 p. 172) and, like other weak/marginalised citizens, are hit hard by costs 
stemming from environmental problems (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 40; Reed 2002 p. 213). 
Natural resource extraction projects can often occur in remote locations like the Amazon 
rainforest. Their geographically isolated position alongside elite state manipulation has serious 
impacts on equality ‘because economically disadvantaged groups lack the tools [strong social 
position and voice] for accessing the authorities through parallel channels’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 
47).  
 
Through PEV, thought must also be given to the geographical position of citizens 
affected by pollution and their accessibility to voice mechanisms, a factor not originally 
discussed by Hirschman but which is clearly important. For instance, Laurian (2004 p. 54), in 
a US case study, argues that the nature of the problem (the siting of toxic waste sites) and the 
high clean-up costs necessitates involvement of federal, state, and local government agencies 
all of which are (theoretically) committed to public participation in planning. A similar 
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evaluation is applicable to other environmental problems and the role of spatially different 
political agencies; the severity, scale and nature of an environmental problem will require co-
ordinated responses between local, regional and national government mechanisms and the 
ability to integrate citizens’ voices at each level. However, while democratic states should 
theoretically be able to provide citizens with voice access at different spatial levels and in 
different formats (community meetings, ICT methods), this can vary across social groups and 
in terms of geography.   
 
‘In the first place, it needs to be restated that space qua space has no causal power and 
spatial relations of themselves do not produce effects’ (Slater 1989 p. 13) but that ‘depending 
on the nature of the constituents, their spatial relations may make a crucial difference’ only in 
terms of ‘the particular casual powers and liabilities constituting it’ (Sayer 1985 p. 52 author’s 
emphasis, cited in Slater 1989 p. 13). A key component that influences these spatial relations 
is the nation state. In a general sense, EMaDEs lack advanced economies’ ability to be able to 
shift resources quickly into desired areas (Stolper 1966 p. 205) due to their scarcity (ibid. p. 
215). This can be seen in the provision of state mechanisms like education and health care 
where their recurrent costs and staffing problems limit what can be done in remoter geographic 
areas (ibid; see also Reed 2002 p. 212). One could also hypothesise that other state mechanisms 
designed to give citizens access to voice mechanisms in these areas may also be missing or not 
within easy reach of isolated citizens. Indeed, Vasquez (2014 p. 65) noted that ‘[o]ne of the 
main complaints of local communities affected by hydrocarbons projects is the lack of state 
presence in their territories, which are usually remote or neglected areas far from the capital 
city where most decisions are made.’ Therefore the absensce of easily accessible government 
mechanisms can lead to cases of citizen disengagement from the state.  
 
A key issue for political ecologists is the relationship between central decision-making 
mechanisms and those in frontiers or remotely located territories. PEV investigations must 
consider the extent to which the spatial locality of environmental management or natural 
resource project decisions influence voice and participation. However, this question of citizen 
accessibility must also extend into analysis of businesses and their decision-making 
mechanisms and modes of communication.  
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Hirschman (1982 p. 103) provides initial guidance for this. Certain ‘strict limits’ are 
placed on citizens regarding ‘their involvement in public affairs as certain political institutions 
[and arguably business] keep them from expressing the full intensity of their feelings on these 
matters.’ So, business may withhold or control access to decision making mechanisms, an issue 
in extraction industry projects to which Himley (2008) and Ballet and Randrianalijaona (2014) 
attest.  
 
Himley (2008) examined the Pierina Project, a large open-pit gold mine in the Peruvian 
Amazon owned and operated by Barrick Gold Corporation of Canada. The study shows how 
the ‘neoliberalisation of resource governance’ has produced  
 
new spatial relations of governance at the point of extraction: the community relations 
office, now a critical node of decision-making regarding the livelihood impacts of 
mining in adjacent communities, is located on mine property, behind a closely guarded 
gate (ibid. p. 446 author’s emphasis).  
 
Community residents must pass through the gate and armed security officials in order to access 
the office, highlighting how the firm itself (not the state) administers access to a crucial 
decision-making site, the capacity to do so enabled by private property rights (ibid.). Similarly, 
in Madagascar, the 1980s QMM mining project (a joint venture by the Canadian company QIT-
Fer et Titane Inc., and the OMNIS (Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Strategiques, 
Supervisory Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining) a Malaysian public agency), saw 
criticism over low levels of local population involvement in the project and a restricted 
participatory process that did not necessarily represent diverse societal opinions (Ballet and 
Randrianlijaona 2014 p.  222).  
 
What do these two brief examples show? To begin with, they highlight the unequal 
power relations between citizens and business. Hirschman broached this issue through a focus 
on consumer ignorance, which is present in the disparity of knowledge between seller and 
buyer over certain types of products e.g. medical services, complex technological products 
(Arrow 1973, cited in Hirschman 1981 pp. 219-220) or between citizens and REIs over 
extraction processes. Citizens will have a degree of ignorance that will make their 
understanding of REI production techniques or safety processes difficult (see Cragg and 
Greenbaum 2002). Crucially, in cases where the citizen have ‘an inferior or impotent position’ 
in which exit and voice will not adequately ‘safeguard … their interests’, some form of pubic 
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intervention or business self-regulating policy is necessary (Hirschman 1981 p. 220). The 
increase in business self-regulatory mechanisms and the ‘neoliberalisation of resource 
governance’ (Himley 2008 p. 446) thus presents a challenge for citizens as it reinforces clear 
‘power inequities’ (Newell 2005 p. 543) between citizens and business and the latter’s control 
and/or withholding of access, consultation and information. This has ‘important implications 
for the types of accountability mechanisms that can realistically be constructed between 
companies and communities’ (ibid.). 
 
In relation to REIs, accessible decision-making mechanisms are particularly important 
to indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities who have historically lacked effective participatory 
influence in decision-making (Reed 2002 p. 220). Reed (2002) evaluates that while firms are 
willing to consult with local communities, take their concerns into consideration and possibly 
modify their plans, they are not willing to include local communities into decision-making 
mechanisms or consider the possibility that local community desires take precedence over the 
REIs (p. 221 my emphasis; see also Cragg and Greenbaum 2002), an issue termed as 
“decoupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Backer 2007 pp. 33-34). Based upon their different 
costs and benefits, the REI treatment of these stakeholders is crucial for PEV due to its 
influence on industry relationships with local citizens and the influence which business can 
have over citizen voice and their opportunity at being heard.  
 
They can seek to quash voice through ‘special favours’ to individual complainants 
(whose preferential treatment buys off their voice) or to collective voice movement leaders 
(resulting in militancy reduction or absolute corruption), which allow firms to avoid 
performance quality improvements (Hirschman 1981 p. 241 author’s emphasis). More radical 
suppression of voice can see firms degrade their treatment of internal employees, or retaliate 
through violent reprisals against local citizens (ibid. pp. 240-241; see also Birch 1974 pp. 75-
76; Frynas 2001) and other groups (e.g. Rowell 1996 ch. 8), a ‘green backlash’ which can 
extend to some corporations funding anti-environmental groups and right-wing think tanks 
(Rowell 1996). Such strategies underline the ‘tremendous power differentials between the 
actors and in which there is no set of enforceable rules’ (Reed 2002 pp. 221-222) that leads to 
disagreement on who counts as a stakeholder, the fair apportionment of costs and benefits and 
how these are to be conceived (Cragg and Greenbaum 2002 p. 320). Accordingly, non-state 
economic actors can control and manage the parameters of citizen voice (when, where, how, 
frequency of contact) regardless of the wider state political context. 
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 Given the importance of contextual accuracy, an accurate depiction of the relevant 
economic actors, particularly business, is key, and this can be illustrated for oil companies. 
Judging social and environmental performances of all oil companies in the same way fails to 
consider their own individual operating styles which differ in their incorporation of 
environmental and social safeguards (Vasquez 2014 pp. 123-124). A more secure financial 
position enables larger REIs to implement greater CSR investment, larger CSR teams and 
better social and environmental impact monitoring, while smaller REIs have less financial 
security and alongside short-term contracts tend to devote fewer resources and effort to long-
term social and environmental development policies (ibid. p. 124).42 
 
Consequently, the lack of standardised industry procedures for dealing with 
stakeholders means that the level, accessibility and therefore strength of various stakeholder 
voices will differ dependent upon the REI. The type of REI impacts upon voice and 
accessibility and to aid investigation into their social effects, they have been categorised in 
Figure 2.3. A similar process can also be undertaken with other REIs, notably mining 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 See Amaeshi and Amao (2009) for REI operational differences in Nigeria.  
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Figure 2.3: Typology of REIs.  
 
 
Lastly, and linked to all of these points, is that the study of voice changes over time 
(Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 5; Lindell 2010b p. 17), even within Hirschman’s original focus 
on the consumer-industry relationship (Pitt et al. 2002). In the case of authoritarian countries, 
for instance, transformation of the political regime via the opening up of the opportunity to exit 
‘changes the human agents’ as, by being allowed more choice, citizens become more aware of 
their options, thereby increasing the likelihood of vocal behaviour (Hirschman 1995 p. 14 
author’s emphasis; see also Birch 1974 p. 79). Social position, economic wealth and 
opportunity will also change for citizens over their life course, dependent on context. Equally, 
citizen – economic actor interaction will change dependent on new business laws and 
regulations on consultation and changes in shareholder aims, values and ethos. Here, the links 
between voice and political ecology are noticeable. Voice analysis at one moment will provide 
                                                          
43 The acronyms in this column differ slightly from the published version (Gonzalez 2015 p. 477) to make clear 
that states can enter partnership with other actors but retain a controlling stake.  
Size of REI operations 
(based on number of 
individual and shared 
operations with other 
private and state owned 
REIs). This encompasses 
oil and gas operations 
Privately operated REIs 
(majority stake owned by 
private business interests)  
Term in italics  
 
State run REIs43   
(majority stake owned by 
nation(s) 
Term in italics  
 
International (or 
transnational): REIs with 
single/shared business 
operations in at least 
thirty countries   
“Transnational resource 
extraction industries” 
(TNREIs) e.g. BP, 
ConocoPhillips, Exon, 
Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, 
Total 
“State controlled 
transnational resource 
extraction industries” 
(SCTNREIs) e.g. China 
National Petroleum 
Corporation  
 
Regional: REIs with 
international 
single/shared operations 
focused in less than thirty 
countries  
“Regional resource 
extraction industries” 
(RREIs) e.g. Chevron, Hunt 
Oil Company, Premier Oil 
Company, Tullow Oil 
“State controlled regional 
resource extraction 
industries” (SCRREIs) e.g. 
Petrobas (Brazil), Pluspetrol 
(Argentina), Sinopec Corps 
(China) 
National/ local: REIs 
with individual/shared 
operations in a single 
country  
“National resource 
extraction industries” 
(NREIs);  
 
“State controlled national 
resource extraction 
industries” (SCNREIs) e.g. 
Gazprom (Russia), Pemex 
(Mexico), Saudi Aramco 
(Saudi Arabia), Petroperu 
(Peru)  
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only a “snapshot” of citizen voice at that time and thus the work of the “present” must be 
situated and related to the past.  
 
2.8 The typology of protest voice  
 
An understanding of history also helps lead citizens and other voice actors to deploy what they 
feel are the most effective methods of voice action in pursuit of their goals, environmental or 
otherwise. Hirschman and other academics have explored different types of voice action, the 
circumstances in which a voice action is used, the actors who use it and the implications this 
can have on achieving stakeholder aims.  
 
The first major underlying aspect of voice action is whether it occurs in active or passive 
forms. Zuindeau (2009) noted that voice ‘should frequently be considered as active (significant 
formalisation, effective search for communication), but can also be passive (rumours, muted 
remarks … characterised as “background noise”)’ (p. 158). Zuindeau’s research goes on to 
explore how different levels and forms of violence encompass voice actions within these active 
and passive forms (Figure 2.4). Within active voice, the most clear illustration is radical voice 
such as demonstrations, riots and revolutions (Lyons and Lowery 1986 p. 332), categorised by 
Hirschman as unconventional ‘participatory explosions’ (1971 p. 42), for ‘which there are no 
parallels’ (Hirschman 1981 p. 215). Radical voice actions will ‘greatly increase the likelihood 
that the event will be noticed’ (Tilly 1978 p. 92) which may help to force through changes to 
the issue at hand. In Bolivia, the 2000 “Water War” and 2003 “Gas War” saw protestors reject 
the neoliberal restructuring and re-scaling of resource governance and, through protests, 
blockades and resistance, seek procedural and distributive justice (Perreault 2006).  
 
An examination of these events, or “critical moments” (Khan 2013) can help reveal 
their causes. Outsider radical action may indicate longing for inclusion (Zahar 2006 p. 39) in a 
specific contextual format (e.g. system, organisation or event) from which they feel alienated 
and consequently are unable to use their voice in any other way. Equally, Herring’s (1989 p. 
139) inherency theory rejects the idea of “illegitimate” versus “legitimate” kinds of political 
activities on the basis that some political challengers are denied access to the privileges and 
advantages available to others and so will resort to tactics, even if they are radical in nature, 
which they feel will produce the results they want. An example can be seen in the hunter-gather 
Penan in Malaysia, whose efforts to repel the logging companies through the building of 
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blockades arose because the government wasn’t listening to them. Hence this action was an 
effort to get the government to listen (Brosius 2006 p. 316). Such actions thus become 
“weapons of the weak” to cite Scott’s (1985) book title and are a form of resistance used by 
the less powerful to express disapproval of corporate activities (Newell 2005 p. 548).  
 
Figure 2.4: Proposal for a renewed exit and voice model 
           ACTIVE 
Violence  
 
 
  
 
CRITICISM               REINFORCEMENT 
  
 
 
 
 
 
         Apathy 
 
             PASSIVE 
 
(Zuindeau 2009 p. 157). 
 
Equally, in Latin America, the failure to reinforce the democratic system and implement 
a strong and equitable state presence limits open participation for self-expression and has 
prevented violence and other radical actions being used to voice grievances and hold authorities 
accountable (Berkman 2007 p. 8; Vasquez 2014 pp. 53-54). People are not violent because they 
are poor but rather that the ‘long-term segregation of people within neighborhoods of 
Voice: critical voice, 
legitimisation of 
violence; 
 
Exit: relocalisation, 
withdrawal 
Voice: explicit support, 
search for reform; 
 
Exit: departure of 
critical agents 
Voice: critical 
“background noise;” 
 
Exit: resignation 
destabilising abstention 
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“background noise;” 
 
Exit: legitimising 
abstention 
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concentrated poverty’ causes people to adapt to deprivation conditions that see them ‘come to 
rely on violence as a basic tool for survival’ (Sanchez R 2006 p. 181). 
 
 Radical voice is not confined to marginalised social groups. Resistance and violence is 
generally a last resort for people whose peaceful attempts have been frustrated or ignored 
(Zahar 2006 p. 50) (a more acute issue for citizens in authoritarian countries) (see Hirschman 
1984 ch. 3; Campbell 2003 p. 80). Illustrations can be seen in the 1996 Mexican citizens’ 
rebellion in Tepotzlan over the imposition of top-down ‘development’ by unresponsive elected 
officials and developers (Simon 1998) or the Zapatista rebellion in which indigenous people 
‘were prepared to risk their lives in an attempt to be heard’ (Harvey 1998 p. 229) and have their 
grievances addressed (see Harvey 1998; Godelmann 2014). Still, for peripheral and mainstream 
groups, care must be taken in radical voice application as ‘people might forget their deferential 
obligations and let voice get carried away’ (Adelman 2013 p. 443) which may hinder long-
term efforts at securing a goal from vertical actors.  
 
Turning to passive forms of voice, these are defined as ‘quiet’ resistance forms (Lindell 
2010a p. 5) such as rumours or muted remarks (Zuindeau 2009 p. 158). In Domination and the 
arts of resistance: hidden transcripts, Scott (1992) explores the action of subjected people 
though the term “public and private transcripts” which at their heart discuss the nature of power 
relations between these actors in these two scenarios. ‘[P]ublic transcript’ (ibid. p. 2 author’s 
emphasis)44 describes open interaction between subordinates and those dominating them and 
will most often see subordinates shape their public performance ‘out of prudence, fear, and a 
desire to curry favour’ in order ‘to appeal to the expectations of the powerful’ (ibid.).  
 
Crucially, it is only when the performers or actors are spoken to ‘“offstage, beyond 
direct observation by powerholders’ and the public transcript scenario (ibid. p. 4) that one can 
unmask a fuller story surrounding their power relations (ibid. p. 2). ‘Each hidden transcript ... 
is actually elaborated among a restricted “public” place that excludes – that is hidden from – 
certain specified others’ (ibid. p. 14). ‘The hidden transcript is thus derivative in the sense that 
it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect 
                                                          
44 Public transcript is defined by the Scott thus: ‘Public here refers to action that is avowed to the other party in 
the power relationship, and transcript is used almost in its juridical sense (procès verbal) of a complete record of 
what is said. This complete record, however, would also include nonspeech acts such as gestures and expressions’ 
(1992 p. 2, footnote 1, author’s emphasis). 
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what appears in the public transcript’ (ibid. pp. 4-5).45 This closed transcript scenario can be 
described as a more passive form of voice and can occur as a critical protest form of 
vocalisation where direct discussion between the citizen and those in question does not occur 
and is perhaps not sought.  
 
Another important area of research is the study of silence. Although Hill (1979) 
explores how symbolic protest and calculated silence or ‘silent non-exit’ (Barry 1974 p. 91) 
can occur if the risks individuals may face may outweigh the benefits of protesting against a 
serious injustice, silence is also a passive form of vocal protest. It can be a type of political 
protest (Gal 1991 p. 176) and activism (see Hatzisavvidou 2015) and a ‘strategic defence 
against the powerful as when Western Apache men use it to baffle, disconcert, and exclude 
white outsiders’ (Basso 1979 cited in Gal 1991 p. 175). The issue with this and other forms of 
passive voice is that in this environmental pollutant scenario, citizens will continue to suffer 
from immediate pollution in silence (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 472) unless some form of more 
active vocalisation occurs.  
 
Lastly, one must give thought to precisely who is vocalising and there are three notable 
actors present. There is individual (i.e. citizen) voice in which ‘the intention of the individual 
in acting is to bring about the desired effect solely through that action’ (ibid. p. 473). There is 
also institutional voice (i.e. the voice of the government, business or REIs) and can be singular 
in nature i.e. via a spokesperson, even though they are representative of a larger collective 
body. Consequently, one can consider institutional voice to be a form of the third type of voice 
actor, collective voice. This final voice actor requires greater explanation.   
 
On the one hand, collective voice can be be seen as another type of voice action. Global 
democratisation and decentralisation trends have opened new political spaces for marginalised 
people to voice, but their success is dependent on the institutions they can access and 
organisational ability (Devas 2005, cited in Brown and Lyons 2010 p. 34; see also Lindell 
2010b pp. 19-22), the latter an issue due to their limited time and resources and lack of 
leadership (Devas 2004 p. 190, cited in Brown and Lyons 2010 p. 36). Collective voice can go 
                                                          
45 One must note that the hidden transcript discourse cannot be seen as “true” and open transcript discourse as 
false. Equally, hidden transcript dialogue is not a realm of freedom and open transcript discourse one of necessity 
(Scott 1992 p. 5). Instead, ‘the hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different constraints 
of power than the public transcript’ (ibid.). 
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some way to combatting difficulties that disadvantaged and/or non-influential groups and those 
forced to use violence can face in vertical voice dialogue. However, as will be explained, 
collective voice can also be understood, as it is here, as a separate category of voice actor.  
 
 ‘In … resource management [and more specifically an environmental pollutant 
scenario] there are multiple voices’ (Howitt 2001 p. 66) and one can differentiate between 
stakeholders or ‘interlocutors’ (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994) ‘that have a legal, moral or presumed 
claim on the firm and groups that have an ability to influence the firm’s behaviour, direction, 
process, or outcomes’ (Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997 p. 859). The former includes citizens 
with a direct or local “stake” in the pollution alongside CBOs charged with the collective 
defence of its individual members’ interests (Bourdieu 1986 p. 301). Other CBOs include 
religious movements, trade unions, student groups and women’s movements (Steifel and Wolfe 
1994 pp. 139-143; Campbell 2003 p. 81). The latter comprises local, national and international 
NGOs and other global citizens (who are perhaps connected to a campaign run by an NGO) 
(Chalmers, Martin and Piester 1997 p. 573) whose range of objectives (e.g. human rights, 
environmental protection) lead them to lobby economic actors. So, while each stakeholder 
group  (citizens, different collective voice actors) has a different voice, they are also often 
interconnected due to these collective groups’ ability to influence citizen voice, how it is heard 
and by whom, and the strength given to citizen voice in vertical situations. Therefore, 
collectivising voice has several benefits.  
 
Research by Vasquez (2014 p. 90) found that a unified indigenous voice e.g. via an 
indigenous federation, allows for faster resolution of oil and gas conflicts as they are more 
likely to be able to use the prevailing socio- political climate advantageously. ‘[T]he 
globalisation of opposition’ to certain industries (in this case mining) allows the network to 
report on mining company and local community negotiations which can be used as a reference 
point or benchmark for other communities in negotiations (Kapelus 2002 p. 277). NGOs’ 
ability to mobilise communities at the grassroots level46 is important, especially in cases where 
there are unequal power relations between communities and other actors47 while their capacity 
to work with businesses as well can help ensure they utilise more environmentally responsible 
practices (Reed 2002 p. 207). Celebrities and other high profile individuals can also strengthen 
                                                          
46 E.g. Lund-Thomsen (2005 p. 629). 
47 E.g. Boele, Fabig and Wheeler (2001). 
84 
 
local collective voice through involvement in environmental campaigns (see Brosius 2006). In 
this thesis, Chapter Eight, Section 8.3 analyses the crucial role which the Catholic Church had 
in strengthening and expanding the voice options for the Cuninico community.   
 
There are problems with pooling voice in this way. In some situations, citizens risk 
“dispossession” of their voice, ‘deprived of an expression which specifically expresses’ 
themselves and their interests which are ‘denied and annulled, by the common voice, the 
opinion communis as produced and uttered by the accredited spokesperson’ (Bourdieu 1986 
pp. 301-302 author’s emphasis; see also Moore, Jr 1984 pp. 267-268; Cornwall 2008 p. 277).48 
This is evident for grassroot activists who are unable to participate directly in transnational 
movements ‘and are dependent upon ‘imagineers’, actors who are critical in furthering 
connectivity, in channelling information and in ‘translating’ the vision of the network to the 
grass roots’ (Lindell 2010b p. 24; see also Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel 2008 p. 189, cited 
in Lindell 2010b p. 24). Consequently, whilst political parties offer excluded or marginalised 
citizens the best means of making their interests and voices heard, established parties can still 
cater predominantly to elite interests (Stiefel and Wolf 1994 pp. 139-140), an indicator of the 
difficulties which these groups face in formal processes of participation established by 
government (Friedman 2006).  
 
Within groups, a campaign originally designed to cater for the wider collective can 
instead predominantly cater for a minority (Hirschman 1981 pp. 242-243; see also Michels 
1962; Hirschman 1992 p. 84; Roche 1999 p. 148). Hirschman typifies this as the “treachery of 
voice”, whereby changes achieved through voice are primarily in the interests of the few (1981 
p. 244) and weaker voices are “drowned out”, a factor which may constrain individuals from 
collective voice participation. As noted in Section 2.5, whilst NGOs and their supporters must 
be accountable to communities, downward accountability is underdeveloped and thus weak, 
for example when the NGO pursues technical strategies unfamiliar to local actors or have 
different objectives (Ebrahim 2003; Kamat 2004 pp. 167-168).  
 
Through PEV, researchers must give thought to ‘whose interests’ these collective voice 
actors serve, ‘particularly where they claim to represent and defend the interests of poor 
members’ (Lindell 2010b p. 11; see also Cornwall 2008 p. 271). For instance, O’Dwyer and 
                                                          
48 E.g. Larson et al. (2016); Finley-Brook (2016 pp. 341-342). 
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Unerman (2010 p. 465) recounted how interviews with Dochas (the Irish NGDO (non-
governmental development organisation) umbrella body) personnel revealed that NGDO local 
elites in Chad determined what was good for their fellow citizens, how Chadian society should 
develop and the rights individuals should claim with little actual citizen consultation. 
 
Overall, the research into forms of voice in this and preceding sections has been 
coalesced into a typology of protest voice for study into voice vis-a-vis environmental pollution 
events. ‘Typologies are a useful starting point for differentiating degrees and kinds of 
participation’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 270). They have ‘‘clarity through speciﬁcity’ – spelling out 
what exactly people are being enjoined to participate in, for what purpose, who is involved and 
who is absent’ which will ‘help make clear what exactly is at stake when ‘participation’ is 
being advocated’ (ibid. p. 281). In a similar vein, a typology of protest voice will also bring 
clarity to the action of voicing by categorising different voice stakeholders and forms of voice 
which a study of the PEV environment can explain the use of. This, in turn, will help make 
clear the ease with which different stakeholders can hold REIs accountable for pollution issues.  
 
Figure 2.5 details the typology of protest voice. Running down the central y axis is the 
degree of violence within the voice action ranging from highly violent down to non-violent or 
passive actions. Split between the x axis are the two overarching forms of voice, active and 
passive voice. Within active voice, there are various forms of voice action starting with the 
most violent termed radical voice. This is followed by a less violent form of voice termed 
unorthodox informal voice in which vertical or horizontal voicing to particular voice actor(s) 
occurs through an unorthodox non-formal method. Scrutiny-based voice is utilised by 
collective stakeholder groups who disseminate or project their voice and its findings into wider 
society. The least violent active form of voice is orthodox formal voice in vertical or horizontal 
situations and includes legally or socially acceptable forms of voicing such as electoral voting, 
consultation mechanisms, government meetings and petitions. These forms of orthodox formal 
voice action are more likely to be found in democratic states as opposed to authoritarian 
regimes, but as Section 2.7 describes, they also need to be accessible for citizens to participate 
and therefore report environmental pollution issues. It is orthodox formal voice action which 
should theoretically typify the normalised mode of communication between citizens and the 
state/REIs. On the far right hand side of the x axis there is also one type of active voice action 
linked to exit termed vocal exit in which people vocalise their objections ‘vociferously’ 
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(Kolarska and Aldrich 1980 p. 43) as they leave a given scenario. Vocal exit action can contain 
a differing degree of violence and voice, again dependent on context.  
 
Passive voice has three main categories. Since this is a typology of protest voice, critical 
background noise such as negative judgements, gossip and conversations, ‘[q]uiet’ forms of 
resistance (Lindell 2010a p. 5) have been catalogued. The second form of passive voice is 
‘silent non-exit’ (Barry 1974 p. 91) or silence which can be understood as a symbolic form of 
protest. Lastly, silent exit is categorised. Whilst, silent exit is an “action”, it is also a passive 
form of voice in which actors choose to leave a situation without choosing to voice their 
objections. In these passive forms of voice, resolving environmental pollution issues is 
minimal. More active forms of voice are crucial.  At the bottom, the typology lists the three 
key forms of voice actor; individual (citizen), collective (citizen, CBO, NGO) and institutional 
(government, business, REIs). 
 
In relation to participation Cornwall (2008) noted that ‘[w]hen forms of participation 
are contextualised, however, they become more ambiguous’ (p. 271). ‘In practice, all the forms 
and meanings of participation identified ... may be found in a single project or process, at 
different stages’ (ibid. pp. 273-274). My typology of protest voice diagram shows a range of 
active and passive voice and connected exit actions and the three key actors within 
environmental pollution incidents. These actors can use a range of different active or passive 
voice actions. They may have a dominant voice strategy which is supported by other types of 
voice actions. Equally, people may change or adopt their voice strategy in new or similar 
circumstances. Contextual specificity is thus key, a factor which PEV fully acknowledges.   
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Figure 2.5: The typology of protest voice. 
VOICE     EXIT 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOICE ACTORS: individual (citizen); collective (citizen, CBO, NGO); institutional (government, business, REI).
ACTIVE VOICE: significant 
formalisation, effective search 
for communication (Zuindeau 
p. 158). 
Orthodox formal voice: legal or socially 
acceptable forms of non-violent voice action in 
horizontal/vertical situations e.g. electoral voting, 
consultation mechanisms, petitions, interviews, 
(government) meetings, discussions, debates, 
lectures. 
 
Scrutiny-based voice: CBO/NGO groups and 
citizens (e.g. academics, journalists) investigating 
environmental and human rights issues 
disseminate their findings. 
Unorthodox informal voice: used due to an 
absence of orthodox formal voice access to the 
vertical actor in question. 
 
Radical voice: ‘participatory explosions’ 
(Hirschman 1971 p. 42) such as riots or protests. 
 
PASSIVE VOICE: 
“background noise” (Zuindeau 
2009 p. 158) taking place 
“offstage” in “hidden 
transcript” scenarios (Scott 
1992). 
 
Critical background noise (Zuindeau 2009 p. 
157): negative rumours, remarks, judgements, 
gossip, conversations. ‘Quiet’ forms of resistance 
(Lindell 2010a p. 5). 
 
Silent non-exit: here understood as a symbolic 
form of protest.  
Degree of 
Violence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vocal exit: as one exits, one also voices (Kolarska 
and Aldrich 1980 p. 44). The degree or level of 
voice (and therefore violence) is variable and 
dependent on context.    
Silent exit: as one exits, one does so silently.  
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2.9 Conclusion  
 
Overall, PEV enables one to study the possibilities for, and strength of, individual and 
collective voice by citizens and other actors. ‘This is a good starting point from which the 
political ecology of a struggle or a campaign may be understood in context and in relation to 
cause(s) of these actions’ (Gonzalez 2015 p. 478). For instance, is it driven by structural flaws 
in the state system, social position, the influence or absence of collective-voice organisations 
or the impact of specific economic actors’ policies towards stakeholder engagement and 
dialogue? Figure 2.6 provides a visual representation of the real-world contextual influences 
on voice. Each facet requires investigation to build up a comprehensive evaluative assessment 
of why particular voice actions are used/not used within the typology of protest voice and the 
potential barriers faced by stakeholders in their efforts at holding economic actors accountable 
for pollution. As the four analysis chapters (5-8) in this thesis show, individual and collective 
voice stakeholders can face a multitude of different impediments to their voice which can 
complicate and prevent the necessary accountability of Petroperu.   
 
Hirschman’s voice theory has a significant role to play in relation to understanding 
actor responses to environmental degradation. Voice investigation is a truly multi-faceted 
process and has been shown to offer strong integration into political ecology’s efforts to 
comprehend the origins and possible solutions to environmental degradation. Importantly, one 
can see how the study of voice action through integrating Hirschman’s theory with a political 
ecology theoretical framework is entirely different from post-structural political ecology and 
discourse. PEV provides researchers with a theoretical framework to explore temporally 
specific political, economic, social, and geographical environments in which citizen and 
collective voice organisations operate and voice, and can be applied to a specific case and 
context. Stakeholder voice has been shown to be influenced by power relations in various 
relationships: state-citizens, businesses-citizens, CBO/NGO-states, CBO/NGO-citizens, 
CBO/NGO-business, and is linked to control, and thus access to, decision-making mechanisms. 
Crucially, these relationships surrounding access are influenced not only by the macro-political 
environment but also localised power relationships involving businesses which great influence 
in dictating the scope and frequency of stakeholder engagement. Access to decision-making 
mechanisms is also linked to spatial scale and locality, and the type of voice mechanisms used 
by the state and each business actor. Together, these issues will have a significant bearing on 
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stakeholder trust, their inclination to voice and the type of voice action used described within 
the typology of protest voice developed in this Chapter.   
 
The study of voice requires a focus on these macro and micro influences through the 
broad themes of power, spatial location, place and time via a political ecology lens. In this 
thesis, PEV’s innovative theoretical framework will aim to broaden our understanding of why 
oil-rich EMaDEs suffer higher levels of environmental pollution. Given the importance of 
contextualisation in PEV, a single country (Peru) has been chosen as a case study, alongside a 
focus on state-run Petroperu. The next chapter will now begin with a contextual overview of 
Peru’s oil industry and detailed analysis of Loreto’s importance for the oil industry.  
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Figure 2.6: The political ecology of voice (PEV). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The theoretical rationale for 
applying voice to 
environmental problems  
 
-The perceived benefit of 
voicing over public interest 
problems (like pollution issues) 
will help to outweigh individual 
cost (time, effort, money) of 
voicing.  
 
-Citizen’s willing to voice to 
defend their own quality of life 
will help outweigh participatory 
uncertainty. 
 
-Loyalty (to a territory) will 
hold exit at bay and activate 
voice. This is influenced by a 
person’s time horizons e.g. 
won’t immediately exit to give 
time for a solution. 
 
- The solutions to environmental 
problems generally occur 
through vertical political 
settings which are most 
successfully influenced through 
collective voice. Environmental 
pollution impacts a collective 
(variably sized) group of 
citizens creating a collective 
voice. 
Real-world contextual 
influences on voice which 
require investigation 
 
Non-state actors’ involvement 
 
-Industries (e.g. REIs) can each 
have different access arrangements. 
This will influence how successful 
individual/collective voice will be 
in reporting environmental 
pollution issues. 
 
-Collective groups that represent 
citizens (CBOs, NGOs) influence 
citizen voice and their choice of 
action described within the 
typology of protest voice.   
Socio-economic and racial 
influences  
 
-The stronger a person’s societal 
position and ability to meet 
participatory costs (time, effort, 
money), the stronger their 
ability to voice and access and 
influence voice mechanisms. 
This means that marginalised 
citizens (e.g. indigenous groups 
or ethnic minorities) who are in 
lower social positions will often 
have a weaker voice and may 
face difficulties meeting 
participatory costs. These 
problems are accentuated in 
socially unequal countries. 
 
-The higher an individuals level 
of political influence, the greater 
their chance of success in 
vertical voice situations. 
 
 
 
Geographical location and 
technological access  
  
-Geographical location of 
individual/collective group will 
influence their access to vertical 
power structures or those they seek 
to voice to. This also applies to 
technological access to the state 
which can strengthen or limit voice. 
  
Time  
 
-Voice is not applied within a static 
temporal time-period. Changes in 
political the system will 
increase/decrease voice 
opportunity.    
  
Political (state) environment 
 
-Voice shaped by the political 
system in which it operates i.e. 
democratic vs. authoritarian 
regimes.   
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Chapter 3 The research context: Peru’s oil history and the 
search for selva oil in the Loreto Region  
 
‘For many Latin Americans, oil is el excremento del diablo’ (the devil’s excrement) 
(Philip 1982 p. 1, author’s emphasis). 
 
This chapter, split into four sections, will provide a brief history of Peru’s oil history, detailing 
the main production sites, their linkages to the wider regional and international economy and 
why the Loreto Region offers such a valuable case-study location to examine PEV. Section 3.1 
sets out the practical and academic changes to the fieldwork location over the course of the 
first year of study. This is followed by two interlinked sections that discuss Peru’s oil history; 
Section 3.2 narrates the country’s oil history from 1900 to the early 1980s while Section 3.2 
continues the journey from the late 1980s to the present day. Finally, Section 3.4 details the 
Loreton case-study location, with a focus on its geography, political administration and oil 
economy.  
 
3.1 Practical and academic changes to fieldwork location  
 
To understand why Peru’s Loreto Region was chosen as the research fieldwork sites for a PEV-
based study, it is important to discuss the academic journey that has transpired since the first 
year of doctoral research. In the initial research proposal submitted in March 2013, the aim was 
to understand the reasons behind oil facility sabotage in the Niger Delta (specifically 
Ogoniland), Nigeria, a region suffering from severe oil environmental pollution and connected 
social impacts (Okonta 2003; Jike 2004; Dung, Bombom and Agusomu 2008; Jernelov 2010; 
Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco 2011; Pegg and Zabbey 2013; Fentiman and Zabbey 2015). 
However, the ongoing militant actions of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND) at the time (superseded since 2016 by the Niger Delta Avengers) alongside 
wider national instability (e.g. Boko Haram terror threat) made fieldwork impossible.  
 
Consequently, the proposal’s aim was redrafted towards analysis of whether oil spills 
in EMaDEs were due to transnational REI production “double standards”, a research question 
drawn directly from the initial proposal. South America’s numerous oil producing countries 
and documented oil pollution incidents in Brazil’s Camamu and Guanabara Bays (Leeuwen 
and Tulder 2006; Paixao et al. 2010; Soares-Gomes et al. 2010), Ecuador’s Oriente Basin 
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(Southgate and Whitaker 1994; Kimerling 1995; Sawyer 2004; Wernersson 2004) and Peru’s 
Loreto Region (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010; Finer, Jenkins 
and Powers 2013) offered excellent scope for integration into this broad research topic due to 
their apparently safe fieldwork locations.  
 
Upon commencing the degree, I decided to narrow focus onto Ecuador’s Oriente, a 
region previously studied in my Master’s programme49 and which has suffered tremendous 
environmental damage from oil extraction, particularly by Chevron-Texaco during their 1967-
1993 operations.50 On this basis, the proposal was accepted and fieldwork was scheduled for 
autumn 2014, at the start of the second year of study. However, as the research progressed and 
preparatory groundwork was undertaken, it became clear that Ecuador was infeasible as a 
viable research location. While the main oil producing Oriente region has several potential oil 
sites, those in the north surrounding Nueva Loja town are within a 12-mile (20-kilometre) 
exclusion zone along the Colombian border, into which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) has advised against all travel. Communication with various Ecuadorian university 
academics also indicated that some of the oil sites in the south are relatively geographically 
inaccessible, while entrance to oil zones had been tightened recently, making it more difficult 
for foreign researchers to gain admission.51 Over the course of 2013, the government also 
moved towards production-sharing agreements which increased the state’s share of revenue 
and deterred private sector participation and investment (US Energy Information 
Administration 2014a; 2014b pp. 3-4), which would have implications for my focus on 
transnational REI extraction sites.52  
 
Accordingly, in spring/summer 2014, a change of fieldwork location again became 
necessary. While this would appear to throw the research question into doubt, the proposal had 
altered significantly as the literature review progressed. The focus on REI double standards 
                                                          
49 See Gonzalez (2011). 
50 This resulted in an ongoing lawsuit (first filed in Texas’ state court in 1994) on behalf of 1,500 Ecuadorian 
Indians and farmers over multiple allegations of untreated, oil-laced water being released from the drilling (Scott 
2000 p. 199). For more on the court-case see Gomez (2015); Steinitz and Gowder (2016); Stewart (2016); 
ChevronToxico (no date). 
51 My 2011 Ecuador paper (Gonzalez 2011) was based on secondary sources rather than fieldwork.  
52 This was not a sudden change of events; following the 2010 reforms to the hydrocarbon law, private companies 
lost their right to keep their share of oil funds and were instead required to hand over oil production to the state in 
exchange for a flat fee that varied from contract to contract and from barrel to barrel (Vasquez 2014 p. 31). The 
departure of four major oil REIs (Petrobas, National Petroleum Company, Canada Grande and Energy 
Development Company) was the culmination of these policies (Ortiz 2010; Vasquez 2014 p. 31).  
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had culminated in spring 2014 with a possible focus on the lack of advanced economy 
consumer knowledge surrounding oil production standards in EMaDEs but this was eventually 
discounted due to its impracticality and time constraints. Despite this, the underlying emphasis 
on REI oil pollution accountability remained and it was through further reading and discussion 
with my supervisor that the PEV theoretical framework was formulated. Coinciding with the 
creation of PEV was the decision to shift attention onto the Peruvian Loreton Region. This was 
not only a safer and more accessible location but also has a huge array of oil production sites, 
contamination issues and associated social conflicts which therefore made it an invaluable site 
for a PEV-based study (see Section 3.4).  
 
Therefore, upon reflection, the changes to the fieldwork sites and the delay in its 
commencement (early 2015) worked out advantageously as they allowed me to narrow the 
accountability theme into an innovative theoretical framework which was ready to use for 
fieldwork. The next two sections provide a brief account of the country’s oil history.  
 
3.2 Peru’s early oil history 1900-early 1980s 
 
‘It is … far from obvious that the interests of the majority of Peruvians are best served 
by this form of development’ (Philip 1984 p. 26). 
 
Peru, like its northern neighbour, Ecuador, is a resource-rich country that has, throughout the 
Twentieth Century, relied heavily on capital-intensive projects that promoted raw material 
exports (Philip 1984 p. 1). Peru has a long history of oil production which began in the 1860s 
and continued until the beginning of the Twentieth Century at very low levels and with slow 
growth (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 95; Tejada-Bailly 1981 p. 118; Vasquez 2014 p. 18). After 
Edwin Drake’s successful drilling of the first oil well in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859, initial 
discoveries in Peru were made on the Pacific north-west coast and include the site of the 
western hemisphere’s second oil well in an area just north of La Brea y Pariñas (La Brea) on 
2nd November 1863 (Pinelo 1973 p. 6). 
 
Between 1890 and 1930, production expanded greatly, with three key fields established 
in the coastal north-western Piura Region; La Brea (owned by the oldest oil producing company 
in Latin America, the London and South Pacific Petroleum Company Ltd which had been the 
lease holder since 1st July 1899), Lobitos (owned by UK company Lobitos oilfields who had 
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discovered the site via wildcat drilling in 1901 before production began in 1904-05) located 
north of Negritos, and Zorritos (operated by a Peruvian company called Piaggio which had 
been created by an Italian immigrant merchant), a small and geographically-complex field 
located further north again (Pinelo 1973 p. 10 and footnote 43 p. 28; Thorp and Bertram 1978 
pp. 95-96, 99; Vasquez 2014 p. 18 and footnote 5 p. 146; Taylor 2015 p. 155).53  
 
Despite these sites, at the turn of the Twentieth Century the major oil companies viewed 
most Latin American countries ‘as a backwater where high tariffs and poor communications 
inhibited sales’ (Philip 1982 p. 9; see also Wilkins 1970 pp. 185-186, cited in Philip 1982 p. 
10). This perhaps helps explain why Peru remained South America’s first oil producer until 
1924 (Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 207). Nevertheless, the period after 1904 marked the 
take-off for the Peruvian oil industry, which was encouraged by the emergence of a large 
national market for fuel oil (due to the switch from coal to oil by the Peruvian Steamship 
Company) and rising international demand (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 97). By 1920, the 
industry was in a radically different position (Philip 1982 p. 10), as reflected by increased 
production levels during the rest of the 1920s (Table 3.1), and accounting for 30 per cent of 
total export earnings by 1929 (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 98). 
 
Table 3.1: Oil production in Latin America 1916-1928 (ooo barrels a day, b/d) 
 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 
Argentina 2.4 3.7 4.5 7.9 12.7 21.5 24.8 
Colombia 0 0 0 0.9 1.2 17.7 54.5 
Ecuador neg. neg. neg. neg. 0.02 0.6 3.0 
Peru 7.1 7.0 7.7 14.6 22.9 29.5 32.8 
Venezuela 0 0.9 1.2 6.0 24.7 101.1 289.7 
Mexico 111.1 174.9 430.3 499.4 247.7 137.4 108.3 
Neg: negative 
(Philip 1982 p. 11). 
 
Part of this situation was attributable to new investment and development. In early 
Twentieth Century Peru, two of the north-western onshore oil fields (La Brea and Lagunitas) 
                                                          
53 A fourth, far smaller site of four square miles (approximately 10.4 square kilometres) near Talara (a port city 
in the north-west) was operated by the Lagunitas Oil Company, a Chilean-financed firm that worked in close 
alliance with London and Pacific (Thorp and Betram 1978 p. 99). 
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had not had their production suitably developed by their owners and their UK operating 
companies were subsequently bought by the International Petroleum Company (an affiliate of 
the Canadian firm Imperial Oil Ltd, itself a subsidiary of the American oil company, Jersey 
Standard) in 1913 and 1914 respectively (Pinelo 1973 pp. 10-11; Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 
100; Brown 1985 p. 16; Bucheli and Sommer 2014 pp. 153-154).54 Moreover, since world oil 
markets were subject to growing oligopolistic control and International Petroleum Company 
offered easy access to these markets, Lobitos Oilfields entered a working alliance with Jersey 
Standard by selling all their oil through International Petroleum Company (Wilkins 1970 p. 
186; Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 100). This effectively made International Petroleum Company 
the key oil operator for the whole country.55 
 
A total of $370 million worth of oilfield investment in the early 1920s helped 
International Petroleum Company drill more than 487 new wells by 1921, increase La Brea 
production and expand their Talara refinery (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 98; Brown 1985 p. 
17). This expansion programme generated increasing production volumes throughout the 
1920s and 1930s which contributed to Peru’s rising production in the latter decade (Table 3.2) 
and its position as a net exporter (Pinelo 1973 p. 42; Brown 1985 pp. 20-21; Clayton 1999 p. 
92). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 For information on the fields ownership, tax issues and International Petroleum Company acquisition see Pinelo 
(1973 ch. 2); Goodsell (1974 pp. 52-53); Kuczynski (1977 pp. 110-121); Miller (1978 pp. 383-389); Brown (1985 
pp. 16-20); Bucheli and Sommer (2014 pp. 153-154); and Taylor (2015 pp. 157-158). 
55 The Zorritos field reached full-capacity production by the early Twentieth Century and by the 1930s was nearing 
exhaustion (Thorp and Betram 1978 p. 96). The oilfield, refinery and port were eventually bought out by the 
government in 1939 who also gained a group of experienced technicians and workers (ibid. p. 167, footnote 50 p. 
384). 
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Table 3.2: World oil output and output of main Latin American countries 1932-1937 (b/d) 
 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
World 2,963,371 3,883,894 4,102,854 3,894,268 4,913,765 5,566,426 
USA 1,1784,560 2,462,922 2,490,978 2,690,534 3,009,773 3,496,050 
USSR 340,801 410,428 462,100 460290 525,826 525,627 
Venezuela 318,418 331,215 389,273 408,247 427,185 512,247 
Mexico 90,517 92,902 104,582 109,601 112,405 128,511 
Colombia 35,956 36,051 39,773 49,320 50,647 55,542 
Argentina 37,404 37,516 38,447 39,170 42,341 44,926 
Peru 36,328 38,154 38,412 44,926 48,200 52,077 
Ecuador 4,438 4,446 4,532 4,653 5,342 5,928 
 
(Philip 1982 p. 47). 
 
The interest of (foreign) REIs in these north-western sites was no accident: ‘one would 
expect the most accessible resources to be developed first’ (Phillip 1984 p. 15), which had 
consequently seen Peru’s easier mining and mineral development prospects exhausted in the 
previous hundred years (ibid. p. 16). By the end of the 1930s, it became apparent that new 
exploration would need to occur in unconventional areas like the selva, especially as La Brea 
production had begun to decline at the very end of the 1930s (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 165). 
These unconventional sites tend to be marginal in nature due to their heavy development costs, 
difficult technology and tendency to be smaller and take more time to develop, yet run dry 
faster (Philip 1984 p. 15; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 208). These factors in one of the 
most difficult terrains in the world limited REI interest (Philip 1984).56  
 
Oil industry exploration hesitation appeared to be valid; despite 30 wells being sunk in 
the selva prior to 1969, only two small finds were made in the 1930s and 1950s (Tejada-Bailly 
1981 p. 121; Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 166; Philip 1984 p. 224). Consequently, until around 
1960, Peru’s oil production still came overwhelmingly from onshore fields on the north-
western coast and a limited amount of offshore production sites (Philip 1984 p. 3). While 
production from these sites was able to increase overall production during the 1940s-1960s 
                                                          
56 Moreover, by the end of World War II, South American oil development became relegated to secondary status 
after the commencement of (large-scale) Middle Eastern production (see BP 1951 p. 2), which has much lower 
production costs than the world average (Philip 1982 p. 152; Wirth 1985 p. xi). 
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(Table 3.3), it was not sufficient to meet the growing domestic demand in the post-war period, 
especially as exploration in the Sechura desert between 1953-1956 had also failed to lead to 
any major finds (Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp. 101, 223-224). Indeed, aside from the Aguaytia 
natural gas and condensates field discovered by Mobil in 1961, no new oilfield discoveries 
were made between 1948-1970, which caused Peru to switch being a net exporter to a net 
importer in 1962 (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 229; Philip 1984 p. 3; Wise 2007 p. 309). 
 
Table 3.3: Oil production and exports in Peru (million barrels, annual average) (1935-1969) 
 Production Exports Internal consumption 
(including imports) 
1935-39 16.3 14.0 3.0 
1940-4 13.3 10.1 4.2 
1945-9 13.6 6.4 6.5 
1950-4 16.1 7.2 9.9 
1955-59 18.3 6.8 14.5 
1960-64 20.9 4.8 21.9 
1965-69 25.1 3.3 31.3 
 
(Philip 1982 p. 245). 
 
The lack of oil discoveries, coupled with the difficulty and expense of developing 
offshore and selva-based oil-fields led to many of the Peruvian REI firms established under the 
Petroleum Law (March 1952) to vanish by the end of the 1960s and be replaced by foreign 
REIs (Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp. 222-226). At this stage, foreign REI interest in the selva 
had grown due to the exploration successes in neighbouring Colombia (the Putumayo field was 
established in 1964) and Ecuador (the Oriente basin oil was discovered in 1967), the latter 
achieving 245,000 b/d piped through their Trans-Andean pipeline by mid-1974 (Stepan 1978 
p. 264; Philip 1984 p. 3). 
 
Of these foreign REIs, International Petroleum Company had been able to maintain its 
near monopoly over the country’s oil industry (controlling 80 per cent of Peru’s output in 1949 
and the country’s economy) by using their powerful position to dictate terms and conditions to 
impoverished governments by offering short-term loans and cash (Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp. 
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108-111; Philip 1982 pp. 243-244; Wilkins 1974 pp. 438-439; US Senate 1952 pp. 21-36, cited 
in Vasquez 2014 p. 18). However, due to various interconnected factors, the company was 
expropriated by the military regime of Army Chief of Staff General Juan Velasco Alvarado 
(1968-1975) under dramatic conditions in 1968-1969,57 which resulted in the creation of the 
national oil company Petroperu. Even so, the nationalisation of the International Petroleum 
Company did nothing to dissuade other American (or foreign) REIs from investing in the 
country; only days after the seizure in October 1968, Belco Petroleum announced an 
investment programme to continue its offshore exploration (Krasner 1978 p. 242; Philip 1982 
p. 109). 
 
Nonetheless, by 1968, Peru’s oil industry was declining and the finds made in the north-
west fields had become less and less significant (Philip 1982 pp. 432- 433; Wise 2007 p. 309; 
Taylor 2015 p. 166). With declining oil production and smaller north-west finds, exploration 
in the selva region was again seen as necessary, so from the beginning of 1969 Petroperu moved 
towards establishing itself in this area (Philip 1982 pp. 433-434), discovering significant oil 
reserves in the early 1970s (Philip 1984 p. 4; Haller et al. 2007 p. 388). This exploration 
decision was ‘momentous for a number of reasons’ (Philip 1982 p. 434). The Peruvian state, 
via Petroperu became the architect of selva oil development which has given the state-run 
company a long association and impact upon selva oil production here. Moreover, the high 
costs of successfully exploring a 1-million-hectare (estimated by Petroperu to be $877 million, 
with $260 million of this committed before any expected return) was many times higher than 
the 1971 $73.3 million approximate value of the company (Philip 1982 p. 434; Portocarrero M 
1982 pp. 439-440).  
 
Subsequently, the decision was taken to secure large credit from international capital 
and maximise resources by joining forces via contracts with private REIs via “Peruvian model” 
contracts (Philip 1982. pp. 127, 436; Portocarrero M 1982 p. 440; Ascher 1999 p. 124; Mikesell 
2015 pp. 70-71).58 Sixteen of these were signed by 1973 (and a further two for exploration 
offshore), the former each covering 1 million hectares (Philip 1982 p. 127; 1984 p. 4; Mikesell 
2015 p. 70). Coinciding with this came plans to create an oil transport pipeline across the 
                                                          
57 See Pinelo (1973); Goodsell (1974 pp. 141-146); Philip (1978 ch. 2; 1982 ch. 12); Sigmund (1980); Bucheli 
and Sommer (2014 pp. 155-158). 
58 These contracts were for 35 years from the date of signing and saw the company provide all technical and 
financial resources for exploitation and development. Produced petroleum was divided between Petroperu and the 
company and ranged from between 44 to 50 per cent for the company (Miksell 2015 p. 70). 
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Andes, a project declared to be a national priority in 1972 (Philip 1982 p. 438). Despite severe 
costs, serious work on the Oleoducto Norperuano began in 1974 and was finally completed in 
1977 at a cost of over $729 million rather than the original estimated 1974 figure of $550 
million (Philip 1982 pp. 442-443; 1984 p. 6; Ascher 1999 p. 124).59  
 
Despite these developments, initial selva prospects proved disappointing; Petroperu’s 
exploration had resulted in only one exploitable field between 1973 and 1977 while problems 
were encountered in its existing discoveries (Philip 1984 p. 4). By 1977, all private REIs except 
Belco (which operated offshore sites) and Occidental Petroleum, the first selva contractor 
(which did develop feasible operations) had left the country (Sanders 1981 p. 93; Philip 1982 
p. 438; Mikesell 2015 p. 70). This was due to a combination of disappointing geological 
surveys (REIs spent $300 million in the process), an increasingly nationalistic Peruvian 
government and changes to 1975 US tax laws which made foreign exploration less attractive 
(Philip 1982 pp. 127-128; 1984 pp. 4-5; Ascher 1999 p. 124; Leonard 2006 p. 47).  
 
Though there was a gradual rise in Peru’s 1970s petroleum production (Table 3.4), and 
five commercially exploitable Amazonian fields with a potential capacity of 40,000 b/d (Philip 
1982 p. 438), Petroperu’s position continued to decline due to a range of factors60 that limited 
its contribution to Loreton regional development (Ascher 1999 pp. 124-125). 61  These 
circumstances helped to strengthen Occidental Petroleum’s position in the country where the 
firm was already making heavy profits through an extremely profitable production agreement 
signed under the 1971 Peruvian model contract (giving them a tax-free share) (Philip 1984 p. 
9; Mikesell 2015 pp. 70-71). Moreover, the Peruvian government was not able to renegotiate 
these favourable terms because of the precarious economic position of the country and could 
ill afford disruption to Peru’s (or Occidental Petroleum’s) oil production (Philip 1982 p. 447). 
                                                          
59 The main pipeline is 24 inches (61 centimetres) in diameter and runs for 306 kilometres from Station 1 at San 
José de Saramuro in Urarinas District, Loreto Province (International Business Publications 2013 p. 69; Segovia 
2014 p. 1) before joining a pipeline extension, the Oleoducto Ramal Norte (the Ramal Norte pipeline). This is a 
276-kilometre pipeline added in 1976 to transport crude from the Andoas oilfield area which joins the main 
pipeline at Station 5 in the town of Borja, Manseriche District, Daten Del Marañón Province (Petroperu no date 
a). Here it becomes a 35-inch (90 centimetres) system that carries crude oil for 547 kilometres to a refinery at 
Sechura Bay on the Pacific coast (International Business Publications 2013 p. 69; Goldenberg 2014). 
60 Several factors lie behind Petroperu’s performance decline. These included an increase in the company’s debts, 
a legal problem with the Peruvian contract model and Petroperu serving as a battleground for competing factions 
after the illness of President Velasco in February 1973, culminating in his overthrow by Morales Bermudez in 
August 1975 (Philip 1982 p. 443; 1984 p. 7; Ascher 1999 p. 127). 
61 The result was that only two exploration wells were drilled in 1979 compared to 14 in 1978, 15 in 1977 and 18 
in 1976 (Philip 1984 p. 8).   
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Consequently, Occidental Petroleum could expand its Peruvian investment, which rose to 
$137.6 million in 1976 and $201.9 million in 1977 (ibid.). This period has been characterised 
as Peru’s first hydrocarbon exploration boom (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 p. 7), in which 
‘[n]early 63,000 km of seismic lines were cut during the four years between 1972 and 1975, 
over half of all historic activity’ (ibid. p. 8). 
 
Table 3.4: Production in main Latin American countries 1973-79 (000 b/d) 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Venezuela 3,384 2,987 2,353 2,294 2,239 2,165 2,356 
Mexico 525 652 806 896 1,040 1,330 1,616 
Argentina 421 413 395 397 431 452 471 
Brazil 175 187 177 172 166 166 171 
Colombia 191 175 163 152 143 136 131 
Ecuador 209 177 161 187 182 202 218 
Peru 72 79 72 77 92 151 192 
Chile 43 39 35 33 33 17 21 
Bolivia 47 46 40 41 35 32 25 
 
(Philip 1982 p. 126). 
 
The end of the 1970s witnessed radical changes in oil contract policy that mirrored the 
wider national economic and political situation. Peru’s recovery of its foreign exchange 
position allowed it to renegotiate its contract with Occidental Petroleum in 1978 which were 
subjected to taxes on profits as well as the existing 50 per cent share of their crude oil 
production (Philip 1982 p. 447; 1984 p. 9; Mikesell 2015 pp. 71-72). However, the election of 
President Belaunde in July 1980 signalled the introduction of a more liberal policy stance via 
tax credits (Decree Law 23231, December 1980) up to a maximum of 40 per cent of the pre-
tax profit which attracted investment from Superior and Royal Dutch Shell, both signing selva 
exploration contracts in 1981 (Philip 1982 p. 448; 1984 p. 10).62 
 
                                                          
62 However, Congressional and military opposition to the liberal policies led to procedural delays in the approval 
of contracts, some of which were terminated, like Shell, which left Peru in 1988 (Philip 1984 p. 10; Wise 2007 p. 
307).  
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Efforts were also made to improve the performance of Petroperu by legislatively 
changing the corporate status of the company in 1981 to exempt it from wage controls applied 
to central government employees, while its financial position was strengthened through World 
Bank loans ($32.4 million in 1981 and further $81.2 million in 1982) that helped it resume its 
exploration activities and led to a significant find in Nueva Esperanza (Philip 1982 p. 448; 1984 
p. 10; Mainhardt-Gibbs 2003 p. 15). By 1981, Peru had once again become an oil exporting 
country (Philip 1982 p. 449), with selva production at the start of the decade at around (or a 
little under) 130,000 b/d encompassing 100,000 b/d produced by Occidental Petroleum and 
30,000 b/d produced by Petroperu, a market value approaching $5,000 million and total 
production barrels of more than 200 million (Philip 1984 p. 10). 
 
3.3 Peru’s contemporary oil history: mid-1980s to the present day 
 
“You cannot escape or name one particular area where the oil spillages have not made 
an irreversible impact on the environment and indigenous people” (FOPOW3, former 
plant operator foreman for Occidental Petroleum 1981-1991). 
 
Peruvian oil development and production have changed remarkably since the 1980s. From a 
global perspective, the 1980s saw Middle Eastern nations remain the primary oil exporters, 
with Mexico and the North Sea the main producers outside this region. Peru was able to 
increase production and become a net exporter with production hovering at around 200,000 
bpd (Oxford Business Group 2014 p. 93).  
 
Since then, a gradual shift has been noted. Production figures for the 1990s and the first 
decade of the Twenty-First Century show clearly that crude oil is being supplied in greater 
quantity (albeit with some variable trends) from non-Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
(OPEC) countries heralding from North America (Canada, USA), Europe and Eurasia 
(Kazakhstan, Russia) South and Central America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru) and Asia Pacific 
(China, Thailand) (BP 2014 p.8; Vasquez 2014 p. 12; BP 2015 p. 8; 2016 p. 8).63 Projections 
on non-OPEC crude and lease condensate (light oil, shale oil, extra-heavy oil and bitumen) 
production from 2020 to 2040 based on five-year intervals show that this trend looks set to 
continue (US Energy Information Administration 2014c pp. 9-14; 2016 p. 27), though more 
likely with a high oil barrel cost (US Energy Information Administration 2015 p. c–13). 
                                                          
63 One must note here that most of this increase is attributable to only five countries; Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and the USA (US Energy Information Administration 2014c p. 9). 
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As conventional oil supplies have started to dwindle, the development of new sites are 
critical for mid and long-term outlook for international markets (International Energy Agency 
(IEA) 2011 p. 103). This is especially important to satisfy increases in world energy demand, 
projected to see a 30-year increase of 56 per cent between 2020-2040 (US Energy Information 
Administration 2013 p. 9) and projected 2020-2040 increases in world liquid consumption from 
non-Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (US 
Energy Information Administration 2014c p. 26; 2014d p. MT-4).64  
 
Moreover, despite noticeable oil price fluctuations, the first decade and a half of the 
Twenty-First Century have witnessed higher oil prices than the preceding 1990s and late 1980s 
(US Energy Information Administration no date) which increased investor interest and helped 
turn ‘previously expensive unconventional Amazon oil into a more tangible option’ (Vasquez 
2014 p. 11; see also US Energy Information Administration 2009 p. 21). Indeed, when one 
factors in natural gas, of which Peru became the first exporter in liquefied form in 2010 and 
the production of which has risen tremendously (see Ministerio de Energía y Minas del Peru 
(Ministry of Energy and Mines of Peru, MINEM) 2015 p. 9), the wider western Amazonia 
basin has taken a prominent place in the Latin American continent and wider hydrocarbon 
market (Vasquez 2014 pp. 11-12). 
 
BP (2006 p. 6) figures for proven oil reserves at the end of 2005 show South and Central 
Latin American producers (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Venezuela and others) had an 8.6 per cent share (103.5 billion barrels) of the world total of 
proven reserves behind all other regions (Middle East 61.9 per cent; Europe & Eurasia 11.7 per 
cent; Africa 9.5 per cent; North America 5 per cent) bar the Asia Pacific region (3.4 per cent).  
However, by the end of 2015, the share of proven oil reserves for South and Central Latin 
American producers had increased significantly to 19.4 per cent (329.2 million barrels) putting 
it ahead of every other region (North America 14 per cent; Europe & Eurasia 9.1 per cent; 
Africa 7.6 per cent; Asia Pacific 2.5 per cent) except the Middle East (47.3 per cent) (BP 2016 
p. 6; see also BP 2014a p. 6). This section will now chart Peru’s contemporary contribution to 
these figures. 
                                                          
64 Indeed, despite slower economic growth in key non-OECD countries (Brazil, China and India) towards the 
latter half of the 2000s resulting in a downward trench of liquid consumption, ‘liquid fuels consumption rises by 
an annual average of 1.1 million b/d’ (US Energy Information Administration 2016 p. 20).   
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The Peruvian government was forced to expand oil production in the 1990s due to 
decreasing production, evident since the 1960s, and lack of a substantial oil discovery reserve, 
which left the country importing petroleum at very high cost (approaching $500 million 
annually by the end of the 1990s) (Haller et al. 2007 p. 387; Wise 2007 p. 314; Vasquez 2014 
p. 27). Under President Fujimori (1990-2000), enormous changes were made to the relationship 
between citizens and state. A new constitution was adopted in 1993, which dismantled the 
recognition of indigenous and communally owned lands and emphasised indefinite state 
ownership of all sub-surface mineral and hydrocarbon resources (Smith 2005 pp. 236-237; 
Haller et al. 2007 p. 387). A raft of laws provided an incentive for foreign investment (Decree 
Law 662), privatisation (Decree Law 674) and a framework for large-scale investment in 
natural resources (Decree Law 818) that allowed concessions to be purchased with few 
limitations (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 171; Vasquez 2014 p. 31 and footnote 9 p. 146). 
 
Additional legislation such as the 1993 Law to Regulate Hydrocarbon Activities in the 
National Territory (no. 26221) aimed to attract foreign REIs through competitive contracts 
while a new government agency Perupetro was created (Article 6 of Law 26221) to promote 
hydrocarbon investments and oversee contract implementation (Mainhardt-Gibbs 2003 p. 19; 
Haller et al. 2007 pp. 387-388; Wise 2007 p. 307; Powers 2012 p. 7). Petroperu’s upstream 
(exploration, exploitation, contracting) and downstream (refining, marketing, distribution) 
operations were also separated, with Petroperu in charge of the latter and Perupetro overseeing 
the former (Wise 2007 p. 313).  
 
The law also legalised hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in territorial reserves 
for the protection of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation (covering 3.6 per cent of Peru’s 
Amazon), areas where indigenous communities held land titles (covering 13.5 per cent of 
Peru’s Amazon)65 and natural protected areas (covering 32.5 per cent of Peru’s Amazon) 
(Instituto de Bien Común (Institute for the Common Good, IBC) 2009, cited in Orta-Martinez 
and Finer 2010 p. 207; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 207). This not only highlights Peru’s 
recent commitment to oil exploration in the selva and the state-driven land grab (North and 
Grinspun 2016 p. 1494) but shows why a Loreton PEV study is so interesting given that the 
                                                          
65 Indigenous peoples must provide right of way for all state-constructed roads and free passage to oil and gas 
pipelines, among other infrastructures (Stocks 2005, cited in Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 213). 
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state is overriding the protection, land rights and voices of the country’s most marginalised 
citizens.  
 
These neoliberal reforms opened the floodgates to foreign direct investment in the 
extractive sector (Bury and Bebbington 2013 pp. 40-43) and had a positive financial impact, 
with foreign oil investment rising from $19.89 million in 1993 to $187 million in 1997. 
However, despite this investment drive totalling almost $1 billion, no new oil deposits were 
found and REI interest dropped (Weintraub 2007 p. 27; Vasquez 2014 pp. 27-28). Mirroring 
these reductions were a significant fall in oil production and proven oil reserves over the course 
of the 1990s into 2000.66  
 
The lack of new oil discoveries and falling investment led to a second aggressive oil 
exploration plan in 2004, characterised as a second hydrocarbon exploration boom, supported 
by investor-friendly policies 67  that generated new REI contracts for the development of 
marginal sites, many again located within the selva (Finer et al. 2008 p. 2; Finer and Orta-
Martinez 2010; Vasquez 2014 p. 28). In 2003, just 28 oil and gas licences were granted, of 
which 7.1 per cent covered the Amazon selva region (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 p. 4; 
Vasquez 2014 p. 14). By the end of December 2009, 41.2 per cent of the selva was covered by 
oil and gas licenses that totalled 52 active hydrocarbon concessions (Finer and Orta-Martinez 
2010 pp. 3-4; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 208). When these Blocks are combined with the 
2010 bidding-round for 18 additional sites, 81 active and proposed oil and gas Blocks covered 
a staggering 70 per cent of the Peruvian Amazon (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 p. 4; Iannone 
2013 pp. 63-64; see also Figure 3.1) highlighting the scale of selva oil production and the higher 
likelihood of locating possible PEV case studies. 
 
However, these bidding rounds have not translated into practical benefits. Peru still 
does not produce enough oil to meet national consumption (Vasquez 2014 p. 29) but is 
                                                          
66 Production increased in the 1990s from 116,000 b/d in 1991 to a high of 128,000 b/d in 1994 before decreasing 
to 100,000 b/d in 2000 (BP 2002 p. 6), whilst proven oil reserves fell from 800,000 barrels in 1981 to 300,000 in 
2000 (ibid. p. 4). 
67 These included royalty rates as low as five per cent and the introduction in 2007 of a new system of competitive 
bidding which abandoned the one-one negotiations between Perupetro and selected oil companies (Vasquez 2014 
pp. 28-29). In 2005, Peru’s Congress also granted Petroperu complete autonomy to undertake exploration and 
development activities and to participate in the whole production chain of hydrocarbon activities in competition 
with other players (ibid. p. 31) signalling to private REIs that the state would no longer be given favourable 
treatment.  
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attempting to change this.68 Planned upgrades to the Talara refinery would allow the processing 
of the domestically produced heavy crude without needing to import expensive oil from abroad 
(Vasquez 2014 p. 29). Meanwhile, production in two key Loreton oil blocks; Block 67, which 
contains 35 per cent (324.8 million barrels) of the 928 million barrels of estimated reserves in 
Blocks 39, 64 and 67 and Block 63, which commenced production in 2013 and contains almost 
300,000 barrels of heavy crude, will also help combat the country’s oil deficit (MINEM 2012, 
cited in Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 5; Vasquez 2014 p. 29). This was forecast to lead 
to a substantial increase in oil production from the selva region from 2015 to 2018 (Perupetro 
2014 p. 14; see Figure 3.2) but has not been without complications or cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 From 2005-2015, production has fluctuated but overall increased; from 92,000 b/d in 2005 to 113,000 b/d in 
2015 (BP 2016 p. 8). However, during the same period, consumption has substantially risen year-on-year (except 
2006) rising from 152,000 b/d in 2005 to 243,000 b/d in 2015 (ibid. p. 9). 
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Figure 3.1: Contract operational Blocks and 2010 bidding round 
 
 
(Perupetro 2010).
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Figure 3.2: Petroleum production and forecast 1994-2018 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Perupetro 2014 p. 14).
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Many oil and gas concessions overlap existing and proposed reserves (dating from 
2000-09) (Table 3.5a, b) implemented through President Alan Garcia’s (2006-11) ‘aggressive’ 
neoliberal natural resource drive in the Amazon region (Stetson 2012 p. 78). One crucial piece 
of legislation was the 2006 Law for the Protection of Isolated Peoples in Voluntary Isolation 
(Law 28736) which allowed the “untouchable” character of protective reserves for people in 
voluntary isolation to be broken for natural resource exploitation ‘deemed by the state to be in 
the public interest’ (Finer et al. 2008 p. 6), whilst a series of almost 100 legislative decrees 
under the Free Trade Agreement with the USA facilitated the sale of inhabited lands to oil, gas 
and timber developers (Napolitano and Ryan 2007 p. 9; De La Pedraja 2016 p. 188). Finer, 
Jenkins and Powers (2013 p. 10) ‘found that nearly half (48 [per cent]) of the total hydrocarbon 
block area in Loreto overlaps at least one key ecological or social factor’ (protected area, 
indigenous territory, white-sand forests or the Nanay watershed), while 80 per cent of planned 
exploratory wells, 100 per cent of planned production platforms and 59 per cent of planned 
pipelines contain such an overlap. 
 
These measures helped cause the 2009 indigenous protest, which culminated in more radical 
action in which around 800 indigenous protestors took over oil and gas infrastructures, blocked 
access roads, and interrupted exports from the country’s oil production areas in Bagua 
Province, Amazonas Region (Stetson 2012 pp. 78-80; Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 
pp. 7-8; Vasquez 2014 p. 1).69 Unfortunately, on 5th June 2009, at least 32 protestors were 
killed and hundreds injured as Peruvian security forces clashed with the indigenous peoples. 
After international condemnation, the government agreed to rescind the contracts (and 
legislative decrees) and open the way for negotiation with the indigenous peoples (Schilling-
Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 pp. 9-11; Vasquez 2014 pp. 1-2).  
 
The radical collective voice actions pursued by Loreton indigenous citizens in defence 
of their territorial reserves and land titles shows why a PEV study exploring voice vis-à-vis 
environmental pollution issues can be deployed productively here. Vocal protest and social 
conflict (explored in Chapter 5, Section 5.1) has been and remains part of the fabric of Peruvian 
life and is caused not only by this aggressive neoliberal resource boom but also because of 
ongoing environmental contamination (discussed in this Chapter’s final section). This helps to 
                                                          
69  The indigenous demands centred around the restoration of land rights lost in amendments to the 1993 
constitution and the process of consultation (see Peru Support Group 2009; Vasquez 2014 pp. 82-83). 
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explain why former President Humala’s foreign investment drive for oil (Bucheli and Sommer 
2014 p. 146) have been largely ineffective. A 2013 bidding round was suspended due to a lack 
of investor interest and only seven Blocks were made available for international bidding in 
2014 (BMI Research 2014; Quesada 2014 p. 25) and only a further eight Blocks were 
announced in June-July 2015 (Quesada 2015 p. 20).  
 
Overall, Figure 3.3, a timeline of Peru’s key oil history events highlights the 
phenomenal change witnessed since petroleum’s discovery in 1863. From these humble 
beginnings, Peruvian oil production has undergone two hydrocarbon exploration booms in the 
selva region which has become the most significant area of petroleum production for the 
country. This final section will set out to explore this selva region of Peru in more detail and 
explain why it offers such a valuable case-study for PEV. 
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Table 3.5: a. Oil and gas concessions from 2000 to 2009 overlapping existing and proposed territorial reserves for indigenous people living in 
voluntary isolation b. Operating companies and existing and proposed territorial reserves for each oil and gas concession 
A           B   
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Oil and gas 
concession 
Operating 
company 
Territorial reserve 
Oil and gas 
concessions 
overlapping 
territorial 
reserves (TR) 
88 88 
99 
88 
99 
88 88 88 
113 
110 
88 
113 
110 
88 
113 
110 
138 
88 
113 
110 
138 
88 
113 
110 
138 
132A/ 
132B 
88 
113 
110 
138 
132A/ 
132B 
99 
Pluspetrol 
Sapet 
Petrobas 
Pacific Golden 
 
 
Perez Compac 
Kugapakori-Nahua TR 
Madre de Dios TR 
Murunahua TR 
Isconahua TR 
Isconahua TR 
 
Isconahua TR 
TR overlapped 
(ha) 
105,254 214,308 214,308 105,254 105,335 1,205,786 1,205,786 1,225,344 1,225,344 1,227,426    
TR overlapped 
(%) 
3.59 7.32 7.32 3.59 3.60 41.18 41.18 41.85 41.85 17.09    
Oil and gas 
concessions 
overlapping 
territorial 
reserves 
proposed (TR) 
31B 
39 
67 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
95 
104 
107 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
95 
104 
107 
121 
128 
117 
119 
120 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
95 
104 
107 
121 
128 
117 
119 
120 
135 
137 
142 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
95 
104 
107 
121 
128 
117 
145 
137 
142 
Area III 
31B 
39 
67 
31E 
95 
107 
121 
128 
117 
135 
137 
Area III 
132A/132B 
162 
133 
31B/31D 
39 
67 
31E 
95 
104 
107 
121 
128 
117 
119 
120 
135 
137 
142 
Maple 
Barrett/Repsol 
Barrett/Perenco 
Maple 
Harken 
Burlington 
Petrolifera 
Perenco 
Gran Tierra 
Petrobas 
Amerada Hess 
Amerada Hess 
Pacific 
Pacific 
Occidental 
Kapanawa TRP 
Napo Tigre TRP 
Napo Tigre TRP 
Kapanawa TRP 
Yavari Tapiche TRP 
Napo Tigre TRP 
Cacataibo TRP 
Napo Tigre TRP 
Yavari Mirim TRP 
Napo Tigre TRP 
Kapanawa TRP 
Kapanawa TRP 
Yavari Tapiche TRP 
Yavari Tapiche TRP 
Yavari Mirim TRP 
TRP overlapped 
(ha) 
775,113 813,105 813,105 813,105 775,667 873,673 1,621,141 3,477,160 3,488,471 2,594,844 132A/ 
132B 
Golden Kapanawa TRP/ 
Yavari Tapiche TRP 
TRP overlapped 
(%) 
18.39 19.29 19.29 19.29 18.40 20.73 38.46 82.49 82.76 60.92 162 
133 
PVEP 
Petrolifera 
Kapanawa TRP 
Cacataibo TRP 
 
(Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 210). 
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Figure 3.3: Timeline of key Peruvian oil history events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1863
-Oil first discovered in 
Peru on north-west coast.
1890-1930
-Production expanded at 
three key fields in the 
Piura region. 
-Take-off period of the 
Peruvian oil industry.
-International Petroleum 
Company purchases two of 
the three Piura oil fields.
1920-1930
-International Petroleum 
Company invest heavily in 
their Peruvian oil holdings. 
Become key operator of 
Peru.
-Oil production levels rise 
throughout the decade.
1930-1940
-Oil production continues 
to rise. Peru becomes a net 
exporter.
-First small selva well 
found.
1940-1960
-Second small selva well 
found.
-Domestic post-war 
demand for oil grows.
-North-west oil production 
continues to expand. 
However, cannot meet 
domestic demand.
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1960-1970
-Peru becomes a net 
importer. Oil production 
declines.
-International Petroleum 
Company nationalised by 
Peruvian government.
-Petroperu established.
1970-1980
-Petroperu uncover significant selva 
oil reserves. 
-Oleoducto Norperuano constructed.
-Sixteen selva Peruvian model 
contracts signed with REIs. However, 
initial discoveries disappointing and 
all companies bar Occidental 
Petroleum vacant the selva.
-Occidental Petroleum heavily invest 
in their Peruvian selva sites leading to 
the country’s first hydrocarbon 
exploration boom.
-Their production causes significant 
socio-environmental problems. 
-Petroperu’s performance declines 
towards the end of the decade.
1990-2000
-Peru becomes a net importer again.
-Neoliberal resource drive under 
President Fujimori. 
-1993 constitution reaffirms states 
ownership of subsoil mineral and 
hydrocarbon resources.
-Petroperu splits and Perupetro 
established.
-Despite large international investments, 
no new oil discoveries made. Production 
and proven oil reserves drop further.
2000-2016
-Second hydrocarbon boom. By 2010, 70 
per cent of the selva covered by oil and 
gas Blocks.
-Pluspetrol take over Occidental 
Petroleum selva oil wells (2000-2015). 
Socio-environmental contamination 
continues.
-2006 Dorissa Accord signed. Further 
agreements (2011, 2012) follow but 
government fails to implement them.
-190 oil pipeline spills across Peru, many 
in Loreto between 1997-2016.
- Seven oil spills occur along Oleoducto 
Norperuano in Loreto in 2016.
-Significant social protests occurring due 
to neoliberal laws (2009) and ongoing 
socio-environmental contamination 
stemming from oil production.
-Peru still importing oil to meet domestic 
demand.
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3.4 Loreto as a case study 
 
“[T]he exploitation of oil has changed greatly in the last years. What used to be done [40] 
years ago, is not what it is done now. What used to be done before was a brutality, a 
barbarity” (IUA1 anthropologist at the Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonia 
Peruana (Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon) and former government employee 
in the office of the Prime Minister). 
 
Peru’s Amazon forms part of the wider western Amazonia region, which encompasses areas of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and western Brazil (Finer et al. 2008 p. 1).  This region maintains 
large tracts of intact tropical moist forest that have a high probability of stable climatic conditions 
in the face of global warming (Killeen et al. 2007 cited in Finer et al. 2008 p. 1). It is also one of 
the most biodiverse areas of the world (Terborgh et al. 1990; Patton et al. 2000; Pitman et al. 2002; 
Lucky, Erwin and Witman 2006). 
 
Peru contains a significant portion of this western Amazon region. The FAO’s most recent 
(2015) report for Peru stated it had a forest area of 73,793 hectares, which covers 58 per cent of 
Peru’s landmass area. These hectares give it the second largest area of rainforest after Brazil (FAO 
2016 p. 17). Of this forest area, 19,674 hectares (27 per cent) have been designated primarily for 
conservation of biodiversity (placing it tenth internationally), whilst a further 18,844 hectares (25 
per cent) lie within protected areas (placing it ninth internationally) (ibid. pp. 29-30). It is home to 
52 of the country’s 55 indigenous groups (the latter encompassing 14 per cent or more than 4 
million people of the country’s 28.2 million inhabitants) split between several different ethnic 
groups organised in 1,786 communities (Agurto and Marino 2016 p. 156). 
 
Several of Peru’s regional political bodies incorporate this selva basin, including 
Amazonas, Cajamarca, Huánaco, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Puno, San Martin and Ucayali. However, 
the largest region and the one encompassing the greatest proportion of the western Amazon basin 
is Loreto, a territory covering nearly 369,000 square kilometres (Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 
p. 2) making it larger than Germany and almost the size of Montana (ibid. p. 10) (Figure 3.4). 
Loreto has an overall population of approximately 1 million people, with ‘[45 per cent] liv[ing] in 
the regional capital … with the remainder dwelling in over 2,000 small, often remote, river-edge 
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communities along the Amazon’ (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 180). This region is integral to Peru’s 
selva oil operations and became the primary location of fieldwork. 
 
Figure 3.4: Case-study area 
 
 
 (Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 2). 
 
Loreto, like other regions of Peru, encompasses regional and local decision-making power 
mechanisms.70 ‘Regional governments are elected by popular vote and are organised following the 
                                                          
70 The 1993 Peruvian constitution established Peru as a decentralised but unitary state with three levels of government 
encompassing national, regional and local levels of governance (see Articles 43 and 189) (Constituteproject 2009 pp. 
15 and 48). 
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political “departments”71 to organise and conduct regional public management’ (Fernandini and 
Sousa 2015 p. 3).72 Iquitos serves as the regional capital of the Gobierno Regional de Loreto 
(Regional Government of Loreto, GOREL). Local governments are also elected by popular vote, 
with the term referring ‘to both Provincial [Provincia] and District [Distrito] governments, with 
Districts housed within Provinces’ (ibid. p. 4).73  Each Province and District have their own 
Provincial and District capitals. In Loreto, there are eight Provinces split into 53 Districts.74  
 
 Loreto has many exploration and production wells, with the latter predominantly focused 
on three oil Blocks (Blocks 8, 31 and 192) (see Apendix 1a, b). Blocks 8 and 1AB (now Block 
192 since August 2015) have been the longest-running oil Blocks in the selva. Unfortunately, this 
has led to huge environmental costs, particularly in these two Blocks. Block 1AB had initially been 
signed in the 1970s to Occidental Petroleum (1971-2000) before being taken over by Pluspetrol 
(2000-2015) and most recently Pacific Stratus Energy (2015-2017) when it became Block 192 in 
August 2015.75 According to a chemical engineering professor at Iquitos’ Universidad Nacional 
de la Amazonia Peruana (National University of the Peruvian Amazon) with extensive knowledge 
                                                          
71  On Peruvian independence in 1826, the republic was divided into eight Departments, which subsequently 
fragmented into 18 in less than half a century and most recently stood at 25 (Thorp and Paredes 2010 pp. 12-13). 
These Departments are, in turn, divided into Provinces which also followed the same tendency, rising from 50 to 100 
units and close to 200 today (Contreras and Cueto 1999, cited in Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 13). To rectify this, by 
2002, 25 “Regions” have been created using the boundaries of the previous Departments (though the original 25 
Departments are still the main way of describing regional aspects of Peru) (Thorp and Paredes 2010 pp. 13-14). For 
the sake of consistency, this thesis will use the term Region.  
72 Regional governments encompass the following bodies: Regional Council which is ‘[t]he regional government’s 
policy-making and supervisory body … composed of regional [councillors] elected by direct vote for a period of four 
years;’ Regional President ‘is the regional government executive body …. elected by direct vote along with the vice 
president for a term of four years;’ and lastly a Regional Coordination Council which ‘is the regional government’s 
coordinating and advisory entity with local governments and civil society. It is made up of the region’s provincial 
mayors and representatives of civil society organisations’ (Fernandini and Sousa 2015 p. 3). 
73 ‘The Provincial Municipality has jurisdiction over the territory of the province and the District Municipality has 
jurisdiction over the territory of the district. It is relevant to note that the district territory is physically smaller than 
the provincial one’ (Fernandini and Sousa 2015 footnote 25 p. 4). The basic structure of the local government includes: 
The Municipal Council (a ‘policy-making and supervisory board of local government’ formed by the mayor and a 
number of councillors), Mayors Office (‘the executive entity of local government’ with the mayor ‘legal representative 
of local government and its highest administrative authority’ elected every four years) and the Local Co-ordination 
bodies encompassing ‘The Local Co-ordination Council (provincial or district) and the Neighbourhood 
Correspondents Meeting [which] are in charge of promoting public participation mechanisms’ (ibid. p. 4). 
74 The eight Provinces and bracketed Provincial capitals are Alto Amazonas (Yurimaguas), Datem del Marañón (San 
Lorenzo), Loreto (Nauta), Mariscal Ramón Castilla (Caballochocha), Maynas (Iquitos), Requena (Requena), Ucayali 
(Contamana) and Putumayo (San Antonio del Estrecho). Given the focus on Loreto Region, only the District and 
Provinces for cited Loreto locations are mentioned unless occurring outside of the case-study region. 
75 However, a series of violent strikes in the Region has forced the government to begin proceedings to transfer the 
Block to Petroperu (see Ojeda 2015). 
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of the oil-industry and these two Blocks, when production commenced there was no ‘regulation 
on how to preserve the environment [and] nothing to tell them the limits’ or seek to control of 
environmental pollution (IUA2). Contaminated water was dumped into rivers (CBO1R1; 
CBO3R1; FOPOW1; FOPOW2; FOPOW3; IUA2; IUA3; NGO1R1; NSI4R1; NSI7R1; RGR1; 
RGR3), a practice that saw Occidental Petroleum dump 9 billion barrels (850,000 barrels a day) 
of contaminated water in its three decades of operations (Amazon Watch no date). For IUA2, this 
has helped create a very slow polluting effect, termed “pollution by passives”, which remain 
hidden below surface level for “20, 30 or 40 years” (IUA2). Natural weather events like rain help 
to filter the pollution further underground where it will join rivers, lakes and other water sources 
(ibid.), thus dispersing it further.76 The extent of the contamination in these two Blocks alone 
shows why Loreto’s selva is such a suitable Region from which to conduct a PEV-based study 
surrounding oil pollution issues.  
 
Numerous reports and research articles have documented indigenous peoples’ decreasing 
living standards – visible in their health problems, including increased concentrations of metals 
(barium, cadmium, lead and mercury) and hydrocarbons in surface water and river sediment 
(NSI7R1; MINEM 1998; Direccion General de Salud Ambiental e Inocuidad Alimentaria 
(General Director’s Office of Environmental Health, DIGESA) 2006; La Torre Lopez and 
Napolitano 2007 p. 110; Anticona et al. 2011; Anticona, Bergdahl and San Sebastian 2012; 
Huaynate 2012; Reátegui-Zirena et al. 2012; Congreso de la República del Peru (Congress of the 
Republic of Peru) 2012-2013; Ministerio del Ambiente del Peru (Ministry of Environment of Peru, 
MINAM) 2013; Fraser 2016a). The environmental degradation has also had a significant impact 
on their food security surrounding fish and game animals (e.g. having to go longer distances to 
find uncontaminated food sources), which are the main sources of protein for local people but are 
affected by the same contaminated water (NSI7R1; NGO4R2a; Reátegui-Zirena et al. 2012; 
Congreso de la República del Peru (Congress of the Republic of Peru) 2012-2013 p. 34). This has 
contributed to malnutrition (Orta-Martínez et al. 2007 p. 34) and a high suicide rate among 
                                                          
76 FOPOW2, a former Occidenta Petrolem community relations officer, believed that ongoing pollution events in selva 
operating sites was historic Occidental Petroeum contamination and not “because of [REI] ill maintenance.” Though 
there is some validity to this argument given IUA2’s comments, this is not entirely correct. For example, between 
2009 and 2012, 25 oil spills in Block 1AB resulted from ‘the corrosion of old pipelines and the overflow of storage 
tanks’ (Lu 2016 p. 104).   
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indigenous communities (Congreso de la República del Peru (Congress of the Republic of Peru) 
2012-2013 p. 34). Sexual abuses, illegal logging, and hunting and commercialisation of bushmeat 
causing overexploitation to the detriment of indigenous peoples’ livelihoods and accusations of 
forced relocation by REIs have also been reported (NSI7R1; Napolitano and Ryan 2007 pp. 6-7; 
Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 211).  
 
Protests by quechua indigenous77 residents finally forced the government and Pluspetrol to 
complete several negotiated agreements with the affected citizens surrounding REI operational 
practices and remediation and socio-economic development for the affected areas.78 Sadly, the 
government’s failure to honour its parts of the agreements (e.g. GORELs administration of PID 
funds) and Pluspetrol’s lack of compliance on remediation led to the resumption of various 
indigenous protests (IUA1; NGO4R2a; Vasquez 2014 p. 99; Lu 2016 pp. 98-100). These, in turn, 
forced the state to establish a Comisión Multisectorial (Multi-sectoral Commission) in 2012 to 
investigate the oil contamination in Loreto (NSI1R1a; NSI2R1).79 Their work in the four cuencas 
incorporating Blocks 8 and 192 (Corrientes, Marañón, Pastaza, and Tigre) resulted in the Pastaza 
                                                          
77 The largest indigenous people of Peru. 
78 In October 2006, the Dorissa Accord was agreed between Pluspetrol, the national and regional government, the 
Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman, DDP) (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1, Footnote 114) and affected 
indigenous groups (Vasquez 2014 p. 99). The stipulations included: Pluspetrol would reinject contaminated waters 
into the subsoil from Blocks 1AB and 8; Pluspetrol would pay 40,169,986 soles (Peru’s national currency) (ca. $14.4 
million) over a ten-year period to fund a comprehensive health plan via the Ministry of Health’s regional office; 
Loreto’s GOREL would construct a hospital in Villa Trompeteros (District capital of Trompeteros, Loreto Province) 
funded by Pluspetrol; Loreto’s GOREL would prepare, lead and execute a comprehensive development plan 
(Programa Integral de Desarrollo, PID) in the river basis for 11 million soles (ca. $3.94 million) (Bebbington and 
Scurrah 2013 p. 183). Further agreements were also signed; the May 2011 Pastaza accord between GOREL and 
Federation of Native Communities of Alto Tigre (FECONAT) committed GOREL ‘to persuade Pluspetrol to draft a 
work plan’ addressing local people’s environmental concerns and complying with the agreements (Lu 2016 p. 95) and 
the June 2012 Accord of Topal between the national government and FECONAT in which the government agreed 
‘that within ten – fifteen days it would create a “high-level” commission to (a) conduct a health campaign in Alianza 
Topal [village in Andoas District, Datem del Marañón Province] and address the health concerns of the people living 
in the Corrientes, Tigre, Pastaza and Marañón river basins; and (b) draft a comprehensive health plan for the 
aforementioned communities.’ To date, the enforcement of these agreements has been incomplete (ibid. p. 97) helping 
to generate ongoing social protest (i.e. radical voice) indigenous responses.  
79 The Multi-sectoral Commission combined a number of relevant government bodies (Autoridad Nacional del Agua 
(National Authority of Water, ANA), Consejo de ministros, (Council of Ministers (this encompasses all the Ministers 
of State presided over by a President, a position akin to a Prime Minister)), DIGESA, MINEM, Organismo de 
Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental (Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement, OEFA), Organismo 
Supervisor de la Inversión en Energia y Minería (Supervisory Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining, 
OSINERGMIN) (NSI1R1a) and indigenous federations alongside their affiliated organisations (such as E-Tech 
International which was an independent observer) (NGO1R1) in order to assess the environmental and social impacts 
within the four river basins (see MINEM no date; MINAM no date). “Each [state] institution produces a report” which 
is presented in a commission meeting to the Council of Ministers who decide what action to take (NSI1R1a). 
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Cuenca being classified as an environmental disaster area in March 2013 with subsequent 
environmental emergencies declared in the Corrientes and Tigre Cuencas (Collyns 2013; Lewis 
2014; Hill 2015a) and an action plan for the affected areas.80 Again, despite these announcements, 
remediation work and development plans have not been implemented, causing further indigenous 
protests (see Collyns 2014; Cultural Survival 2015a).81 The context of this PEV-based study, 
namely exploring responses taken by citizens and other stakeholders to environmental pollution, 
underscores why the widespread social harm (predominantly impacting upon indigenous citizens) 
and resulting social protests makes this such a valuable place to site the study.  
 
Environmental and social problems are not just limited to these sites. The Oleoducto 
Norperuano and connecting pipelines operated by Petroperu have also been a source of huge socio-
environmental damage, primarily due to their age and poor maintenance (CBO4R1a; CBO4R3; 
IRC1; IRC3; NGO7R1; NSI1R1b). From 1997 to 12 August 2016, OSINERGMIN registered 190 
oil pipeline spills across the country (although 67 of these were attributed to sabotage) (Hill 2016a). 
The Amazon region has been a major source of these pipeline breakages. Since 2011, 21 oil spills 
have taken place directly attributable to Petroperu with the most recent year (2016) having seven 
oil spills reported in Loreto and neighbouring regions (Peru Support Group 2016a; b; c; d; Law in 
Action no date).82 The huge number of Amazon contamination events combined with the essential 
role that the Oleoducto Norperuano plays in Loreto’s (and wider Peru’s) oil production provides 
an extremely useful platform from which to conduct a PEV-based study. Indeed, one of the 
                                                          
80 MINAM ‘coordinated new action plans for the area that included the installation of emergency health services, 
provision of drinking water, assessments and rehabilitation of the areas affected by effluent discharges and/or oil spills, 
an environmental monitoring system and surveillance of priority areas’ (Lu 2016 p. 108). 
81 A representative from ANA noted that in 2014, GOREL’s refusal to provide any additional funds to Direccion 
Regional de Salud (Loreto Regional Directorate of Health, DIRESA) meant that “[t]hey couldn’t deliver water kits 
…. [and] couldn’t develop the health services in the area” (NSI1R1a). 
82 The first spill took place on the 25 January near Chiriaco and Imaza indigenous communities located in Imaza 
District, Bagua Province, Amazonas Region. Six indigenous communities were directly affected with contamination 
occurring in the Rios Inayo, Chiriaco and Marañón. The second spill took place on the 3 February in Morona District, 
Datem del Marañón Province, and spilt over 2,000 barrels into the Rios Mayuriaga and Morona. A 90-day health 
emergency was declared in relation to drinking water in both cases (Peru Support Group 2016c). A third oil spill was 
reported on the 24 June spilling approximately 600 barrels and affecting an estimated 400 people from Barranca 
District, Datem del Marañón Province (Peru Support Group 2016d). The fourth spill occurred in early August affecting 
the Uchichiangos indigenous community located in Nieve District, Condorcanqui Province, Amazonas Region (Vélez 
2016). Two further spills of an estimated 4,000 barrels occurred in late August near Nueva Alianza in Urarinas District, 
Loreto Province (Fraser 2016b) with a further spill in September, the last two blamed on vandalism by Petroperu. 
Together, all seven incidents have spilt an estimated 10,000 barrels of oil (Law in Action 2016; Peru Support Group 
2016b). 
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pipeline’s most significant oil spills, occurring near the village of Cuninico in 2014, became one 
of the primary case-studies for this thesis (see Photographs 3.1; 3.2).  
 
Photograph 3.1 View of the Oleoducto Norperuano after the Cuninico oil spill.83 
 
 
Photograph 3.2 Snake covered in oil after the Cuninico spill. 
 
                                                          
83 For Chapter 3 photograph sources see Footnote 3. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall, this chapter has traced Peru’s oil history and analysed the Loreton oil producing region in 
greater depth. Oil remains an important cornerstone of Peru’s economic and energy output and has 
also played a central role in shaping the country’s politics, visible in the political influence that the 
International Petroleum Company could wield in the early-mid Twentieth Century through to the 
1968 coup against President Belaúnde by Army Chief of Staff, General Alvarado. Yet despite the 
grand neoliberal selva resource extraction drive implemented by successive governments, 
Peruvian Amazonian oil development has not been able to replicate the country’s early-mid 
Twentieth Century’s north-western onshore production successes, a situation exacerbated by 
increased national demand. 
 
The state, via Petroperu, has been the primary driver of the growth of selva oilfield 
development and therefore makes the company worthy of investigation for this PEV study. Its 
long-running control of the extensive Oleoducto Norperuano, arguably the most important but also 
most difficult part of Peru’s oil infrastructure to maintain, stands as a testament to selva oil 
development. However, its age and poor maintenance have made it a huge source of ongoing 
environmental contamination in Loreto and this situation served as an important catalyst for focus 
on one such pollution event in Cuninico.  
 
The difficult operational selva conditions for REIs, combined with the non-existent 
regulatory structure, continues to cause significant environmental costs throughout Loreto which 
impact upon local, predominantly indigenous people. Indeed, the history of broken promises, 
absence of concrete action and ongoing oil spills had culminated, since late September 2016 in ‘an 
indefinite protest’ by various indigenous peoples (including the Achuar, Cocamas, Kichwa and 
Urarina),84 numbering at least 2,000 Indians (Hill 2016a). This action is centred on the Oleoducto 
Norperuano pumping Station 1 at San José de Saramuro (but also encompasses a blockade of the 
Rio Marañón and the detaining of tourist and provision boats) to request discussion with central 
                                                          
84 The Achuar reside either side of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border, the Kichwa are part of the much larger Quechua 
people of South America and the Urarina inhabit the Chambirai, Corrientes and Urituyacu river basins. 
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government over these issues and the wider viability of Loreton oil activity (Hill 2016a; Peru 
Support Group 2016b). 
 
The long-running and wide-ranging nature of oil production here and the unfortunately 
high number of documented historic and recent oil spills and contamination, show clearly why 
Loreto and Petroperu offered such an interesting place and actor to base a PEV study on oil 
pollution incidents. Chapter Four will now continue this analysis by focusing on the Methodology 
used for PEV in Loreto and expanding upon the choice of fieldwork locations in this region. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
‘I have no doubts today that qualitative research is heart work, but it also has a 
powerfully political potential’ (Aitken 2010 p. 47). 
 
This chapter examines the methodology developed for this thesis. It comprises three key 
sections. Section 4.1 provides a general overview of the differences between quantitative and 
qualitative methods and philosophies and my choice of qualitative research and my critical 
geography philosophical outlook. Section 4.2 starts by describing the multi-method qualitative 
approaches used in the research, before moving on to discuss gatekeepers and fieldwork case 
studies (Section 4.2.1), gathering data and data collection levels (Section 4.2.2), interview 
guides and interview questions (Section 4.2.3), audio recordings, interpreters, translators and 
positionality (Section 4.2.4) and ethical considerations (Section 4.2.5). Lastly, Section 4.3 
describes the qualitative data analysis methods used within the thesis.  
 
4.1 Quantitative and qualitative research methods and philosophies  
 
The nature of PEV lends itself to methods that can harness this focus on voice and it is clear 
that the qualitative school and SSIs alongside micro-geography analysis offer approaches that 
can be used appropriately with the different stakeholder groups. To understand how this 
conclusion has been drawn, I provide a brief narrative of the quantitative school and the 
important role that ontological85 and epistemological86 questions play for me.  
 
For decades, there was deep division in academic quarters between quantitative 
(geographic) research methods and the ‘soft approaches’ of qualitative (geographic) processes 
(Newman and Benz 1998 p. 2; Openshaw 1998 p. 317; Martin 2001; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004 p. 14) with qualitative approaches criticised for lacking scientific rigour 
(Mays and Pope 1995 p. 109; Berg and Lune 2014 pp. 3-5). However, Twenty-First Century 
academics now recognise that both traditions simply ‘represent different ontological and 
epistemological approaches to knowledge and data’ (DeLyser et al. 2010 p. 6), highlighting 
that the division was philosophical (i.e. ontological) in nature rather than methodological 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000 pp. 8-10; Kraus 2005 p. 759). Even so, academics have stressed that 
                                                          
85 See Lowe (2007). 
86 See Schommer-Aikins (2004). 
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consideration must be given to the theoretical research paradigm87 that guides the investigator 
in the choice of methods and these ontological and epistemological questions (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994 p. 105).  
 
Quantitative research is most often associated (though by no means exclusively) with 
the philosophy of (post)-positivism that is utilised within the naturalist school of thought 
(Graham 2005; Hubbard et al. 2005 pp. 31-32; Kitchin 2006). This paradigm’s belief that there 
is only one truth (namely the world as it exists), observation and measurement of data and 
collection of things that are known to exist (Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil 2002 p. 44; Sale and 
Brazil 2004 p. 353; Hubbard et al. 2005 p. 29) would make little sense for PEV, with its focus 
on drawing out stakeholder opinions and ideas. Instead, anti-naturalism offers greater evidence 
of the suitability of qualitative methodologies.   
 
Anti-naturalism ‘unmask[s] the alleged objectivity of all forms of research, including 
science’ (Wicks and Freeman 1998 p. 127) and holds that ‘[s]ocially transmitted concepts and 
names direct how reality is perceived and structured’ (Goles and Hirschheim 2000 p. 252; see 
also Black 2002 pp. 2-3). This approach is more aligned with qualitative research, the premise 
of which is to ‘understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular context and the 
interactions there’ (Patton 1985 p. 1, cited in Merriam 2002 p. 5).  
 
Moreover, anti-naturalism does not reduce people, settings, and groups to variables but 
views them holistically, with the researcher getting to know people personally, experience what 
they experience in their daily struggles and learn about concepts such as pain, faith, suffering 
and love (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 8) and in this case voice. Qualitative researchers require 
methods that can access these personal experiences in an ever-changing world (DeLyser et al. 
2010 p. 6), enable the researcher to experience the world as they experience it (Taylor and 
Bogdan 1998 p. 7) and understand the person’s worldview in its current or “live” setting. 
 
The researcher’s function as the primary instrument for data collection and analysis 
(Merriam 2002 p. 5) has several notable impacts; the interaction with people and places 
invariably affects our array of senses that makes it impossible to be detached from data 
collection (DeLyser et al. 2010 p. 7) impacting positionality (see Section 4.2.4), places great 
                                                          
87 See Guba and Lincoln (1994 pp. 107-108). 
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importance on ethical considerations within data collection (see Section 4.2.5) and reinforces 
why the researcher must be clear on their own philosophical outlook. In this case, it is critical 
geography.  
 
While lacking a distinctive theoretical identity, critical geography brings together those 
working from different approaches with a shared commitment to exposing the social-spatial 
processes that reproduce inequalities between people and places. A significant focus is on the 
study of social, cultural, economic or political relations and the way they change to create 
uneven, unjust and exploitative geographies (see Harvey 1996; Proctor and Smith 1999; 
Glassman 2010; 2011) so includes engagement with moral philosophy, social, and 
environmental justice (Hubbard et al. 2005 p. 62). This is part of a broader shift towards 
emphasis on investigation into the multiple axes of power which are fluid, fragmented and 
socially constructed, the way these create social and economic divides and its impact on 
marginalised groups within society (ibid. p. 63).  
 
Two facets of this school are important for this research and which again reinforce why 
critical geography offers excellent integration into PEV. The first is political ecology, which 
has already been discussed in relation to Hirschman’s voice theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
The second is the geography of domination and resistance, in which socio-spatial processes 
serve to oppress certain groups socially, politically and economically, leading to resistance 
through activism, civil disobedience, the use of formal political systems (Hubbard et al. 2005 
pp. 69-73) or even everyday practices (a spoken word or movement) (see de Certeau 1981, 
cited in Hubbard et al. 2005 p. 69). While the former’s links to PEV are clear, the latter’s focus 
on resistance to domination through radical voice acts shows it is undoubtedly an important 
theoretical feature of PEV deserving mention. 
 
Thus, qualitative research through a critical theoretical perspective offers the most 
relevant and useful approach for this thesis. The qualitative focus on understanding 
contextually unique situations make its methods ideally suited to an investigation based on 
current, past and future periods in a specific geographical, cultural and social environment. The 
approach will enable the voices of Loreton citizens to be heard and make critical geography’s 
emphasis on the exploration of inequalities and environmental justice an integral perspective 
from which conclusions can be drawn.  
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4.2 Multi-method qualitative research; semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and 
micro-geography analysis 
 
‘The reason why we have two ears and only one mouth is that we may listen the more 
and talk the less’ (Greek philosopher Zeno of Citium in 300 B.C., cited in Patton 1987 
p. 108). 
 
Qualitative data methods offer researchers a vast array of options. I used a multi-method 
qualitative approach, a system that can be applied to the standard domain of qualitative work 
(Collier and Elman 2008 p. 782) and has been successfully employed in a range of fields (see 
Darbyshire, MacDougall and Schiller 2005; Palakshappa and Gordon 2006). While the 
implementation of multiple methods can be complex (Hoggart, Lees and Davies 2002 p. 69), 
they are still deployed in qualitative studies due to several interconnecting factors.  
 
Many of the qualitative methods ‘can only provide a partial account and may require 
… [supplementation] by other data’ (Morgan et al. 2002 p. 18). A multi-method approach 
partially overcomes the deficiencies that flow from using a single method (Denzin 2009 p. 300) 
which at the same time enhances the internal reliability and validity of qualitative research 
(Mathison 1988 p. 13; Eisenhardt 1989 pp. 537-538; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 80; Denzin 
2009 p. 300; Suter 2012 p. 309). Furthermore, due to the interdisciplinary nature of social 
problems, the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to enhance the potential 
for understanding meaning and behaviour (Harrison and Livingstone 1980 p. 28; Hoggart, Lees 
and Davies 2002 p. 67) and allowing the ‘multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed 
and understood’ (Baxter and Jack 2008 p. 544). Indeed, it is important to note that SSIs cannot 
hope to capture all the data that could prove valuable for analysis; a recording of a conversation 
between the researcher and a participant does not include the physical or emotive gestures and 
expressions that are apparent when we converse or the wider socio-economic personal, family 
and community circumstances which are integral to PEV.  
 
A multi-method approach can seek to capture this “non-spoken data” in order to 
strengthen the scope, scale and validity of my research findings. Academics have cautioned 
however, that it is not about using diverse data sources as such but about using complementary 
mechanisms that utilise separate means of information collection to highlight different aspects 
of the research problem (Hoggart, Lees and Davies 2002 p. 71; Berg and Lune 2014 pp. 5-8). 
My multi-method approach utilises SSIs supported by micro-geography analysis. 
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Unlike other qualitative methods, interviewing can usually be completed in a shorter 
period, which can make efficient use of researcher’s possible fieldwork time constraints 
(Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 91). Despite the time efficiency for researchers, it does not mean 
that it is a justification for superficial research (ibid.); great pains must be taken in the choice 
of fieldwork location and its accessibility for my data collection, the structure of SSI questions, 
the type of interview supporting equipment used and wider ethical considerations. Before these 
aspects are discussed we must examine what interviewing entails. 
 
‘Interviewing may be defined simply as a conversation with a purpose’ (Berg and Lune 
2014 p. 105). It ‘allows the evaluator to enter another person’s world, to understand that 
person’s perspective’ (Patton 1987 p. 109). Qualitative interviewing techniques, such as SSIs, 
are powerful and flexible tools which are useful for studying specific situations (Laforest 2009 
p. 1; Rabionet 2011 p. 563) and provide a method through which we can learn about things that 
we cannot directly observe such as thoughts, feelings, intentions or behaviours (Patton 1987 p. 
109). Again, these are relevant to PEV.  
 
The use of interviews places responsibility on the interviewer to provide a framework 
that will allow people to respond comfortably, accurately and honestly to questions, with the 
quality of the obtained information largely dependent on the interviewer (ibid.) and interview 
approach. SSIs have several advantages over structured and unstructured interviews.88 Unlike 
structured interviews, SSIs allow a freedom of digression for researchers to probe beyond 
answers to their prepared structured questions (Berg and Lune 2014 p. 112). Moreover, while 
researchers will make every effort to formulate their structured questions in words familiar to 
the interviewee, the SSI approach enables the researcher to adjust the level of language of 
structured or unscheduled probes that may arise from the interview itself (ibid.).  
 
Conversely, unstructured interviews offer the same highly adaptable system to 
interviewing but require a great deal of time to get systematic information (Patton 1987 p. 110) 
and run the risk of not eliciting the necessary information from participants. SSIs provide 
greater scope for this but also make sure that the participant stories are heard (Rabionet 2011 
                                                          
88 See Petterson and Durivage (2008 pp. 8-11) on structured interviews and Berg (2007 pp. 94-95) on unstructured 
interviews.   
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p. 564) which is imperative as it is through these stories that their opinion and experiences can 
be gained (Ramirez-Rubio et al. 2013 p. 2).  
 
 Pre-fieldwork, the decision was taken to utilise individual SSI interviews over group 
interviews or focus group discussions89 for two key reasons. Due to my intermediate level of 
Spanish, I conducted SSIs with an interpreter, which made individual interviews a more 
manageable process by preventing them from having to act as a facilitator and moderator in 
group/focus group interviews and helped me to concentrate on each interviewee’s responses. I 
also felt that single interviews would allow interviewees to focus solely on their own personal 
experiences and opinions which could become muddled or lost in group/ focus group 
interviews.   
 
 Overall, this strategy was deployed successfully during my 2015 fieldwork. Of the 110 
interviews conducted with 105 interviewees, 90  75 were in Spanish and of these 56 were 
conducted with only one interviewee. 91  However, there were instances where two (13 
interviews), three (two interviews), four (three interviews) and five (one interview) 
interviewees were present. The reasons behind this are varied but are due to the practical 
constraints of fieldwork. Some were focus groups born out of data collection necessity (e.g. in 
the case of Cuninico interviews IRC26-IRC29, it was my last day in the pueblo and I needed 
to speak to several older women to hear more of their voices) and data collection opportunity 
(e.g. I interviewed four members of Red de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes (National Network of 
Children and Adolescents) (REDNNA) (CBO2R1-4) after I was invited to meet them by one 
                                                          
89 See Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 113-115). 
90 A representative from the NGO, The Peru Mission, had three interviews labelled a, b, c (NGO21a, b, c). A 
similar categorisation was used for the ANA national government agency spokesperson (NSI1R1) (two 
interviews), NGO ProNaturaleza representative 2 (NGO4R2) (two interviews) (who was involved in a colleague’s 
interview (NGO4R1) but had their own separate interview) and Catholic Church interviewee 1 (CBO4R1) who 
answered several supplementary questions over email after fieldwork had finished. Finally, two indigenous 
Cuninico women and one man made passing remarks in three interviews but were not directly interviewed and so 
are not part of this total. They have been labelled “indigenous resident of Cuninico participant n” (IRCPn) in the 
thesis.  
91 Each participant was given a coded category. This was based on a combination of their broad professional 
occupation, ethnicity, geographical location and the number of the organisation and interviewee (n). The main 
codes are as follows: mestizo (mixed-race) resident of Barrio Florido n (MRBFn), indigenous resident of Cuninico 
n (IRCn), national state institution n representative n (NSInRn), regional government representative n (RGRn), 
CBO n representative n (CBOnRn), NGO n representative n (NGOnRn). For other smaller groups of interviewed 
professionals and groups, the following codes have been used: Iquitos university academic n (IUAn), non-case 
study selva citizen n (NCSSCn), former Occidental Petroleum oil worker n (FOPOWn), Iquitos university student 
n (IUSn), Iquitos legal professional n (ILPn), Iquitos construction worker n (ICWn), Iquitos journalist n (IJn) and 
former indigenous resident of Cuninico n (FIRCn). See Appendix 4 for the coded interviews categories and name 
and information on each government, CBO and NGO organisation. 
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of my interpreters). Other scheduled interviews with a CBO/NGO representative evolved into 
interviews with two interviewees (e.g. I was only expecting to interview Catholic Church 
representative 1 (CBO4R1) but also ended up interviewing a second representative (CBO4R2), 
whilst other such instances were due to circumstance (e.g. in Barrio Florido and Cuninico, 
some citizens would sit together outside their homes and would be interviewed in pairs or small 
groups since anything else would have been perceived as rude). 
 
 Despite my pre-fieldwork concerns, these group interviews proved to be as useful as 
the single-interviewee discussions. Aside from the second participant confirming specific facts 
raised by the other interviewee, focus/group interviews also gave some interviewees, 
particularly indigenous women, the confidence to participate. However, I didn’t wish to 
conduct all my citizen interviews in this manner for two reasons; the latter problem wasn’t an 
issue for every indigenous female and there could have been a possibility of detracting from 
individual voice, particularly with the complexities of conducting these through an interpreter. 
My own judgement based upon the context of each interview was thus key.  
 
  Regardless of their nature, SSIs cannot ever fully capture voice in all its complexity 
and contextual detail. Instead, the use of SSIs provided a snapshot of a participant’s voice but 
in a way which is less prescribed than structured interviews and considered (as much as 
possible) my own language barrier. These points help to underscore why it was important to 
support the SSIs through a complementary approach that can strengthen and enhance data 
collection. Given the importance that personal, family and community socio-economic 
circumstances have in PEV, participant observation92 was an obvious methodology to consider. 
However, the short fieldwork period and intermittent Barrio Florido and Cuninico community 
visits meant that there would have been only limited time to use this method effectively. 
Instead, a form of participatory observation was operated within the SSIs themselves to 
formulate my multi-method approach. 
 
 A fascinating article by Elwood and Martin (2000) discuss how the sites of interviews 
produce ‘micro-geographies’ encompassing ‘spatial relations and meaning, where multiple 
                                                          
92 ‘Participant observation is used to cover a mixture of observation and interviewing’ to ‘understand how the 
cultures they are studying ‘work’, that is, to grasp what the world looks like to the people who live in the fishing 
village, the boarding school or the mining community’ (Delamont 2007 p. 206).  
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scales of social relations intersect in the research interview’ (p. 649). In essence, the interview 
site is not removed from social and cultural contexts that operate at or through other levels but 
instead provides a ‘microscale of socialspatial relations’ that manifest in ‘the intersection of 
broader power dynamics – at multiple scales, such as the neighbourhood, city, region, and so 
on – with the social relations constructed in the interview setting’ (ibid. p. 650). In many 
respects, micro-geographies are similar to efforts to form an impression management (e.g. see 
Leary 1996) of each individual, how they view themselves and/or want to be viewed by others 
and what this tells you about them (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 76) all of which underscore 
why micro-geography analysis is so useful. 
 
These micro-geographies ‘provide an important opportunity for researchers to make 
observations that generate richer and more detailed information than can be gleaned from the 
interview content alone’ (Elwood and Martin 2000 p. 653). Interviews conducted in Barrio 
Florido and Cuninico citizens’ homes ‘enable researchers to enrich their understanding of 
explanations offered by participants’ (ibid. p. 652). For instance, through a written journal (see 
Section 4.2.4), I was able to record information surrounding their economic status and 
livelihoods which fed into research analysis (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1). Micro-geographies 
also helped to situate a participant in relation to other actors and their own multiple identities 
and roles which affected the information communicated in the interview and thus the power 
dynamics of the interview itself (ibid. pp. 652-653). This was noticeable in interviews with 
collective (CBO1R1; NGO2R1; NGO3R1) and instutional (government) (NSI2R1) employees 
which were often conducted in their home away from their professional office and at times 
afforded very open answers to questions that would not have been handled in the same way in 
a professional capacity (e.g. the OEFA spokesperson (NSI2R1)).  
 
Linked to this was consideration of where the interview locations themselves were 
chosen. 93  Giving interviewees the choice of interview location helped to empower the 
interaction with the researcher and reduce the power discrepancy that may be felt between the 
researcher and the participant who occupies a different power positon (Elwood and Martin 
2000 p. 656; see also Rose 1997 p. 307). Many Barrio Florido and Cuninico citizens chose to 
have the interviews conducted in their homes and I felt this allowed participant’s to be more 
                                                          
93 These were public, private or office locations and in two cases electronically (email and skype, the latter purely 
for practicality). 
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relaxed and calmer in a personal setting. This was important given that I was unable to spend 
long periods of time in each community building up trust. A similar conclusion can also be 
reached for the other collective and institutional actors; despite my inferior power position, 
offering these participants the choice of interview location still produced the same effect and 
possibly led to interviewee’s being more open about their respective organisations’ voice. 
  
4.2.1 Gatekeepers, fieldwork case-studies  
 
Pre-fieldwork research had established some of the actors that I would seek to collect data from 
(individual (citizen), collective (CBO/NGO) and institutional voice (government, REI)). I was 
also able to commence the fieldwork with a rough idea of the number of case-study locations 
that I would work towards. By its nature, qualitative research can be incredibly time-intensive, 
especially when dealing with a culture distinct from one’s own. This makes it a slow process 
from which to develop cultural familiarity and rapport with site members to be able to ask the 
right questions and have faith in the answers (Herbert 2010 p. 76). I therefore opted to focus 
on two or three communities to build up trust and rapport. Without the trust and confidence of 
interviewees, ‘researchers cannot be sure if they can rely on what they are being told’ (Higgins 
1980 p. 185). This, of course, does raise problems; there are limitations to the generalisability 
of theories or conclusions that are made (Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich 2001 p. 201) from a 
small number of field sites but as will be explained in Section 4.2.2, my chief aim was not to 
produce generalisations but rather sample and collect relevant data that may expand or refine 
my research or lead to new insights. 
 
A key consideration became how to access these stakeholders, which in turn influenced 
my specific Loreto case studies. I decided to wait until my arrival in Loreto in March 2015 so 
that I had time to meet with several CBO/NGO gatekeepers I had been emailing.94 To gain 
access to potential fieldwork sites, a researcher must gain permission from gatekeepers by 
convincing them that they’re a non-threatening person who will not harm the organisation or 
                                                          
94 These were Red Ambiental Loretana, an indigenous environmental watch-dog CBO (CBO1R1) and three 
NGOs; E-Tech International which provides environmental technical support to EMaDE communities 
(NGO1R1), The Peru Mission who provide developmental support to Loreton communities (NGO2R1), and 
Alianza Arkana, a development grassroots organisation providing development support to indigenous 
communities and raising awareness and supporting campaigns surrounding indigenous human rights abuses 
(NGO7R1). Except E-Tech International (NGO1R1), all were based in Iquitos and found through a Google 
internet search.  
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community in any way which may necessitate guarantees for access to participants (Taylor and 
Bogdan 1998 pp. 29, 34) e.g. confidentiality, an aspect tackled in Section 4.2.4.  
 
The decision to contact these collective voice gatekeepers rather than institutional 
actors (government/REIs) was twofold; I had to consider how I presented myself to local 
people and I believed that, in the context of my research and the high level of ongoing 
environmental damage, local communities would probably have a more positive and 
potentially more trusting relationship with CBO/NGO gatekeepers. In this case, my actions 
proved beneficial. As the OEFA spokesperson noted, in Peruvian civil society “[y]ou [are] 
either with the companies or with the people” (NSI2R1) so travelling to fieldwork locations 
with institutional representatives may have damaged my own efforts at gaining citizen trust or 
compromised my position as a researcher due to my identification with them (NGO2R1a). 
 
Meetings with these collective voice gatekeepers focused on my fieldwork aims, their 
interest in an interview, possible case-study communities and other contacts of relevance. The 
latter, i.e. the snowballing effect,95 was the main method deployed to recruit interviewees. 
These aims were achieved. Each of the pre-fieldwork contacts agreed to at least one interview. 
Discussions with these contacts helped me to understand Loreton REI oil production and 
installations including the location of Petroperu’s Iquitos refinery which through further 
investigation coalesced into the Barrio Florido case-study. The Peru Mission representative’s 
(NGO2R1) knowledge and contacts within the Catholic Church (CBO4R1-CBO4R2) is 
fundamental to me gaining gatekeeper access to the Cocama pueblo of Cuninico, which helped 
improve the community’s trust of me.96 Overall, this helped to focus the research primarily 
onto a case-study of Petroperu and two affiliated communities, supported through other 
testimonies on different REIs.   
 
However, there were instances where these collective voice gatekeepers failed to gain 
me interview access, particularly to REIs. For example, though NGO2R1 had several friends 
within Pluspetrol, it did not help me secure an interview with a representative. Despite my own 
efforts at trying to meet the Petroperu refinery manager at Barrio Florido and other staff in 
                                                          
95 See Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 32-33). 
96 IRC6 told me that I was “welcome” in Cuninico due to my connection with the accompanying Catholic Church 
representatives. On another occasion, I was also informed that the community’s warm and generous welcome, 
particularly from IRC6 and their family who acted as hosts during my stay was due to this link (ibid.).   
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Iquitos, I was unable to talk to any current REI employees or representatives except several 
former oil workers from Occidental Petroleum (FOPOW1; FOPOW2; FOPOW3). This has 
unfortunately meant that REI voices are largely absent in this thesis but the experience with 
NGO2R1 shows that even gatekeepers with personal connections do not always guarantee 
success.97 Institutional voice is thus focused solely on Peruvian political (national and regional) 
government representatives.  
 
As noted, the two-main case-study locations are Barrio Florido and Cuninico (Figure 
4.1). The first is a non-indigenous community of 840 inhabitants (MRBF2) situated on the 
banks of the Rio Amazon and adjacent to the Iquitos Petroperu refinery in Puchana District, 
Maynas Province (Latitude: -3.64056, Longitude: -73.21583). It is split into four administrative 
zones; Barrio Florido, Barrio Porvenir (closest to the refinery), Barrio Tivinsa and Barrio 
Escavino (MRBF6). Residents reported that the refinery “pollute everywhere” (MRBF4) with 
small amounts of “contamination every year” (MRBF24). “All the waste from Petroperu is 
thrown to the back part” of the refinery and eventually arriving in the lake (MRBF6) which 
feeds into a small creek (the Rio Ramirez) situated between the refinery and village that, in 
turn, drains into the Rio Amazon. The pollution affects all the residents, “especially … the kids 
…. [who] bathe there, in the ravine [lake]” (MRBF24) and contaminates the pueblo’s source 
of food (fish) and water (MRBF27) from these two connected water sources. 
 
Two major oil pollution incidents were reported by interviewees. The first (2009) in 
which heavy rain caused four barrels of oil to spill into the Rio Ramirez accidentally, killing 
fish and causing illness (“headaches, general sickness … also diarrhoea”) (MRBF14) in 
children (MRBF1; MRBF13; MRBF14; MRBF18; One to One International 2010). The second 
incident (2011) saw an unknown quantity of oil from several storage tanks connected to the 
refinery’s storm drain system leak into the Rio Ramirez, which residents said “killed many fish 
and animals” and affected the population (MRBF6; see also LaRepublica.pe 2011). At the time 
of fieldwork (March-June 2015), more recent pollution was alluded to by MRBF12 showing 
that contamination remains an ongoing problem.  
 
                                                          
97 I’m not alone in this; IJ1, a journalist has found that companies never “respond to anything I ask.” They remain, 
as my interpreter noted, “closed off.” 
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Cuninico, established on the 8th October 1959, is a Cocama indigenous community 
numbering between 450-500 inhabitants98 (CBO4R1b; IRC2) split into 143 families (IRC2) 
located on the banks of the Rio Marañón, Urarinas District, Loreto Province (Latitude: -
4.81667, Longitude: -75.16667). Interviews in this pueblo centred on the events surrounding 
the 2,000-barrel oil spill from the Oleoducto Norperuano in 2014, which burst into the dredged 
waterway that follows it and flows into the Rio Cuninico, which in turn feeds into the Rio 
Marañón and subsequently the Rio Amazon (NSI1R1b; Segovia 2014 p. 1; Fraser 2016a p. 
642). In the first week of June, residents noticed that the fish they were consuming and water 
they were drinking tasted of gasoline, while the oil and dead fish floating down-river from the 
Rio Cuninico helped them eventually to locate the leak and raise the alarm after three weeks 
on the 30th June 2014 (CBO4R1b; IRC2; IRC7; IRC8; IRC11; IRC13; Fraser 2016a p. 642). 
This spill forms the basis of the second case study.  
 
                                                          
98 Catholic Church interviewee CBO4R1 provides a figure of “roughly 450” (CBO4R1b) with a community leader 
giving a specific figure of 486 inhabitants (IRC2). 
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Figure 4.1: Approximate case-study locations   
   
(Hill, K. 2013). 
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4.2.2 Gathering data and data levels 
 
Unlike collective voice actors, citizen voice is not a group that speaks with one voice. While citizen 
voice is made up of an infinite number of individual voices, my PEV narrative has shown that its 
use may be influenced by a range of demographic indicators (age, gender, race) that provided an 
obvious way for me to categorise it in greater detail to help analysis and draw conclusions from 
the data. Appendix 2 sets out the categorisations that have been chosen for this study and included 
gender (male/female), age (16-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+), ethnicity and occupation. The latter two 
require more explanation.  
 
The ethnic and racial groupings are based on the 2006 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e 
Informatica (National Continuous Survey, INEI) (INEI 2006 p. 91) which indicate that 59.9 per 
cent of Peruvians identified as mestizo, 22.7 per cent as Quechua (indigenous ethnic group), 4.9 
per cent as blanco (white), 2.7 per cent as Aymaras (indigenous ethnic group), 1.8 per cent as de 
la Amazonia (presumably affiliated with an indigenous group but not specified by individual 
survey respondents), 1.6 per cent as negro (black) and 6.7 per cent as otro (other) (predominantly 
Chinese and Japanese). These classifications were utilised except for the distinct indigenous 
groups which were amalgamated into a single “indigenous” category. 
 
By doing this, I showed that individuals within this final group are separate from other 
ethnic and racial groups but without causing unnecessary complexity in the data collection tables. 
Nevertheless, I’m clear in my research that fieldwork was undertaken with only one indigenous 
ethnic community. Other communities’ cultures, histories and experiences of oil development are 
all different (IJ1) (a point expanded upon in Chapter Eight, Section 8.2) so I have been cautious 
when extrapolating the results from this study into a discussion on Loreton indigenous voice, their 
treatment by REIs etc. This one study cannot “speak” for all Loreton indigenous communities.  
 
A similar reasoning was applicable for the four occupation bands based on the International 
Labour Organisation’s (ILO) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and 
resolution ISCO-08 (ILO 2007 pp. 3-12). By banding the major and sub-major professional 
groupings into wider alignments, I created a classification system that still enabled me to examine 
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a participant’s occupation and the impact this may have on their voice action (e.g. economic 
means) without delving into unnecessary occupational intricacy. It also helped me make sure that 
I was achieving gender balance and discussions with young/old, rich/poor, professional/primary 
occupations. One can see that a fifth band was added to the table; this was based upon my own 
research findings and the need to classify those not in some of employment including students, 
housewives and retirees. Appendix 3a, b lists the collected data for male and female participants.  
 
This leads me onto sample size data levels. Qualitative researchers will often typically 
define their samples on an ongoing basis as the study progresses (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 26). 
The term “theoretical sampling” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, cited in Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 26) 
refers to a procedure whereby ‘researchers consciously select additional cases to be studied 
according to the potential for developing new insights or expanding and refining those already 
gained’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 27) with maximum variation in the additional selected cases 
allowing the applicable theoretical insights to be broadened (ibid.). In effect, I was not an 
ethnographer trying to get the fullest data to create empirical generalisations on a group, location, 
setting, context or temporal period but rather a researcher that was actively sampling for relevant 
data that offered ‘variably situated knowledges’ (Derrington 2014 p. 24; see also Higgins 1980 p. 
192; Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 9; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007 p. 238; Glaser and Strauss 2012 
p. 58) in relation to PEV. Gans (1962 p. 350 author’s emphasis) terms his study a ‘reconnaissance 
– an initial exploration of a community to provide an overview – guided by the canons of 
sociological theory and method but not attempting to offer documentation for all the findings’, a 
term that I feel aptly encapsulates this methodology and the importance that context plays in PEV.  
 
 A similar sampling system was used during data collection. Altogether 110 interviews were 
conducted with 105 interviewees from the various voice actor groups. Of the interviewees, nine 
participants representing eight separate NGOs took part (NGO1R1; NGO2R1; NGO3R1; 
NGO4R1-R2; NGO5R1; NGO6R1; NGO7R1; NGO8R1) along with ten CBO representatives 
from four separate organisations (CBO1R1; CBO2R1-4; CBO3R1; CBO4R1-3), 11 interviewees 
from different national and regional government bodies (NSI1R1; NSI2R1; NSI3R1; NSI4R1; 
NSI5R1; NSI6R1; NSI7R1; RGR1; RGR2; RGR3; RGR4) and 59 citizens from the two-case study 
communities (30 for Barrio Florido and 29 for Cuninico). The remainder (16) were a mix of other 
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citizens whose views were deliberately sought via snowballing or who were part of fieldwork 
“chance encounters” (e.g. FIRC1; ICW1). They incorporated three academics (IUA1; IUA2; 
IUA3), three citizens from three different selva communities (NCSSC1; NCSSC2; NCSSC3), 
three former Occidental Petroleum oil workers (FOPOW1; FOPOW2; FOPOW3), two legal 
professionals (ILP1; ILP2), two students (IUS1; IUS2), a journalist (IJ1), a construction worker 
(ICW1) and one former Cuninico community member (FIRC1) (see Appendix 4). I feel this 
method was successful in capturing a wide variety of citizen, collective and institutional voices 
which has provided analytical depth to the PEV analysis. 
 
4.2.3 Interview guides and interview questions  
 
I now set out the precise types of SSI questions and the format used for my interviews. Before 
fieldwork, I composed an interview guide99 which consisted of various topics and subject areas 
that I was free to explore via probing questions100 that elucidate and highlight a subject (Patton 
1987 p. 111). Interview guides are an excellent platform for SSIs as they remain merely a checklist 
for the topics that should be covered; the interviewer is free to adapt the words and sequencing of 
questions, build a conversation within a subject area or word questions spontaneously while 
maintaining the focus on a predetermined subject from the checklist. They allowed me to keep an 
outline of the topics discussed in each interview and track previous topics and changes, modify 
future interview questions and refer to specific points raised in prior conversations (Taylor and 
Bogdan 1998 p. 115). It also helped me make use of the limited time available in interview 
situations (ibid.), an important point when the fieldwork was located on a different continent where 
only a predetermined amount of time was spent.   
 
As an interviewer, I must start by finding ‘ways of getting people to start to talk about their 
perspectives and experiences without overly structuring the conversation and defining what the 
interviewee should say’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 102). According to these authors, one of the 
best methods to utilise is known as descriptive questioning in order to create what Spradley (1979, 
cited in Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 102) calls “grand-tour” questions. While this may lead to off-
                                                          
99 See Patton (1987 pp. 111-112). 
100 See Patton (1987 pp. 125-126) and Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 106-108).  
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topic conversations, this isn’t bad as the participant gains confidence to open-up and should not be 
interrupted but instead gently steered back on topic through subtle gestures such as refraining from 
nodding (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016 pp. 116-117). My interview guide placed these 
questions within the first section alongside neutral grand-tour demographic questions which lead 
into three theme-based topics that have a mix of open-ended questions based around 
opinion/belief, knowledge and feeling questions (see Patton 1987 pp. 118-119), all supplemented 
by probing questions. Initially, each of these themes had certain types of questions directed at one 
or more of the stakeholders depending on their relevance, though as will be discussed below, this 
was changed with the creation of specialised stakeholder interview guides.  
  
Due to the influence of time on PEV, past and future questions (based on a ten-year 
period) 101  were inserted into the theme-based sections after a focus on the present day. As 
questions about the past tend to be easier for respondents to answer than hypothetical speculation 
on the future, they were placed after the focus on the present day, which acted as a useful baseline 
for past reflection before any broaching of the future (Patton 1987 p. 121). While some of the 
questions based around knowledge can be quite threatening for the interviewee (ibid. p. 120), it 
was hoped the initial grand-tour questions helped the interviewee feel at ease before moving into 
the topic areas. A similar issue can be found with the more sensitive and potentially uncomfortable 
demographic questions (age, ethnicity) so these were split up and placed in a final section (see 
Patton 1987 p. 121).  
 
The SSI interview guide questions have been pretested as per the standards suggested by 
Patton (1987) and Berg and Lune (2014). Firstly, the interview questions were assessed by my 
supervisor to help facilitate ‘the identification of poorly worded questions, questions with 
offensive or emotion-laden wording, or questions revealing the researchers’ own biases, personal 
values or blind spots’ (Berg and Lune 2014 p. 126) that could prove problematic. This resulted in 
an updated pre-fieldwork interview guide written in English and Spanish.  
 
                                                          
101 A decade was chosen as it was felt this would provide a general time-frame for interviewees that was not overtly 
large which may have been too difficult to reflect and hypothesise on.   
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Secondly, upon reaching Loreto, this interview guide was put through several pilot 
interviews (IUS1; NGO1R1; NCSSC1; NCSSC2; NCSSC3) (bar NGO1R1 which was conducted 
before fieldwork) to assess how well it worked and whether the sought information was obtained 
(Creswell 2013 p. 165). I quote the work of Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht (1984 p. 120, cited in 
Berg 2007 pp. 105-106) who suggest five questions for assessing an interview to help save time 
and cost: 
1. Has the researcher included all of the questions necessary to test the research hypothesis? 
2. Do the questions elicit the types of response that were anticipated? 
3. Is the language of the research instrument meaningful to the respondents? 
4. Are there other problems with the questions, such as double meaning or multiple issues 
embedded in the question? 
5. Finally, does the interview guide, as developed, help to motivate respondents to participate 
in the study? 
To fulfil this latter point, I interspersed support, recognition and praise responses throughout the 
interview guide to provide positive reinforcement to the interviewee from time to time so that they 
felt the process was worthwhile (Patton 1987 pp. 126-127).  
 
Tied to this was the importance of a reflection period after each interview, which allowed 
me to perform quality control checks to make sure I was gaining useful, reliable and valid data 
(ibid. p. 140). Through a template contact summary sheet (see Miles and Huberman 1994 pp. 51-
55) (Appendix 5) conducted after almost every interview, I was able to change or modify interview 
questions or their language by utilising words or phrasing of initial interviewees to help make 
questions clearer for future participants (ibid. p. 123), develop broad data interpretations straight 
away rather than at the end of the study (which provided me with an opportunity to test these 
notions in subsequent data collection) (Gans 1962 p. 348) and reflect on my own interview 
experience and performance. This fed into a weekly evaluative summary (Figure 4.2) of my 
fieldwork discussing my interview technique and thoughts, tasks and actions taken, which was 
also sent to my supervisor for information and evaluation. 
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Figure 4.2 Excerpt from weekly evaluative summary. 
 
As fieldwork progressed, these pilot interviews and contact summary sheets made clear 
that changes to the interview guide were necessary and that a single interview guide for all 
Week 1: 9-
15 March 
2015 
 
 Conducted some test pilot interviews with a range of people in Iquitos (a 
young student, three selva citizens). This helped me modify my interview 
guide ready for further interviews with a GOREL interviewee and NGO 
co-ordinator. Results provided me with interesting material and I began 
immediate transcription.   
 I also began to email contacts whose names I had been given, 
predominantly through the hospedaje (lodge or host) family. 
 Created my data analysis table on Excel, allowing me to categorise each 
interview based on gender, age, ethnicity, residency and interview 
location. 
Week 2: 16-
22 March 
 
 Continued interviewing a wide range of individuals (another NGO co-
ordinator, a young adult’s environmental group (REDNNA), a former oil 
worker, a national government agency employee).  
 Through last week’s transcribed interviews, I created several new 
questions which included: the impact/use of technology by citizens in the 
present-day (is it used, how and does it strengthen voice); whether the 
government “listens” (questions directed to government employees); and 
geographical accessibility (where do meetings between the government – 
citizens and citizens – REIs occur?). 
 These were inserted into the interview guide by creating three guides; one 
for citizens, one for CBOs/NGOs and one for government/REIs. This 
allowed me to change the type of question being asked about a topic that 
was relevant across all three strands e.g. accessibility.  
 Created a formal letter of introduction (written and checked by my 
hospedaje family in Spanish). 
 I attended a conference in the college of lawyers and secured an interview 
with a legal expert (subsequently postponed). 
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stakeholders was proving ineffective and unwieldy. The stakeholder interview guide underwent 
three major changes during fieldwork (see Appendix 6 for the final version with new/amended 
questions marked in bold) while interview guides were specifically created for Barrio Florido and 
Cuninico pueblo residents, CBO/NGO groups (where possible compiling interview guides based 
upon internet obtained public information about the groups) and government and REI contacts.  
 
4.2.4 Audio recording, interpreters, translators and positionality 
 
To record these SSI questions and the micro-geography analysis successfully, a written journal, an 
observer’s main tool (Shrum, Duque and Brown 2005 p. 3) was maintained supported by audio 
equipment. The use of electronic equipment has been contentious for researchers; Douglas (1976 
p. 53, cited in Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 70), for example argued that ‘there is every reason to 
believe that obtrusive recording devices have fundamental effects in determining what actors think 
and feel about the researcher (mainly, it makes them terribly suspicious and on guard) and what 
they do in his presence.’ As Taylor and Bogdan (1998) conclude, ‘it is naïve to assume that filming 
or taping will not alter what some people may say or do’ (p. 70) or what they believe or will say 
or do in other situations (p. 91), issues which are more pronounced for those who may feel inhibited 
by the prospect of the interview to begin with, such as vulnerable groups e.g. the elderly (see 
Skovdahl, Kihlgren and Kihlgren 2003 p. 518).  
 
Still, one must not overstate the detrimental impact these devices can have. While it is true 
that they may make interviewees feel uncomfortable, these participants have agreed to be 
interviewed, so that should make them feel less alarmed by an audio recorder so long as it has a 
minimal presence and is unobtrusive (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 112-113). Moreover, I believe 
that this equipment provided several positive benefits that outweigh these issues. Audio recording 
the interviews allowed me to focus on responding appropriately to interviewee needs and cues 
(Patton 1987 pp. 126-127), improve the accuracy of my data from the interviews and allowed me 
to securely store the data in an external hard drive and two electronic storage programmes 
(Dropbox, Googledocs) to prevent data loss. It was initially planned to film the interviews but pilot 
interviewee hesitation made me realise that this would have impeded my SSIs and perhaps have 
made some government participants less willing to contribute despite anonymity. Instead, I noted 
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down each participant’s micro-geography observations and emotive and physical gestures through 
the written journal, which though less accurate, still captured interview and participant micro-
geographies. 
 
The use of audio recordings has great bearing on three further important factors that I must 
discuss; the use of interpreters and translators102 and my positionality. As I have already stated, 
my intermediate level of Spanish required the use of an interpreter for my SSIs, which were then 
passed on to several UK-based translators. Although these mechanisms have often been used by 
researchers, they have received little attention in qualitative research (Temple and Edwards 2002 
pp. 1-2) despite the clear impact they can have on data collection. Academics who have spoken 
about the use of interpreters have rightly raised concern about their translation of a respondent’s 
answers and whether it has captured their meaning (see Merriam et al. 2001 p. 415) which leaves 
academics with no choice but to trust their interpreter (ibid.). 
 
To explain why, one can turn back to anti-naturalism’s view of a multi-layered and 
constructed world that is unique for everyone; by extension this means that ‘there is no one 
translation’ with an array of possible word combinations used to convey meaning, some of which 
may not have been spoken by the research participants (Temple and Edwards 2002 p. 2). Moreover, 
translation, like words are dependent on the same range of contextual circumstances (Hatim and 
Mason 1994, cited in Temple 1997 p. 609) such as ‘who said them, when, and in relation to what’ 
(Temple 1997 p. 609); the difficulty is that there is no singular cultural inhabitable field in their 
use (Temple 1997 p. 609; Temple and Edwards 2002 p. 3) which makes determining “cultural 
meaning” problematic (Temple and Edwards 2002 p. 3).  
 
Where did this leave my use of interpreters and UK-based translators? For Temple (1997), 
the problems raised above must be put into the wider perspective of what humans and researchers 
do; we all ‘‘translate’ the experiences of others …. to be able to communicate’ (ibid. p. 609) which 
suggests that the use of interpreters and translators merely add another layer to an already present 
process. Even so, there were several ways I improved these mechanisms.  
                                                          
102 The key difference between the two ‘is the mode of expression. Interpreters deal with spoken language and translate 
orally, while translators deal with written text’ (Northeast Ohio Translators Association 2007). 
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I utilised two Iquitos-based university students (who incidentally were the children of my 
hospedaje owner) who had a good grasp of English. This allowed me to talk through my research 
in detail, its aims, the interview guides, the sort of information I was interested in hearing from 
participants and how I expected them to conduct themselves. After each interview, I asked them 
to evaluate it and their performance and I answered any questions they had. Despite not being 
experienced interpreters, they were fantastically hard-working individuals and my detailed 
research brief enabled them to grasp the type of follow-up questions and details I was interested 
in which allowed the interview to flow.  
 
At times, I was perhaps not leading the interview enough but this was expected given my 
lack of previous interview experience. However, my solid level of Spanish comprehension meant 
that I could follow interviews well and listen out for conversations going “off topic” or ask 
interpreters to confirm interviewee answers before asking a follow-up question. At other points, 
the interpreters did not always understand my question and asked a participant a different enquiry 
but overall this rarely occurred, a testament to their grasp of English and our friendship which 
generated very successful interviews.   
 
Initially, I intended utilising a Peruvian or wider South American transcription agency for 
the translation process. However, my limited financial means meant that transcription agency fees 
were too high. Instead, they were translated by eight paid individuals, seven of whom were 
postgraduate students and one professional translator, the former all found through the Society for 
Latin American Studies (SLAS) postgraduate group in the UK (Postgraduates for Latin American 
Studies, PILAS). Each was given a detailed brief of the presentation of the interview transcript in 
Microsoft Word. 
 
Studies that involve interviewing will see ‘researchers attempt to give readers a feeling of 
walking in the informants’ shoes – understanding their inner experiences and seeing things from 
their points of view’ (Taylor and Bogdan 2016 p. 162). However, due to the research oriented 
nature of interviews and the aim of testing or finding answers to research questions, researchers 
will often struggle with their efforts at representing ‘the ‘truth’ of their findings as well as allowing 
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the ‘voices’ of their participants to be heard’ (Merriam et al. 2001 p. 414). How then did this affect 
my own contextual portrayal of stakeholder’s voices and instructions to translators? 
 
A denaturalised approach was taken. This has ‘less to do with depicting accents or 
involuntary vocalisation’ and instead ‘accuracy … [surrounding] the substance of the interview, 
that is, the meanings and perceptions shared during a conversation’ (Oliver, Serovich and Mason 
2005 p. 1277). In practice, this meant removing repeated words or phrases, conversational stutters 
and audible acknowledgements from the interviewee, interpreter and researcher. The objective 
here was not to subvert or change stakeholder voices in any way but rather create a textual space 
in which their voices are more clearly heard by the reader without any interference from 
communicative oral phrases that we use in conversations (see Derrington 2014 p. 34). This allowed 
me to engage more clearly with my interview data and present their voices in an open and 
accessible manner for the reader. However, I felt it was important to convey some participant 
conversational actions (e.g. long pauses, emotion, marked between []) as this helped feed into my 
use of micro-geography analysis and the emotions which this PEV topic aroused within 
interviewees.  
 
Other instructions were also given to the translators. Only the question I posed was written 
out, except in the few instances where the translator did not ask the right question, so that duplicate 
English-Spanish written questions didn’t occur. The participant’s answers were written in English 
and I instructed the translators also to write out any poignant phrases in italicised Spanish with 
further phrases also chosen by myself and subsequently written in Spanish by my Father 
accompanied by a bracketed English translation. This was done to connect more strongly with the 
original interview participant’s voice and language and the context of the Peruvian fieldwork. 
Overall, this system was successful and helped generate detailed transcripts.  
 
Lastly, my positionality (age, gender, nationality, race, social and economic status and 
sexuality) (see Madge 1993 p. 296, cited in Rose 1997 p. 308) is also tied implicitly to this issue 
of translation. Temple (1997) notes that ‘[r]esearchers reconstruct the experiences of others in their 
own terms and from their own reference points’ (p. 609), which therefore affected my relationship 
and interaction with stakeholders and how it could influence the compiled “data” and therefore the 
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information that is coded as “knowledge” (Madge 1993 p. 296, cited in Rose 1997 p. 308). At first 
glance, as a straight, male, late twenties postgraduate research student heralding from the UK and 
conducting fieldwork in Peru, my positionality appeared akin to an outsider status, a general issue 
for advanced economy academics working in EMaDEs (Madge 1993; Radcliffe 1994, cited in 
Laurie et al. 2014 p. 51). 
  
Yet I do have personal and emotive connections to South America through my father, who 
was born and raised in Venezuela until his emigration to the USA and subsequently the UK. 
Putting to one side the pride that I feel in my South American heritage, my father’s indigenous 
ancestry has always been a source of interest to me, with this underlying emotive connection 
perhaps inexorably drawing me towards research on this continent. Thus, at some level, there 
would appear to be a shared emotive cultural insider connection to the continent and its indigenous 
citizens despite the more obvious exterior outsider connotations. This reinforces why ‘as 
researchers, we can be insiders and outsiders to a particular community of research participants at 
many different levels and at different times’ (Villenas 1996 p. 722, cited in Merriam et al. 2001 p. 
411), with positionality therefore resting ‘on the assumption that a culture is more than a 
monolithic entity to which one belongs or not’ (Merriam et al. 2001 p. 411).  
 
While the insider-outsider dichotomy highlights some interesting personal reflections, this 
dualism is seen by some as ‘overly simplistic’ (Dwyer and Buckle 2009 p. 60). Instead, an analysis 
of my position as a researcher would appear to place me in the ‘spaces of inbetweenness’ 
(Kobayashi 1994, cited in Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138). This position accepts that I’m not fully 
part of any Loreton stakeholder group and neither can I retreat to my own personal space or a 
distant researcher role (Dwyer and Buckle 2009 p. 61; Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138) leaving me 
‘straddling multiple spaces’ (Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138). What this implies is that the ‘positions 
in which research places the researcher and those involved in the research may be multiple and 
may vary over time and space’ (Laurie et al. 2014 p. 52), circumstances that qualitative researchers 
appreciate due to ‘the fluidity and multi-layered complexity of human experience’ (Dwyer and 
Buckle 2009 p. 60).  
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Consequently, the role of alliances between interviewer and interviewee shows how the 
positionality of the researcher can shift (Laurie et al. 2014 p. 51) and be constantly renegotiated, a 
strategy deployed by Chattopadhyay (2013) through every day acts in her work with displaced 
Adivasi communities in western India. 
 
How I ate, how I sat (especially the height, if on a chair or stool, as that signified a vertical 
hierarchy) and where I sat mattered …. These ways of presenting myself and interacting 
with my participants, however mundane, are not insignificant because they narrate my 
embodied situatedness as the researcher (p. 154). 
 
Through this reflexive positionality, a researcher can approach fieldwork from an adaptable 
perspective that recognises that each person has a unique biography with different personal 
histories and lived experiences (England 1994 p. 248). Reflexive positionality has a willingness to 
understand researcher “position” as a temporally fluid concept, contextually situated in unique 
environments within which a study participant’s relationship to the researcher and vice-versa will 
constantly change but which can help strengthen the ethical commitments to conducting ‘‘good’ 
research based on building mutual respect and recognition’ (Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 154). In 
relation to my interpreter, I felt that by recruiting someone from Loreto who shares closer cultural 
links and affiliations with interviewees, my own reflexive positionality was strengthened, 
particularly in the initial stages of meeting participants as it could have positively influenced their 
willingness to engage and discuss their “voice” with me.  
 
4.2.5 Ethical considerations 
 
A common misconception is that ethical issues arise only during data collection, whereas they are 
actually present in several phases of the research process: prior to study conduct, at the beginning 
of the study, during data collection and in data analysis (Creswell 2013 pp. 56-57). Prior to 
fieldwork, it was clear that participant ethical considerations were of high importance due to the 
nature of the qualitative methodology deployed in the field. As such, and in line with my 
university’s ethical procedures, a light touch process was utilised where ethical issues and 
responses were discussed with my supervisor alongside the completion of university ethics 
approval and risk assessment forms which were cleared by Royal Holloway before the 
commencement of fieldwork.  
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It was also important to contemplate the level of information given to gatekeepers and 
participants concerning my research procedures. Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 33) are of the view 
that a researcher should remain ‘truthful, but vague and imprecise’ with it ‘generally unwise’ to 
give details surrounding the research but acknowledge that what each researcher says is dependent 
on each research design. In relation to PEV, several important points can be made. For gatekeepers 
and interviewees, it seemed appropriate to explain broadly what “voice” in this context meant and 
how their own thoughts, views and opinions form the heart of the study which is important as there 
are no right or wrong answer to these questions. By understanding this, it was hoped participants 
felt more emboldened to answer thoughtfully and with higher levels of confidence.  
 
My effort to explain voice and the discussion topics was also important due to the possible 
emotional risks that could arise for interviewees who may not have felt willing to discuss some of 
the themes. Their welfare and the need to have a humane research experience was paramount, so 
a form of informed consent was utilised in which I briefed the participant about the nature of my 
research before asking them if they understand the information and were willing to take part 
(Appendix 7). ‘Affirmative [oral] responses and completed interviews serve the purpose of 
implying consent in the absence of a signed consent slip’ (Berg 2007 p. 79), the latter ruled out 
due to the ethical dilemma of preserving a formal record of participants’ names (ibid. p. 78). 
 
Informed consent also applied to audio recording equipment; if participants objected, then 
with their permission written notes would have been taken but this was not necessary as each 
participant agreed. I also endeavoured to make sure that the interviewee remained calm and relaxed 
through the process and that I remained non-judgmental of people by accepting them ‘for who and 
what they are’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 100). If, despite informed consent, there was a 
reluctance to supply information to a question then it would be omitted or the interview terminated. 
Again, this did not occur.  
 
Consideration was also given to reciprocity (Creswell 2013 p. 55). ‘It is unclear what, if 
anything, informants stand to gain from the relationship, other than the satisfaction that someone 
thinks their lives and views are important’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 110-111). However, 
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reciprocity is important and accordingly a review of what participants gained from this study was 
conducted (Creswell 2013 p. 55). I believe that PEV’s topic provided participants with an 
opportunity for self-reflection on their own voice and its current, past and possible future position 
within their local community and wider area. It is a type of life history (see Temple 1997 p. 608), 
a point relevant especially for citizens who may come to understand more about themselves and 
the way they have engaged with environmental problems in their lives. Indeed, this self-reflection 
could even lead to proactive changes on the part of participants who may seek to address or 
improve what they perceive as issues with their use of voice. 
 
Thought has also been given to participant feedback in my research and for this, the 
gatekeeper groups play a pivotal role. I provided gatekeepers and each participant with my contact 
details so that they could contact me with any further questions or thoughts about the interviews. 
During the write-up period, I have liaised with gatekeepers and where possible, with individual 
interviewees about my research through the provision of a short summary report that covers the 
essentials of my research findings and main conclusions. I feel that this short report prevented me 
from merely diving into and then out of the fieldwork without giving any further thought to those 
involved and their connection to the work and offered a personal and hence genuine measure of 
thanks compared to the provision of the full (and in places highly technical) PhD document.  
 
Finally, confidentiality and the privacy of participants within the study is a crucial concern 
for researchers who should ‘go out of [their] way’ to let participants know that information taken 
from the research and used in any format will not carry any identifying information (Taylor and 
Bogdan 1998 p. 34). Informed consent was sought after each interview to ask whether publication 
of their transcript quotes and/or photographs was permissible while each interviewee had a 
pseudonym in the form of a code (see Section 4.2 Footnote 91) adopted in the thesis to prevent 
identification. Participants are described only in very broad terms (e.g. university professor) to 
provide some degree of accuracy to the analysis. In terms of the data itself, it was held in two 
encrypted electronic storage sites with the list of recorded interviews removed after they had been 
fully utilised to help bolster confidentiality (Berg 2007 p. 80).  
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4.3 Qualitative data analysis 
 
‘I have tried to give a voice to a people who are rarely heard’ (Lewis 1965 p. xii). 
 
So far, I have set out my qualitative multi-method approach via SSIs and micro-geography analysis 
supported by interview guide(s), audio recording equipment and ethical considerations that 
underpin this research. The latter leads into a discussion on the way I analysed my data created 
predominantly through SSIs.  
 
Academics have noted that qualitative data analysis is a creative process that sees 
researchers develop their own methods of organisation, analysis and interpretation due to the lack 
of standardised methods that are apparent in statistics or broad quantitative methodologies (Patton 
1987; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 140-141). Nevertheless, there are some widespread systems of 
data analysis that have been discussed broadly in the literature which offered apt analytical 
methods. One of these is known as the “constant comparative method” by Glaser and Strauss 
(2012) which is used alongside my chosen data collection strategy of theoretical sampling (ibid. 
p. 102). 
 
 Firstly, I began by repeatedly reading through each interview transcript, my fieldwork 
journal and contact summary sheets, making annotative memos on initial thoughts or ideas that 
struck me so that I could engage with the data (see Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 142) in a more 
systematic fashion. This was aided through my use of QSR NVivo 10 software in which I coded103 
my data through a range of concepts,104 categories105 and propositions106 (i.e. typologies) via a 
weak form of inductive (or conventional) content analysis.107 This method’s ‘primary purpose … 
is to describe and classify’ (Patton 1987 p. 153 author’s emphasis) but also to help lead into the 
                                                          
103 ‘Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled 
during a study. Codes usually are attached to “chunks” of varying size – words, phrases, sentences, or whole 
paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting’ (Miles and Huberman 1994 p. 56 authors emphasis). 
104 They form the basic units of analysis (Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 7; see also Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 144-146). 
105 They are higher level groupings than concepts (see Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 7).  
106 This is formed between concepts and categories (see Pandit 1996, p. 2; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 144-146). 
107 ‘Inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out 
of the data rather than being decided prior to data collection and analysis’ (Patton 1987 p. 150; see also Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005 p. 1286; Zhang and Wildemuth 2009 p. 2). 
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validated creation of these typologies that moved me from ‘description to interpretation and 
theory’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 144).  
 
I chose to use an inductive approach for several reasons. Through PEV, I have created an 
untested qualitative research theoretical framework and research questions surrounding voice vis-
à-vis environmental problems which makes the inductive approach most appropriate. Moreover, 
the inductive method should help nullify the problem of “confirmation bias” that researchers may 
have when testing a prior hypothesis (Greenwald et al. 1986, cited in Onwuegbuzie and Leech 
2007 p. 236). While I do have a PEV framework structure that has a broad set of propositions from 
which to study voice, the data to assess it is grounded within the individual stakeholder voices; 
their views, thoughts or opinions form the bedrock of the concepts and categories that ultimately 
take shape from within the data and help illuminate my research questions and PEV theoretical 
framework. The inductive analysis was combined for the most part with analyst-based 
typologies 108  and where possible indigenous or emic typologies. 109  PEV’s strongly defined 
theoretical framework meant that many of the elements of voice to study were already in place 
prior to fieldwork. However, using indigenous typologies made sure that wherever possible I 
“heard” the voices of my participants and utilised them in a way that did not sully or change it. 
 
To help support the coding process, I developed a loose research storyline based upon my 
PEV theoretical framework that set out initial concepts and categories I wanted to communicate 
in my study and how my data were initially organised and coded (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 151). 
Taylor and Bogdan (1998 p. 151) suggest that one should think of coding in terms of writing a 
book; by deciding on the major focus of my book or research storyline through one or more “core 
categories” (Strauss 1987 pp. 34-36), I could create a rough number of chapters based on the 
research questions within PEV. I duly set out my core category (the functioning of stakeholder 
voice within Peru’s Loreto Region) and initial chapters (propositions) based upon the PEV 
theoretical framework which I used to create an NVivo framework. 
 
                                                          
108 Concepts, categories and propositions ‘that appear to exist but that are not a part of a participants’ vocabulary’ are 
created by the researcher (Patton 1987 p. 152).  
109 See Pelto and Pelto 1978 p. 54, cited in Patton 1987 p. 150. 
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With this drawn up, I started coding the interviews directly into NVivo and this storyline. 
Again, where possible, the concepts produced from the data were based as much as possible on 
indigenous typologies and remained merely tentative categorisations until more data validated and 
where necessary reformed them (Strauss 1987 p. 32). I must point out here that data analysis should 
not be an action committed after or independent of data collection but rather one which goes ‘hand 
in hand’ with this process (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 141), hence the use of theoretical sampling 
and the constant comparative method.  
 
As I continued to code each interview and collect and build up my data, categories were 
revisited and modified recursively (Derrington (2014); I worked through my coding categories and 
SSI concepts to test, refine and validate the emerging categories (ibid. p. 35), collapse concepts 
(where appropriate) that were related or overlap into wider typologies and modify my initial 
research story and chapter outline (see Miles and Huberman 1994, cited in Zhang and Wildemuth 
1999 p. 4). In this way, I worked through a system of open coding (‘components of ‘theories’ 
formulated personally by the producers of the text in question’ (Bohm 2004 p. 271) seen through 
concept creation) and axial coding (‘reassembling data’ by creating connections or relationships 
between each category and linked concepts) (Strauss and Corbin 1998 p. 124) that encompass the 
constant comparative model. In this way, a final research storyline was established encompassing 
analyst and indigenous typologies.  
 
To help this recursive process and category formulation, the data were assessed through 
several additional criteria and methods. This is important as ‘[w]hat is discovered during analysis 
must be verified by going back to the data under study and examining the extent to which the 
emergent analysis really fits the program and works to explain what has been observed’ (Patton 
1987 p. 160). Qualitative categories are often judged on two merits; their internal homogeneity 
(‘the extent to which the data that belong in a certain category hold together’) (ibid. p. 154) and 
external homogeneity (‘the extent to which differences among categories are bold and clear’) 
(ibid.). To help combat the problem of divergence noted by Guba (1978, cited in Patton 1987 p. 
154) (dealing with how to “flesh out” the categories) (Patton 1987 p. 154), I utilised the ‘processes 
of extension (building on items of information already known), bridging (making connections 
among different items), and surfacing (proposing new information that ought to fit and then 
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verifying its existence)’ (ibid.). However, the ability to create mutually exclusive (external 
homogeneity) categories (see Krippendorff 2004) is difficult in qualitative research ‘owing to the 
intertwined nature of human experiences’ particularly ‘when a text deals with experiences’ 
(Graneheim and Lundman 2004 p. 107; see also Thomas 2003 p. 5), a conclusion relevant for my 
PEV work. Indeed, qualitative content data analysis allows the researcher to assign data, where 
appropriate, to more than one category simultaneously (Tesch 1990 p. 121), an approach which I 
felt was of relevance for PEV. 
 
In this endeavour, the constant comparative method (see Glaser and Strauss 2012) was 
extremely useful; through its process of comparing multiple pieces of data, it allowed me to tighten 
up my ideas ‘and gradually move [me] to a higher level of conceptualisation’ (Taylor and Bogdan 
1998 p. 156) by helping confirm, divide, expand, build upon, re-define and remove pre-fieldwork 
storyline concepts to accommodate SSI data (Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 9; Taylor and Bogdan 
1998 p. 156).  
 
I also focused on examining negative cases (Kidder 1981; Katz 2015 pp. 133-136) and 
surprising findings (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007 p. 243) within these categories which helped 
increase my understanding of qualitative patterns that did not fit within the wider form (Patton 
1987 p. 160; 1999 pp. 1191-1192). By forcing myself to examine these instances, I refined and 
qualified concepts and propositions (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 139) and could assert greater 
claims regarding the general nature of what I found (ibid. pp. 139-140) as the more ‘differences 
discovered within the data, the greater the number of possible negative cases, and thus the more 
broadly valid the resulting theory’ (Katz 1983 p. 136). ‘The test is not whether a final state of 
perfect explanation has been achieved but the distance that has been travelled over negative cases 
and through consequent qualifications from an initial state of knowledge’ (Katz 2015 p. 135 
author’s emphasis). 
 
Finally, I must also mention the way that the data are presented in the thesis. As noted in 
Section 4.2.4, the denaturalised process was used in the writing up of each interview and was also 
applied to their inclusion within the main thesis text. Here, I modified participants’ grammatical 
language to the correct format and at some points changed the tense in which a certain word was 
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utilised through square brackets. This was not done to subvert interviewee voices but to allow the 
main text to flow smoothly and enable me to use their words to fit into a point(s) I was making.  
 
The next four chapters present the PEV research conducted in Loreto through the multi-
method qualitative approach (SSI and micro-geography analysis) analysed through an NVivo 
coding system set out in this Chapter. As noted, the focus is on Petroperu and the experiences of 
two of its oil communities; Barrio Florido and Cuninico which have been supported by further 
participant testimony from collective (CBO/NGO), institutional (government) and other individual 
citizen voices.  
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Chapter 5 PEV in the Peruvian physical and emotive world: 
Freedom of voice and societal influences on voice 
 
The analysis in the next four chapters explores the PEV of Loreton stakeholder groups with the 
state and Petroperu. This can be broadly split into two categories; citizen voice, explored primarily 
through the Barrio Florido and Cuninico case studies, and collective voice, incorporating the CBO 
(Catholic Church) linked to Cuninico and wider Loreton movements. This chapter examines the 
national political – state environment in which voice operates and some of the wider societal 
influences that shape government and REI engagement with citizens and other stakeholders. 
Section 5.1 investigates the national political – state environment through an assessment of the 
freedom for stakeholders to voice and the laws and regulations surrounding this action. Section 
5.2 considers the national environment’s societal influences that appear to shape the levels of 
access and engagement given to Peruvian stakeholders. This has been split into two sections; 
Section 5.2.1 explores the impact of class, race and discrimination and Section 5.2.2 investigates 
bureaucracy and the role of amiguismo.  
 
5.1 Freedom of voice: assessing Peru’s political state environment 
 
‘What we want to do with this law today is make it important for your voice to be heard. 
For you to be treated as citizens, and not as small children who are neither questioned nor 
consulted’ Former President Ollanta Humala. Bagua, September 6, 2011 (cited in Sanborn 
and Paredes 2015 p. 2).  
 
Peru has had a chequered political history. Since 1821 independence, ‘it has had 13 constitutions, 
with only [nine] of 19 elected governments completing their terms’ (Taft-Morales 2013 p. 1). The 
military has been at the forefront of shaping the country’s history throughout the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries with approximately 60 per cent of Peruvian presidents from independence 
through to 1995 having a military background (Eatock no date). It is little wonder that democracy 
has been stifled, taking until 1980 for the country’s most recent democratic transition to occur 
(Taft-Morales 2013 p. 1). This process was marred by Alberto Fujimori’s ‘ten years of assault on 
Peru’s democratic institutions’ and has only recommenced since the election of Alejandro Toledo 
in 2001 (Hood 2004 p. 69).  
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As the PEV theoretical framework makes clear, a democratic country should offer greater 
scope for freedom to voice than an authoritarian country. My 2015 fieldwork coincided with a 
period of democratic stability marked by successive free elections since 2001.110 However, modern 
Peru can also be categorised as undergoing a period of democratic consolidation which helps 
explain the nation’s mediocre Voice and Accountability score under the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (World Bank no date)111 and its evaluation as a “flawed” and “defective” democracy 
within The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index112 and The Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Transformation Index (BTI)113 respectively. To understand these classifications and what they 
mean for the freedom to voice in Peru, one must explore the rights and privileges given to society 
through national, regional and international law.  
 
The nation’s current constitution, enacted on 31st December 1993 (and revised in 2009), 
sets out various rights under Title 1: The Person and Society Chapter I, Article 2 which provide a 
strong freedom to voice for citizens. Firstly, Peruvians cannot be ‘persecuted on a basis of his ideas 
or beliefs’ and there exists ‘no crime of opinion’ (Constituteproject 2016 p. 4). Peruvian nationals 
have the right to ‘freedom of information, opinion, expression, and dissemination of thought, 
whether oral, written, or in images, through any medium of social communication, and without 
previous authorisation, censorship, or impediment, under penalty of law’ (Article 2, point 4) 
(ibid.). Equally, people have the right to their ‘own voice and image’ (Article 2, point 7) (ibid. p. 
5). ‘[P]eaceful assembly without arms’ is guaranteed though notice must be given if these are held 
in public squares or thoroughfares and may be prohibited due to public health and safety issue 
(Article 2, point 12) (ibid.). Foundations and other not-for-profit legal organisations can be 
                                                          
110 See La Misión de Observación Electoral de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (MOE/OEA) 2001, 2009, 
2011, 2016). There is still room for improvement (see MOE/OEA 2016 for the latest recommendations). 
111 This measure ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.’ Scores are given 
between -2.5 to 2.5. Peru’s most recent (2015) score is 0.2 which is a marginal improvement over previous fluctuating 
scores of -0.1, 0.0 and 0.1 since 2002 (ibid.). 
112  The Democracy Index categorises countries into full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and 
authoritarian regimes (Yang 2014 pp. 31-32). Peru ranks 65th out of 167 countries (or 45th out of the flawed 
democracies category) (EIU 2015 p. 14). 
113 The BTI ‘analyses and evaluates the quality of democracy, a market economy and political management in 129’ 
EMaDEs (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a). Peru had a “limited” overall status (combining political, economic and social 
– economic aspects) and is ranked 31st of 129 countries in 2016 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b).  
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established and associated with and cannot be ‘dissolved by administrative resolution’ (Article 2, 
point 13) (ibid. p. 6).  
 
Citizens are also able to participate, either as individuals or in collective groups, ‘in the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the Nation’ (point 17) (ibid.) and can submit written 
petitions (again individually or collectively) to the competent authority who have a duty to respond 
in writing to the interested party (point 20) (ibid.). Given this thesis’s specific focus on voice vis-
à-vis environmental pollution, citizens also have the right to the protection of their health, family 
and community environment (Article 7, Chapter II) (ibid. p. 8). Finally, these rights are protected 
through the DDP (Chapter XI: The Office of the Ombudsman, Article 161, 162) which seeks ‘to 
defend the constitutional and fundamental rights of the person and the community, and to ensure 
the enforcement of the state administration duties, as well as the provision of public services to 
citizens’ (Article 162) (ibid. p. 43).114 
 
From a wider regional and national perspective, various mechanisms and laws strengthen 
Peruvian society’s freedom of voice. At a regional level, the country is a member of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS)115 with its IACHR116 and Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights117 and accompanying conventions (American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
(signed 1948) and American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (ratified 
1978) and its additional protocols) formally acknowledged and ratified. At an international level, 
various treaties have been signed, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (ratified 1978), Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified 1990) and the 
ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention, 1989 (ILO Convention 169) (ratified 1994), all 
of which are important for this thesis. 
 
Taken together, these constitutionally enshrined laws and international conventions and 
treaties theoretically provide an open freedom of voice for Peruvians. However, contemporary 
                                                          
114 The DDP can take cases directly to the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the country or to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (Vasquez 2014 p. 115; see also Evans no date).  
115 See OAS (no date). 
116 See IACHR (no date); International Justice Resource Centre (no date). 
117 See Inter American Court of Human Rights (no date). 
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democratic Latin American countries have faced ‘difficulty integrating the agendas and dynamics’ 
of social movements, which aided the establishment of representative democracy ‘into the 
constitution and functioning of institutions’ (Vilas 1997 p. 6). In Peru’s case this has helped lead 
to institutionally weak state mechanisms and regulation (CBO2R1; IJ1; NSI2R1; NSI4R1; 
NSI5R1; NGO8R1; RGR4).118 As a PhD student and judicial assistant among my interviewees 
noted, “the government can say many things on paper but [pause] it’s another thing to implement 
the law … bring it into effect, make it real” (IUS2). Consequently, ‘[a] state that is unable to 
enforce its legality supports a democracy of low intensity citizenship’ (O’Donnell 1993 p. 14), a 
situation also brought about due to the country’s diversity and social discriminatory practices 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016c), factors discussed in Section 5.2.  
 
It is these ‘problems in governance’ (EIU 2015 p. 45) which contribute to Peru’s 
classification as a flawed and defective democracy. Ample evidence can be found from various 
studies. The BTI’s study encompasses a focus on its “Rule of Law” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b) 
and concludes that whilst ‘the state respects civil liberties in principle’ it has failed to ‘strengthen 
them further and occasionally does not protect them adequately’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016c). 
‘[T]he state’s weak authority, and especially a weak and corrupt judiciary’ sees ‘civil rights … 
violated in some parts of the country or citizens … discouraged from claiming their rights’ (ibid.). 
 
This conclusion is also shared by Freedom House who in their 2016 edition of Freedom in 
the World, categorised Peru’s status as “free” with a score of 71 (0= worst, 100= best) (Freedom 
House 2016a). This position and numerical score places it higher than five other countries on the 
continent, all given a “partly free” status (Bolivia (68), Paraguay (64), Colombia (63), Ecuador 
(59) and Venezuela (35)) but numerically lower than seven other countries (Guyana (74), 
Suriname (77), Argentina (79), Brazil (81), French Guiana (91), Chile (95) and Uruguay (98)) 
(ibid.). However, the nation’s political rights and civil liberties categorisation provide further 
evidence of its more limited position in these areas. Peru’s political liberties are weakened due to 
‘corruption, limits on the functioning of political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or 
military influence on politics’ while some civil liberties are neglected (Freedom House 2016b, my 
emphasis).   
                                                          
118 See for example Costa and Neild (2005) and Costa (2006) on post-2001 Peruvian police reform.  
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This word neglect has been emphasised as an important reason. By moving away from a 
generalised overview of Peru’s freedom of voice into the contextually specific focus of the PEV 
surrounding REI projects and wider national development, a more accurate evaluation can be 
made. In this setting, it becomes apparent that the national environment for stakeholders to voice 
is restricted, intolerant and suppressive.  
 
Upon reflection, the co-ordinator of the Catholic Church’s Comisión de Justicia y Paz - 
Derechos Humanos del Vicariato de Iquitos (Commission for Justice and Peace - Human Rights 
of the Vicariate of Iquitos) believed that the state is “more willing to listen” (CBO4R1a) to selva 
citizens’ voices than REIs. Other interviewees agreed. A national government civil servant argued 
that “the [indigenous people] know they have a voice and it is being heard” (NSI4R1) because, as 
the La Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente (Regional Organisation of Indigenous 
Peoples of the East) (ORPIO) representative mused, “they [the state] can’t promote investment by 
stepping on indigenous Peruvians’ rights” and require agreement “on at least some points of 
convergence” (CBO3R1). However, as Chapter Three has shown, contemporary Peru has pushed 
oil exploitation aggressively in the Loreton selva Region, often over existing and proposed 
indigenous territories and mining projects situated along the coastal and near-coastal region (see 
EY and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Peru (MRE) 2015 pp. 30-32), a process supported by Peru’s 
constitutionally enshrined ownership of natural resources.119 
 
These hydrocarbon policies symbolise an “ultra-liberal/capitalist” (RGR2) “pro-business 
and … private investment” (IUA1) national development policy vision for the sierra (mountain 
highland region) and selva orchestrated by MINEM, Perupetro and Petroperu. They are, 
understandably, “very pro-oil and … business” (NGO1R1), protective of foreign capital 
(CBO4R3) and whose power in the government allows them to direct and run the economy 
effectively (CBO1R1). In terms of the selva, the “state knows very clearly what it wants for the 
Amazon and … is preparing a set of very controversial measures … involving the pipeline … the 
                                                          
119 ‘Natural resources, renewable and non-renewable, are patrimony of the Nation. The State is sovereign in their 
utilisation’ (Article 66, Chapter II: The Environment and Natural Resources) (Constituteproject 2016 p. 19). 
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waterway … the dams in the Marañón … the electricity concession coming from Moyobamba to 
Iquitos” (CBO4R3)120 and other large transport projects.121   
 
What impact has this “selva hydrocarbon and development vision” (SHDV) had on 
citizens’ rights and their ability to voice? A more detailed study of various laws and regulations 
surrounding REI projects and national development reveal state efforts to suppress and constrict 
the freedom of voice for affected people.  
 
The Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (International Co-
operation for Development and Solidarity, CIDSE) note that in Latin America, countries have 
routinely tried to criminalise social protest, particularly surrounding large investment projects 
(CIDSE 2011 pp. 1-2). New or adapted legislation has sought to ‘convert legitimate protest into 
criminal acts. The aim of criminalisation is to create fear, tarnish reputations, weaken resistance, 
force opponents to expend time and resources defending themselves and to justify the use of force 
against them’ (ibid. p. 2). A clear example is the 1992 Article 2, Law No. 25475, which sets out a 
broad definition of terrorism which has been harshly criticised due to its application ‘on acts … 
not related to actual terrorism’ (Scheinin 2010 p. 16),122 such as those surrounding environmental 
and indigenous issues.  
 
Other laws have been built on this. In July 2007, Law No. 982 expanded the legal definition 
of extortion to incorporate actions broadly associated with public protest, including ‘the 
obstruction of roads and the disturbance of government functions for any … reason, both of which 
became punishable by up to 25 years in prison’ (Aiello no date). This was followed in December 
                                                          
120 The pipeline is a reference to the 6.5-mile (10.5-kilometre) extension to the Camisea Gas pipeline project in Block 
88 in the Ucayali Basin, south-eastern Peru. Almost 75 per cent of this Block overlaps the KNN Territorial Reserve 
and Manu Buffer Zone (Hill 2014a; 2014b). 
The waterway is a reference to the Hidrovia Amazonica (Amazon Waterway) project (see InfraPPP 2015). 
On the Rio Marañón, 20 dams have been proposed (see Hill 2015b). 
The Moyobamba-Iquitos electricity concession refers to a project to construct a 600 kilometre 220kv transmission line 
across the selva to Iquitos (Prolnversión no date). 
121 These include the Pucallpa-Cruzeiro do Sul road that would link the Peruvian city of Pucallpa in eastern Peru to 
the western Brazilian town of Cruzeiro do Sul (Mandle et al. 2013 p. 4) and the Twin Ocean Railroad, a 5,300-
kilometre interoceanic railway between Brazil’s Porto do Acu Atlantic port and Peru’s Puerto Ilo on the Pacific coast 
(Lee 2015). 
122 See also IACHR (2000 Ch. II Section C.1.c); Ruebner et al. (2004). 
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2008 by Supreme Decree 012-2008-DE/CFFAA, which removed the requirement for the 
government to declare a state of emergency before army deployment (Latin American Andean 
Group Report 2010 p. 12). In September 2010, Law No. 1095 permitted armed forces deployment 
in public security operations, including protests and regulated the use of lethal force against 
‘“hostile groups”’ (Front Line Defenders (FLD) 2014 pp. 1-2). In January 2014, Law No. 3051 
(an amendment to country’s Criminal Code (Article 20 (11)) ‘granted members of the armed forces 
and the national police exemption from criminal responsibility if they cause injury or death, 
including through … use of guns or other weapons, while on duty’ (ibid. p. 2; see also FLD 2014 
p. 3; OAS 2014). Despite these laws being widely condemned (see Scheinin 2010 pp. 2, 16; OAS 
2014; Peru Support Group 2014), they and other regulations (see Aiello no date) have been used 
to brutal effect by the state. 
 
In 2009, the state sent riot police in response to indigenous protestors occupying Andoas 
airfield (Andoas District, Datem del Marañón Province), which resulted in one police officer and 
protestor being killed and the subsequent arrest of 25 indigenous protestors who were taken to 
Iquitos prison, tortured and sentenced (CBO1R1) though they were later exonerated in a December 
2011 court ruling due to lack of evidence (NSI7R1). In May 2015, troops were deployed and a 
state of emergency declared near the Tia Maria copper mine in Islay Province, Arequipa Region 
after several deaths (BBC News 2015a; 2015b). This was followed by a second state of emergency 
later in the year, this time for 30 days over events at Las Bambas cooper mine in the Apurimac 
Region (BBC News 2015b), leading to at least three citizen deaths (BBC News 2015c).  From July 
2011, when former President Ollanta Humala took office, until September 2014, 34 citizens were 
killed in various social conflicts across the country (Human Rights Watch 2015). 
 
More widely, a FLD report reveals that environmental human rights defenders working 
with  
 
indigenous or campesino [farmer] communities have been the direct target of death threats, 
physical attacks, surveillance, stigmatisation, smear campaigns, and judicial harassment. 
Reports from the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos [National Co-ordinator 
for Human Rights] (CNDDHH) found that, in 2012 alone, 70 [per cent] of the attacks 
reported in Peru against HRDs [human rights defenders] were to environmentalists and 
those working on indigenous issues (FLD 2014 p. 2). 
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Most recently, 12 land and environmental defenders were killed in 2015, the fourth highest figures 
in the world that year (Global Witness 2016a pp. 8-9). These add to the 38 fatalities witnessed 
between 2010-2014 (Global Witness 2016b). 
 
This trend should be understood as part of a wider government effort to clamp down on 
organisations and individuals that agitate against the SHDV, including those working for the state 
(NSI5R1). 123  A lawyer working for Alianza Arkana, an NGO specialising in indigenous 
development and human rights support felt that “NGOs are really attacked by the Peruvian 
government” (NGO7R1). The “official discourse of the government” is to de-legitimise the work 
of these organisations in the eyes of society by “painting” a falsified image of what they are there 
for (ibid.) and causing them term to “effectively [become] a dirty word” (IJ1).124 “Some say we 
are anti- mining, anti-hydrocarbon … that we are here to encourage protests, some others say that 
we are trying to protect the interests of the USA and Europe, so it is complicated to work in this 
environment” (NGO6R1).  
 
An illustration was provided by an interview with Red Ambiental Loretana, a Loreton 
indigenous environmental watchdog group based in Iquitos (CBO1R1). Peruvian law stipulates 
that oil contracts signed after 2005 must reinject contaminated waters (Vasquez 2014 p. 93) but 
this does not apply to retrospective contracts like Block 1AB. In 2004, Red Ambiental Loretana 
began campaigning against this situation through “sit downs, protests … meetings, talk[ing] to the 
press … [and visiting] schools … [and] universities.” Initially, the government viewed these 
actions as “a nuisance” but “became very sensitive to our … voice” and moved to expel the CBO 
co-ordinator back to his native country (CBO1R1). However, significant support from citizens, 
                                                          
123 A representative from the Procurador Público Especializadi en Delitos Anticorrupción (PPEDC) descentralizado 
del Distrito Judicial de Loreto (Public Prosecutor Specialised in Crimes of Corruption for the dencentralised Judical 
District of Loreto) described how their former work in the Ucayali Region surrounding logging caused “too many 
problems … even … life threats” (NSI5R1). 
124 For example, IUA1, an anthropologist at the Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon and former national 
government civil servant believed that “whenever there is an oil project in [an] area … NGOs bring these films, and 
show them to people to scare them” whilst the director of an Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonia Peruana 
(Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon) research department suggested that indigenous communities were being 
“taught wrong” by NGOs (IUA3).  
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CBOs and NGOs at the local, national and international level helped force a government back-
down.125 
 
A second example was provided by a teacher and human rights lawyer (ILP1), who 
described the experience of Gregoria Santos, governor of Cajamarca, who has led the opposition 
to Newmont Mining’s $5 billion Conga copper and gold project since 2011 (Jamasmie 2014). 
Santos was subsequently jailed on corruption charges for fourteen months at the end of 2014, 
charges which many felt were the culmination of a government campaign against him (ibid.). 
  
Aside from suppression, what evaluation can be made of various legal mechanisms for 
stakeholders, particularly citizens, to voice through orthodox formal channels?  
 
[I]t is important to be clear about exactly which decisions the public have the opportunity 
to participate in’ as ‘claims to have ‘involved the public’ may boil down to having a few 
conversations with a couple of community leaders or calling people to a public meeting, 
which only the most active members of a community attend (Cornwall 2008 p. 280 author’s 
emphasis).  
 
A report by the Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal (Due Process of Law Foundation) 
(DPLF) for Oxfam described Peru’s legal and regulatory provisions as ‘fragmented, inadequate, 
and insufficient’ (Galvis 2011 p. 13) and two contextually important examples illustrate this; the 
2011 law of Consulta Previa (Prior Consultation) and Estudio de Impacto Ambiental 
(Environmental Impact Assessment, EIAs). Both highlight the dominance of the SHDV. 
 
 The Law of Prior Consultation was based on ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, both of which set out the need for consultation with 
indigenous people prior to the development of natural resources in their territories.126 Until this 
point, the right to consultation had been regulated in very general terms by the 2005 General 
                                                          
125 This campaign helped lead to the Dorissa Accord (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 78). 
126 Crucially, states are obligated to have indigenous ‘consent as the objective of the consultation mechanism’ before 
projects like hydrocarbon exploitation occur (Asia Pacific Forum of Human Rights and Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013 p. 26 my emphasis). 
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Environment Law (no. 28611) (Vasquez 2014 p. 79; see also Perupetro no date a)  and accordingly 
represents a positive evolution for indigenous communities (CBO3R1).  
 
Whilst the new law provided a far more comprehensive framework127 and to some extent 
increased dialogue (CBO3R1),128 various objections were raised by indigenous organisations. 
These centred on the stringent criteria for initiating Prior Consultation, the inflexible (short) time-
scale for consultation and the state’s leadership in carrying out each respective measure of the 
process (IUA1; Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 pp. 14-18). Two prominent flaws reinforce 
the view that the Peruvian State is intent on pursuing development in the selva and wider country 
and consequently constrict any voices critical to this objective.  
 
Firstly, the fourth information stage for all affected communities and citizens therein “is 
the most important stage” of the process (CBO3R1). However, “[t]he information in other [later] 
stages is not shared with everyone … only … with the leaders” (termed Apus) (ibid.), meaning that 
“[t]he ordinary people in the village very often don’t know what’s been agreed [or] what’s been 
talked about” (CBO1R1) since the fourth stage. Limiting vocal engagement to civil society leaders 
directly contravenes stipulations laid out in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (Articles XVIII and XXIII).129 The subsequent lack of wider civil society involvement or 
information will also prevent clear, concise opinions to formulate making community consensus 
harder to gain. This is already a difficult prospect when oil and gas projects can split communities 
and/or cause tensions between those who see it as a potential benefit and others as a threat) 
                                                          
127 The Law of Prior Consultation’s Article 8 lists seven stages to the consultation process: 
a) Identification of legislative or administrative measures subject to consultation. 
b) Identification of indigenous or native peoples to be consulted. 
c) Publication of the legislative or administrative measure. 
d) Supplying information pertaining to the legislative or administrative measure. 
e) Internal evaluation of the legislative or administrative measure by organisations of indigenous or native peoples. 
f) Process of dialogue between government representatives and representatives of indigenous or native peoples. 
g) Decision (Peru Support Group no date). 
128 At the time of fieldwork, CBO3R1 confirmed that five Loreton consultation mechanisms had been completed with 
a sixth for Block 196 ongoing.  
129 See IACHR 2002 Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States (Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,  
Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 860 (2002)) supra. para 140 (University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 2002) and 2004 Maya 
indigenous community of the Toledo District v. Belize (Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004)) supra, para. 142 (University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 
2004)). 
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(CBO3R1; IUA3; NGO4R1; NGO4R2b130). Crucially, if no community(ies) consensus is reached, 
the lead state entity will take the final decision (Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 p. 15; 
Vasquez 2014 p. 109). 
 
Secondly, in an interview with a GOREL Manager of Health and Environment, they stated 
that the state and REI “need the approval from the communities directly affected by that [REI] 
intervention” (RGR1). This is not correct. The law has only a consultative power and ‘does not 
give the communities the right of veto’ (Villanueva M 2013 p. 100; NSI7R1). Subsequently, the 
Peruvian government can legitimise its extractive and wider development drive under the guise of 
the Law of Prior Consultation. No extractive development projects can be stopped. Interviewees 
summarised it as “a salute to the bandido [bandit]” (NGO2R1c), a top-down (ILP1), non-
transparent (NSI2R1), unequitable process (NSI7R1), required by law but not considered 
(NGO4R1) and “conditioned by international [REIs]” (ILP1). It is they which the government is 
more interested in achieving a good agreement with (NGO7R1). This ILO interpretation has been 
done for the benefit of the state (RGR2) that fails to satisfy local citizen concerns (CBO3R1) and 
effectively ignores their voice. 
 
One can also find issues with EIAs, a tool which was introduced through the 1990 National 
Code for Environmental and Natural Resources (Legislative Decree 163) (Castro et al. 2014 p. 
1).131 They are carried out before the commencement of ‘any hydrocarbon activity likely to cause 
environmental impacts, such as seismic exploration, drilling of exploratory and development 
wells, construction of production facilities, etc.’ (Perupetro no date b). Despite their importance, 
two CBO interviewees described them as merely “formalities” (CBO1R1; CBO4R1a) and one can 
see this in the two citizen participation mechanisms; Taller Informativo (Informative Workshops) 
and Audienca Pública (Public Hearing) (NSI2R1; Stetson 2012 p. 85; Shoobridge and Kapila no 
date p. 95). These do “not allow … its citizens [to] know the impact [that the SHDV] has” 
(CBO4R3). 
                                                          
130  One ProNaturaleza NGO interviewee alludes to this point: “Both in conservation and in services projects 
[environmental monitoring], we identify three groups of people in the communities: 1) the ones against; 2) the pro-
activity ones, and 3) indifferent ones” (NGO4R1; see also Chapter 8, Section 8.4 where a Loreton Regional Councillor 
(RGR2) suggests deliberate government efforts at creating division). 
131 For reform history see Glasson, Thirivel and Chadwick (2005 pp. 313-315) and Castro et al. (2014 p. 2). 
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For example, the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator recounted that in the case of 
the Amazon Waterway project (see Footnote 120), the environmental impact report and the 
contractor’s study “should have been done with the involvement of the population and they 
haven’t” (CBO4R1a). Discrepancies can also be found in relation to oil extraction projects. In the 
case of Perenco in Block 67, the Red Ambiental Loretana spokesperson noted that the company 
had “actually started work” building heliports and establishing camps “before their studies had 
been finished” (CBO1R1) an indicator of the level of REI contempt to this “weak” and 
uncontrolled system of participation (NSI2R1). 
 
Efforts to improve EIAs have been undertaken. They were originally controlled by each 
government ministry which meant that those for hydrocarbon projects were approved by MINEM, 
specifically the Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales Energía (General Directorate of 
Energy-Related Environmental Affairs, DGAAE) (Powers 2012 p. 6). This situation ‘[set] up a 
direct conflict of interest: the mining industry has responsibility for both promoting investment 
and enforcing social and environmental regulations’ (Slack 2009 p. 6). However, in December 
2012, a new agency, Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones 
Sostenibles (National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investment, 
SENACE) was established and is now part of MINAM (Watts and Collyns 2012), thus helping 
remove conflict of interest.  
 
Nevertheless, the prominence given to the SHDV remains. The July 2014 Law No. 30230 
‘reduces to 45 days the time allotted to governmental entities for reviewing [EIAs with] civil 
servants … subject to sanctions for failing to meet the deadline’ (OECD 2015 p. 188). This 
“ridiculous” timeframe (NGO2R1c) made them irrelevant formalities (RGR2), but was useful to 
speed up hydrocarbon project implementation.  
 
Consequently, one finds that community consultation via Informative Workshops and 
Public Hearings ‘take place after the government has already negotiated and signed leases with oil 
and gas companies’ which is unlikely ‘to cancel already signed concessions’ (Stetson 2012 p. 86 
author’s emphasis). Indigenous citizens are “the last ones to know something” (Interpreter in ILP2 
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interview; see also Vasquez 2014 p. 108). Moreover, they appear to remain rubber stamping 
exercises. CBO1R1 concluded that he’d “known of no case … where the previous studies have 
ever said no, you can’t carry on. There always approved” (CBO1R1),132 consequently providing 
further clear evidence of the state’s zealous pursuit of the SHDV and the constraint placed upon 
the freedom of voice for citizens and other stakeholders.133  
 
Though there are high levels of social conflict in Peru,134 these limited formal mechanisms 
for public engagement surrounding resource extraction projects and the latter’s divisive impact 
have been a fundamental cause of these problems. In a 2009 report by DPLF, 126 (44 per cent) of 
the 288 social conflicts were related to problems with the consultation process (Fundación para el 
Debido Proceso Legal 2010 p. 46, cited in Vasquez 2014 p. 108). A 2016 report by three 
environmental NGOs (CooperAcción, Fedepaz and Grufides) found that under former President 
Humula’s political administration, government social conflicts averaged 217 in any one month 
(Peru Support Group 2016e) of which just shy of 70 per cent were socio-environmental 
(CooperAcción, Fedepaz and Grufides 2016 p. 16) in nature. The clear majority of these (62.7 per 
cent) are related to mining (ibid.), which has a history of causing social conflict in Peru.135 
Nevertheless, 15.9 per cent of these conflicts are caused by the hydrocarbon sector (ibid.) due to 
the consultation issues, the overlapping of their indigenous lands, the impact of environmental 
pollution136 and the difficulties in gaining environmental legal justice (NSI7R1).137 
                                                          
132 I uncovered only one partial case. Perenco had been awarded Block 67 in 2008 (Perenco no date). However, in 
2012, its EIA for its next operational stage was blocked by MINEM, partly due to its failure to obtain technical support 
from the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblo Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuano (National Institute for the 
Development of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Populations, INDEPA) (Hill 2012). 
133 Recent reforms continue this trend. In May 2015 Law No. 30327 was enacted which allowed investment projects 
to obtain global environmental certification (GEC) combining EIA and environmental permitting; for projects in the 
same geographical area to share the same baseline (reducing EIA implementation by an estimated year); and for 
environmental permits from different government agencies to be granted in a simultaneous rather than sequential 
manner (OECD 2015 p. 188). 
134 A DDP report shows that there were 210 social conflicts, 149 of which were active and 61 latent (DDP 2015 p. 1). 
135 In 2005, the DDP ‘recorded thirty-three separate conflicts related to mining’ whilst ‘the World Bank noted that at 
least fifteen mining zones were affected by conflicts’ (Bebbington et al. 2007 p. 6; see also Observatorio de Conflictos 
Mineros de América Latina (Latin American Miners Conflict Observatory, OCMAL) (no date). 
136 For instance, after the second oil spill from the Oleoducto Norperuano in February 2016 (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.4, Footnote 82), the Wampis community responded by taking ‘at least eight public officials hostage to demand help 
from the central government’ (Hill 2016b). 
137 Indeed, the PPEDC lawyer reported that even when complaints “against the companies have been formally [i.e. 
legally] presented … the problem is that ecological crimes have very short penalties, four to five years so …. once the 
time … has passed … criminals don’t have to be persecuted any longer” (NSI7R1). For selva citizens, gaining legal 
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Overall, this section has highlighted that freedom of voice in Peru is fragile. Whilst Peru’s 
consolidation of democracy does bestow civil rights on its citizens and other collective voice 
actors, within the context of hydrocarbon projects and state development, a far more dangerous, 
inflexible and intolerant environment is found. The country’s aggressive hydrocarbon expansion 
is proliferated through and protected by various laws governing citizen consultation and 
engagement where one can see a ‘closure of the democratic spaces in which people struggle for 
redistributive policies’ (North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1485). In other words, tokenistic forms of 
participation (Arnstein 1969) exist for citizens to formally voice through. At the same time, the 
labelling of anti-mining and wider selva indigenous protestors as “anti-mining terrorists” (Post 
2016a) and “intransigents” (CBO3R1), highly charged terms for a country wracked by the Shining 
Path insurgency, shows that supporters of the state’s SHDV are seeking to de-legitimise genuine 
stakeholder grievances in the eyes of wider society. One NGO, CooperAcción concluded that there 
is ‘an intent to present all this [the anti-mining movement] as a kind of plot against investment, 
against development, against the country’ (Hill 2015c). Consequently, the state will “always take 
the side of the oil companies [and other REIs] to defend private investment” (CBO4R3) a measure 
of which can be seen in the freedom of voice levels for stakeholders surrounding hydrocarbon and 
state development.  
 
At this point, one can return to CBO4R1, CBO3R1 and NSI4R1’s beliefs that the state is 
more willing to listen to local selva communities than REIs. For the Catholic Church human rights 
co-ordinator, potential improvement in this regard over the next ten years was dependent on 
“who’s in government” (CBO4R1). This opinion can be challenged. Looking at the two main 
contestants in the 2016 Peruvian Presidential elections both were “very neoliberal” adherents of 
capitalism with a focus on resource use rather than a social development and sustainability agenda 
(NGO6R1). Both shared a belief in selva and sierra development and whilst specific polices may 
have differed, their pledges run in a similar vein to contemporary former administrations.138  
 
                                                          
justice is therefore difficult, exacerbated by the lack of state presence (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1) and their own 
individual access to non-state actors (see Chapter 8, Section 8.3). 
138 See Peruanos Por el Kambio (Peruvian for Change, PPK no date pp. 9, 14) and Fuerza Popular (Popular Force) 
(no date). 
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Is it all doom and gloom? The establishment of the 1.3-million-hectare Sierra del Divisor 
National Park (see Erickson-Davis and Joshi 2015) is a significant achievement, whilst the national 
government has formally acknowledged the environmental harm caused by oil companies in 
Loreto (NGO1R1) via the acta historica de diez de Marzo (Historic Act 10th March 2015, Historic 
Act) (NGO7R1).139 However, these measures in no way deny the implementation of the SHDV or 
the importance placed upon this policy. In fact, some interviewees felt that despite the Historic 
Act, the government were still not taking environmental remediation or the fulfilment of wider 
socio-economic commitments to selva communities seriously enough (CBO1R1; NGO2R1b; 
IUA1) 140  reinforcing the dominance of certain state mechanisms (MINEM, Perupetro and 
Petroperu) and private interests (Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales 
Privadas, The National Confederation of Private Business Institutions, CONFIEP) and the 
weakness of MINAM (CBO1R1; NSI2R1)141 who do not necessarily share the ruling regimes 
neoliberal extractivism (Bebbington and Scurrah 2013 p. 174). 
 
One sixteen-year-old girl from REDNNA concluded that “oil is one of the most important 
activities for Peru and it’s something that is not going to … go away” (CBO2R1). For extractive 
stakeholders, no matter who won in 2016, their PEV environment remained shaped and restricted 
by the importance that the state has placed on hydrocarbon activities and their defence of REIs, 
“even against its own people” (CBO4R3) and the protection of their rights (ILP2; IUA1; NSI7R1; 
NGO8R1). 
 
5.2 The social influences and mechanisms within Peruvian society  
 
“They [the central government] don’t want a dialogue with the people here, not ever” 
(IRC7). 
 
                                                          
139 The agreement included the ‘installation of provisional clean water system’, the creation of a 50 million soles 
guarantee fund and remediation work by the responsible company (Kerremans 2015).  
140 For the Red Ambiental representative, the 50 million soles fund was “a pittance” and believed that 500-600 million 
soles were necessary (CBO1R1). 
141 In 2014, Law No. 30230 weakened MINAM and OEFA (NSI2R1) by revoking the former’s ability ‘to enforce air, 
soil and water quality standards …. [and] establish nature reserves’ while OEFA’s level of fines given to REI’s have 
been cut by half (Southwick 2014). 
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Loreton fieldwork made clear that several national societal influences were at work which have a 
significant impact on government and REI professionals’ engagement and access for citizens. In 
an interview with The Peru Mission spokesperson, class, age and race were listed as several 
underlying influences which have shaped indigenous people’s use of radical action in the selva 
(NGO2R1b). The assessment of these and other interconnected factors within Peruvian society 
help uncover their role in formulating the national PEV environment for citizens and their ability 
to voice and be heard effectively.    
 
5.2.1 Class, race and discrimination 
 
[T]hey [Petroperu] wanted to argue with us, they were challenging us, and we said, yes, 
they are educated … but we also have some education, at least high school to defend 
ourselves at least, and we said that [just] because they are professionals [doesn’t mean] 
they can humiliate us (IRC13 recounting a conversation with Petroperu engineers). 
 
Two interviewees felt that two of the most important interconnected features of Peruvian society 
are its strong class system (IJ1; NGO2R1c) upheld through the dominance of race and 
discrimination. From a historical perspective, South American countries ‘have shown an 
entrenched pattern of clientelism and corruption, usually determined by the extent of influence 
individuals or groups can exert on the authorities to advance their own interests’ (Vasquez 2014 
p. 47). Traditionally, in Peru, the social organisation was ‘essentially dualistic, with the blancos 
[reflecting the old Spanish and Portuguese elite] and the mestizos occupying the upper and middle 
strata respectively’ whilst the lower classes contained two distinct groups, the marginalised Indians 
and the rapidly growing cholo or mestizo group (Paulston 1971 p. 90).  
 
The evolution of the state ‘was profoundly shaped’ by these white business elites (Thorp 
and Paredes 2010 p. 112). Their focus on economically productive regions and advanced economy 
trade created highly uneven national development, a process strengthened ‘by a political system 
increasingly responsive to an electorate concentrated in the Coast’ at the expense of the sierra and 
selva (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 112; see also Slater 1989 p. 67; Santos-Granero and Barclay 
1998 p. 64; Aljovin and Lopez 2005).142 
                                                          
142 Under the 1895 electoral law, ‘illiterate citizens could not vote. Thus, in 1899, only 108,597 people, or around 2.5 
[per cent] of Peru’s population, were eligible to vote’ (Hunefeldt 2004 p. 158). 
 
 
170 
 
 
‘In contrast to this external orientation, interrelationships among the mining zones and 
other regions within Peru were much more limited’ (Slater 1989 p. 67), with the sierra seen as an 
area for the provision of cheap labour (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 206). Race was also tightly 
linked to this spatial economic focus. To early Twentieth Century elites, a ‘serrano (person of the 
highlands) … [was seen] as primitive while the coastal criollo [a person from South or Central 
America, especially one with pure Spanish descent] was representative of modern Peru, and 
considered “white” regardless of skin colour’ (de la Cadea 2000 p. 21, cited in Ewig 2010 p. 15) 
while ‘the Amazon … was not inhabited by primitive Indians, but by “savages” that had nothing 
to offer Peru’s nation-building project’ (Ewig 2010 p. 15). The discriminatory views fed into 
indigenous exploitation in the latter Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century rubber boom in the 
Putumayo Province of Loreto (IUA1; IUS2; NGO3R1). 
 
For contemporary Peru, the country’s key problem (CBO4R3) remains its ‘historically 
rooted’ ‘pervasively discriminatory society’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016d pp. 7, 12; see also 
Saaveddra, Torero and Nopo 2002). Indigenous people, suggested by a Catholic Church priest to 
have a “fifth category” societal status (CBO4R3), have been persistently exploited (ILP2), 
excluded and ignored (CBO4R1a; NSI7R1)143 and have only a limited voice in the Peruvian 
political system (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 204). It is little wonder to find that ‘[e]qual 
opportunity is not a reality in Peru’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016d p. 22) with one in two Peruvians 
living in poverty (Drinot 2006 p. 13).144 This discrimination is fed by a state which continues to 
view the indigenous, particularly those in the selva, as an obstacle to the fulfilment of the SHDV.145   
 
The scale of Peruvian discrimination can be glimpsed from some of the Loreton interviews. 
In Barrio Florido, indigenous people were seen to “always exaggerate” the problems they have 
and do “so for the money. They block it [the river] to get money” (MRBF2). Other residents 
                                                          
143 As two Cocama Cuninico residents stated; “we are marginalised in …our country, we are forgotten” (IRC2) and 
“insignificant” (IRC7). 
144 For instance, the Gini Index shows that income distribution is unequal across the whole population and far higher 
than other EMaDEs (Iguales and Oxfam 2015 p. 5).  
145 For example, in a 2007 El Comercio newspaper article, former President Alan Garcia defined indigenous people 
as second-class citizens and went on to describe them as obstacles to transnational privatisation of the Amazon 
indigenous land (see Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times 2007; Gonzales 2012 p. 223).  
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believed that they’re always “looking for benefits” from REIs and aren’t willing to work for their 
income (MRBF1) or even fish, and were drinkers (MRBF3).   
 
A former government employee, now an anthropologist at the Research Institute of the 
Peruvian Amazon, thought that indigenous people only want “to be given money” and that if you 
did so, they would “shut their mouths” and stop complaining “about this and that” (IUA1) whilst 
a colleague labelled them as “closed-minded” (IUA3). Meanwhile, a construction worker believed 
indigenous people to be “very, very lazy … people …. [who] don’t like to work” (ICW1).  
 
A symbolic phrase by many Peruvians is to see their country as ‘a beggar sitting on a bench 
of gold’ (Drinot 2006 p. 12), an expression illustrative of ‘the highly racialised character of 
development thinking in Peru’ (ibid. p. 15). The beggar is handicapped and cannot properly exploit 
the country’s riches due to the predominance of Peru’s indigenous masses, who are characterised 
as ‘dirty, ignorant, dependent on others, as well as devious and untrustworthy’ (ibid.). At the same 
time, the society ‘integrated in such a way as to perpetrate the inferiority of the indigenous culture 
vis-à-vis the Hispanic culture and rural areas vis-à-vis urban areas’ (Paulston 1971 pp. 90-91). 
 
In Iquitos, this manifests itself through urban resident efforts to “divorce themselves” from 
the selva and their own indigenous heritage (NGO2R1c) (even though an estimated 80 per cent of 
the city is indigenous) (CBO4R3) through their “risen” materialist and urbanised status e.g. 
ownership of a Tuk Tuk (rickshaw), TV, Nike trainers etc. (NGO2R1c). The issues faced by 
indigenous peoples are insensitively viewed as their own internal problems (NGO2R1c; IUA1). 
“There is an element of “well, they want to live there …. If they don’t want that, they should come 
and live in the city”” (NGO2R1c). “In all cases, they [wider society] see it as a problem that is not 
theirs, but a problem of indigenous peoples” (IUA1). This socio-cultural and spiritual divorce is 
not only a result of discrimination but also a lack of understanding that Peruvian’s in general and 
those living in urban centres have for the rainforest, its people and their different cultures (IJ1; 
NGO3R1), beliefs, traditions and livelihoods.146 This is not an exclusively Peruvian issue with 
                                                          
146 Conversations with Barrio Florido residents typify this. MRBF2 believed that “indigenous people receive a lot of 
benefits from the state for their education.” MRBF3 recounted how friends of his working in the selva told him that 
indigenous villages “get a lot of help …. [like] light, water, oil, satellite, etc.” (MRBF3) and “are given everything” 
(MRBF21). For most communities, the opposite is true. Whilst a tiny proportion adjacent to oil extraction sites receive 
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wider indigenous and non-indigenous intercultural relations characterised by ‘paternalism, 
ignorance and misunderstanding’ (Howitt 2001 p. 25). 
 
Consequently, while all Peruvians are considered citizens, citizenship remains constrained 
by the long-standing ethnic and class-based divisions of Peruvian society which has seen the state 
reinforce the historic divisions of Peruvians into first and second class citizens rather than promote 
democratic citizenship (Burt 2007 p. 50). Even the mestizo or mixed ethnic based citizenship has 
not prevented discriminatory practices based on cultural and racial traits (Thorp and Paredes 2010 
p. 7). 
 
In sum, racism in Peru structures social hierarchies and shapes development policies 
because, by racialising culture and culturalising race (by making ideas of racial and cultural 
superiority/inferiority mutually reinforcing), it constructs the non-white ‘other’ (the 
indigenous, the mestizo, the Afro-Peruvian, the chino [broad term for Asian ethnicity]) as 
the depository and agent of poverty, cultural backwardness and national failure (Drinot 
2006 p. 19). 
 
Given the predominance of Peru’s racialised class consciousness and widespread indigenous 
discrimination and apparent cultural inferiority, what impact could these negative societal traits 
have on the work and outlook of Peruvian professional elites such as engineers, lawyers, doctors 
or public servants? Evidence suggests that it directly influences their engagement with society, 
particularly with lower-class indigenous citizens, from mundane everyday interactions147 through 
to more official levels of communication. As a Peruvian professional, “I don’t have to open the 
door to you if I don’t want to, I don’t have to concede you a visit” (NGO2R1b). Of importance for 
this research was the opinion of some interviewees that some professionals, chieflly state 
representatives, were reluctant to interact and engage with the population, especially those in the 
selva (CBO4R3; NGO2R1; NSI2R1). In other words, institutional (i.e. government) societal voice 
engagement was seen to suffer.  
                                                          
electricity or have satellite television, the rest live a subsistence existence as “survival farmers” (NGO2R1c). For 
example, in Block 192 there are around 100 communities in the REIs operational area of influence but only two 
directly adjacent to the base camp receive electricity and water, a situation repeated in other Loreton oil drilling sites 
(IUA1; NSI2R1). 
147 NGO2R1c provides a detailed example. On one occasion, several priests visited his home for a meal and “they 
wouldn’t speak” until his indigenous housekeeper who ate her meals with NGO2R1 “had left the room.” Despite 
NGO2R1’s protestations, they argued that “we can’t possibly have a conversation amongst priests who are 
professionals with her present.” 
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In The Peru Mission representative’s experience, regional government politicians “get a 
nice office with air conditioning and don’t want to leave it” and “get their hand[s] dirty” 
(NGO2R1b). Leaving their urban environment and travelling into the selva for people who aren’t 
“really worth bothering” (IJ1) with creates “a resentment about it” (NGO2R1b). “[T]hey don’t go. 
They seem comfortable where they are” (NGO4R1). For instance, a GOREL regional development 
and intercultural advisor felt that the Peruvian state has low compliance for the Prior Consultation 
law because state officials “feel … they live apart from the indigenous people” making many of 
them “indifferent” to the law and “not … up for the job” of supporting these communities (RGR4). 
Consequently, whilst these representatives may go out in speedboats for a day or two (NGO2R1b) 
to visit closely situated communities, going to high selva (remoter rainforest) pueblos “just doesn’t 
interest them” (NGO2R1c).148 They “don’t want to go out to the jungle and get hot and sweaty and 
bitten by mosquitoes” (NGO2R1b), use “primitive” facilities (RGR3) or have to eat basic 
foodstuffs like banana, fish and yucca149 for several days (NGO2R1c).  
 
This reluctance stemming from discrimination generates an unwillingness to see anything 
clearly or put themselves in a position where they can’t avoid seeing (CBO4R3) or sympathising 
with selva-based communities (NSI2R1), an attitude not lost on interviewed citizens. In Barrio 
Florido, a housewife found that politicians weren’t “humble” (MRBF24) and once elected “don’t 
even know you” (MRBF25) while the Petroperu refinery manager “looked down on people just 
for being in charge” (MRBF6). In Cuninico, a male manual labourer felt that Petroperu and 
government officials “think themselves important because they’re educated people” (IRC19) 
whilst Petroperu must view them as “ignorant” natives who “don’t know anything” (IRC28). 
Petroperu workers “think … [that because] they have more money than somebody else, they don’t 
have to pay any attention to them” (IRC4), an attitude and treatment the female interviewee 
levelled at the company in their relationship with Cuninico.  
 
                                                          
148 For example, the incumbent GOREL president was the first office holder to ever visit villages along the upper Rio 
Tigre. “They've had oil companies there for forty years and [this was] the first time that a Regional President [had] 
visited” (IJ1). 
149 A shrub, also known as cassava, native to South America and a major staple food. 
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One should acknowledge interviewees who suggest that these issues are not universal 
throughout all state officials. Younger professionals, such as agricultural and forestry engineers, 
are prepared to go out into the selva (NGO2R1b), whilst government agency staff (e.g. ANA, 
DIGESA, Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado (National Service of 
Protected Areas by the State, SERNANP), OEFA)150 have “been willing to go into the [selva] 
villages at some points and present their … findings”, often at asambleas (public meetings) 
(NGO1R1), particularly since the Multi-sectoral Commission’s establishment (NSI1R1a). 
Accordingly, it’s important to distinguish among these different government institutional 
representatives (politicians and civil servant agencies) when analysing state engagement in 
Chapter 6 to test the validity of these opinions and provide a more accurate analysis. 
 
Yet, crucially, even when dialogue does occur, selva indigenous communities and state 
representatives can struggle to understand one another due to their two completely different 
realities that are “not on the same field” (NGO3R1; NSI7R1; see also Howitt 2001 p. 59). In CBO 
and NGO interviews (CBO4R1a; NGO2R1b), interviewees alluded to the indigenous belief in a 
“holistic cosmovision of creation” (NGO2R1c), an idea that Nature is their Mother which 
manifests itself through great respect for Creation and Nature (NGO2R1b) and a spiritual life 
which sees humans and animals as one and the same (CBO1R1; NGO3R1; NSI7R1). 
 
We may think of something differently from them, because we have an occidental 
mentality. They have a different “cosmovision” and there’s a difference with the way the 
state communicates. How can an occidental person think that the water has a mother? And 
how underneath the river there’s life? We have worked with them … and I start to 
understand, but at first it was difficult for me …. For example, … Miguelito told us about 
his family being in Brazil, and how his sons were going to take him there …. Turns out 
that for them Brazil was underneath the river, and next month he didn’t come back to the 
workshop because he went with his sons. For me, Miguelito passed away. But for the 
                                                          
150 ANA, located within the Ministry of Agriculture manages and monitors aquatic water sources except those for 
human consumption (NSI1R1a; ANA no date). Water for human consumption is monitored by DIGESA located 
within the Ministry of Health (DIGESA 2010). SERNANP, located within MINAM is the governing body of Servicio 
Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (National System of Protected Natural Areas by the State, SINANPE) 
(SERNANP no date). Lastly OEFA is an environmental enforcement agency working as the governing body of the 
Sistema Nacional de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental (National System of Evaluation and Environmental 
Control, SINEFA) (OEFA no date a) located within MINAM (OEFA no date b). 
 
 
175 
 
people Miguelito went with his sons (CBO4R1a).151 
 
This holistic cosmological worldview is common among indigenous communities worldwide (e.g. 
see Grieves 2008; Poroch et al. 2009). It affords them a completely different “perception of reality 
… than ours” (NGO3R1), one based around subsistence rural livelihoods and is subsequently 
“difficult for us to see and understand … especially [for] the state” (CBO4R1a) who “don’t take 
enough time to try and understand” it (NGO2R1 in CBO4R1-2 interview). 
This can lead to difficulties in communication between the state/REIs representatives and 
indigenous people. For instance, a Catholic Church spokesperson recounted an argument she had 
with a government authority over cosmovision:  
 
I told him about the cosmovision, and he said he understood it but then in the end he was 
only attacking them not understanding. You need to listen to people if you want to start a 
dialogue and understand them, but he didn’t see it that way. He was from the government 
and the state acted that way. I think the state doesn’t believe in that dialogue, they can’t see 
it from an indigenous point of view (CBO4R1a). 
 
This is perhaps born out of fear for what the state/REIs might find if they “peel[ed] back the layers 
too much” (NGO2R1c). It may reveal that indigenous people “have a legitimate set of values and 
customs and oppositions to [resource] extraction” (ibid.); in other words, a vision which 
contradicts the state’s SHDV and consequently one which it struggles to reconcile or accept. This 
shows ‘[t]he dominance of industrial values in shaping resource management systems’ that deny 
the cultural integrity (Howitt 2001 p. 59) and worldview of indigenous peoples whose “rhythm of 
life” can be transformed by oil development (RGR1). 
 
These issues are multi-directional. The indigenous reality, one lived outside “the legal 
framework of modern society” (NGO3R1) can present practical and conceptual difficulties in their 
own interaction with wider Peruvian state and society. An anthropologist at the Research Institute 
of the Peruvian Amazon noted that they “are in a situation of interaction ... which they are not used 
to, and in which similar situations of interaction, they have not fared well, where they been 
                                                          
151 In a later email exchange, the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator noted that the Cocama are connected to 
their indigenous land within the Pacaya Samiria Áreas de Conservación Regional (Regional Conservation Area) as it 
is there that the midwife buried her umbilical cord when they were born (CBO4R1b). 
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deceived” such as the Nineteenth Century rubber boom (IUA1). This event has undeniably 
damaged their trust of government and exterior actors and dialogue and interaction with them. At 
the same time, their understanding of the processes behind these interactions can be limited. Selva 
indigenous people can fail to recognise that “processes take quite a bit of time” which can leave 
them frustrated with the lack of immediate results (NGO3R1) or the notion that they can expect 
instantaneous meetings with political representatives upon their arrival in urban centres (NGO3R1; 
NSI6R1; RGR4). Practically, subsistence selva-based lifestyle do not make it easy to keep 
documentation which might be needed in dialogue with the government (NGO3R1). Together, 
these two realities and the intolerance that the state may have for socio-cultural customs and values 
at odds with their own industrial/developmental ideas and agendas can hinder dialogue and 
interaction between the state, REIs and indigenous peoples. 
 
5.2.2 Formalised bureaucracy and amiguismo 
 
Two further aspects of Peruvian society must now also be discussed. Firstly, politicians’ aversion 
to interaction with selva-based citizens is supported by the broader bureaucratic (ILP2; IUA2; 
NGO2R1b, c; NGO3R1; RGR3) and formalised culture of dialogue in Peru by government 
personnel. The Peru Mission interviewee noted that exchanges are “very official … and 
bureaucratic”, usually occurring through an institutional – organisational format rather than 
institutional – individual citizen (NGO2R1b). This often sees citizens require the support of CBOs 
such as indigenous federations to raise issues with the state. Highly formalised typed and printed 
introductory letters are required to garner interviews with state officials and other professionals152 
but the process is slow. “A document may have to go through different sectors and it may take 
days to transfer, even though it can be done in hours” (IUA2). The requested official 
documentation also requires printing and administrative payment costs and thus saw an Iquitos 
lawyer conclude that “the bureaucracy goes hand in hand with corruption” (ILP2), an issue which 
                                                          
152 I experienced the formality of this during fieldwork; in the early stages, I did not gain government interviews due 
to my failure to provide two formal letters of introduction. Whilst my generic formal letter (see Appendix 8) gained 
me access to government interviewees, it is a distinctly western letter. Appendix 9, a letter written by my hospedaje 
owner (and lawyer), provides an idea of the type of formal letter required to establish a state meeting.  
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“affects the environment … on a huge level” (CBO1R1) and is so deeply entrenched that the 
former President was unable to “dominate” and “delete it” (MRBF2).153 
 
The results of this are twofold. Citizens with weaker education and limited access to 
technology such as computers and printers, a problem for selva-based citizens, will obviously face 
difficulty in producing formal letters and will require, if possible, CBO assistance. They, in turn, 
face a “hugely time consuming … expensive” (NGO2R1c) and possibly corrupt bureaucratic state 
dialogue process, generating the correct letters, visiting the necessary people and receiving the 
information and documentation they require. In this bureaucratic and formalised environment of 
dialogue, state officials can conceivably use it to help them filter the type of citizens able to access 
them.   
 
A second crucial barrier for citizens is the modus operandi of the political system, termed 
amiguismo.  “A lot depends here … on… “amiguismo”, having a friend in power … then you have 
… fast and easy access” (NGO2R1b). The Peru Misison interviewee goes on to admit that he 
personally tends “to use friends to … [organise] interviews … because I know that that’s how it 
works” (ibid.) here. Amiguismo is particularly important given that government employees lack 
institutional email and instead utilise personal addresses (NGO2R1c) and phone numbers 
(NSI1R1a; NSI3R1), reinforcing the personalised nature of contact. For instance, NSI3R1, who 
works for SERNANP in Loreto, is contacted personally by friends in the selva about oil pollution 
incidents. “We’re [SERNANP] not very close to the people; I work for the state. They [local 
people] used to tell me what was going on because we were friends” (ibid.), a personalised method 
of access which raises issues for non-acquaintances. 
 
 During my fieldwork, I had direct experience of amiguismo. Through NGO2R1, an 
interview was arranged with the GOREL Regional President but, upon arrival, we were informed 
                                                          
153 One can see this clear corruption in Loreto. RGR2, a GOREL Regional Councillor stated that between 2011-2015, 
54 million soles were misappropriated which should have been given to indigenous communities via the canon 
payment system (this appropriates some of the oil revenue to oil producing Regions, other actors and local people). 
NSI5R1, a public prosecutor lamented that one District, Trompeteros (Loreto Province) has particularly bad corruption 
with local mayors “reported for corruption [e]very year” (one for stealing half a million soles).  
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that he had been called away. There had been no need to write a formal letter of introduction to his 
secretary. Instead, a phone call from NGO2R1 was enough to provide smooth access.154 
 
Iquitos’ lack of “civil society” (NGO7R1) is perhaps one result of amiguismo, where 
community cohesion and collective support are suppressed. For citizens lacking the ability or 
opportunity to establish amiguismo-based access (i.e. selva-based citizens), voice in this vertical 
setting becomes more difficult and their state access and/or speed of access must occur through 
more formalised channels of communication or through CBO-based groups.   
 
One of the primary ways that amiguismo can flourish is the lack of a permanent civil 
service. Peru’s public employment conditions for the public sector are governed by a legal 
framework (Legislative Decree No. 276) and its regulation (Reglamento de la Carrera 
Administrativa, DS No 005-90-PCM) (Webb and Valencia 2006 p. 200). This has, however, 
‘rarely been fully applied’ (World Bank 2003 p. 117) and is ‘weak’, leading to a ‘chaotic’ status 
for the civil service (ibid. p. 118; see also Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) 2016). Unlike the UK where there is 
a permanent ‘politically impartial and independent’ civil service (GOV.UK no date), Peru ‘has … 
banned by decree’ permanent civil service positions (Burdescu et al. 2007 p. 73). This has led to 
the government resorting to staff hiring on a contractual basis, ‘a process that is not subject to any 
required procedures for recruitment and selection’ (World Bank 2003 p. 115) 155  and allows 
nepotism appointments to flourish; “the cousin [pause] gives work to the other cousin” (ILP2). 
 
This system has helped contribute to a civil service ‘that is poorly prepared, poorly trained, 
poorly supervised, and, consequently, of very low productivity’ (Lopez-Calix 2006 p. 49). An 
OEFA interviewee described the Regional Government as “completely crap” and “only an obstacle 
…. a stone in your [shoe]” (NSI2R1) whilst a former government civil servant described its 
personnel as “awful … imbeciles …. very insensitive, and very irresponsible” (IUA1). Two NGOs 
representatives labelled it weak (NGO7R1; NGO8R1) and lacking experience and capacity 
                                                          
154 However, one must wonder whether, even with the provision of a formal letter, the Regional President might not 
have found something more urgent to do.  
155 One or two staff from each department are permanent and are not contracted personnel (CBO1R1; NGO2R1c). 
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(NGO8R1). On this latter point, one can often find that new public servants “take a year to find 
out what they are meant to be doing”, usually because they have been assigned a job where they 
lack training or professional competency (NGO2R1c; NSI2R1).  
 
The impact of these staff changes can be extensive. The Catholic Church human rights co-
ordinator (CBO4R1) noted that under the former administration of Alan Garcia, the government 
created a course on the transformation of social conflict, which their members studied alongside 
other government officials. However, under the Humula administration, these “skilled people 
aren’t there anymore” (ibid.), reinforcing the damage that this lack of permanent, skilled staff can 
have. Continuity and strong relationships cannot form. Actors like the Catholic Church and NGOs 
are forced “to contact them [the government] again and explain to them what we’re doing” 
(NGO4R1). In this light, though the 2013 Civil Service Law reform aims to create a system based 
upon the twin pillars of meritocracy and citizen-service approach (MESICIC 2016 p. 8), it remains 
to be seen whether the functioning of this system will help alleviate the impact of amiguismo. 
 
Overall, one can see that state and lower class indigenous citizen interaction is adversely 
affected by wider societal influences, notably racialised class consciousness and discrimination 
and the lack of shared reality and understanding, all of which act as a barrier for these citizens. 
Discrimination and decades of mistreatment have caused indigenous mistrust of the state 
(CBO4R1a; NGO2R1b) and REIs (NGO1R1) which generates “resentment” and “[p]sychological 
bitterness” (CBO1R1), an issue not helped by the cultural distrust which their communities are 
built upon (CBO4R3).156 This can make dialogue all the more difficult, especially as “for them 
[there] is only one government” (NSI2R1) which can hinder the help given by certain state 
organisations.157 There have been efforts by the Peruvian government to improve its understanding 
of indigenous culture through a national intercultural department and a regional institution (the 
subgerencia de indigenas) (RGR4; see also Duenas 2015 p. 21; Peru Ministerio de Cultura no date 
a) and are hence “trying more and more to take intercultural issues into consideration” (NGO5R1). 
                                                          
156 As a Catholic Church priest who has worked extensively in the selva with Rio Marañón communities noted, 
“[d]istrust is the basic element of union in a group to build a community. Not like we think in Europe, where trust is 
what generates community, here … it is the opposite …. Distrust, gossip, witchcraft, everything” (CBO4R3). 
157 The OEFA interviewee recounted a visit their agency made to a Rio Marañón pueblo where an indigenous leader 
lambasted them for issues caused by another government department (NSI2R1). 
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However, the latter’s highly bureaucratic and advisory capacity (RGR4) suggest that the state is 
not open towards ideas that hinder the SHDV or more open engagement with indigenous people 
to improve the PEV environment for citizens. Consequently, the country’s ongoing low 
Transparency International Index rankings (Transparency International no date) reflect a society 
‘hav[ing] little confidence that they have fair and effective governmental institutions’ (Vasquez 
2014 p. 47) or an environment that serves all of Peruvian society.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections have outlined the impact that the national political – state environment and 
the mechanisms and social influences within Peruvian society have on Loreton stakeholders’ PEV. 
The state’s pursuit of the SHDV fundamentally alters Peru’s weak democracy and civil liberties, 
which subsequently impacts upon the freedom of voice afforded to stakeholders. Hydrocarbon 
dialogue mechanisms are limited and brief tokenism (Arnstein 1969) formalities which fail to 
provide citizens with the necessary information and, more importantly, gain their consent over 
development projects. This is linked to a wider state effort to tarnish, delegitimise and suppress 
the voices of actors that pose a threat to the SHDV, evident, in its most extreme form, in the high 
number of Peruvian environmental and human rights defender deaths.  
 
Tied to this are the impacts stemming from social influences and mechanisms within 
Peruvian society. Peru’s racialised class consciousness continues to shape Peruvian development 
thinking by reinforcing the idea that the country remains handicapped by its indigenous peoples. 
Therefore, selva hydrocarbon voice mechanisms are not only limited because of the state’s wish 
to achieve extensive Amazonian (hydrocarbon) development but also because the affected citizens 
are natives whose views can be disregarded as those of culturally inferior, ignorant people. This 
racialised class consciousness exacerbates an urban socio-cultural divorce from indigenous people, 
strengthening the discriminatory stereotypes of the “other” and negatively impacting upon 
interaction between Peruvian professionals and indigenous and mestizo rural citizens. At the same 
time, the bureaucratic and formalised nature of state dialogue and amiguismo reinforce the 
accessibility barriers which rural indigenous and mestizo citizens can face in voicing to the 
government.  
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This overview chapter has provided an introduction into Chapter 6, which takes a more 
detailed investigative journey into state access and engagement for citizens, centred predominantly 
on Barrio Florido and Cuninico and collective voice-based organisations. Through this, one can 
see many of the themes and issues set out in this chapter and understand the difficulties that these 
stakeholders have in using their voice and accessing the government to report environmental 
pollution incidents by Petroperu.  
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Chapter 6 PEV in the Loreton physical and emotive world: 
The feasibility of Loreton stakeholder engagement with the 
government 
 
As Chapter Five showed, the freedom of voice for stakeholders surrounding hydrocarbon and 
development processes is restricted, intolerant and suppressive. At the same time, the mechanisms 
and social influences within Peruvian society (discrimination, bureaucracy and amiguismo) can 
serve as barriers to access and dialogue between the state and its citizens. This Chapter will explore 
these findings further through a contextually specific focus on Loreto and the feasibility of 
stakeholder engagement with the government which has been split into three over-arching sections.  
 
Section 6.1 details the state’s presence, engagement and relationships with Barrio Florido 
and Cuninico. It begins with an examination of the state’s physical presence in Loreto before 
focusing on the situation in the two communities and the causes of the chronic lack of 
development. This feeds into four sub-sections which explore various impacts on the PEV 
environment of Loreton citizens. Section 6.1.1 evaluates selva civil society development for Barrio 
Florido and Cuninico, the political response to public requests for development and the 
repercussions of the poor public transport network for selva communities. Section 6.1.2 examines 
politicians’ engagement with selva-based pueblos and Section 6.1.3 documents two overarching 
impacts that result from the circumstances set out in the previous two sections. Altogether, they 
help frame state access, dialogue and voice actions for both communities for contamination events 
described in Section 6.1.4. 
 
Section 6.2 investigates collective voice-based access and relationships with the state centred on 
two points; the SHDV will impede access to some but not all government actors and secondly, 
their access and relationship can also be dependent on the skills and expertise of collective voice 
based groups which the state may require. Lastly, Section 6.3 draws together the various points to 
provide an overview of the key findings for stakeholders PEV environment relating to the state.  
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6.1 State presence, engagement and relationship with Barrio Florido and Cuninico  
 
“But they [the government] don’t want a dialogue with the people here, not ever” (IRC7). 
 
During discussions with interviewees about state presence in Loreto, a key word utilised was 
“centralisation” (CBO1R1; IUA3 NGO2R1b), focused predominantly on Iquitos but also other 
bigger towns where subgerencia [local government] offices for the Provincial and District capitals 
are based (NGO2R1b; NSI7R1). However, as one moves further away from Iquitos (NGO3R1) 
and other urban focal points, state presence in Loreto’s smaller towns and villages (numbering 
over 2,000 along the Amazon and its tributaries) (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 180) is described as 
“invisible” (IJ1; NGO1R1), “absent” (CBO4R3; NSI4R1; RGR3), “inaccessible” (NSI4R1) and 
“almost negligible” (NGO2R1b), especially surrounding education, health, legal services and 
other infrastructure (CBO4R3; IJ1; NGO2R1b; NGO6R1; NSI4R1; NSI5R1; RGR1).158 
 
Importantly, this is also apparent within crucial state selva dialogue mechanisms; the DDP 
spokesperson (NSI4R1) noted that their government agency (working in Loreto since 1999) was 
unable to participate in all consulta previa meetings because “there’s reduced staff” with only 
“seven [lawyers] for the whole region [which] is quite limited.” Just as significantly, they 
recounted that MINEM’s Loreton office for social issues which is charged with ensuring 
productive working relationships between companies and communities “only has one person …. 
[who] cannot deal with all this work” (NSI4R1). Thus, “[t]he people here would say the state 
doesn’t reach …. In Spanish, they’d say “el estado no lo alcanza” it doesn’t reach those places” 
(NGO2R1b). Both case-study communities highlight this situation.  
 
In Cuninico, “[t]his community is in extreme poverty like you both see” (IRC20). A single-
roomed primary school is centrally situated next to a communal field, whilst unconnected electrical 
pylon posts and street lights (Photograph 6.1) run alongside a small cement pathway (Photograph 
6.2) past the moloqua (community hall) (Photograph 6.3). The community initially had a 
                                                          
158 On health-care issues see Brierley et al. (2014). In relation to legal services, the PPEDC interviewee noted that in 
2011, only one anti-corruption public prosecutor was in Loreto (based in Iquitos) to process cases for the entire Region 
and though things have improved (there are now four lawyers and two assistants) (NSI5R1) the staffing levels are 
hopelessly inadequate to deal with the volume of cases. Equally, ANA and OEFA representatives confirmed that their 
office staff were only located in Iquitos (NSI1R1; NSI2R1). 
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communal generator to provide electricity (IRC29) but this was broken by Petroperu (IRC23; 
IRC29) after their arrival in the pueblo for the 2014 pollution event.159 Some families do have their 
own generators, which they use sparingly due to their difficult and costly access for fuel (IRC28; 
IRC29) but overall, the majority of resident’s lack electricity (IRC14; IRC15).160 Cuninico doesn’t 
have a medical facility (IRC12; IRC14; IRC15; IRC17; IRC20; IRC24) which forces residents to 
travel upriver to Maypuco (Urarinas District capital, Loreto Province) on a 45-minute riverboat 
journey (IRC14). Finally, there is no secondary school (IRC7) or access to clean water or basic 
sanitary systems and only one public satellite telephone for communication (IRC1) though other 
residents do have their own telephones (IRC13). 
 
Photograph 6.1: Electric lights line the main street in Cuninico. This view is taken from the 
moloqua looking out onto the central public space during the annual Rio Marañón flooding.161 
 
 
 
                                                          
159 See Chapter 7, Section 7.2. 
160 I counted three generators used by families.  
161 For Chapter 6 photograph sources see Footnote 3. 
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Photograph 6.2: View of the main street in Cuninico, where the flooded small cement pathway is 
visible.  
 
Photograph 6.3: Cuninico’s moloqua taken from a resident’s canoe. 
 
Similarly, in Barrio Florido, a 30-year-old school building (MRBF1; MRBF15), sinking 
into the ground and in need of repair (MRBF1; MRBF15; MRBF21; MRBF22) (Photograph 6.4) 
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was nearby a small medical posta (post), open sporadically (MRBF13) 162  and lacking the 
necessary medicines (MRBF22). This was adjacent to a cement single-track road (Photograph 6.5) 
which ran towards a small dock and public field which floods during the seasonal Amazon flooding 
(Photograph 6.6). 
 
A low bridge connecting two parts of the pueblo had been built by community residents 
(MRBF5) and improved by El Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social (The Co-operation 
Fund for Social Development, FONCODES) (MRBF3) but was now in a state of disrepair 
(Photograph 6.7). A water tower had also been built by FONCODES (MRBF15) but this provides 
insufficient capacity for the pueblo and is only accessible to citizens who can afford to pay for the 
water (MRBF6; MRBF30).163 This situation forces others to drink water from a pond (MRBF13). 
Meanwhile, electrical meters, now broken, had been installed by the former GOREL 
administration (ICW1; MRBF1; MRBF4) next to each house along with the provision of tin roofs 
for some (MRBF24) but not all residents (MRBF27). Whilst Barrio Florido has electricity, it is 
supplied by the refinery, not the state.164 Overall, the state development in a pueblo where “there 
is nothing new” (MRBF19) can be summarised by MRBF15; “como un cero a la izquierda” (we 
are a waste of space, here there is nothing).  
                                                          
162 Over several visits, I never saw the medical centre open. 
163 The water is provided by Petroperu roughly every week and collected by residents by canoe from the refinery 
(MRBF25; MRBF27; MRBF30). The water tower is administered by the local municipal agent (MRBF2) who sells 
water for 20 cents per bucket (MRBF6). When this water runs out, it is filled with pond water (MRBF11). 
164 The “[e]lectricity is not free. We pay” (MBF18) through the cultivation (maintenance) of the pipeline which “they 
convert into consumption” (MRBF2). A minimal monthly monetary sum is also paid (13 or 18 soles) depending on 
each houses’ appliances and is provided from 6am until 1.30pm on weekdays and from 8am to 4pm at weekends and 
if someone in the pueblo dies (MRBF6; see also Chapter 7 Section 7.3, Footnote 205). 
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Photograph 6.4: Barrio Florido’s school building. 
 
Photograph 6.5: Barrio Florido’s single-track cement road wide enough for a motocaro. 
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Photograph 6.6: One of two Barrio Florido public spaces. This one, visible when the Amazon 
water had subsided is adjacent to the community moloqua and the launch-point for boats. 
 
 Photograph 6.7: Barrio Florido’s bridge taken from the small hill at the top of the pueblo. 
 
From these conditions, one can see that government support and development of selva 
communities extends only to the provision of “token gestures that don’t really affect the way the 
whole economy operates in Loreto” (NGO1R1) and do “nothing to improve the situation of 
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people’s lives” (CBO4R3). The Alianza Arkana representative felt this situation was caused by a 
“lack of political will” (NGO7R1). However, it is perhaps more pertinent to suggest a misplaced 
political will.  
 
As Chapter Five, Section 5.1 described, Peru’s political elites are focused on the SHDV. 
Whilst this might appear to offer positive developments for a forgotten region of Peru (NGO3R1; 
RGR3), Loreto’s people are not part of this vision (NGO2R1c), as is evident from the lack of 
interest in human capital investment (RGR2). This is an indicator of the lack of priority and care 
afforded to indigenous peoples (CBO4R3) and wider civil society, reflecting the impact of 
corruption (NSI7R1) and influence of racialised class consciousness and discrimination. As a 
lawyer in Iquitos reflected, “the state … plays a very important role in the defence of their 
[indigenous peoples] lands [pause] [but] they haven’t done it with the due respect when they … 
exploit[ed] their lands [for] hydrocarbon” (ILP2). At the same time, there is also “political 
disinterest … [in] ensuring that the indigenous communities in the [selva] are [pause] in a good 
state … and maintaining their quality of life” (IUS2 my emphasis). Taken together, racialised class 
consciousness, societal discrimination and political disinterest shape the PEV environment of 
Loreto citizens and their ability to voice to the state in several important ways. 
 
6.1.1 Selva civil society development 
 
“This village has no resources” (MRBF2). 
 
To begin with, as testimonies in Barrio Florido and Cuninico indicate, these factors help to explain 
the “selva civil development vacuum” (SCDV). Cuninico residents have struggled to improve the 
pueblo because “in the past, nobody has listened to us” (IRC7). “[W]henever we ask for something, 
suddenly the mayor isn’t available” (IRC7) with it “taken as a joke” when they ask the local 
government for support (IRC11). “That’s why we’re here, in this state of abandonment” (IRC7). 
Inhabitants for example were still awaiting the installation of clean water after a meeting with the 
municipal government (IRC7 in IRC26-29 interview; IRC29). Consequently, in Cuninico one 
finds that “pretty much everything” had been built by the Catholic Church (CBO4R3) and local 
people, with only limited state assistance. 
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Likewise, in Barrio Florido, inhabitants were dismissive of state assistance and 
development with municipal (MRBF6) and regional government (MRBF24) providing no support. 
“In the ten years that I’ve been living here I haven’t seen improvement” (MRBF26) or “any 
benefits from the government” (MRBF1). “They [only] help you with the bare minimum” 
(MRBF26) such as the annual flooding event which sees the Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil 
(The National Institute of Civil Defence, INDECI) supply tents (MRBF13; MRBF15; MRBF24) 
and small packets of rice to those affected (MRBF21), while the local government provide wooden 
planks to use as duckboards (MRBF11; MRBF16; see Photograph 6.8). “[M]eaningful donations 
from the regional government” during the annual flood haven’t been seen by residents (MRBF13). 
 
Photograph 6.8: Duckboards enable the community to move around during the annual flooding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Politicians “never pay attention to the community’s needs” (ILP1) and this political 
disinterest is apparent from interviews. Barrio Florido holds two assembly meetings each month 
to discuss what they need and write documents to the government requesting support (MRBF15). 
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Projects requested include the building of a pavement and football field (MRBF14), construction 
materials for a tourism viewpoint (MRBF2) and a bridge (MRBF11; MRBF26) and the fixing of 
the school classroom (MRBF12; MRBF30). These plans have been denied (MRBF14) or so far 
come to nothing (MRBF7; MRBF11; MRBF21) with the local mayor “talk[ing] a lot and offer[ing] 
empty promises” (MRBF30). Bureaucracy has also been a useful tool for the government to 
frustrate Barrio Florido citizens’ dialogue. A male retiree recounted how the community had 
requested support after the 2015 flooding by presenting a document but were told “no, come 
tomorrow, come the day after tomorrow .... Just like that” (MRBF11), which is a major problem 
for citizens who lack money to leave the pueblo (MRBF8; MRBF14). The result is that it often 
takes several years “to hear back from the government” (MRBF15), especially as these written 
documents can easily and deliberately be lost by politicians (NGO2R1c). In terms of the school 
classroom, “[w]e are still waiting .... And our children are studying there, taking the risk of using 
that classroom which can fall anytime” (MRBF12).  
 
When one considers the above narrative within the PEV theoretical framework, a direct 
result of this SCDV is the repercussions that this has on selva citizens’ ability to access the state 
from a technological and transport-based approach. These pueblos have limited or non-existent 
access to basic services like electricity and IT, including PCs, printers and the internet. This is “a 
major barrier to the folk in the rainforest being able to have their voices … heard” (NGO2R1c) as 
it restricts their access to online government systems of accountability i.e. orthodox voice. Given 
the nature of this study, this discovery is of vital importance. 
 
From an environmental perspective, OEFA have a service called Servicio de Información 
Nacional de Denuncias Ambientales (The National Information System on Environmental 
Complaints, SINADA) which ‘allows citizens that become aware of any environmental damage, 
to report and alert the Government, be it in person, via the internet or by post’ (OEFA no date c). 
SINADA has undoubtedly improved citizen access to voice vis-à-vis environmental problems 
especially for those living in Iquitos but for selva-based citizens this is not the case and whilst 
there is an opportunity to make a formal report in person at OEFA’s Iquitos office, the limited 
nature of public transport and citizen poverty makes this difficult.  
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Economic liberalisation in the 1990s led to the deregulation of public transport and a 
significant surge in imported motorised vehicles, which together ‘contributed to a rapid increase 
in informal taxis, minibuses, and moto-taxis’ (Independent Evaluation Group 2015 p. 1). Iquitos 
has several small privately-run bus operators that provide cheap but limited transport around the 
city and between it and the port city of Nauta along Loreto’s only major road. A similar non-public 
transport system operates on the Rio Amazon and its major waterways (Corrientes, Marañón, Tigre 
and Ucayali) using three general types of vessel.165 However, as E-Tech international reported, 
“mobility [remains] a huge issue in the area” (NGO1R1) and other rural regions (International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2013 p. 2) and is one of the reasons “why the 
indigenous people are greatly abandoned” (ILP2). A GOREL Manger of Health and Environment 
jokingly stated that if selva communities want to come to Iquitos “they use the boats of the [oil] 
compan[ies]” (RGR1), a situation which also occurs for state representatives (CBO4R3) who can 
also be forced to rely on NGO logistical support (NGO4R2b; NGO6R1). 
 
Photograph 6.9: A fishing canoe. 
                                                          
165 The first are canoes, usually family owned and fitted with an outboard engine for short journeys (Photograph 6.9). 
Botes fluvial (botes) are also used for local travel and on waterways that are too shallow for larger ships. They have a 
cargo capacity of less than 100 tons and can accommodate roughly 50 passengers (Vuori 2009 p. 30) (Photograph 
6.10). Motonaves, also known as lanchas, are larger, slow, cargo and passenger-carrying ferries with a capacity of 100 
tons or more of cargo and roughly 100 passengers and are used on the Amazon and its major tributaries like the 
Marañón. Finally, delizadores or rápido are fitted with powerful engines and provide faster but more expensive 
passenger transport along the Amazon (ibid.). 
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Photograph 6.10: A bote fluvial.  
 
Even with the limited nature of transport, the poverty of both pueblos citizens means that 
transport costs are “very expensive” (IRC3) which acts as a further barrier to state access, even to 
state-run selva meetings (NSI1R1a)/ 166  Appendix 3a/b details Barrio Florido and Cuninico 
residents’ employment statistics. In Barrio Florido, 29 of the 30 interviewed citizens provided 
employment details. The largest employment category was Band 3 employment (low skilled) (six) 
followed by Band 1 (manager/professional) (three) and Band 2 (technical/associate and clerical 
support) and Band 4 (elementary) (two each). 16 residents were in Band 5 unpaid positions (11 
housewives, three retirees, one student and one unemployed person). One can see that the clear 
majority of families were reliant on a single source of predominantly male income.  
 
At a national level, the Peruvian average monthly income for most residents below Band 1 
is low. For Band 3 low skilled employment (e.g. MRBF1 is an iron monger), monthly salaries are 
around 1,350 soles (Trading Economics no date a), just over £311 in July 2016 currency 
conversion, whilst Band 4 elementary occupations (e.g. MRBF16 is an unskilled labourer in the 
                                                          
166 The ANA official found that community attendance at selva located meetings “is limited because they do not have 
petrol” and rely on support from their respective federations (NSI1R1a). 
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Petroperu refinery), have an income of 750 soles, Peru’s minimum wage (Trading Economic no 
date b), just under £173 in July 2016 conversion. However, one must factor in Loreto’s rural 
location, where family income per capita is 500 soles per month (Clancy and Kerremans no date 
p. 13) and the 2010 poverty rate was 49.1 per cent (USAID/Peru 2012 p. 5). For residents working 
within the informal economy (MRBF7; MRBF12; MRBF14), they will ‘earn approximately 40 
[per cent] less than urban formal sector workers’ (Inter-American Development Bank 1999 p. 34). 
Further proof of their poverty was seen in the makeshift homes put together with wooden plank 
walls and tin roofs whilst sparse interiors housed hammocks and the occasional piece of furniture 
(Photograph 6.11). 
 
Photograph 6.11: A typical Barrio Florido dwelling.  
 
In Cuninico, 27 of the 29 interviews had employment data taken. The largest employment 
category was again Band 3 (five) followed by Band 1 (three), Band 4 (two) and Band 2 (one). 16 
residents were categorised as Band 5 with 14 of these acting as houseparents (one other studied 
and one was unemployed). Their main method of employment was as subsistence farmers, fishers, 
hunters and gathers (Band 3) with their cocha (smallholding or small farm) (CBO4R1a) farming 
probably occurring on a small-scale of five hectares or less (Hotz and Guarín 2014 p. 4). “Here 
people don’t get paid from the state. It’s from their own means” by “liv[ing] from their animals” 
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(IRC28) and leading “a very quiet life” (IRC13). The specific income level was not requested but 
can be accurately gauged from other research; of the 179 adult inhabitants in ten remote pueblos 
who participated in 2014 research, ‘87.7 [per cent] (N=157) reported earning [less than] 1 US$ per 
day’ (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 181) and one can suggest a similar figure here.   
 
Their extreme poverty is visible in their homes, which, like Barrio Florido, are again 
improvised with timbers and tarpaulin for the walls and corrugated tin and straw-based roofs 
(Photographs 6.2 and 6.12). Many residents cooked over open fires and have little in the way of 
furniture or other possessions. However, from what was observed, a small number of households 
did own a satellite television set, possibly bought (though unverified) through their employment 
in paid remediation work outlined in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.  
 
Prior to the 2014 oil spill, citizens would grow bananas, yucca and corn (IRC7) in their 
cocha and fish for their daily consumption, the latter sold to residents (IRC13) or in urban market 
centres in Iquitos, Nauta and Yurimaguas (CBO4R1a). However, the oil spill has irrevocably 
“changed … our life cost” (IRC13) and subsistence livelihoods. Fishing from “the gorge [Rio 
Cuninico] … was the source of our life” (IRC13) but the loss of fish from this area (ibid.) forces 
fishermen to “go out and look for other fishes … to have something to eat” (IRC19), often leaving 
at 3am to travel three hours up-river away from the pollution to fishing sites (researchers notes). 
While the fish caught at these locations were clean, they are nomadic and “don’t stay” (IRC13).  
 
Moreover, the spill had, in my translator’s words, created “a bad image of the community” 
(Interpreter in IRC23 interview) for people outside of their locality and this had a huge impact on 
their subsistence livelihoods and income. Selling the fish to get other food to eat (IRC7) and a 
small income could no longer occur (IRC2; IRC3; IRC4; IRC13; IRC23). One elderly housewife, 
for example, recounted that buyers in Yurimaguas, upon learning that the fish were from Cuninico, 
stated that it was “not worth anything” (IRC23). Thus, one can understand the fear felt by another 
housewife who told a Petroperu engineer that “we live for our jobs. You will hurt our wealth. In 
the first place, we get our money from fish. If they take away the fish, we’ll have no money. Where 
will we get the money or the food from?” (IRC29). How will we “meet the needs of our kids?” 
(IRC2).  
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Photograph 6.12: Cuninico dwellings.  
 
Given this economic situation, it is unsurprising to find citizens from both communities 
unable to afford travel costs. For example, in Cuninico, whilst  
 
a few people who have business go there [to Iquitos] once a month …. mostly, because of 
the cost of the journey [a single one-way journey costs 45 soles by lancha or 90 soles by 
rápido], they send their produce by boat and don’t travel with it, and then their money gets 
sent back to them. People travel very rarely, because of the cost of the journey …. and then 
extra costs here and there (IRC3). 
 
In Barrio Florido, where transport costs to Iquitos are markedly cheaper (six soles each way), 
citizens rely on their “internally elected volunteer authorities” (IEVAs) (discussed shortly) to 
deliver the pueblo’s written development project requests to the government (MRBF24) and even 
then, the volunteer officials must borrow money to travel (MRBF6). Consequently, one finds that 
in a general sense, “the people in the jungle haven’t got the money to get down here [to Iquitos]” 
(NGO2R1b). 
 
“Why isn’t there … [an affordable] public transport system in the Amazon? A state-run 
public transport system that allows people” greater access and mobility. “It’s like the key problem” 
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(IJ1). This question posed by a journalist was answered by other citizens who broadly shared a 
similar conclusion. A retired Cuninico lady with children in Lima felt that the poor selva transport 
links allowed “[t]he state [to take] advantage that there is no means of communication” in 
comparison to those living in more accessible regions, like the sierra, where they 
 
get the trucks. They all reach the congress. They just park in parque unversitarios [a park 
centrally located in Lima] and stay there …. From la sierra … because of the mines. They 
travel three-four times. They protest and they reach the congress and they are heard but 
from here there are no means of transport (IRC28). 
 
Six interviewees whose professional employment (government, academic and NGO) was 
linked to the selva, suggested that access is difficult for the government and citizens due to the 
geographical distance, travel costs and poor logistical capabilities (IUA1; IUA2; IUA3; NGO6R1; 
RGR1; RGR2) which limits state engagement with selva communities (IUA3; RGR1; RGR2). 
However, the Red Ambiental interviewee (CBO1R1) and judge in the Superior Courts of Justice 
(Judicial District of Loreto) (NSI7R1) disputed this. CBO1R1 believed that a “justification” on the 
part of the government for their engagement with communities is that “there’s difficult access and 
everything else. But given the time that the petrol companies have been in Loreto … one would 
have thought regional or national government[s] would have done something about making it [i.e. 
accessibility] easier” (ibid.). The interviewed judge ties this back to the interlinked impact of 
political disinterest and racialised class and discrimination: 
 
[T]he issue regarding communication with the communities is political will …. When 
someone wants to go somewhere, they go either by air or using the river …. Yes, the area 
is large [and the] … region is rather difficult for the indigenous and for us [legal 
representatives], but not for the state or companies that have a lot of resources and can do 
it …. The problem is that there has always been asked “who is there?” A small group of 
indigenous, so they don’t care …. So, the issue … is the lack of will to respect as part of 
the state policy (NSI7R1). 
 
6.1.2 Politicians engagement with selva-based pueblos 
 
This lack of public transport and unaffordable transport costs for citizens with low incomes and 
subsistence livelihoods mean that their interaction with state officials is entirely in the hands of 
state representatives to reach these communities. However, testimonies from Barrio Florido 
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(MRBF4; MRBF5; MRBF7; MRBF12; MRBF14; MRBF15; MRBF16; MRBF19; MRBF20; 
MRBF21; MRBF23; MRBF24; MRBF27; MRBF29) and Cuninico (FIRC1; IRC1; IRC3; IRC5; 
IRC7; IRC8; IRC11; IRC12; IRC13; IRC18; IRC19; IRC20; IRC21; IRC25; IRC27; IRCP3) 
indicate highly sporadic, often, non-existent communication with the various levels of government 
(local, regional and national). “The government doesn’t come”, stated one female middle-aged 
Barrio Florido resident (MRBF7), even after 2014 GOREL elections (MRBF12). “They don’t 
remember us” said a young male student in Cuninico (IRC25). GOREL “never comes here” 
(IRC5), not even sending a representative (IRC18; IRC19). As IRC11 concluded; “I am 66 years 
of age and I’ve never seen anyone”. 
 
Political disinterest extends historically not only to other selva pueblos167  but is also 
evident in the state’s choice of location for consultation meetings. For example, EIA Public 
Hearings and Informative Workshops and Prior Consultation meetings will only happen in cities 
like Nauta and San Lorenzo, “when they want to be politically correct” (NGO3R1), but usually 
taking place in Iquitos and Lima (NGO1R1; NGO3R1; NSI4R1; RGR2; RGR4) for only a day 
(CBO1R1). These issues and the fact that only the community leader(s) are present means that 
knowledge of this mechanism is poor (RGR4) and wider community participation doesn’t occur 
(see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). This problem can be traced back to:  
 
the embedding of inequalities over time which can make the problem almost imperceptible: 
Given the history of centralisation on Lima, it seemed ‘natural’ to hold public hearings 
[there] …. Yet this was to ignore the real costs and resulting lack of voice suffered by 
indigenous populations because of transport costs, opportunity costs and lack of 
information (Thorp and Paredes 2010 pp. 175-176). 
 
For selva asambleas that do occur, state mechanisms like the Council of Ministers and politicians 
“are usually missing in action” (NGO1R1). For instance, The Peru Mission interviewee observed 
one EIA meeting held by Palmas del Espino in Maniti (Indiana District, Loreto Province) roughly 
five hours along the Rio Amazon where “there were no government authorities present” 
                                                          
167 A missionary father working with indigenous communities in the Trompeteros District (Loreto Province) said that 
in two years of work there “I haven’t see any of the governmental entities” (NCSSC2). From a historical angle, a truck 
and plant driver for Occidental Petroleum stated that during his entire selva oilfield employment (1981-1991), “I never 
saw an official government inspection or any proactivity from any official about the whole oil process or its impact 
on the local communities” (FOPOW3).  
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(NGO2R1c), evidence of the impact that GOREL staff shortages play in preventing its presence 
at all selva dialogue mechanisms (NSI4R1).168 
 
However, a significant caveat is visible to the limited selva dialogue that does occur. Barrio 
Florido residents had slightly less intermittent interaction with government representatives, who 
would sometimes be “present” (MRBF3), often for celebratory events like Mothers Day 
(MRBF11; MRBF24) or when campaigning for approaching elections (MRBF1; MRBF4; 
MRBF6; MRBF9; MRBF14; MRBF15; MRBF16; MRBF17; MRBF18; MRBF19; MRBF22; 
MRBF23; MRBF24; MRBF25; MRBF26; MRBF27; MRBF29). In Cuninico, whilst no residents 
mentioned state representatives visiting on celebratory days, they would also sometimes see 
candidates campaigning for forthcoming elections (IRC8; IRC11; IRC15; IRCP3) or have the local 
government representative (the mayor) stop by (IRC1; IRC5; IRC22), often only once per year 
(IRC5). “[U]sually [though] you don’t see anybody” (IRCP3 in IRC2 interview). 
 
Consequently, whilst politicians are disinterested in the plight of selva communities, 
sporadic communication appears to occur only when it serves their electoral ambitions (ILP1; 
NSI2R1). Residents in both communities certainly thought this was the case. In Barrio Florido, 
“when they’re on a campaign they come for our votes, but after winning they’re not interested 
anymore” (MRBF4). “Little or nothing [do] they care” visiting “usually when they need votes” 
(MRBF14). “When they come, they sit on that couch and they do nothing, but when it’s about 
getting votes .... madam a signature for this petition” (MRBF21) and “never honour[ing] their 
promises” (MRBF15). Inhabitants had been promised playing fields and a park by politicians 
(MRBF23), a store (MRBF25), the fixing of the bridge, road and water tank (MRBF24) but 
nothing has transpired (MRBF23; MRBF24), an issue MRBF26 felt was caused by their focus on 
personal greed (MRBF26) rather than a sincere wish to help the populace. Equally, in Cuninico, a 
man recounted how politicians visit for elections “[b]ut after that, they disappear” (IRC15). IRC22 
noted that her husband would “go to the sessions and listen” to the mayor promise things. ““Let’s 
go make your medical centre, give you your water”” and a “school” (ibid.), none of which 
materialised.  
 
                                                          
168 See Section 6.1. 
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Further evidence of politically self-serving dialogue can be seen if one factors in the vastly 
different geographical locations of both pueblos. Barrio Florido is “not … far away from Iquitos” 
(MRBF13) (roughly 12 kilometres). In comparison, Cuninico, situated in a “rural” (IRCP3 in IRC2 
interview) “[i]solated” (IRC16; IRC17) position “right at the edge of the country” (IRC6), is 45-
minute boat journey away from Maypuco, their closest point of state contact (IRC14). This 
situation is, of course, not unique to the Peruvian selva and can be seen in other EMaDEs (see 
Inderst and Stewart 2014). However, combined with politicians’ inconsistent and self-serving 
dialogue, the SCDV and citizens’ economic poverty, the PEV environment for these communities 
to formally voice becomes ever more restrictive. 
 
One would expect Barrio Florido’s closer proximity to Iquitos to have led to a noticeably 
improved level of state representative interaction in comparison to Cuninico but this is not the 
case. For Cuninico, they have almost complete state detachment, particularly from GOREL and 
their geographical distance cannot serve as an excuse. A retired Cuninico lady argued that they 
were located “very close to Iquitos” with it “just an overnight journey to [the city] from here” 
(IRC7). Transportion, though limited, does exist, and for Cuninico requires a far shorter journey 
than other more remote Loreton areas. 169  This suggests that politicians could reach these 
communities but appear to only do so when it serves their own electoral interests. 
 
6.1.3 Overarching impacts of this situation 
 
Overall, the combination of political disinterest and discrimination help explain the SCDV and 
high levels of political detachment between the state and selva communities. These issues result 
in two overarching impacts for selva citizens and communities. 
 
First, trust in the government for citizens was absent. People in Barrio Florido felt that the 
government wasn’t on their side (MRBF16). “No, not me, not me, I always depend on myself and 
have no hope on them” (MRBF15). “They don’t do anything for us” (MRBF20) and instead “does 
                                                          
169 For instance, on a lancha, the journey between Nauta and Cuninico would take 24 hours whilst on a rápido the 
journey would take 12 hours. In comparison, the missionary father’s journey to Trompeteros required a three-and-a-
half-day lancha journey or a 15-hour rápido journey (NCSSC2).  
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things to deceive us” (MRBF7) and “tell lies” (MRBF11). Political apathy was present. “I voted 
clean [blank] [pause]. What’s it worth to vote for the right person if they offer [things] and never 
come” (MRBF24). In Cuninico, inhabitants described a feeling of abandonment by the government 
(IRC6; IRC7), and sense of being forgotten (IRCP3; IRC6) by the “liars” (IRC3) and Regional 
President “rat” (IRC9). “[T]hey [GOREL] never follow through with anything they say, so we 
don’t believe that it’s going to get better” (IRC5).  
 
Understandably, it confirmed for many inhabitants the influence of discrimination which 
is preventing consistent dialogue. Upon being asked why GOREL doesn’t visit Cuninico, a farmer 
felt that “it’s because it’s not important to them. They’re over there … in power” (IRC6). Another 
Cocama thought it was “[b]ecause … well, they’ve forgotten us, they don’t value us, they see us 
like wild, irrational animals … like dogs or something” (IRC1) despite having enough money “to 
go where they want” (IRC5). Other residents felt that “we are outsiders to them …. so they don’t 
have to look after us” (IRC4) and as “[t]hey [indigenous people] don’t know anything, there’s no 
need to help [them]” (IRC6). This mistrust will inevitably affect the willingness of these 
communities to voice to the state with any real conviction and may see citizens seek out alternative 
voice actions. 
 
Secondly, according to some informants, these communities “don’t really live within the 
legal framework of modern society” (NGO3R1). In Barrio Florido for instance, the pueblo “work 
for themselves” (MRBF18) by being “self-sufficient” (MRBF6). Research by Azarya and Chazan 
(1987) show how state disengagement by citizens (e.g. through the absence of accessible 
government mechanisms (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7)) leads to the creation of parallel systems 
which include examples such as ‘black markets, smuggling, corruption, and the use of alternative 
methods of justice’ (p. 121) or equally systems of governance. In both communities, local informal 
systems of governance (IEVAs) operate that are not part of the government system and help to fill 
the state SCDV and poor engagement. In Cuninico, an Apu and deputy administer justice, with the 
former acting as the pueblo’s representative in indigenous federation meetings and other functions. 
Likewise, in Barrio Florido, three IEVAs known as the Agent, Judge and Teniente (Lieutenant) 
run the pueblo (MRBF6; MRBF11). They are unpaid by the state and rely on tips from the village 
(MRBF6) with the Teniente and Agent elected on an annual basis via an asamblea (MRBF6; 
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MRBF14). Residents rely on these IEVAs to hand-out items and materials donated by people 
(MRBF11), monitor the provision of water from the water tank (MRBF6) and, crucially, represent 
the pueblo in dialogue with the refinery discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.  
 
Despite establishing their own informal governance structures to replicate the state, these 
do not improve citizen access to the formal state. Moreover, combined with the absence of state 
engagement, this situation makes it far harder for citizens to to be able to access state channels of 
dialogue through which to utilise orthodox formal voice, a situation feeding into citizen mistrust 
and confirming for some the issue of discrimination. Significantly, as the next section explores, 
these issues have a major impact on Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s ability to accessibly voice to 
the government and the actions they choose to take when affected by oil contamination. What is 
more, the government response, and dialogue with both communities appears to reinforce the 
disinterest, discrimination and detachment that politicians have for selva-based communities.  
 
6.1.4 Barrio Florido and Cuninico state access, dialogue and voice actions for contamination 
events  
 
“[I]t [GOREL] talks about helping us, but it’s all a lie, this is the truth, the reality. Anybody 
that comes, they’ll see, this is the reality of it” (IRC7). 
 
In Barrio Florido, their choice of actions in the face of contamination events reinforces the impact 
that state disengagement and citizen mistrust of the government has had. After residents noticed 
the contamination in 2009, two residents chose to ring the radio (MRBF13) which led to various 
stations, “Radio Loreto, Radio La Caribena …. [and] Radio Arpegio” arriving half an hour later 
(MRBF13), followed by TV channels, “América Televisión” (MRBF12), “Panamericana 
[Televisión and] Frecuencia Latina” to report about the contamination (MRBF13).  
 
Though not directly suggested by one of the interviewees who phoned the radio, doing so 
was influenced by their knowledge of other hydrocarbon-related voice events in Saramuro and 
Trompeteros. 
 
So we ... in a very ignorant way … went there [to the refinery] and thought that we could 
take advantage because we were listening to Saramuro or Trompeteros, there is Pluspetrol 
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and … whatever that community asks for, they just give it to them, and we thought that 
here it would be the same … (MRBF13). 
 
As another male inhabitant explained, for the government to “listen to you [pause] you have to … 
make a racket …. in the news, you see Huancayo, in those places where they close roads and that’s 
how the government listens to you” (IRC14).170 The radio became their attempt at making a racket.   
 
As for the government, they were contacted almost as an afterthought (MRBF12). There 
are several reasons for this. First, a housewife touched upon a fear which has infected residents. 
“[M]any of the inhabitants are afraid, they are afraid to talk …. [and express] themselves” a 
situation born out of their fear “that their words will be rejected” and they will not be listened to 
(MRBF13), a statement seemingly confirming the impact that political disengagement and 
disinterest has had on local citizens who clearly feel scared about voicing and mistrustful of the 
state. 
 
Second, this fear of voicing and government disinterest could have conceivably pushed 
citizens to contact a mechanism they could easily access, and this is partly due to the issue of state 
bureaucracy. One resident stated that they didn’t initially alert the government because the process 
was “too slow” (MRBF25). The government “sometimes … give you appointments … and all 
that” (MRBF25) a procedure that hadn’t yielded positive results for Barrio Florido. A quicker, 
more immediate voice action was necessary and the radio became that unorthodox informal voice 
response.  
 
Third, citizens’ poverty prevented them from reaching the government and would have 
helped precipitate remotely calling the radio. As MRBF27 noted “[w]e work as merchants, [if] 
something happens … how are we going to go protest [to the government?] Where would we get 
[the money from unworked hours] from?” Equally, contacting the refinery, discussed in Chapter 
7, Section 7.2 was chosen because “at times there is no money to go somewhere else” (MRBF14). 
Finally, the absence of IT technology prevented citizens from being able to access OEFA’s online 
complaints system.   
                                                          
170 IRC14 is referring to events in the Junin Region and the La Oraya smelter where a miner’s strike had blocked off 
the Carretera Central Highway (see Post 2015). 
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In the light of these actions, civil service departments, including DDP, MINAM, and 
OSINERGMIN, arrived to discuss the pollution but it would seem the inhabitants failed to find a 
sympathetic ear for the situation. Barrio Florido citizens on a tour of the contaminated area 
accompanied by these (and Petroperu) representatives “talked [together] … and we witnessed a 
woman throwing her garbage into the water …. So … [we were told], “what are you asking for 
when you are obviously an important part of the contamination here!”” (MRBF13). This response 
not only fails to acknowledge the impact that missing state services such as refuse collection are 
having but rather unfairly attributes blame onto the local people. This lack of sympathy and scorn 
would have done little to improve the pueblo’s opinion of the state.  
 
Residents recounted that water samples were taken for analysis (MRBF3; MRBF12; 
MRBF13) by DIGESA (Velarde 2009) and, whilst one resident was aware that results indicated a 
lack of contamination within the Rio Ramirez (MRBF3), intermittent state interaction undoubtedly 
increased inhabitants’ mistrust of the state response. For example, MRBF13 believed that DIGESA 
individuals “would take [samples] from a different place above the contaminated one” and “never 
got samples from the polluted area.” 
 
Regardless of this reaction, the 2009 event “gave us the strength” (MRBF13) to remain 
vocal. Consequently, the 2011 incident saw residents again inform the radio (ibid.) and the press 
(MRBF6) resulting in the latter arriving to investigate (MRBF1; MRBF7; MRBF11; MRBF18). 
Nonetheless, this appeared to have generated scant political response despite residents being forced 
to consume contaminated fish and water (MRBF13). Only GOREL state representatives made an 
appearance (MRBF11), whilst local government representatives did not (MRBF16). One resident 
(MRBF12) spoke about water samples (taken by DIGESA) taken a month and a half before the 
interview (roughly April 2015) but no interviewees mentioned result distribution.  
 
There also seemed to be little state interest to pursue legal justice. The DDP’s arrival saw 
“[t]he whole neighbourhood” go there to put pressure on them (MRBF15) about the situation. 
Their response was “that they needed time for the [legal] process but never have we …. gotten 
anything from them” (MRBF15). This was probably because there was no legal case to answer, a 
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conclusion which should have been passed onto the pueblo or, equally, due to apathy. Regardless, 
the lack of communication merely ‘reinforced popular views of the justice system as corrupt and 
as a tool for the powerful to preserve their privileges, rather than as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution or to seek redress in the face of injustice’ (Burt 2007 p. 50). As the PPEDC legal 
representative lamented, “you tell me, can you trust the justice system? …. I feel helpless here, 
there is a legal vacuum …. because there isn’t justice” (NSI5R1).171 
 
  In Cuninico, testimony evidence shows that their state access was extremely restricted. 
Residents confirmed that they were not able to alert the government about the oil spill due to their 
lack of knowledge about whom to contact (IRC1; IRC15; IRC24; IRC25), a phone number to ring 
and their absence of IT capabilities. A female retiree admitted that whilst the community have 
“never really tried to … contact the government [directly]”, they themselves have “never come 
here” (IRC7). Unlike Barrio Florido, no radio or TV channels were alerted to the oil spill, 
highlighting their heightened geographical isolation and limited involvement in wider Peruvian 
civic society. Indeed, only their geographical proximity to Maypuco allowed the Cocama to travel 
there and alert local authorities to the spill (IRC13) showing that orthodox voice options were 
severely restricted. Moreover, it was their direct contact of Petroperu, discussed in Chapter 7, 
alongside the Catholic Church that helped draw the wider state’s attention rather than the local 
government whose institutional effectiveness in these situations has been rightly questioned 
(CBO1R1). 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1, it is useful to distinguish between civil servant and 
politicians’ responses to the spill. In terms of the former, residents noted that the first to arrive 
were OEFA, who reached them ten to 15 days after the spill (roughly mid-July) (IRC3; IRC5). 
Other agencies arrived about 20 days after this (IRC5) and set to work taking water and soil 
samples and examining the tree damage over a three-day period (IRC3; IRC14) 172  whilst 
interviews were conducted with residents about the spill (IRC1). 173  However, analysis of 
                                                          
171 More widely, this is also due to the legal difficulties for ecological crimes (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1, Footnote 
137).   
172 This is assumed to be ANA. 
173 This is assumed to be OEFA. 
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interviews shows that the provision of information and support to Cuninico from these civil service 
departments was meagre. 
 
On the one hand, there were positive aspects. In OEFA’s case they maintained monthly 
contact with the pueblo and were present in November (IRC19) and December 2014 (IRC3; IRC7; 
IRC29), and visited on three occasions (IRC7) as well as holding an unspecified number of 
meetings with the Apu in Iquitos (CBO4R1a). Equally, DIGESA (IRC7 in IRC25-29 interview; 
NSI1R1b) and ANA also held meetings, the latter’s “two or three” included allowing community 
leaders to observe the collection of water source samples and another held with OEFA in 
December 2014 for result distribution (NSI1R1b). This shows that ANA staff were proactive in 
their engagement with Cininico and sought to reassure residents over the environmental impact of 
the spill, an important point given the cultural and spiritual significance which the rainforest has 
for these indigenous citizens (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1). 
 
 However, there were limitations. Despite OEFA’s swift arrival, residents insisted that its 
officials “told the community nothing” (IRC3) and instead “came just to investigate ….  question 
people, conduct interviews” but have not received any follow-up results from this (IRC1). 
“They’ve never come here to the village to tell us. Nobody, none of those organisations, has come 
here” (IRC6), assertions corroborated by other citizens in relation to DIGESA, which “didn’t want 
to give any results” (IRC7 in IRC25-29 interview) about the water quality and contamination 
(IRC13; IRC18; IRC29).174 This indicates that the presentation of data results were not held with 
the whole pueblo (perhaps only its leaders)175 and that precise information was not offered and/or 
understood by the Cocama, the latter issue explored fully in Chapter 8, Section 8.3. 
 
Meanwhile DIGESA promises in December 2014 to explore the lack of clean water had, 
at the time of interviews (May 2015), come to nothing (IRC29) whilst residents were still awaiting 
delivery of water purification kits (IRC3; NSI1R1a), thus damaging their trust in the DIGESA 
                                                          
174 IRC14 went as far as to question the validity of the entire water sampling process itself. 
175 There is further evidence of this. IRC18 recollects that a group of seven or eight citizens went with OEFA personnel 
to the oil site and were given results at the end of each month. Clearly, OEFA did not adequately ensure that these 
results were presented to the whole community via an asamblea which could explain some of their ignorance about 
data results. Equally, there was a failure by these citizens to disseminate the results to the wider community, possibly 
due to their inability to articulate or explain what they had been told, a factor discussed under Chapter 8, Section 8.3. 
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“liars” (IRC29).176 The level of support by regional health agencies was also poor. On 4th July 
2014, representatives from GOREL’s DIRESA visited Cuninico to provide them with chlorine 
tablets for water (CBO4R1b; IRC27; IRC29) but this was the extent of their support throughout 
the entire remediation work (IRC12; MINSA 2015 p. 3).  
 
In comparison to these Peruvian national agency representatives, the political response was 
woefully slow. The Vice-President of Peru, GOREL representatives and various other ministers 
“didn’t come directly” (IRC13), instead arriving several months after the spill (IRC1; IRC14). 
Whilst there is logic in bringing all non-local government representatives together at the same 
time, it is difficult to understand why the response, particularly by GOREL, was so slow.  
 
Was their failure to get there quicker born out discriminatory indifference? One female 
resident seemed to think so:  
 
I think they [the politicians] only saw the spill but they didn’t check on …. the community 
and I also think that they didn’t make any comments about … what had happened to 
people’s skin or the impact the oil spill had on children, adults … I think it was more about 
the river and the spill and that people don’t have fishes to fish (IRCP2 in IRC12 interview). 
 
While this question cannot be conclusively answered, this quote and level of political dialogue 
after the initial visit mean discriminatory indifference was probably a factor.  
 
Inhabitants noted that government representatives visited Cuninico only once after the spill 
(MRBF29) and that since the departure of national agency staff in December 2014 (IRC1; IRC7; 
IRC29), no politicians had returned at the time of the first research trip (1-3 May 2015) (IRC1). 
An extension of this detachment was the lack of government information (IRC13; IRC18) who 
“didn’t tell us anything” (IRC8). This is particularly poor given that their appearance a few months 
later would have provided them with clarity about the pollution event and the issues faced by 
Cuninico and the opportunity to answer questions. Basic support from the various levels of 
                                                          
176 This situation can be explained. A 2015 Ministerio de Salud del Peru (Ministry of Health of Peru, MINSA) 
document under point 2.5 states that water and food provision are ‘not the concern of DIGESA’ which instead 
correspond to the Oleoducto Norperuano operator who per ‘number 3, item 3.2, Appendix 4 of D.S. No. O81-2007-
EM’ will provide affected communities with drinking water until DIGESA declares the water free of contamination 
produced from the spillage (MINSA 2015 p. 3; see Chapter 7, Section 7.2).  
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government was also non-existent; a community leader stated that despite their knowledge of 
Cuninico’s predicament regarding health issues and absence of clean water and food, the 
government (nationally or regionally) helped them (IRC2). “Nothing, in terms of support, nothing” 
(IRC13). Technically, one can argue that the state did respond through Petroperu’s limited 
provisions (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2) but this lasted only five months (August-December 2014) 
(IRC2; IRC18; IRC19) whilst the state’s own long-term support has not materialised.177  
 
In the light of this Cuninico evidence, it is understandable why residents felt that the 
government “didn’t respond” (IRC6) to the pollution and “has forgotten” the pueblo (IRC25). 
Clearly, civil servants and politicians can’t be at this site permanently or make trips every fortnight 
but their lack of consistent presence, provision of information and support reinforces the view that 
there must have been an unwillingness or reluctance to do so.  Those working with Cuninico and 
its citizens draw similar conclusions. The “big consequences” from the spill are ones which “not 
even the state wants to assume” (CBO4R1a). “They don’t want to face up to it all” (IRCP3) stated 
an inhabitant, a reference perhaps to the severity and scale of the spill which would force 
politicians, at least initially, to enter the selva.  
 
For other Cocama inhabitants, it was due to discrimination. The spill saw a community 
leader and the rest of the village “demand that the government recognise us as human beings. That 
we are Peruvians. We are indigenous, but we are human beings.” (IRC2). “They know perfectly 
[the] state the area is in” (ibid.) but were “incapable of helping us, of having a conscience” by 
sending “us some basic supplies, a bit of water, on behalf of [GOREL]’ (IRC7). These “[r]ich 
people” are indifferent to their suffering; “what does it matter, one more or less [indigenous], what 
is the difference?” (IRC27). For people already distrustful of the state, its failure to provide 
stronger support to Cuninico has naturally damaged their trust even further (IRC7; IRC15; IRC22; 
IRC23). 
 
Overall, the situations in Barrio Florido and Cuninico show remarkably similar levels of 
socio-economic development and state engagement, which have fed into both communities’ 
                                                          
177 Two residents (IRC7; IRC29) spoke about a meeting with the local government to install a water tank with an NGO 
“[b]ut so far they haven’t come” (IRC29) and is probably another empty promise.  
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distrust of the state and their formation of informal governance structures that operate beyond the 
state system. The political disinterest, detachment and discrimination seen from politicians has had 
a significant impact on these two communities. It has meant that both lack accessible orthodox 
voice options to report environmental contamination issues. This has left Barrio Florido and 
Cuninico utilising unorthodox informal voice actions, a situation seen in other pueblos around the 
selva.178 The state’s patchy support of pueblos in these events combined with the lack of clear data 
dissemination only confirms for many why the state isn’t on their side.  
 
6.2 Collective voice-based access and relationship to the state 
 
“We are the voice of those who don’t have one” (CBO2R1, member of Red de Ninos, 
Ninas y Adolescentes (REDNNA) (National Network of Children and Adolescents)). 
 
For other collective voice-based organisations, their access to the state revolves around a different 
set of influences. State infrastructural presence and political engagement with selva-based 
communities does not dictate the latter’s access or engagement to the state. These groups are 
usually situated in urban centres of political decision-making even if their work takes place in the 
selva. Each CBO and NGO interviewed for this thesis was in Iquitos or had the financial resources 
to travel there (e.g. E-Tech International (NGO1R1)), providing physically easier access to 
government departments and personnel. Even so, their access is dependent on two central factors.  
 
Firstly, one national government employee remarked that “sometimes the state considers 
that the position of some NGOs was contrary to the interests of the state” (NSI4R1). Therefore, 
one finds that the state’s SHDV runs contrary to the concerns and vested interests of many Loreton 
CBO and NGO groups. Unsurprisingly, environmental activists and other similar NGOs will 
“probably have a more difficult time accessing people in the government” (NGO1R1) due to their 
lack of shared vision and threat they could pose to government interests. For instance, despite their 
extensive Loreton experience (since 2006), E-Tech International has “very little access” to 
GOREL, a result the interviewee felt of its close ties to the oil industry (NGO1R1). Others 
                                                          
178 NCSSC3, a farmer, lives in San Jorge, a pueblo on the banks of the Rio Marañón in Nauta District, Loreto Province. 
When Petroperu oil contamination occurs, they protest to the company and call the local government “but sometimes 
they won’t listen to us” and don’t visit to see the pollution “[b]ecause they don’t want to.” 
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(NGO7R1) only ever had government communication through indigenous federations but were 
willing to have dialogue if asked. The difficulty however is that state representatives are 
“[i]ncapable” of forging alliances (ibid.) and working with other stakeholders due to the anti-NGO 
state discourse discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.  
 
This anti-NGO rhetoric has also damaged collective voice-based groups’ work with 
citizens, communities, and other CBOs. NGO7R1 experienced this with their work in Putumayo 
Province, where they received a lot of “negative comments”, first because they were foreigners, 
second because they were from an NGO. People would question what they were doing there when 
“they drink [well], they have good houses” and are clearly “living out of our money, they are 
asking for money on our behalf” (ibid.). The widespread nature of this discourse was evident from 
comments by my interpreter and a Barrio Florido housewife who had never tried to contact an 
NGO for help. “At times, NGOs, when they see that there is some money involved, they are there” 
(MRBF13) because “[t]hey are always looking for money” (Interpreter) so to “join them is like to 
waste time” (MRBF13).179  
 
Bureaucracy is another problem which would appear to be used as a tool to deliberately 
disengage with collective-voice based stakeholders whose requests and/or work is not in the 
government’s interests. For example, the E-Tech International interviewee recalled one instance 
when their NGO tried to get GOREL funding for environmental evaluation work with indigenous 
communities: 
 
And so … that money was promised to us, they paraded us around, they lost the proposal 
four or five times, they promised that the cheque was [going to] be there in 24 hours and 
they did this over and over and over again, basically just dragging out the process and in 
the end, they did nothing (NGO1R1). 
 
                                                          
179 Equally, IUA2, a professor at the National University of the Peruvian Amazon, believed that a major problem with 
indigenous people “is that the [vast] majority of them are handled by NGOs” whose negative influence causes 
communities to ask REIs for things and “do something” (i.e. strike) if not received. The GOREL Manager of Health 
and Environment also believed that some NGOs have an overly “radical” nature and “don’t look [after] people’s needs 
properly” (RGR1). 
 
 
 
211 
 
Barriers to government access also include specific government mechanisms. E-Tech 
International encountered interference in relation to Mesas de Desarrollo (development round-
table discussions). These “include[s] all the different players from the indigenous federations to 
… government ministries … and is supposed to include the oil company” (though they apparently 
never show up). In NGO1R1’s experience “we have seen some cases where the … [MINAM] for 
example has tried to push us out of these Mesas because they know that we have a critical and 
legitimate technical voice at the table and so makes them a little bit nervous.” Consequently, their 
scrutiny-based voice, one based on technical and knowledgeable experience, is a threat to the state. 
 
Collective voice-based stakeholders’ work can grant them access to some mechanisms in 
the government who do not fully adhere to the SHDV. E-Tech International had “quite easy” 
access to OEFA and MINAM due to their long history of selva employment and the connections 
they had made in the latter’s ministry (NGO1R1). Their relationship with these agencies allows 
them to “have very honest discussions with them about how we think things need to improve from 
a technical point of view” (ibid.). Here though, one can also see the importance that amiguismo 
can play in aiding access further. The Peru Mission interviewee noted that he could easily access 
GOREL to arrange meetings due to his position as an authoritative figure (NGO2R1b), a position 
that most citizens don’t have and cannot use to gain improved and more efficient contact. 
 
Three other NGOs (NGO4R1-R2; NGO5R1; NGO6R1) also had a working relationship 
with the government and the reason for this is made clear by one of the interviewees. The Sociedad 
Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Peruvian Society of Environmental Law) (SPDA) which 
promotes environmental policies and legislation “identified … that the region has a need for … 
professionals in law and environmental law to ensure better management of natural resources” 
(NGO5R1). As Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 highlighted, GOREL’s weak and inexperienced nature 
forces this institution to reach out to NGOs that have experience in various areas. Consequently, 
Naturaleza y Cultura Internacional (Nature and Culture International) (NCI), who have been 
working with GOREL for ten years have tried “to establish conservation areas for the region”180 
                                                          
180 They have helped to successfully establish three Regional Conservation Areas; the 2.4 million acres Alto Nanay-
Pinuyacu-Chambira in 2008, the 1 million acres Tamshiyacu Tahuayo in 2009 and the nearly 977,600 acres Maijuna 
Kichwa in 2015. 
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and are also involved “in various spaces” with the government, including the “technical table for 
watershed protection [and] the management committee for conservation areas” (NGO6R1). They 
are part of these mechanisms “due to our experience and also because of the schemes we have 
been developing” (ibid.). 
 
NGO4R1-R2’s privately-funded NGO, ProNaturaleza, which focuses on conservation 
work and natural resource management in protected areas (e.g. Pecaya Samiria Regional 
Conservation Area), has a good but indirect relationship with the state based on its professional 
experience (NGO4R1-2b). Their knowledge of various areas like “fishing management” will see 
their professional opinion sought and has led them to promote and “work with several state 
organisations in our projects” (NGO4R1) including La Dirección Regional de la Producción 
(Regional Production Management Loreto, DIREPRO) related to fishing (NGO4R2b) and their 
involvement in other technical mechanisms including “Mesa REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) …. [and] CAR (Regional Environmental Commission)” 
(NGO4R1). 
 
Similarly, SPDA’s Loreton regional office (established 2006) has given technical advice, 
training and accompanied GOREL on issues “within the frame[work] of environmental politics 
and … environmental legislation in Peru”, conservation issues and social conflict situations 
(NGO5R1). The latter saw them working together on a scheme called “conservation for peace … 
a [two-year] project about environmental conflict-management linked to the use of natural 
resources” implemented in Alto Nanay District (Maynas Province) with four communities, two of 
which are indigenous (ibid.). Given the importance of Loreto for Peru’s onshore oil production 
and the need to reduce the high levels of social conflict (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.3, 3.4), 
GOREL’s partnership with this NGO and other similar actors is hugely important.  
 
Therefore, one finds that in this context, collective voice actors who offer technical 
expertise and adopt a conciliatory supportive approach can develop far more accessible and 
positive relationships to the state in comparison to other scrutiny-based (environmental and 
human-rights) groups. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
 
“Sadly enough, the State itself isn’t very good at communicating, they don’t reach people 
or communities as fast as they should and … react only when the conflict is already taking 
place” (NCI representative NGO6R1). 
  
The narrative described in the preceding sections has provided further analytical detail of the PEV 
environment for Loreton stakeholders. For Barrio Florido and Cuninico, their socio-economic 
decay highlight the state’s SCDV and its centralised focus on Iquitos and other Provincial and 
District capitals, though the latter still only have basic facilities.181 Crucially, for these citizens, the 
lack of affordable and frequent river public transport combined with their own poverty and absence 
of IT connectivity, means that their ability to report contamination events either in person or over 
the internet via formal voice channels is thus lost. Citizens and their respective communities 
therefore become heavily reliant on their links to collective-voice organisations (discussed in 
Chapter 8, Section 8.3) and state representatives’ own engagement with them to voice.  
 
The 2002 Decentralisation Law (Law No. 27783) ‘aims at a balanced division of powers 
and functions among the three governments levels’ and improved public participation (Fernandini 
and Sousa 2015 p. 1). Despite its lofty ambitions, the experiences of Barrio Florido and Cuninico 
show that the Peruvian state is far from achieving this. Political disinterest, combined with 
racialised class consciousness, social discrimination and staff shortages have meant that contact 
between the state and these pueblos “isn’t a fluid communication” (IUA3) which usually only 
occurs to serve electoral self-interest rather than any effort at establishing a strong relationship. 
The communities’ IEVA systems of parallel governance indicate their disengagement from the 
state (Azarya and Chazan 1987) and do little to improve their formal access to or trust of the state. 
 
One must recognise that some civil agencies are more involved than other political 
apparatuses. The ANA agency used to only run data presentations in Iquitos (to involve and 
integrate GOREL and indigenous federations) but soon found that this “didn’t work” as indigenous 
leaders failed to always present their results to communities (NSI1R1a). Instead, presentations are 
                                                          
181 For instance, IRC12, whose son was ill from oil contamination in the Rio Marañón, had to be sent to Iquitos for 
“his blood to be washed” (possibly dialysis) as the staff were not “specialist” (IRC12) and lacked the necessary 
equipment to carry out the procedure.  
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now duplicated in locations central to each cuenca “so that communities … can be present and 
learn the results …. In this way, everybody is taking part” (ibid.). Whilst positive, their selva 
dialogue is limited to a specialised reactionary role (i.e. responding to environmental issues), 
which does not encompass the wider socio-political and economic community concerns or their 
political representation at local, regional and national levels. In this sense, the pueblos are “left on 
their own” (NSI7R1) to operate beyond the state political system.  
 
This has four impacts within their PEV environment. First, the absence of dialogue left 
Cuninico without any idea of who to contact to report the pollution and so an inability to access or 
voice through orthodox formal channels. Second, it damages citizen/community trust of the state 
(NSI4R1) which for indigenous communities like Cuninico reinforces historic feelings of 
discrimination and further damages their willingness to voice. Thirdly, limited state engagement 
alongside these other two influences can force communities to take more radical or unorthodox 
informal voice action to be heard, the latter witnessed in Barrio Florido and their plea for help 
through the radio. As the NCI interviewee evaluated, “if the communities don’t protest, then the 
State at times wouldn’t even know that they exist or ... they wouldn’t even take into consideration 
their needs” (NGO6R1). “That is precisely why native communities … have to take over the [oil] 
wells …. Only then [do] people realise [that] they are demanding something” (NSI7R1). Finally, 
the state’s poor response to these contamination events can further reinforce selva citizens’ 
perceived need to take radical or unorthodox informal voice actions which can become their only 
means of communication. Accordingly, citizen accountability of REI oil spills issues suffers. 
 
In relation to collective-voice organisations, Section 6.2 has shown that though they can 
have easier government access, this is highly dependent on their aims and objectives. The SHDV 
can often determine the scope and scale of this engagement with those scrutinising this aim 
struggling to gain access or establish a working relationship. This is apparent in various ways. 
NGOs have encountered the repercussions of the state-sponsored anti-NGO rhetoric which has 
damaged civil society trust and understanding for what these organisations do. Hence, it is likely 
that any involvement by these actors in a pueblo like Barrio Florido may be unwelcome and viewed 
with suspicion by some residents despite the possible improvements they could bring to citizen 
state voice access. Other NGOs (NGO1R1), have had their access to state mechanisms like the 
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development round-table discussions impeded due to their technical scrutiny-based voice and the 
heightened levels of environmental accountability that they can bring to these discussions. 
 
Yet at the same time, state institutional inexperience and incompetence (NSI4R1), 
particularly within GOREL, is one of the key causes for the constructive relationship found 
between the state and some collective-voice actors. The latter’s work in areas like conservation, 
conflict and natural resource management and sustainable development have allowed them to form 
partnerships on projects or have their voice recognised and listened to by the state. It is these 
supportive or conciliatory collective voice actors that form relationships with the state rather than 
other scrutiny-based voice organisations like E-Tech International’s (NGO1R1). This is not 
altogether useful when it is the latter that are often fighting to protect citizens and society from the 
SHDV’s potentially detrimental impact.  
 
As noted in the PEV theoretical framework (Chapter 2, Sections 2.6, 2.7, 2.8), the state 
forms only one part of the PEV research into REI accountability. The next Chapter focuses on 
REIs, specifically Petroperu, and their relationships and engagement with Barrio Florido and 
Cuninico and collective-voice actors, the latter section taking a broader look into their REI 
relationships.  
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Chapter 7 PEV in the Loreton physical and emotive world: 
The feasibility of Loreton stakeholder engagement with 
Petroperu 
 
“Occidental Petroleum didn’t want us getting close to them [natives] [pause] because they 
were afraid that we would give them information … so they put us within the least amount 
of contact with them” (FOPOW1,  former mechanical engineer for Occidental Petroleum). 
 
This chapter sets out stakeholder engagement with Petroperu bolstered through collective voice- 
based testimony related to other REIs. It begins by setting out REI presence in the Loreton selva 
and their historic and contemporary access arrangements for citizens before re-affirming the need 
to explore each REI individually. This leads into Section 7.2, which investigates Petroperu’s 
relationship with Cuninico and the pueblo’s ability to voice surrounding the 2014 oil pollution 
event. Their treatment during and after the spill including their remediation clean-up employment, 
the provision of medical aid, food and clean water clearly highlight discrimination discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.  
 
Section 7.3 investigates Barrio Florido and Petroperu’s relationship which focuses on their 
day to day relationship and instances of voice protest (e.g. environmental pollution). The 
penultimate section tackles collective-voice and REI access and engagement and the power of the 
latter to control dialogue. Together with the previous sections, this feeds into a conclusion (Section 
7.5) summarising Petroperu’s modus operandi in their relationship with and response to 
stakeholder issues.    
 
7.1 REI presence, engagement and relationship with stakeholders 
 
REI infrastructural presence is dictated by the location of petroleum and the relevant facilities 
needed to extract and transport it. In Loreto, Petroperu’s infrastructure is situated at Iquitos (fuel 
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supply plant), Barrio Florido (refinery) and the Oleoducto Norperuano and Oleoducto Ramal 
Norte and its pumping stations and storage tanks (Petroperu no date a; no date b).182 
 
These oil extractive campamento (camps) sites are “like another world” (NSI2R1), 
described as “castillos [castles] in the selva” (IUA2). The camps are surrounded by electric 
fencing, with workers having access to accommodation, medical facilities, clean water, food, 
electricity and air conditioning (IUA2; MRBF26; NGO2R1b; NSI2R1; NSI7R1). Effectively, they 
are “like a gated community in the middle of a native community” (NSI2R1).183 What sort of 
access and engagement do local communities have with this infrastructure and personnel working 
there?  
 
The Red Ambiental Loretana spokesperson (CBO1R1), who has lived in Iquitos for 14 
years, concluded that industry access and engagement for citizens has improved. A decade or more 
ago, “there was no access” for citizens, with REIs lacking a Loreton community relations office 
(ibid.). Today, its “getting better” with REIs having an Iquitos office (ibid.) e.g. Perenco (NSI2R1) 
and Pluspetrol (IUA2), whilst the latter company also have a Trompeteros office where their oil 
Blocks were located, staffed by an intermediary who liaises with the seven or eight communities 
nearby (NCSSC2). REIs also try and hold information sessions in cuenca urban centres. For 
instance, Perenco, working in Blocks 39 and 67 in Napo District, Maynas Province, held various 
meetings in the District capital, Santa Clotilde (CBO1R1).  
 
However, this rosier contemporary picture is misleading. According to the OEFA 
interviewee, the level of communication between oil communities and REIs is “very informal” 
due to the lack of specific regulation surrounding this dialogue within their EIAs (NSI2R1). This 
provides companies with huge flexibility on the type of relationship they want, exacerbated by the 
                                                          
182 Loreton Oleoducto Norperuano pumping stations are Station 1 and Station 5 (Borja) and storage tanks at Station 1 
and 5 and on the Oleoducto Ramal Norte at Andoas and Morona (Morona District, Datem del Marañón Province) 
(Petroperu no date a). 
183 The term gated community refers to areas of land that are surrounded by walls or fencing and whose access is 
‘rigorously controlled’ (Rossi and Vanolo 2012 p. 115). In Africa and Latin America, ‘extraction industries are 
confined to isolated enclaves, militarily controlled and disconnected from the local society, which does not benefit in 
substantial ways from their presence’ (ibid p. 116).   
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inadequate staffing levels of the MINEM Loreton social issues office which presents “a big 
challenge” to their monitoring of oil company – citizen relations (NSI4R1).184 
 
Hence, one finds that, broadly speaking, REI selva sites will not have an office or a 
permanent community relations presence (CBO1R1; NGO2R1b) leaving citizens either to wait 
until the company visits or they travel to Iquitos themselves (NGO2R1b). Whilst companies have 
an Iquitos office, this isn’t always for community relations purposes with personnel (usually 
comprising only small teams) (NSI4R1) often based in Lima, where they travel from to conduct 
community relations in different areas (CBO1R1). The lack of REI website information 
(NGO7R1) makes it difficult to gauge accurately the contact levels between REI employees and 
oil communities but various participants broadly agree on what dialogue can be like.  
 
Interviewees believed that REIs “try not to engage with the communities as much as they 
possibly can” (NGO2R1b) and “won’t give them any attention” (RGR4). For the Superior Courts 
of Justice judge, “[i]t is like apartheid in South Africa. Whites would never go where blacks were, 
and blacks weren’t allowed to be with whites. That’s how companies work here. The camp is here 
and indigenous aren’t allowed …. Everyone lives in their own world” (NSI7R1). Oil workers and 
professionals with direct experience of their selva operations confirm these (racialised) 
engagement and access assertions. In FOPOW1’s 1980-2001 Occidental Petroleum work as a 
mechanical engineer, he noted that “natives were … marginalised [pause] because they [the REI] 
would suspend me if I took a native in the truck – it was prohibited to give a life to the native.” 
Moreover, “there was a lot of control …. [over] dialogue with them … they didn’t want us getting 
close to them [natives] – because they were afraid that we would give them information …” (ibid.). 
Equally, FOPOW3, an Occidental Petroleum plant operator foreman from 1981-1991 recounted 
that indigenous contact with oil workers at the camp was “prohibited”, the latter extending to the 
causally contracted indigenous workers who were denied access to the camp canteen or the use of 
the shower and toilet facilities.  
 
From a more recent perspective, the National University of the Peruvian Amazon chemical 
engineer professor (IUA2) who spent ten years analysing Pluspetrol-produced waters recalled that 
                                                          
184 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1. 
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oil site access is strictly controlled by the REI which requires individuals to state the purpose of 
their visit before deciding whether to grant authorisation and a specific date to travel on. Likewise, 
it is mandatory for Apus’ to register at the REI camp entrance and follow a parallel protocol method 
which, dependent on the availability of personnel, will see a meeting occur immediately or on a 
specific date (IUA2). In a similar vein to the previous Occidental Petroleum testimonies, a 
Pluspetrol Block 8 oil worker explained that “a rule” made it “forbidden” for oil workers to have 
“relationships with the community” or visit them (MRBF26). One finds that in Cuninico’s case, 
“you usually don’t see the oil companies [Petroperu] at the communities” (CBO4R3).  
 
Consequently, “[i]t would be very difficult [for selva citizens] bar them saying to some 
security guard on the [camp] gate, these are our problems we would like you to know about 
them…[because] there’s nobody there constantly doing community relations work” (NGO2R1b). 
The result is the creation of “lots of barriers to accessibility” seen through a lack “of running 
dialogue between the next-door neighbours”, which forces citizens to travel to Iquitos and make 
an appointment to see someone (ibid.). However, as the PEV framework noted,185  it is important 
not to generalise. Each REI has “a different relation … a different approach” (NGO4R2b) to 
stakeholder dialogue and access arrangements. The focus of this chapter will be on state-run 
Petroperu.  
 
7.2 Petroperu’s engagement and relationship with Cuninico 
 
“Petroperu doesn’t want to talk to us” (IRC22, a housewife). 
 
Prior to the oil spill, Petroperu had never visited the community (IRC1; IRC2; IRC3), a situation 
confirmed by one former resident who had left the pueblo in 1995 at the age of 14 (FIRC1). 
“They’ve never been friendly with us. Never.” (IRC3). “We don’t know them” (IRC16), leading 
to a relationship described as “contradictory” and “not in balance” (IRC17), even though Station 
1 is located only three hours away by rápido or four hours by lancha or bote fluvial (CBO4R1b). 
Consequently, whilst the company has geographically close personnel, this has not improved 
Cuninico residents’ access to Petroperu to report environmental pollution issues.  
                                                          
185 See Chapter 2, Section 2.7. 
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For example, Petroperu’s annual book donation to school students in pueblos like Cuninico 
(CBO4R1b; IRC2; IRC14) occurs through the Education Institution (CBO4R1b) rather than direct 
visits. Similarly, despite a community leader suggesting that Cuninico could help keep watch over 
the pipeline, the company have never been there to establish this (IRC2). Were it not for the spill, 
it is probable that the lack of contact between Cuninico and Petroperu would have continued. 
 
This absence of dialogue has major repercussions in crisis situations like the 2014 oil spill. 
One farmer described how inhabitants were left not knowing “what … the proper process for us 
[is] to follow” (IRC6). The Cocama were uncertain who to ring (IRC4) because they weren’t sure 
which company was responsible for the pipeline (IRC2). However, even if they did know, they 
lacked a Petroperu telephone number (IRC1), eventually finding one in the distributed school 
books which put them through to the Talara refinery in Piura (IRC2; IRC3; IRC14; IRC15). 
Without this, Cuninico wouldn’t have been able to contact the company (IRC23) through formal 
voice channels.186 This raises a huge issue vis-à-vis their ability to report and hold Petroperu 
accountable for pollution issues. Given the nature of this study, this is a higly significant point. 
For one community leader, these issues occurred “because they [Petroperu] never came here for 
meetings, to even introduce themselves” (IRC2). A glimpse of how ill prepared Cuninico was can 
be found from one housewife who was “surprised” and “scared” when Petroperu landed a 
helicopter nearby (IRC20) on 30th June 2014 (CBO4R1b).187 
 
The spill brought Cuninico citizens and Petroperu personnel physically closer together than 
they ever had been before. Oil workers stayed in the village for approximately six months188 and 
employed residents as “emergency workers” in the initial remediation work which lasted roughly 
four months (CBO4R1a, b; IRC3; IRC11) (discussed later in this section). Analysis of these events 
highlight the power and control Petroperu had in setting the dialogue parameters and information 
                                                          
186 To the company’s credit, their response to the morning telephone call (IRC5; IRC14) made on the 30th June 2014 
was prompt, arriving in the afternoon (IRC2; IRC5) at 4pm (IRC23).  
187 CBO4R1 suggests that Petroperu were aware of the spill because the amount of oil sent through the pipeline did 
not reach Station 5 but did not have the location of the breakage (CBO4R1b).  
188 Though unconfirmed, this would fit the description of later events discussed shortly.  
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provision which were minimal and the influence of discrimination in their treatment of the 
Cocama. 
 
Petroperu’s arrival into the community shows disrespect and discrimination and a lack of 
understanding for how these indigenous communities live. Petroperu’s oil workers failed to 
apologise for the spill (IRC3; IRC5; IRC6; IRC7; IRC8; IRC11; IRC15; IRC16; IRC19; IRC22), 
instead arriving angrily (IRC27; IRC29) and were “direct in [their] treatment” (IRC8) of Cuninico. 
“[C]an you believed it?” exclaimed one elderly resident (IRC29). Indeed, they were even willing 
to go as far as to blame residents themselves for the spill (IRC13).189  Cocama interviewees 
described Petroperu asking to stay in Cuninico without residents’ permission (IRC24; IRC25).190 
The “high price[s]” that they paid for food such as plantains (cooking banana) (20-25 soles), “a 
bag of yucca for 30-40 soles” and hens (40-50 soles) when values were originally between five 
(for plantain) and ten soles (for yucca) (IRC13) would have been seen as arrogantly extravagant 
and a vain reinforcement of their perceived societal superiority.191  
 
Whilst renting various people’s homes (IRC4; IRC5; IRC9; IRC29), “they didn’t treat us 
well …. We were there before using just a tiny little light, but when they came … they installed a 
lot … of little machines … and they used a lot of energy, and the [community’s] generator gave 
out” (IRC7). After apparently failing to replace the community’s generator,192 they brought in their 
own to hook up refrigeration units (IRC23; IRC29) but refused to share the generators or electricity 
with the pueblo (IRC23; IRC27; IRC29). 
 
Once in the village, Petroperu’s minimal interaction with Cuninico became clear. “[T]hey 
just wanted to check on their oil, because it was spilling out, nothing more” (IRC4 my emphasis).  
“Whenever we wanted to speak to anyone, even if they were right there in front of us, they would 
say that we were … it wasn’t “impeding”, they used another word … that we were stopping them 
from doing their work, stopping them from cleaning” (IRC7). This excuse evidently became a way 
                                                          
189 The tube was at least three metres underwater. “Who is the person who is going to hold his breath so much to cut 
that … Nobody! Therefore, they lie” (IRC13). 
190 Roughly 25 workers stayed in Cuninico (IRC16; IRC17).  
191 It has also meant that since Petroperu left, “the same people from the community … come but they want to sell the 
plantain to the same price [sold to Petroperu] …. this is one of the things that hurt us the most” (IRC13). 
192 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1. 
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of preventing any form of casual communication between oil workers and Cuninico whilst the 
former resided in the pueblo. “They just wanted to get away from us” (ibid.). 
 
As one would expect in this situation, the Cocama were desperate for information and 
contact. A young male topographer wished that Petroperu had “held a general assembly” so that 
they would inform the community about “what the problem is and what it’ll cause” (IRC18). 
Instead, the company communicated solely with and through the Apu and his deputy (IRC8; IRC9) 
(explored more fully in Chapter 8, Section 8.1), which would help suppress wider critical questions 
raised against the company which would instead be directed at their leaders. The two community 
asambleas that five interviewees mention (IRC6; IRC13; IRC15; IRC20; IRC21) only occurred 
due to residents’ protestation and extreme action (locking Petroperu engineers in the Apu’s 
house).193 All other instances of invited attendance at town meetings were refused (IRC9; IRC16; 
IRC17; IRC18), showing that dialogue, whenever possible, was strictly controlled and resisted by 
the company, a situation it used to its advantage as Chapter 8, Section 8.1 discusses. 
 
In this early period, Cuninico’s access to information from Petroperu was negligible, 
misinforming and discriminatory. A community leader noted that, whilst residents were working 
at the remediation site, the meetings he had with Petroperu in Cuninico “were only ever to do with 
[the] work, there wasn’t anything else” discussed (IRC2). Other residents confirm that Petroperu 
refused to provide them with any information (IRC5; IRC7; IRC16; IRC17; IRC23; IRC25; 
IRC29) including on the size of the spill or the security measures put in place (IRC3), water quality 
results (IRC27), a report on the clean-up process (IRC14; IRC15), how the spill can affect residents 
(IRC21), particularly if they bathe in certain areas or eat certain food (IRC22), any idea of “when 
it will get better” (IRC6) or the diagnosis and treatment of oil labourers who became sick (IRC7; 
IRC13). Like the pre-spill period, Petroperu did not provide any training sessions (IRC6; IRC16; 
IRC19), an action which particularly impacted indigenous remediation labourers (IRC16; IRC17), 
who “never knew about these things [remediation work]” (IRC16). Petroperu made deliberate use 
                                                          
193 The first stemmed from residents demanding an increase in food provision, which resulted in an asamblea to 
confirm this would happen (IRC13), though as discussed shortly, the increased supplies were still not enough. The 
second asamblea occurred when Petroperu engineers were locked in the Apu’s house by residents as they were leaving 
Cuninico in December 2014 after they demanded answers to their environmental concerns and the resolving of the 
pueblo’s long-term clean-water access (IRC23; IRC22 in IRC23 interview). 
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of their naivety. “I mean, if I would have known that the oil could hurt us, I would have never 
gotten into that” (IRC13). “We were in the dark. We didn’t know … about those things, about the 
spill. We didn’t know where we were ... No one said anything, nothing” (IRC16). 
 
Tied in with this lack of information were deliberate efforts to misinform Cuninico. One 
resident recalled that in their initial visit “they told us that in 15 days everything would be solved 
… [and] will go back to the way it used to be” (IRC13) whilst a community leader was later told 
that the spill was “mild” (IRC2). A second example is Petroperu’s reaction to residents’ concerns 
raised at the second asamblea that the environment, specifically the water and fish, were 
contaminated.194 Petroperu personnel were upset and angry with Cuninico (IRC16; IRC17; IRC23; 
IRC25) and denied that there was any contamination (IRC6; IRC7) of water or fish which could 
be drunk and consumed safely (IRC23; IRC25). A farmer noted that despite telling the community 
that they were waiting for confirmation of results (presumably from DIGESA), “as far as they’re 
concerned, we’re not contaminated” (IRC7).  
 
The Cocama, however, refused to believe this. Three residents (IRC7; IRC23; IRC29) 
described how they “demanded” (IRC7; IRC23) that the Petroperu personnel eat and drink a fish 
and river water “so they can see if they would get diarrhoea or not” (IRC23). “We … told them 
“look sir … I’ll give you … this water …. Because you say that the water … was left cleaned 
where you[‘re] working. I’m [going to] give you a fish that was obtained here from the water … 
so you can eat it …”” (IRC29). Water was brought but the personnel refused to drink it (IRC23; 
IRC29; IRCP1 in IRC24-25 interview). For residents, the result was that they didn’t know “what’s 
safe and what’s not here … if the water weren’t contaminated, like they say, they would have 
washed in it and drank it with us, but they never let even a drop of water touch them” (IRC7). This 
researcher’s photographs of oil visible in three separate locations on the Rio Cuninico up-river 
from Cuninico (Photographs 7.1-7.3) show that pollution was still a problem 11 months after the 
spill. 
 
                                                          
194 See also Section 7.2, Footnote 193 and Chapter 8, Section 8.3.  
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Photograph 7.1.1: First oil site on the Rio Cuninico approximately 20 minutes up-river from 
Cuninico.195 
 
Photograph 7.1.2: Close-up of the first oil site. 
 
                                                          
195 For Chapter 7 photograph sources see Footnote 3. 
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Photograph 7.2.1: Second oil site on the Rio Cuninico approximately 30 minutes up-river from 
Cuninico.  
 
Photograph 7.2.2: Close-up of the second oil site. 
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Photograph 7.3.1: Third oil spill site on the Rio Cuninico approximately 45 minutes up-river from 
Cuninico taken at the entrance to the ravine leading to the Oleoducto Norperuano.  
 
Photograph 7.3.2: Close-up of the third oil site. 
 
Petroperu’s perception that these were merely ignorant natives was evident in other brief 
exchanges. “[H]ow can these [engineers] say that it will take two – three months [to clean]? Lies. 
Tell them to tell the truth” (IRC9). A community leader recalled showing Petroperu oily water in 
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Cuninico (IRC2). Their response was to “say it’s vegetable oil .... But we are also indigenous 
people, and we can see the difference between what is vegetable oil, and what is from the pipe. …. 
They’re absurd explanations that they give to us.” 
 
Discriminatory scorn for the village’s plight can also be seen in the medical, clean water 
and food provisions. Regarding the former, Petroperu’s support was crude. One young mother’s 
baby became physically swollen (IRC12; IRCP2 in IRC12 interview), covered in “large red welts, 
that [were] very ugly” and suffering from a fever after being showered in the Rio Marañón 
(IRC12). Petroperu’s provision of an ineffective lotion was the extent of their medical support, 
which itself stopped once they left Cuninico, forcing the mother to use her own money to travel to 
Maypuco’s health centre (ibid.). 
 
Clean water and food provisions were also meagre. Initially, when Petroperu first arrived, 
“they weren’t giv[ing] us groceries. It was like they were mocking us” (IRC23) but after two 
weeks’ supplies started (IRC13). However, they were given only five litres of water for 6-7 people 
(CBO4R1a; IRC5; IRC7; IRC13; IRC23) which was not enough to shower and drink with 
(IRC13). “How are we supposed to drink that water in five days? Like a small bucket of paint” 
exclaimed IRC23. The food provision was also limited (IRC26)196 and despite increased supplies 
(via the second asamblea meeting), were still not enough to stop residents being forced to eat 
contaminated fish “out of necessity” (IRC7). Moreover, these supplies lasted only five months 
(August – December 2014), ending when Petroperu left the pueblo and remediation site which 
compelled the Cocama to drink boiled rain or river water (IRC2; IRC3; IRC14; IRC15; IRC19; 
IRC24; IRC28; IRC29).197 As IRC13 noted, “Petroperu thought to leave us aside without giving 
us enough value as human beings.” So, whilst they “came … they didn’t stay to help us” (IRC4) 
and were clearly apathetic to the community’s problems from the spill. 
 
However, perhaps the greatest indicator of Petroperu’s contempt and discrimination can be 
seen from their employment of 150 Cuninico citizens as emergency workers for roughly four 
                                                          
196 Supplies included either four (IRC7; IRC13) or seven kilos of rice (IRC19; IRC29), “four of millet flour … [and] 
six fillets” (IRC7) along with “guarina [biscuits], oil, a preserve [and] milk” per family each week (IRC29). 
197 Access to clean water remains an ongoing issue in 2016 (Fraser 2016c; Fraser and Tarabochia 2016). 
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months (CBO4R1a, b; IRC3; IRC11) in the remediation work.198 Petroperu personnel (IRC16; 
IRC20; IRC23; IRC25) arrived at the pueblo to find causal labourers, aided by one Cuninico 
resident who helped organise this process (IRC20). The Cuninico and other pueblo residents 
involved in the remediation work were split into work groups numbering roughly 100 people 
(IRC1; IRC21). One group was given the task of carrying “out a survey of the source [the pipeline], 
to fix it, and to stop it from spilling” (IRC3), a second “recuperation” (or remediation) and 
cleaning, a third as “chaleros” (cutting away vegetation) and a final group to gather the polluted 
vegetation etc. (IRC21). Though the work was a mix of manual and heavy labour, residents were 
not given any initial training (IRC1; IRC13) or protective clothing (CBO4R1a; IRC6; IRC7; 
IRC13; IRC14; IRC19; IRC20; IRC22) by Petroperu or its contractor (IRC6) and almost no 
equipment (IRC1).  
 
 The experience of these indigenous workers, particularly those locating the pipeline break 
was harrowing. Initially, a community leader watched citizens go into the ravine  
 
without protection and wading into the oil. Because it was crude oil … it was twice as 
thick. That’s what you need to imagine, that they were working right in it, trying to find 
out where the break was, because it was underwater, it was about three metres deep. So … 
to find the break … they dived until they found it …. and raised it up, and they were all 
completely exhausted, but they patched it up (IRC2). 
 
A citizen who took part recounted that  
 
to try to lift the pipeline, we had to immerse in that water without any protection … under 
the instruction of engineers, they told us that we had to try to reach it, so we did immerse 
there without any clothing, only underwear and it was full of crude oil, it was thick (IRC13; 
see also Photographs 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6). 
 
A Cuninico lady saw her husband return from the oil site “really black, you could only see his …. 
teeth and his eyes, nothing else” (IRC24).  
 
                                                          
198  A further 350 indigenous citizens from other local pueblos (San Antonia, Esperanza) were also employed 
(CBO4R1b; IRC16) but only a total of 12 women (IRC16; IRC20), the rest were male.  
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Photograph 7.4:  Cocama work without protective clothing locating the pipeline break.  
 
Photograph 7.5: Cocama residents inserting or removing one of the large wooden timbers that 
supports the pipeline. 
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Photograph 7.6: Some residents worked without clothing, others wore t-shirts like IRC21. 
 
Other residents were given “very simple gear” (IRC25) including a helmet (IRC16; 
IRC23), long-sleeved shirts, trousers, boots, (IRC16) and gloves (IRC25). Those clearing away oil 
scooped it into buckets and used a funnel to pour it into cylinders (IRC16; IRC25), a process that 
spilt it onto their bodies (IRC25) whilst the gloves would “break … with the heat from the oil” 
(IRC20; see also Photograph 7.7). Citizens would shower and clean themselves with significant 
quantities of gasoline (IRC23; IRC24) and a moisturiser (IRC13; IRC16; IRC23; IRC24; IRC25; 
Photograph 7.8) provided by Petroperu. The hours were long, with residents roughly leaving the 
pueblo between 3-6am, and returning between 6-8pm or working at night from 5pm until 2am 
(IRC17) resting only to eat the limited food provided (IRC6; IRC16; IRC20; IRC24; IRC25).199 
  
 Most damning was the employment of four indigenous children (CBO4R1a; IRC23),200 an 
action which explicitly contravenes Article 32 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) no date p. 10). One of these, IRC25, who was 15 at the time, 
was interviewed for this research. According to his testimony, the contractor knew that he was 
                                                          
199 Breakfast included portala (porridge) (IRC20), “a cup of minga [rice-based drink] with rice and yucca and two 
breads” which was expected to sustain them until 2pm (IRC25). Lunch included half a fish (ibid). 
200 IRC25’s mother stated that two children were aged 16 and 17 respectively and two others were aged 15 (IRC23). 
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under-age when he provided them with his yellow DNI national identity card (the colour for all 
Peruvian minors) (ibid.). He goes on to explain that initially he “started working gathering the 
rubbish” but was soon “working with the oil, getting it out of the water” sinking “my body up to 
the waist” without any protection (ibid.; see also Photograph 7.9). Despite their employment 
ending with the arrival of journalists (IRC20), it apparently continued in a clandestine fashion for 
several months afterwards (IRC23; IRC25).201 
 
According to Cuninico residents, they worked at the site for almost a month without any 
protective clothing (CBO4R1b; IRC13; IRC16; IRC20) and unsurprisingly, there were major 
health impacts. Residents suffered headaches (IRC16; IRC20; IRC24) and bronchitis whilst 
another woman fainted twice from the smell (IRC20). Burns, rashes, allergic reactions (IRC10; 
IRC11; IRC17; IRC19) and boils (IRC20) were reported, numbness and weakness in their bodies 
(IRC2; IRC8; IRC11), sore and locked joints (IRC1; IRC13), stomach problems (CBO4R2), 
breathing difficulties (IRC24), fevers (IRC23; IRC24), and pain and blood from urinating (IRC9; 
IRC23). As one former oil worker lamented “para que trabajar para la recuperacion de esta 
compania de la muerte” (why work on the recovery with this company of death?) (IRC8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
201 When OEFA arrived for the first inspection, the minors were hidden in the selva and continued employment on the 
condition that they hid on future inspections (IRC25). Whilst one could argue that the indigenous people may have 
willingly wanted their children employed due to their economic poverty, this was combined with a company that was 
deliberately overlooking this fact.  
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Photograph 7.7: Cocama residents removing the polluted wood and vegetation from the 
contamination site.  
 
Photograph 7.8: Cocama residents cleaning themselves off after searching for the pipeline break. 
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Photograph 7.9: The Cocama minors at the oil site (Infoamazonia no date). 
 
The emergency workers were finally provided with thin protective white overalls (IRC13; 
IRC15; IRC16; IRC17; IRC20; IRC22) but these were inadequate (IRC13; IRC14; IRC20; IRC25; 
Photograph 7.10). For example, the remediation work which began after the pipeline was fixed 
(IRC2) saw a group of men ordered to clear the oil from the ravine surface (IRC20), which forced 
them to step into oil up to their waist (IRC1).  
 
[W]hen we [were] immersed there, the oil made it [the overalls] tear to pieces, it didn’t 
resist. Perhaps three to four mins, ten mins at the most but with our movement in that crude 
... it tore apart and the oil would attach very easily to the textile …. [T]here were some very 
deep places where we had … to clean … and suddenly you would feel [“plum” sound 
made] and the oil coming inside your cloth (IRC13; see also Photographs 7.11.1/2). 
 
It was only the arrival of journalists and OEFA for inspections which seems to have prompted 
Petroperu to provide the necessary clothing (helmets, googles, ear protectors, masks and gloves) 
(IRC6; IRC16), suggesting it was done purely for show rather than any care for the indigenous.202  
 
                                                          
202 See also Chapter 8, Section 8.1. 
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Photograph 7.10.1: Cocama residents in the white overalls. 
 
Photograph 7.10.2: Protective rubber feet and leg protectors worn under the white overalls. 
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Photograph 7.10.3: Mask worn by some of the oil workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 7.11.1: Cocama residents working on removing oil from the ravine.  
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Photograph 7.11.2: Emergency workers in the ravine.  
  
Discrimination is rife throughout this chain of events. If Petroperu could initially arrive 
with “barriers” (IRC2; see Photographs 7.3.1/2) and specialist pumping equipment 15 days later 
(IRC1; IRC2; IRC14; IRC24), why did they also not have protective equipment with them? 
Moreover, indigenous people were given the most dangerous and difficult task of locating the 
pipeline break without any training, protection or equipment. As IRC13 noted, “they just waited 
for us to do the toughest job” before lifting the fixed piece of pipeline into place themselves.  
 
 For citizens, their sense of fear and frustration after this lack of dialogue and dangerous 
emergency work would have deepened when the oil workers “fled” (IRC4; IRC9; IRC20; IRC22; 
IRC23) Cuninico “like thieves” (IRC16) one night in December 2014 “[w]ithout thanking us” 
(IRC9) or paying residents for their hospitality (IRC5; IRC16; IRC26). Then, “suddenly people 
were talking to them a lot … asking them, clamouring, wanting to know what was happening to 
the wildlife, but they didn’t get it …. They didn’t want to share anything with us, and in the end, 
they just left” (IRC7). The Cocama’s concern for their cosmovision and natural world is evident 
here but they were never likely to be reassured. Instead, leaving the pueblo allowed Petroperu to 
reinforce the disengagement, difficult access and lack of information seen during the spill. 
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At the time of the research field trip in May 2015, remediation work by Petroperu was 
continuing. Whilst oil workers travel past Cuninico on boats, none of them stop to talk (IRC2). 
Other testimonies (IRC4; IRC5; IRC8; IRC13; IRC14; IRC17; IRC19) confirm that Petroperu 
have failed to communicate with the whole pueblo, despite Cuninico trying to fight back and get 
in touch (IRC4). “[I]t’s been a very long time since they came” (IRC7). One unemployed resident 
concluded that “for about four and a half months they considered us, but after that, nothing, fin, 
let’s go. Just like that” (IRC1). 
 
Instead, Cuninico’s only contact occurs through the Apu, who visits the company’s offices 
in Saramuro (IRC2). Whilst the community leader suggests the meetings are a sign of Petroperu 
thinking about the distance involved for Cuninico, they remain controlled by the company who 
have maintained “difficult” communication, something “we don’t understand, we don’t know why 
they don’t come to coordinate with us” (ibid.). For Cuninico, the REI  
 
should come, because they know exactly what’s happened … [because] of this spill, the 
state it’s left us in, so they have an obligation …. That’s what we’re hoping for, to 
coordinate with them, make them see what we’re living through right now, then maybe 
we’ll be listened to by them or … the state (ibid).  
 
 Overall, were it not for the spill, Cuninico would almost certainly never have had any 
contact with Petroperu, despite their close proximity to the Oleoducto Norperuano and this raised 
significant issues for their ability to alert the company verbally through orthodox formal voice 
channels to contamination problems. Petroperu’s actions during and after the pollution event show 
that they   
 
were never interested in the village. That’s what I understood from them. Because, when I 
met with them, I made them aware of the community’s needs. I insisted that the water was 
contaminated … I asked them what they were going to do for us when the flood [the annual 
rising of the Amazon tributaries] would come? It would contaminate even more! It would 
harm us even more! .... But they were far from recognising, considering or thinking about 
what they were to do as a company …. (ibid.). 
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Their lack of concern and efforts to disengage and misinform the pueblo not only generated 
rumours203  but also destroyed the trust placed in the company. 204  Petroperu’s lack of values 
(IRC28), conscience (IRC7), disrespect (IRC24) and abuse of citizens (IRC24) due to their poor 
class (IRC19) was because “ellas eran unas personas que no sabian sentir por otras personas” 
(they seemed like people who didn’t know how to feel anything for others) (IRC5). “Como ellos 
son ingenieros y educados ellos nos ponen por el suelo” (They think that because they are 
engineers, they are better than us. They treat us like dirt) (IRC11). Though the spill brought 
Cuninico and Petroperu physically together, the events during and post-spill have driven them 
even further apart and this makes any future vocal exchange even more difficult to envisage.  
 
7.3 Petroperu’s engagement and relationship with Barrio Florido 
 
“Yes, again the manager called us, particularly me, the manager sent a watchman to ask 
me to go see him, I went to meet him and he told us “if there is a problem, there is no need 
to call the radio or other people”” (MRBF13). 
 
In Barrio Florido, a cursory appraisal would suggest that their situation is radically different to 
Cuninico’s. “We have a friendly relationship” (MRBF6) due to there being “more communication 
here” (MRBF4) and are “hand [in] hand with Petroperu” (MRBF7), which can be seen in their 
close geographical proximity, the refinery’s important provision of electricity and jobs for 
residents, as will be discussed shortly. However, deeper analysis has shown a far more cautious 
evaluation of citizen interaction and voice opportunity is needed. 
 
The refinery, founded in 1982 (MRBF27; Petroperu no date b), and Barrio Florido have 
“grown together” (MRBF2). When one resident arrived in 1971, there “weren’t many houses” 
(MRBF3) but the construction of the refinery gradually drew more citizens to relocate seeking 
work. By doing so, they moved into the refinery’s sphere of influence, which is particularly 
powerful given the SCDV and the subsequent provision of electricity and source of jobs for local 
                                                          
203 Residents thought that there were still broken pipes (IRC22) and that another rupture had occurred, which Petroperu 
were searching for and couldn’t find (IRC14).  
204 “They only come to fool” (IRC9) and lie about the number of spilt barrels (IRC14), had deliberately blocked the 
telecommunication mast near the pueblo so that they couldn’t contact and speak with anybody (IRC3) and paid 
Cuninico citizens to act as informants (IRC18; IRC19; IRC28), the latter a clear indicator of the paranoia which the 
spill had created. 
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residents. This has exaggerated the power disparity between the two parties, which have helped 
Petroperu create a voice environment with Barrio Florido i.e. the frequency of meetings, where 
they occur and their composition, that is advantageous to them. This has been regulated through a 
so-called “formalisation of dialogue” which manifests itself in two ways; their everyday 
relationship and instances of voice protest.  
 
Firstly, in periods like 2015 when “las aguas estan calmadas” (waters are calm) (MRBF13) 
i.e. when contentious issues haven’t occurred, Petroperu maintains an infrequent, controlled 
cordiality with Barrio Florido. In these periods, interaction with the refinery “isn’t very often, it 
has its moments” (MRBF15) whilst they provide minimal (MRBF26) “symbolic support” 
(MRBF11) for the pueblo.  
 
Analysis of testimonies make clear that Petroperu sought to liaise only on an infrequent 
basis with the pueblo’s three elected representatives (i.e. IEVAs) (MRBF2; MRBF4; MRBF6; 
MRBF16). Meetings with these IEVAs occur in the refinery every six months concerning their 
informal Petroperu work (MRBF18). 205  Whilst one of the representatives insisted that these 
meetings can occur “at anytime” and that “[t]here’s no problem with access” (MRBF2), this does 
not appear to be strictly correct. Authoritative exchanges appear to be highly formalised and 
controlled; occurring through an appointment (MRBF13) which needs to be made through a 
written formal letter delivered through the pueblo’s IEVAs (MRBF3; MRBF12). “[E]verything 
has to be formal” (MRBF12).  
 
That is not to say that larger community meetings and wider engagement don’t happen. 
Petroperu “maybe visit about four times … a year” usually “let[ting] us know in advance” 
(MRBF15) by inviting residents (MRBF18 my emphasis) to events (MRBF16; MRBF18; 
MRBF26) run at specific points in the year. During the summer holidays, they do things for the 
children including sports activities in February and a football competition in March. In April, they 
                                                          
205 The refinery pays Barrio Florido every three months for the “cultivation” (MRBF2) i.e. maintenance of the pipeline 
by cutting vegetation. This is used to pay for electrical consumption (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Footnote 164) and 
provides a 3,900 soles income (MRBF6). This is appropriated for each person based on the number of metres they cut 
(“if you do 15 metres, they will pay you 20-30 soles”) (MRBF6) with the remaining soles used for the village (MRBF2; 
MRBF6). Three more batches of work in the neighbouring refinery areas is also offered “every four months” (MRBF6) 
worth 2,000 soles (MRBF2; MRBF6).  
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deliver school supplies whilst September sees another football competition called the “Poleoducto 
Cup” involving teams from each of the pueblo’s zones and other pipeline communities (MRBF2; 
MRBF3; MRBF11; MRBF12; MRBF15). In October “they make games for the whole community 
and there are prizes” (MRBF12), whilst in December they visit for Christmas, bringing toys and 
holding a chocolatada 206  (MRBF2; MRBF18). The annual flooding (MRBF22; MRBF24; 
MRBF28) of Barrio Florido areas results in Petroperu staff visiting to make donations and provide 
support (MRBF13; MRBF15; MRBF21) such as groceries (MRBF7; MRBF16; MRBF20; 
MRBF25; MRBF28).  
 
Other non-specific calendar engagements and support have also taken place. At least one 
moloqua asamblea has taken place (MRBF8; MRBF9; MRBF10; MRBF25; MRBF30) as several 
interviewees were aware of whom to contact in the event of environmental pollution (MRBF23).207 
“[A]t times … [they provide] health related” (MRBF15) support. For instance, when there are no 
doctors at the medical posta and it’s an emergency, residents are seen in the refinery (MRBF23) 
and taken to Iquitos by Petroperu (MRBF13; MRBF15; MRBF18) whilst “they come with 
different medical doctors” (MRBF15) like in early April 2015 when they provided medicine for 
children for flu, parasites and diarrhoea (MRBF6; MRBF15; MRBF19). The pueblo is also 
supplied with water for the reservoir tank, transported from the refinery roughly every week in big 
containers by canoe (MRBF25; MRBF27; MRBF30). 
 
One should acknowledge that Barrio Florido “is in a better position than other villages” 
(MRBF3). However, “apenas lo que ellos quieren, no lo que el pueblo quiere” (they provide what 
they want, not what the town wants) (MRBF14), indicating that their power in these interactions 
is absolute. This allows Petroperu to “promise things and then … never do anything” which left 
one IEVA feeling the need “to record or take a photo of what’s happening … [so] that I can put 
pressure on them” (MRBF6) and improve accountability. 
 
                                                          
206 A social event where drinking and eating chocolate is the central activity of the meeting and usually occurs for a 
festive or commemorative event.  
207 “So, the first thing you do is you tell the company what’s happening and so they will put [out] an alert” (MRBF3) 
i.e. a siren so that residents enter their homes quickly (MRBF17; MRBF23). 
 
 
241 
 
At certain times, Petroperu are invited by the pueblo “so that they can see the work we 
want to do” (MRBF18). However, residents spoke about their recent request for increased water 
supply, something which the refinery offered (MRBF7; MRBF26; MRBF27) and then failed to 
implement (MRBF7; MRBF14). Other inhabitants complained that the refinery refuse to supply 
“energy for a special activity in town …. even if we ask” (MRBF14) and that their request for 24-
hour electricity was not supported by their local leaders (MRBF10; MRBF27).208 In the case of 
the 2011 oil spill, the pueblo requested “water, and for doctors to analyse people and check their 
health …. They gave us water [for several days] but they didn’t send any doctors” (MRBF6).  
 
So far, one can see the parameters of the infrequent, controlled cordiality between 
Petroperu and Barrio Florido. Meetings and engagement between the two parties are infrequent 
and whilst cordial friendly relations “have [been] fought for” by the IEVAs (MRBF6), they are 
strictly controlled by the refinery. An extension of their power can also be seen in the provision of 
small, cheap “symbolic support” (MRBF11) and again, despite the elected authorities fighting for 
it (MRBF6), it is Petroperu not Barrio Florido which decides the specific help. 
 
However, this everyday relationship is in a state of flux. The most noticeable influence is 
the change of refinery manager. “This company always changes its manager [every year or two] 
and at times it [their relationship] gets better and at times it gets worse” (MRBF12). The impact 
on support and dialogue would appear to be profound. “If there’s a manager who supports, then 
he’ll come here and start meeting with us and there’s a fluid relationship …. But some others we 
don’t even see them” (MRBF3).  
 
For instance, testimonies spoke about a more proactive “nicer” (MRBF25) manager, a 
“wonderful person” (MRBF12). Under his management, “championships” were held in the pueblo 
and he “constantly came to visit the town and … see our needs, to talk to the authorities” 
(MRBF13). The manager during my 2015 fieldwork, who had been at the refinery for roughly 
eight months (MRBF25), was described in vastly different terms. He was “quiet” and unwilling to 
                                                          
208 This is understandable given that Barrio Florido’s level of electricity has been explicitly laid out in a “covenant” 
signed between the local leaders and the refinery (MRBF6) which commenced six years after the establishment of the 
refinery (ICW1) and has been recently negotiated (see Section 7.3, Footnote 209). As the local volunteer judge states; 
“if there’s a case that is not going to favour us, I will stop it” (MRBF6). 
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“reach out here so often” so that residents “barely [saw] him” (MRBF3). “This one is a little 
rebellious, as the authorities say” and wasn’t friendly (MRBF25). Contacting him took a long time 
and he would often say that there weren’t any funds for community projects (MRBF3) causing 
him to be labelled as “a bit stingy” and there to be less events than previous years (MRBF13). 
Though the manager has visited the pueblo on at least one occasion (to check progress on the 
painting of the school), a sense of detachment persists through his use of representatives to cover 
his absence at community events to which he was invited (MRBF3).  
 
Thus, refinery manager staff changes do greatly impact upon the nature of their everyday 
relationship; whilst the 2015 fieldwork period had a disengaged and unsupportive manager 
generating an infrequent, controlled cordiality, previous individuals have shown more involvement 
which would have undoubtedly improved the everyday voice environment for citizens.  
 
However, as noted, the formalisation of dialogue manifests itself in two ways. There are 
instances which cause the pueblo to test Petroperu’s control of their dialogue and the restrictions 
placed upon them. “[I]f they’re [the citizens] abused then the village may raise against it 
[Petroperu] …. their pipes go through the village and so we claim responsibility when there’s 
pollution, or when they don’t comply with the agreement” (MRBF2) for the provision of electricity 
for Barrio Floridio. When the community asks these more serious protestation questions, Petroperu 
responds with calculated, suppressive formality attempting to diffuse and disperse the collective 
group arrayed against them. 
 
Evidence of this can be seen in one interviewee’s discussion of the village’s actions 
concerning 2013 electrical supply issues which involved around 20 residents (MRBF14) and was, 
though unconfirmed, a request for 24-hour provision noted by MRBF27. Initially, the refinery 
stipulated that they “just wanted the Lieutenant to come in with someone else, only two people” 
(probably one other IEVA) rather than allow the rest of the inhabitants’ access (MRBF14). Despite 
Petroperu conceding that a “maximum” group of eight residents would be given entry, “from those 
eight they only wanted three people to talk, no more” (MRBF14), no doubt Barrio Florido’s 
 
 
243 
 
IEVAs.209 Indeed, the IEVA judge noted that if “the community [is] going to protest against [the 
refinery] … they call the leaders Teniente, Agent, etc; and they go as a Committee representing 
them” (MRBF6). “Always, when there is a problem, it’s … the authorities that go and talk to them” 
(MRBF16) reinforcing the levels of control that Petroperu had over Barrio Florido citizens in this 
vertical voice situation.   
 
The 2009 oil pollution incident also saw challenges to Petroperu but this time their control 
were less successful. After the incident, a Commission of roughly 20 residents was formed, two 
of whom alerted the local press (MRBF13). However, the manager “didn’t want to come to the 
town”, instead giving them an appointment for a meeting in the refinery auditorium alongside the 
press and DDP (ibid.), highlighting their control over the location and meeting participants. 
Though they were unable to restrict their communication to formal discussion with Barrio 
Florido’s IEVAs, Petroperu continued to control proceedings in other ways. At the meeting, 
dialogue was non-existent; “nos comieron con zapato y todo” (they didn’t even let us talk) (ibid.) 
whilst the company alongside state representatives attempted to discredit the residents’ claims in 
the eyes of the journalists.210 Despite this, press and public prosecutor involvement increased the 
levels of scrutiny on Petroperu,211 which is undoubtedly why they were so reluctant to have the 
press involved in the 2011 incident.   
 
In this case, one or more unknown citizens called the radio (MRBF13; MRBF14). Due to 
MRBF13’s 2009 involvement, the manager sent a security guard to ask her and other residents to 
visit him (MRBF25). Once there  
 
he told us “if there is a problem, there is no need to call the radio or other people” …. he 
was very nice and he said that they would definitely give us a solution …. Senora, 
particularmente usted (madam, particularly you!) [laughs] Meaning that I enjoy being in 
                                                          
209 In this instance, the Committee secured an improved electrical supply agreement. Initially, electricity was only 
supplied “in the morning Monday-Friday, 8am-10am …. and so, we asked them to give us a broader timetable” to run 
from “6am to 1.30pm” (MRBF6). After “excuses” from the refinery and arguments during negotiations, they agreed 
to extend the electrical supply to its current level (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Footnote 164). The revised agreement 
was signed by “myself, Teniente and the agent. And the Director [of the refinery]” (ibid.). 
210 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1.4. 
211 The 2009 incident did mean the redirection of effluent from the Rio Ramirez directly into the Rio Amazon (MRBF1; 
MRBF6; MRBF11; MRBF12). However, by doing so “they haven’t improved the system” (MRBF1) as the same 
levels of waste are now being emitted directly to the Amazon river (see also Velarde 2009). 
 
 
244 
 
the media, “don’t call them” and I told him “I didn’t call them this time, I don’t want any 
more trouble, I have no idea who called them” (MRBF13). 
 
Whilst the refinery is in a prime position to solve the environmental pollution, the manager’s intent 
on speaking to the resident(s) they felt were responsible for alerting the radio and the suggestion 
to refrain from vocalising beyond the confines of their relationship indicates that “[t]hey wanted 
to avoid the authorities [coming], and journalists as well” (MRBF6). “[I]f the media come, then 
they are pushed to make an agreement” and this was seen to be one reason “why they don’t support 
with what the town …. wants” (MRBF14). 
 
Overall, in these circumstances, Petroperu responds with a tightening of control over the 
voice environment for Barrio Florido citizens. Whilst the change in refinery manager may impact 
upon the frequency and support of their everyday relationship, it is probable that it wouldn’t alter 
each manager’s response to these protest voice situations. In these cases, the interests and 
reputation of the company are threatened and the refinery will seek to maintain dialogue explicitly 
between themselves and the pueblo where their power is greatly enhanced.   
 
7.4 Collective voice-based access to REIs and Petroperu 
 
“[W]e have to get right to the point … [and] provide the evidence right away …. because 
they aren’t interested in having … honest open discussions. They’re on the attack right 
away … and we need to be ready for that” (E-Tech International representative describing 
REI dialogue (NGO1R1)). 
 
“[P]etrol companies don’t like us” (CBO4R1a) and do not see us as legitimate stakeholders 
(NGO7R1), instead merely “part of … indigenous federations” (NGO1R1). By unpacking these 
responses, it becomes clear that collective voice REI access and engagement echo some of the 
same parameters as citizens’ experience.  
 
Firstly, REIs would appear to try to control their CBO/NGO exchanges. For example, a 
Catholic Church requested meeting with Cuninico representatives and Petroperu was accepted by 
the company so long as the Bishop attended who in turn stipulated the presence of CBO4R1’s 
team. By trying to frame the parameters of the exchange in this way, the REI hoped that the Bishop 
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would have helped “maintain cordiality” by acting as a buffer against the undoubtedly hostile 
reception and voices from Cuninico residents (NGO2R1 in CBO4R1-R2 interview). The presence 
of the Catholic Church’s human rights legal team posed a threat and the meeting never occurred 
(CBO4R1a), showing that REIs can choose to reject participation if they cannot control it. The 
Alianza Arkana interviewee recalled how Pluspetrol were not willing to take part in the Messa de 
Desarrollo Multi-sectoral Commission talks that led to the signing of the Historic Act and were 
reluctant to sign it (NGO7R1) highlighting the lack of a participatory enforcement mechanism. 
REI power vis-à-vis collective groups means that the latter, especially scrutiny-based voice groups, 
can struggle to achieve dialogue like citizens. 
 
However, this situation doesn’t apply to all NGOs. In E-Tech International’s case, their 
technical scrutiny-based based voice means that “[t]hey [REIs] have to listen to us.” “Our social 
justice work comes from the technical documents” they produce whilst former oil industry 
employees have more “direct connections to people within oil companies” (NGO1R1). This does 
not lead to a more positive relationship. The representative found that “it can be a little more 
difficult to deal [with] the people operating in Loreto …. because they’re used to doing things their 
way” e.g. Pluspetrol. Consequently, “we have to get right to the point … [and] provide the evidence 
right away …. because they aren’t interested in having … honest open discussions. They’re on the 
attack right away … and we need to be ready for that.” Moreover, “their willingness to listen to us 
only goes as far as … their best interests” (ibid.), rather than any profound sense of best practice 
or concern for their oil exploitation impacts.  
 
Nevertheless, more recent international REI arrivals such as Gran Tierra have been more 
open in setting a good example (NGO1R1; NGO4R1), allowing E-Tech International and NCI to 
access plenty of information (NGO1R1) and establish a “relationship with them” through “the ... 
regional conservation management committee” (NGO6R1). It is probable that this REI lacks local 
extractive knowledge which makes these stakeholder groups useful. At the same time, their status 
as “new kid on the block” means that it’s imperative for them to create positive relationships with 
other experienced actors to help lead to a stable operating environment which, at least in the short-
term, reduces collective-voice-actor scrutiny of their operations.  
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Secondly, like the state, one finds that “an NGO that is prepared to work, to keep the people 
soft towards the [oil] company is going to be favoured by them and an NGO that is more militant 
is[n’t]” (NGO2R1c). A clear illustration is SPDA (NGO5R1), which partly focuses on social 
conflict and natural resource management. “[W]e are always in contact with them [REIs] or they 
have contact with us because they identify our experience and consult with us to be able to develop 
their activities” (ibid.) One of the most crucial practical aspects is their role as impartial 
intermediaries in conflict management between indigenous communities and REIs, a difficult role 
given the bias which communities may feel the NGO is showing towards oil companies (ibid.). 
Moreover, SPDA’s help linking some REI “activities to the communities where we also operate” 
(ibid.), is also useful as it allows the NGO to act as the benign non-corporate face of REIs with 
indigenous communities that may mistrust these actors (NGO6R1) and help establish relations 
through their own pueblo contact. This is particularly useful for REI’s which move into new oil 
Blocks who will lack local contacts and personalised relationships.  
 
Likewise, ProNaturaleza (NGO4R1-R2) is also closely affiliated to REIs, which provide 
economic support for their projects along with other international and private donors 
(NGO4R1). 212  Specific support from the companies includes funding for community-based 
environmental monitoring programmes operating in the Corrientes Cuenca and CSR projects in 
their extractive zones such as “fishing management” (working with five communities on the Rio 
Corrientes) (NGO4R2b), the purchase of land for use as a conservation area and an indigenous 
scholarship programme (NGO4R1; NGO4R2b).  
 
These projects are extremely beneficial for REIs; in the case of the monitoring programme 
they act “like … [an] alarm” which allows “contingency plans [to be] delivered asap” and can 
prevent social conflict issues from taking root. Given the history of environmental contamination, 
and the resentment communities may have for REI activities (NGO4R2a), their funding of 
                                                          
212 We “have received up to $800,000 per year from the oil companies” (NGO4R1). 
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ProNaturaleza’s CSR programme allows them to make use of an actor whose work with 
communities may have been occurring for longer213 and in a more positive and trustful manner.214  
 
This local knowledge, particularly their identification of “pro-activity” (i.e. pro-oil) people 
born through formal and informal dialogue events,215 can help spread the message and evangelise 
other citizens to see the benefits of oil development (NGO4R1). This is undoubtedly beneficial for 
REI operations whose own staff “don’t do that evangelisation” and may not have such detailed 
local knowledge (ibid.).216 Consequently, though ProNaturaleza’s first interviewee states that their 
close REI relationship is an opportunity to develop “our work and our projects” (my emphasis) 
and generated a triple-win situation for the NGO, REI and selva communities (NGO4R1)217 it is 
clear that these are almost fully if not wholly orchestrated and aligned with oil companies who 
gain many useful undeclared benefits not felt by communities.  
 
Consequently, REI self-interest and the services that these non-state actors can offer for 
extractive operations will allow some supportive NGOs to have strong working relationships in 
comparision to scrutiny-based voice actors. REI control and power will also allow them to seek 
out meetings with these stakeholders proactively, motivated by self-interest rather than a search 
for dialogue. For example, the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator recalled one occasion 
when Pluspetrol flew from Lima to meet to discuss oil contamination and the positive remediation 
work they were doing and their concern at negative media reports stemming from CBO4R1. In 
another case, Derecho Ambiental y Recursos Naturales (Law, Environment and Natural 
Resources, DAR), an NGO focused on governance, sustainable development and the promotion 
of Amazonian indigenous peoples’ rights, described how REIs strategically approach NGOs like 
                                                          
213 Their institution has been operating for 20 years in Loreto with the interviewee having worked 15 years, travelling 
and staying with communities for 35 days at a time (NGO4R1).  
214 “I think that communities would believe more in an institution like ProNaturaleza. They see the company as the 
one who comes to take things from them, and the state as someone who doesn’t do anything” (NGO4R1). “They trust 
us, because our intervention is part of a link between the person/fisherman and the specialist, where the values of the 
professional are very important” (NGO4R2b). 
215 Formal tools occur through “regional assemblies” while informal tools include “sports evenings, cinema, etc.” 
(NGO4R1). 
216 “I have personally met some of the community relations’ people [from REIs] who … didn’t know the name of the 
main representative of the community” (NGO4R1). 
217 “We both win from the situation [pause] we win because we get a name, and the company get a better image from 
the work they do, and finally the communities also win because they benefit from that situation” (NGO4R1). 
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their’s to assist them in their extractive projects by helping with community relations i.e. 
galvanising positive local support (NGO8R1). However, for these stakeholders, “you don’t want 
companies to support you either” (NGO7R1) “because sometimes the indigenous people think 
you’ve sold yourself” (CBO4R1a), an issue which ProNaturaleza has found with their close REI 
links,218 highlighting the tightrope and contentious environment which can form between REIs, 
CBO/NGO groups and their respective citizen links.   
 
7.5 Conclusion 
  
Overall, two overarching points are apparent from this citizen and collective voice situation with 
Petroperu and other REIs. Firstly, both case-study communities show that Petroperu’s selva civil 
engagement can be summarised as a responsive “sticking plaster” approach (NGO2R1b). Whilst 
a community leader in Cuninico is right to note that it has an “obligation” (IRC2) to co-ordinate 
with the pueblo, the citizens have no way of forcing it to do so. The GOREL Manager of Health 
and Environment utilised a chess analogy that is aptly suited to this conclusion. “Negotiations are 
like a chess game. We have Garry Kasparov [Russian chess Grand Master] here, for example, and 
then the communities are just like a trainee. The negotiations go this way: while he has been 
thinking about five different ways of doing things, the others haven’t even started thinking” 
(RGR1). The power and knowledge reside almost solely with the REI who dictate dialogue terms.     
 
Accordingly, one finds that REIs will travel into the selva and meet communities in 
response to environmental disasters or radical action taken by citizens (NGO2R1a, b). There is 
never any ongoing style of communication, evidenced most strongly in Cuninico’s case, where 
they “distanced themselves from the community” (IRC8) and left them without any orthodox 
formal voice access. In Barrio Florido, their geographical proximity and economic and energy ties 
necessities some form of exchange but here again, the community cannot enforce it do so with the 
everyday relationship controlled by Petroperu who seek to internalise dialogue to the IEVAs, 
especially in instances of voice protest. Even so, this pueblo is treated significantly better than 
                                                          
218 The indigenous pueblos are aware that this NGO is partially funded by REIs. “At the beginning, it was questioned 
by the communities” (NGO4R2b) who “may feel like we’re supporting companies and that’s not the case” (NGO4R1). 
However, “after six years of work, we have proved that being funded by the company doesn’t necessarily mean that 
the results will be on their best interest” (NGO4R2b). 
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Cuninico, where discrimination is evident from their remediation work and short-term limited 
supplies provided by Petroperu. It is conceivable that if Barrio Florido were an indigenous pueblo, 
their everyday relationship would be significantly worse. 
 
Unfortunately, these experiences are not unique for Petroperu219 or indeed the Loreton and 
the wider EMaDE oil industry. A Catholic Church human-rights lawyer recounted the experiences 
of the Saramurillo indigenous pueblo (Urarinas District, Loreto Province) who were affected by a 
Pluspetrol oil spill in 2011. They  
 
started asking for dialogue with them [the REI], they’re neighbours. They called them, 
invited them, because they wanted their waters to be cleaned …. [But] they [the REI] didn’t 
pay attention. They have invited them several times and they have felt discriminated 
[against] (CBO4R2).  
 
Equally, in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region, communities have often been blamed for ongoing 
oil spills through pipeline sabotage (see Gonzalez 2016a; 2016b) which until very recently helped 
stop REI’s giving financial payments to affected communities (Vidal 2014).220  
 
For collective voice-based stakeholders, their access and relationship is dependent upon 
the rationale of their work. Organisations which scrutinise REI operations have struggled to 
establish contact with REIs unless it’s in REI interests to do so. Only technical scrutiny voice-
based organisations (i.e. E-Tech International, NGO1R1) are in a stronger position and cannot be 
so easily ignored, a situation aided by insider contacts and industry links. For supportive voice 
actors (e.g. ProNaturaleza, NGO4R1-R2 and SPDA, NGO5R1), they are able to establish strong 
working relationships due to their technical skills and range of selva projects which can be very 
beneficial for REI operations.  
                                                          
219 For example, NCSSC3 from San Jorge community have a representative president who “will have some dialogue 
with the company [Petroperu].” The most recent oil pollution in September 2014 did see the REI provide “water and 
food [rice]” but only for a short time. More recently, the first two 2016 Oleoducto Norperuano oil spills saw reports 
(denied by Petroperu) of children employed in remediation work (Post 2016b) whilst indigenous remediation work on 
the third oil spill in June 2016 saw them lack proper safety equipment (Fraser 2016d; see also Chapter 3, Section 3.4, 
Footnote 82). 
220 After a three-year legal battle, Shell agreed to a £55 million ($84 million) settlement with residents of the Bodo 
community in 2015 (BBC News 2015d), a deal which throws open the door to future cases against the REI and the 
impact from sabotage or stolen oil (Vidal 2014). 
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Secondly, the state SCDV means that communities turn to companies instead, which are 
viewed as “more solvent and organised” (NSI4R1). They often must adopt state duties to provide 
basic services (which are “not the company’s responsibility” (IUA2) or “obligation” (RGR1) in 
exchange for local community operational consent ‘that generates a sort of bargaining 
momentum’, which ‘has very little government involvement’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 65). Indigenous 
communities “need them because there’s nobody there for you in cases of emergencies” 
(NGO7R1) reinforcing their REI dependency (RGR2) and increasing the power of companies who 
can control what this support entails. 
 
Despite RGR1’s assertion that REIs provide frequent help and productive societal projects 
such as “health campaigns [or] schools”, Barrio Florido has shown that this support is minimal 
(MRBF26), symbolic (MRBF11), low cost and “simple” (FOPOW1) and usually only done if it’s 
in the company’s interests or at the whim of staff who “show off how much they’ve given” 
(MRBF29).221 These “companies are doing it because … it ticks the box, not because they really 
believe this is the way forward’ (NGO2R1b), leading to a lack of “productive projects” (NSI2R1) 
and a haphazard development approach evident in other REI selva operations.222 Though some 
indigenous communities have seen simple benefits they “haven’t been enough to balance out the 
symmetry that exists in the oil [Blocks] and the indigenous communities … [who] perceive [pause] 
the prejudices against these communities more than the benefits” (IUS2). This is a particularly 
powerful evaluation when one considers the lack of Petroperu development and benefits for 
Cuninico, a situation reinforcing the discriminatory nature of this REI who clearly, wherever 
possible, cut back on CSR initiatives for indigenous communities even more than they do for non-
indigenous communities. As the Earthwatch interviewee noted, “there’s no social side to oil …. 
Oil is a social disaster. Where is oil not a social disaster?” (NGO3R1). Indeed, “Loreto [Province] 
                                                          
221 IUA2, MRBF26 and NSI2R1 recalled how Pluspetrol, which ran Andoas airfield, would “give out a few seats” 
(NSI2R1) on their chartered light aircraft to indigenous people requiring medical treatment in Iquitos.  
222 For instance, the SERNANP interviewee evaluated that “Pluspetrol has a terrible social policy…. They don’t 
comply with [agreements and] …. don’t take communities seriously” (NSI3R1) and evidence of this can be seen from 
a school built in Doce de Octobre on the Rio Tigre (Tigre District, Loreto Province) that had no teachers to staff it 
(NSI2R1). “Pluspetrol and many companies only care for the infrastructure” (ibid.) rather than consider the wider 
practicalities of this support. 
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has given Peru a lot of the country’s petrol …. and in return there [are] only bars …. prostitution, 
drunk people [pause]. So, petrol doesn’t help” (RGR2). 
 
 Even so, REI CSR control affords them the opportunity to utilise it to influence protest 
voices arrayed against them. These ‘special favours’ to individual complainant’s or collective 
voice leaders (Hirschman 1981 p. 241 author’s emphasis) represent only one strategy that Loreton 
REIs have deployed against possible threats and these will be discussed in the following Chapter 
alongside the influential role which CBO/NGO groups also play in shaping citizen voice.    
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Chapter 8 Petroperu and collective voice-based stakeholders 
shaping and moulding voice 
 
Throughout the previous three chapters, the thesis has highlighted the difficulties facing 
stakeholders in their engagement and relationship with the government and Petroperu. The state 
has failed to be present in both case-study communities in a physical and authoritative sense and 
this has had two important impacts. Firstly, as noted in Chapter Seven, this has put REIs in an even 
more powerful position vis-à-vis selva-based communities and Section 8.1 will explore how 
Petroperu have sought to use this position to control and suppress critical citizen voice in Barrio 
Florido and Cuninico. Section 8.2 will explore their fragmentation of CBO-based voices. 
Secondly, the SCDV has strengthened the influence and role of CBO/NGO groups over citizens 
and their voice actions, generating both positive and negative effects, which will be discussed 
within Section 8.3. 
 
8.1 REIs’ suppression of voice through economic, development and other threats 
 
“[H]e said you know this is a private company and they would never want information to 
filter outside, the things they do” (IRC13 recounting a conversation with a Petroperu 
engineer). 
 
As Chapters Six and Seven have shown, the refinery is the main employment source for Barrio 
Florido (MRBF4; MRBF7; MRBF21; MRBF27), usually taking the form of short-term temporary 
(elementary occupation) contracts (MRBF18), although during fieldwork only a few residents 
were employed (MRBF15; MRBF18). Nevertheless, these short-term contracts, alongside the 
money they make for the maintenance of the pipeline, make the pueblo economically dependent 
on Petroperu and this has generated a societal environment of fear and an unwillingness to voice. 
Evidence of this can be seen from the reaction of one female resident who declined to take part in 
an interview upon learning what it was about. MRBF13 felt this happened because “everyone is 
afraid … [as] they all depend on the refinery.”  
 
This situation has a major impact on the inclination of inhabitants to voice. Testimonies 
spoke about refinery workers’ reluctance to criticise Petroperu because they would lose their jobs 
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(MRBF13; MRBF16). “Mostly because all people from here work there, if they protest they will 
get fired” (MRBF21). “Oh yes. They don’t denounce …. it’s like they’re mute” (MRBF27). 
Consequently, in the 2009 oil spill, “some of them [neighbours] supported me but there were … 
others …. They all work here at the refinery and they are afraid of losing their jobs” (MRBF13). 
 
 Other residents believed that the IEVAs were also caught up in this climate of economic 
fear in two ways. “The authorities work there and they [the refinery manager] threaten to fire them 
from the job” (MRBF24) or “always give money to the Lieutenants” (MRBF27) to buy their 
silence (MRBF6: MRBF22; MRBF26; MRBF27; MRBF29). Interviewees felt this helped to 
suppress IEVA willingness to voice by keeping them “quiet” (MRBF24; MRBF29) or “asleep” in 
their jobs (MRBF6), reduce the threat of radical action being taken and make them obedient to the 
refinery manager (MRBF6; MRBF22). The result is that when pollution events or contentious 
moments occur, IEVAs don’t “do anything” (MRBF6) and trust in them by the pueblo must suffer. 
 
The root cause of this situation is the economic dependency of Barrio Florido, which all 
but prevents the pueblo from having impartial IEVAs. “For example, always when we have 
elections here, candidates shouldn’t have any relationship with the refinery but that’s impossible 
because … [most] people … like [90] per cent … from here work there” (MRBF12). For successful 
candidates, “[t]here is always this pretext, what do you love more, your job [pause] ....  so, they, 
of course, abstain from saying anything, so almost never has the refinery [had] problems” 
(MRBF12). Understandably, residents wished this was different. “For me [it would be best] that 
the authorities be strong and [say], “you can fire me and I can see the betterment of the pueblo”” 
(MRBF24). Sadly, no interviewees alluded to this happening.  
 
Yet these job losses would appear to be based on fears and rumours rather than fact. No 
interviewees could name citizens who had lost their job. Indeed, after the 2009 event, MRBF13, 
the housewife who had initially contacted the radio noted that “at the end no-one was made 
redundant, no one lost his job, they are all working” (MRBF13). Are these rumours spread by 
Petroperu or residents concerned that the vocal actions of others may cause them to be fired? The 
source(s) will never be substantiated but this misses the point; for Petroperu, they are a useful 
economic threat to suppress protest voices. As one young manual refinery labourer noted, there 
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was no need for Petroperu to “say anything to us” as we “know that if we complain or say 
something [pause] they’ll just fire us” (MRBF16). Words do not need to be expressed; the climate 
of fear which envelops Barrio Florido provides the necessary deterrent for voice.  
 
Petroperu have been able to use this environment to great effect in other ways, notably their 
unverified employment of citizen informers. “If you have a meeting done here, next day first thing 
in the morning the general manager knows what we said the night before ...” (MRBF13). On one 
occasion, residents had put together an agenda asking the refinery for some things but “we hadn’t 
even arrived and the general manager already knew what we wanted to ask for” (ibid.). The threat 
of temporary contract termination, personal greed and citizen poverty are all underlying motives 
for informers, whose actions would imbue the refinery with a greater sense of power in the 
pueblo’s eyes. By using informers, Petroperu can fracture Barrio Florido’s collective voice 
strength by sowing seeds of disunity and mistrust. 
 
The climate of fear has also been used concerning electrical provision. Some residents 
suggested a reluctance to voice due to the “essential” electrical provision (MRBF15) and the threat 
from Petroperu to “take away the electricity” (MRBF25). Though these “rumours” ignored the 
long-running energy agreement between Barrio Florido and the refinery (MRBF12), 223 they would 
have been useful in drawing the pueblo into negotiations where they could placate the radical voice 
threat (MRBF11; MRBF25) through an increase in electrical provision.224 
 
The fear and voice suppression within Barrio Florido are not a continuous cycle. One 
housewife felt that whilst people had feared job losses in the past, “right now it seems that people 
aren’t that afraid” (MRBF13), illustrated perhaps through the 2011 phone call to the radio. The 
new-found optimism may also be based on the pueblo’s recent IEVAs. The volunteer judge, the 
same individual who successfully renegotiated the increased electrical provision in 2013, also 
worked at the refinery but argued that it didn’t mean he would “stop talking just because the 
refinery is paying me. I am a worker but also an authority. They can’t buy me” (MRBF6). 
                                                          
223 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Footnote 164 and Chapter 7, Section 7.3, Footnote 208. 
224 See Chapter 7, Section 7.3, Footnote 209. 
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MRBF6’s strength of character, perhaps aided by a family relative acting as Teniente allowed them 
to “fight” and not “just stand there and not do anything about it [i.e. issues]. We will listen to what 
they [Petroperu] say, but then we’ll do what’s necessary.” 
 
Consequently, the moral strength of individuals’ characters also play a role in shaping how 
successful Petroperu is in silencing the pueblo’s voice, particularly its IEVAs. However, the annual 
electoral cycle for IEVAs means that stronger, more resolute individuals may not always be 
elected. New authorities, who can seem “shy” and reluctant to “step up”, have sometimes required 
community encouragement (MRBF25), a situation stemming not only from their inexperience as 
authoritative figures but also borne through the pueblo’s economic dependency and climate of fear.  
 
Despite being a vastly different context, Petroperu orchestrated a similar climate of fear in 
Cuninico, with the exclusive aim of suppressing citizen voice. Petroperu sought to “negotiate 
silently with … [the pueblo] without anyone’s knowledge” to conclude a deal to “hide everything” 
(CBO4R3), clean the spill quickly (IRC25) and therefore prevent wider public knowledge of the 
spill.  Residents noted that the company embarked upon “little secret meetings” (IRC8) “in silence” 
(IRC24) with the IEVAs (the Apu and his deputy) who were shut off by themselves rather than 
held with the rest of the community (IRC8; IRC14) to buy them off (IRC23; IRC24; IRC25). 
“That’s how it was. That’s how they behaved. They didn’t want to have meetings with the village 
… to discuss the contamination with us …. It was all hidden …. they closed the door, so that 
nobody could go in, and they had the meetings inside” (IRC7). These meetings led to an agreement 
that included job provision in exchange for their silence (CBO4R3), the IEVAs informing the 
community that “everything [had] been solved now” (IRC24). This agreement gave Petroperu the 
opportunity to begin its suppressive voice strategy.  
 
Residents were told that ““if you speak out against us [Petroperu], there won’t be any work 
at all”’ (IRC7). The community’s economic poverty and work opportunity on a wage of 80 soles 
a day (IRC11; IRC13; IRC14; IRC18; IRC20; IRC22; IRC25) (rising to 150 soles a day for 
workers lifting and repairing the pipeline (IRC13)) was received very happily (IRC3) by almost 
all the Cocama, who “offered themselves up” (IRC7) for employment. “Ochenta soles. Era un 
platal y teniamos que trabajar por la necessidad” (80 soles. That was a fortune in those days and 
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we had to work for necessity) (IRC11). Given these circumstances, this blunt threat was taken 
“seriously” (IRC7) by residents and left them, as Petroperu hoped, feeling “scared”, “afraid to talk 
… [and] silent [with] … only three or four people … who spoke up and defended the village” 
(IRC7).  
 
This economic suppression of voice continued for those working at the remediation site. 
Testimonies make clear that resident labourers were warned not to criticise Petroperu in any way 
otherwise they would lose their job (IRC6; IRC7; IRC11; IRC15). “[W]hen the workers … claim 
their food, they [Petroperu] got angry and said that they were paying well for that and you do not 
have to claim …. Because if you start claiming you’re gonna be fired” (IRC24). The threats became 
reality; IRC13 was fired for questioning the company about the spill, their remediation methods 
and for being secretly present at an oil camp meeting between Petroperu and state representatives 
which none of Cuninico’s IEVAs could attend.225 
 
Given these circumstances, people “didn’t say a word” (IRC7) and “kept quiet” about their 
employment conditions and “endur[ed] it” (IRC6). Citizens were worried; IRC7 believed they 
were observed and that “if anybody spoke up …. they’d remove us from the workforce”, leaving 
residents anxious and “throwing themselves at this work.” The threat of job losses helped force 
workers to complete tasks they were hesitant about. In one instance, the group of female workers 
were “threatened … that if we didn’t complete the tasks [helping remove oil from the ravine 
without protective clothing] [pause] they would fire us” (IRC20). As IRC7 summarised, Petroperu 
“were clever” and “knew” that residents “were … afraid that they’d remove you from the work.” 
 
Yet this blanket of fear over job provision also ran parallel to a range of promises made to 
community members in exchange for their silence. Cocama interviewees spoke about Petroperu 
promising to “send us everything” (IRC5) and “whatever you want” (IRC3) like “food for a year” 
(IRC5), the provision of a generator so “you don’t talk” (IRC15), a medical posta staffed by a 
doctor (IRC5; IRC6; IRC7; IRC8; IRC9) and a water tank (IRC9; IRC13), all of which “at the end 
wasn’t true, they lied” (IRC13). Other residents (IRC6; IRC7; IRC9) don’t recall these promises 
                                                          
225  The absence of IEVAs at the meeting is unsurprising; IRC13 asserted that Petroperu lied about Cuninico’s 
(positive) opinion concerning their remediation work and the provision of medical and subsistence aid.  
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being made suggesting that Petroperu were making these verbal commitments to different people 
in an intimate manner to generate a web of falsehoods that would suppress any immediate 
community protest voice. Indeed, upon asking one fisherman why Cuninico hadn’t staged a strike 
over the pollution, their reply highlights the initial success Petroperu had in stifling voice.  
 
Because we thought that Petroperu was going to cooperate and keep their promises to us, 
because they told us “we’re going to help you with whatever you want, so don’t protest. 
We’re going to keep our word to you.” So, we waited. But then later, when we saw that 
they were resisting a bit, we called people in to help us …. that’s why we didn’t do anything 
earlier (IRC3). 
 
In other villages, this strategy of offering employment, small-scale development promises 
and money has been successful in keeping “everyone quiet” (NGO2R1b). A Catholic Church 
priest, whose parish covers communities in the Marañón Cuenca, provides an illustration of  
 
San José de Saramuro, [where] people value the possibility of having a job at the oil 
company [Oleoducto Norperuano Station 1], and that is above any other claim. When the 
spill in Cuninico took place, one week before that, there was a spill in San José de 
Saramuro. Does somebody know about [this spill]? No …. Why [do] people know about 
Cuninico? Well … because they requested our help ... but San José de Saramuro, which is 
also part of the parish … didn’t want anything (CBO4R3). 
 
Therefore, even in a community that had Catholic Church support, Petroperu could suppress their 
voice.226 
 
Why was Cuninico willing and able to remove the veil of fear and suppression caused by 
Petroperu? Arguably, it could perhaps be the failure of Petroperu to deliver their promises in a 
timely manner and subsequent refusal to provide help (IRC3). However, like Barrio Florido, 
individual figures played an important role in shaping Cuninico’s ongoing reaction to Petroperu’s 
initial suppressive strategy.  
 
Firstly, IRC3 who was “an organiser at the [Catholic] Church” (IRC3) had significant 
influence over the decision to contact the Catholic Church repeatedly for help (CBO4R3). IRC3’s 
                                                          
226 Equally, two interviewees recounted Pluspetrol’s efforts to secure private deals with communities (NCSSC2; 
NGO2R1a) to prevent them from trying to seek other forms of legal justice discussed in Section 8.3. 
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“pushing” along of these authorities “saying that, please they had to look at the situation with the 
spill in this community” (IRC3) was therefore instrumental. “We have to thank this guy, that he 
was an animator” (IRC29) of their Catholic Church-based alliance.  
 
Secondly, despite Petroperu’s efforts, one elderly resident concluded that “the Apu cannot 
sell himself”, not only because he had grown up in Cuninico but also because “[h]e’s very much a 
stand-up guy” (IRC9), a phrase taken to mean honourable, moral and principled. This was a leader 
who was willing to “[fight] for the people” (ibid.) and not be silenced through bribery or 
intimidation. Through his leadership and the community’s close Catholic Church connection, they 
almost completely unified and had the strength to seek out this actor’s support.227 As one fisherman 
remarked, “we didn’t want to be controlled by Petroperu. If we’d carried on working for them 
instead of looking for [pause] well, we wouldn’t have carried on with the suit [the legal case], 
nothing” (IRC6).  
 
Yet even with the involvement of the Catholic Church, Petroperu continued to try and 
maintain control over proceedings and limit the fall-out from the oil spill response. The company 
sought to secure private financial agreements with the families of the employed minors to make 
them “forget about [the] complaint”, an arrangement the mother was “very reluctant” to consent 
to due to the hurt caused to her son (IRC23). Other testimonies spoke of a “settlement” (IRC22; 
IRC23) or “liquidation” (IRC20) payment for the manual workers ranging from between 1,300 to 
1,700 soles (IRC20; IRC22), no doubt an effort to try and weaken the resolve of these workers to 
protest and continue their Catholic Church relationship.  
 
Petroperu also took steps to suppress knowledge about the full extent of the spill and their 
employment of indigenous people without protective clothing. Oil workers who brought their 
camera phones to the oil site had them confiscated (IRC13). 228  When government agency 
representatives (ANA, DIGESA, OEFA) or journalists arrived to document the spill, the oil 
workers in the clean-up of the dredged waterway were removed and hidden in the selva, being 
                                                          
227 IRC19 noted that only a handful (two to four) inhabitants who worked for Petroperu (in what capacity it isn’t clear) 
were reluctant to forge a Catholic Church connection for fear of what it might lead to.  
228 This was not altogether successful; IRC13 confirms that community members did take photos which were given 
to the Catholic Church. 
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allowed to return to work after the inspections had left (IRC11; IRC13; IRC20; IRC24; IRC25). 
In this way, they never saw “what we did, they never took pictures of us inside the canal as we 
used to work” without adequate protection and instead “would only see people from other areas 
with wheelbarrow[s] or doing maintenance” work (IRC13). 
 
Moreover, by stopping this cleaning work, Petroperu was able to “cheat” (IRC8) the 
inspection process by showing state representatives “that it was all clean” (IRC14) rather than land 
“full of ... oil” (IRC16).229 This was also achieved through the use of a chemical applied to the 
remediation site that sank the oil into the ground or to the bottom of water (CBO4R1a; IRC2; 
IRC8; IRC9; IRC13; IRC14; IRC16; IRC17; IRC19; IRC20) and by taking government 
representatives and journalists to areas “where there wasn’t any ... oil” (IRC19).230 
 
 Other oil workers employed in basic maintenance and clean-up duties were told “to 
continue our work” but denied the chance to speak to journalists (IRC14). The arrival of journalists 
saw “the ones that were too black” from the oil “given white overalls … boots … gloves … [and 
a] helmet” to change into “so they could say that’s how … we worked” (IRC25). Workers “listened 
to them for fear of getting fired” (IRC20). 
 
Petroperu also sought to subvert Cuninico’s workers’ voice. Under job loss threats 
(IRC17), a group of roughly ten workers were “prepared” (IRC14) by Petroperu for interviews 
with visiting government figures or journalists. They were instructed to say that “it’s clean” 
(IRC14), the spill was less severe than it was and that the workers were given protection (IRC16). 
Petroperu’s success here was dependent on how individual citizens responded to this situation. 
IRC16 didn’t want to be interviewed and instead left whilst others “came out against what we were 
supposed to communicate” (IRC20). However, a 60-year-old Cuninico man “scared” of the 
situation felt he faced a dilemma between depriving the people of work and selling himself but 
decided that “because of the needs of the people, I had to say that it wasn’t contaminated” (IRC9) 
                                                          
229 IRC13 travelled with Catholic Church representatives to show them areas where the oil had been buried. “[T]hey 
did wash the first layer but underneath it was dirty, and … I … took my spade … [and] dug and we could see how it 
was full of oil.” 
230 Incidentally, a similar strategy was utilised by Occidental Petroleum in their former operations by taking state 
representatives to collect samples from non-polluted locations (IUA1). 
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whilst IRC16 recalled that one interviewed lady was saying “everything in [Petroperu’s] favour” 
which was “to the contrary” and untrue. Petroperu staff sought to disseminate these accounts to 
journalists brought along by the company (ibid.).  
 
Overall, both communities show similar Petroperu efforts to subvert and stifle their voices. 
This can occur through dependency, which occurs in each pueblo in two different ways. For Barrio 
Florido, the state SCDV and disengagement runs alongside its Petroperu socio-economic 
dependency which the oil company utilises against the pueblo to suppress protest voices. In 
Cuninico’s case, their form of dependency came through their remediation jobs in exchange for 
their silence, maintained through veiled employment threats and promises of small-scale 
development gifts. With Catholic Church involvement, the REI went into damage limitation mode 
by trying to buy off labourers and subvert their voice to the government and media.  
 
However, the events in José de Saramuro make clear that this strategy is widespread. 
“When there’s a spill, that’s how Petroperu is. They go to the towns. They recruit everyone, the 
president, the Apu, the deputy, the authorities … [they] are [all] paid, and there’s nobody who 
speaks out” (IRC6). Local mayors who show an interest in REI operations would reach “an 
agreement” with them to not “stir up any trouble” in exchange for favours such as free river 
transport (CBO1R1) which can irrevocably damage local community trust for these authorities.231 
For selva oil-based communities, their weaker power, REI dependency and the latter’s economic 
voice suppression means that “you’re not gonna stand up against them …. Or … question them 
…” (NGO7R1).  
 
8.2 Fragmenting voice: divide and rule  
 
“[T]hey [REIs] try to separate … communities, they try to divide them” (OEFA 
representative NSI2R1). 
 
                                                          
231 One Cuninico housewife animatedly suggested that the (then) new local mayor’s lack of post-spill support was 
because “Petroperu [had] paid him”, which led to him “play[ing] dumb” and “stay[ing] mute” (IRC20). 
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Citizen voice suppression is not the only strategy applied by REIs. Indigenous federations, 
collective voice organisations which are present across the selva and wider Peru, are a fractured 
and divided force in Peruvian socio-political life. REIs have had a hand in this division. 
 
Within Loreto, there are four major indigenous organisations which span the cuencas. 
These are Cocama Conservation and Development Association San Pablo de Tipishca 
(ACODECOSPAT) in the Marañón Cuenca (which represent Cuninico), FECONAT in the Tigre 
Cuenca, Federation of Native Communities of Corrientes (FECONACO) in the Corrientes Cuenca 
and Indigenous Federation of Pastaza Quechua (FEDIQUEP) in the Pastaza Cuenca. Other 
indigenous organisations of various sizes bring the total number to 22 (CBO3R1), an indication of 
Loreto’s geographical size and the multitude of indigenous groups residing there. These are 
represented by ORPIO (Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the East) at a regional 
“second level to give a place for dialoguing with the Government … where the state can hear about 
the problems of … indigenous people” (CBO3R1). Alongside eight other regional federations, 
they are represented at a national level by Association Interethnic Development of the Peruvian 
Jungle (AIDESEP) (AIDESEP no date).  
 
The management of indigenous federations should offer advantages for Loreton indigenous 
citizens. This local network and their connection to larger regional and national organisations 
provides citizens with different levels of collective voice platforms from which to engage with and 
build and support dialogue with the government and REIs, e.g. monitoring remediation agreement 
implementation with the latter (CBO3R1). This is particularly useful in vertical voice dialogue 
with REIs, the stronger power of which vis-à-vis citizens can be rebalanced by a collective 
negotiating platform (NSI4R1). However, though this representative system should strengthen 
indigenous voice, it is fractured and divided at all spatial levels.  
 
At a local Loreton level, ProNaturaleza working in the Corrientes Cuenca recounted that 
“[t]here are two federations in the Corrientes – FECONACO, the oldest federation; and FEPIBAC 
[Federation of Indigenous People of the Lower and Upper Rio Corrientes]. There are communities 
where they are all FECONACO and they are all FEPIBAC” (NGO4R2b). This results in two 
representative Apus’, who divide the cuencas collective voice through needless distractive conflict, 
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meaning that “they tend to miss … opportunities to fight for their resources” (NGO4R2b) and 
rights.  
 
Another illustration can be seen from the establishment of Indigenous Amazonian States 
in Defence of their Territories (PUINAMUDT) in 2011 by nine indigenous Loreton federations 
(see Baker 2013-2014 p. 13; PUINAMUDT no date), a semi-regional organisation which 
conceivably weakened ORPIO’s collective voice. Similarly, at a national level, AIDESEP is also 
joined by a rival federation, The Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP) 
(Peru Ministerio de Cultura no date b), which includes numerous indigenous Amazonian groups 
(Forestry Legality Alliance no date). 
 
While both groups are critical of government land policies, CONAP favours a more 
accommodating approach since it holds that development is inevitable and communities 
should focus [on] getting a fair share of the benefits. On the other hand, any territorial 
encroachments at all are opposed by AIDESEP (Minorities at Risk 2003; see also Earle 
and Pratt 2009 pp. 18-19). 
 
Once again, as with the Loreton regional situation, these two national federations and their 
different visions prevent a more unified national voice from being established (NGO8R1).  
 
Yet, is it even possible to generate a unity of purpose and single, strong indigenous voice 
in Loreto and Peru? There are two key reasons why this is highly difficult. Firstly, whilst 
communities have Apus, they are still traditionally run through a clan and family-based approach 
(NGO7R1). This creates a far wider horizontal authority structure and can generate a greater 
variety of opinion. Leaders will almost inevitably create conflict with individuals, families, groups 
or whole communities somewhere at some stage for decisions they make. Indeed, one can also 
recall Hirschman’s (1981 p. 244) point on the “treachery of voice” evident in this collective voice 
scenario.232 There is thus a multiplicity of voices and opinions preventing the establishement of a 
strong unified indigenous voice. 
 
                                                          
232 See Chapter 2, Section 2.6. 
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Secondly and more specifically for Loreto, the Red Ambiental Loretana interviewee makes 
clear that there was never “a single voice or a collectivity” of voices sharing the same ideas and 
this is fundamentally to do with the evolution of Loreton oil development over time. Going back 
to the commencement of CBO1R1’s CBO, only Achuar and Kichwa communities living in the 
Corrientes and Tigre Cuencas were affected by oil development but other communities “really 
didn’t voice” (CBO1R1) as they were “asleep” and “didn’t anticipate that anything could happen” 
(FOPOW1) and lacked experience “of what contamination might be like” (CBO1R1). 
Consequently, the communities were at different stages in their relationship with REIs and 
therefore wanted different things; “one group [was] already working with the companies, others 
[were] complaining about what will happen, others now ready to talk to the company, it was a 
whole evolution so it’s never been a Loreton movement” (CBO1R1). 
 
In this climate, REIs have had a conceivably easier time fragmenting indigenous collective 
voice and numerous examples show them helping to create smaller, weaker and conflicting 
entities. Perenco’s Block 67 operations have seen the emergence of a new indigenous federation 
with links to the REI. A report by CooperAcción noted that Perenco’s actions (compensation 
payments to only a few communities) caused the division of FECONANCUA (Federation of 
Communities Natives of the Napo, Curaray and Arabela Rivers) into FECONAALCA (Federation 
of Native Communities of Alto Curaray and Arabela) (Claps 2013 p. 34). “It is enough that … an 
employee from an oil company says that a particular person received money for an organisation to 
divide or … weaken” (CBO4R3). 
  
Similarly, in Block 116 (Santiago Basin, Amazonas Region) operated by Canadian-
Columbian Pacific Rubiales and French Maurel et Prom, indigenous communities have been 
divided by the REI. ‘“Before the arrival of the companies we were united”, Shawit [a Shawit 
indigenous federation member] said. “We shared the same fight, but the company has created 
divisions”’ (Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times 2014). In relation to Pluspetrol’s former Block 
1AB operations, there was “an internal conflict … with the indigenous people because the 
company … started to split the organisations” via their payments to certain communities for the 
rights of way (CBO4R1a).  
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Other REI strategies include focusing their attentions onto federation leaders to subdue 
possible protest voice leaders. In one case, a federation leader was flown to Lima by Pluspetrol 
and “[o]offered everything …. beer, drugs and women”, with which they can then blackmail the 
leaders or continue providing if they like it (IJ1). Money is also offered: the former President of 
the Matsés indigenous people233 “took 10,000 soles from a company and completely changed his 
public position … from being sternly against … for three years and then … effectively supporting 
the company” (IJ1). At other times, gossip alluding to payments to leaders is generated, a tactic 
magnified due to the indigenous culture of mistrust (CBO4R3). Together, these methods help to 
alienate leaders from their citizens (IJ1) and subsequently weaken them as authoritative figures 
within these important collective voice movements.  
 
Overall, REIs have been able to utilise the fractured indigenous collective voice situation 
to their advantage. Their tactics have helped generate a more destabilised and less unified 
indigenous voice response to oil development as well as directly suppress any collective protest 
voice movements. While it is impossible to speculate on the direction that Peruvian indigenous 
politics will take, it is probable that division will remain a feature of the indigenous PEV landscape 
which in practice will see each people deal with REIs “to the best of their ability” (CBO1R1).  
 
8.3 CBO/NGO and asesora influences: The good, the bad and the ugly 
 
Interpreter: “Why do you think native communities go to strikes?” 
MRBF1: “They are being manipulated by more prepared people, like NGOs – they 
dominate that conversation.”  
 
Aside from REIs, there are other important collective voice actors (CBO/NGO) and individuals 
(asesoras or advisors) like anthropologists and lawyers, who have a significant influence on citizen 
voice, in this case helping to shape their government and REI access and the protest voice actions 
they choose to take. Two NGO interviewees sought to make their Loreton work vis-à-vis the 
government clear. The SPDA spokesperson noted that their NGO’s mission “isn’t to fulfil the 
state’s role” and instead seek to co-operate, advise and accompany the state in the fulfilment of 
various aims within environmental politics and law based themes (NGO5R1). Likewise, the NCI 
                                                          
233 An indigenous people split across the Brazil-Peru border. 
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interviewee stated explicitly that they “are not the state and by no means do we pretend to occupy 
their place. We work with the communities … but we try to do our activities together with those 
from the state …. so that … activities are led by [them]” (NGO6R1).  
 
However, as Chapter 6 has shown, there is state SCDV and disengagement which has 
allowed the establishment of an open space (NSI2R1) and “a gap that the state isn’t filling” 
(NGO6R1) that these other actors can operate and have a great deal of influence in (CBO3R1; 
NGO4R1). Their influence on citizens is not only high due to the SCDV but also because selva 
indigenous citizens are, in a general sense, unsure and conflicted about what they want from the 
SHDV (NGO2R1a; NSI2R1). This is primarily caused by low educational levels (NSI2R1; 
NSI5R1; RGR1), poor educational opportunities234 and weak indigenous capacities, “logistic[al], 
technical or scientific” (CBO3R1). This leaves them unable to formulate informed responses and 
open to possible manipulation by people “with more knowledge … [and] education” (NSI5R1). 
Consequently, hese external actors have an operating environment which allows them to impose 
their own individual selva visions on indigenous peoples (NGO7R1) which can have positive and 
more contentious impacts. 
 
Firstly, these groups provide many positive supportive mechanisms for citizens to voice. 
One of the most important was empowerment “so that they [indigenous peoples] can defend 
themselves” (NGO7R1) and this was most resolutely achieved through education (CBO4R3; 
NGO6R1; NGO7R1; NGO8R1), particularly through the knowledge about their hydrocarbon 
process rights. These sorts of activities are vital given that there has not been “too much care of 
the government to really … educate the … indigenous organisations” and “no methodologies 
provided by the government to explain to indigenous people about their rights” (NGO8R1). Whilst 
the Ministry of Culture and Vice Ministry of Interculturalism have been created, they are still 
relatively new (established in 2011), meaning that CBO and NGO actors will continue to play an 
important role in educating and supporting indigenous organisations (NGO8R1) in the years to 
come.  
                                                          
234 A 2014 study found that of the 179 adult inhabitants of ten remote pueblos ‘30.2 [per cent] (N=54) had not 
completed primary education, with 54.2 [per cent] (N=97) having completed primary education and no further 
education. Eight [per cent] (N=12) were illiterate and could not sign their name’ (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 181). 
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For instance, DAR work predominantly work with indigenous federations rather than at 
grassroots level and seek to improve the “capacities” of federation leaders in the Ucayali Province. 
They provide them with an understanding of “the legal framework for hydrocarbon activities”, the 
EIA process and their rights related to these procedures, achieved through a special methodology 
for indigenous people that utilises “[d]idactic materials” for them to understand (NGO8R1). 
 
Two other NGOs also focus on capacities but from a grassroots level. NCI “trains 
communities in their rights so that they know them …. [and] how they can … claim them” 
(NGO6R1). SPDA, which “has been working for almost 30 years in topics related to 
environmental politics, and environmental legislation within Peru”, is currently employed on the 
aforementioned “conservation for peace” (NGO5R1).235 By strengthening them in this way, “we 
expect to have an early warning protocol that will be managed by some of the communities’ leaders 
which will help with conflict management” (ibid.). As with DAR, some publications are “adjusted 
so that they can be interactive and good for communities” whilst “a team of professional 
communicators who specialise in trying … to identify the ways in which these communities can 
access information [has been established], so [that we can] reach people in the most appropriate 
ways” (ibid.). 
 
Similarly, the Catholic Church through the interviewed parish priest (CBO4R3) not only 
completed religious duties for over 60 communities in the Marañón Cuenca but also “put itself at 
the service of indigenous people who didn’t understand what was happening [to their 
environment].” To that end they focused on “preparing various leaders in different topics, one of 
them, indigenous rights” to improve indigenous federation internal knowledge (ibid.). Often these 
collective voiced-based actors are “just there to provide all that information that they have been 
missing for so much for so long” (NGO1R1). 
 
The educational provision that these organisations deliver includes supporting indigenous 
youth in higher education (NGO7R1). Crucially an effort is made not to “disconnect them from 
                                                          
235 See Chapter 6, Section 6.2. 
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their communities and federations” so that these pueblos will “have their own human resources” 
(NGO7R1) leading to an increased talent pool which strengthens their future capacities and voice.  
 
Aside from a focus on improving indigenous hydrocarbon rights and knowledge, practical 
educational or technical activities were also carried out. Two important aims were apparent. The 
most common was “vigilancia de la comunidad” (NGO8R1) or environmental monitoring which 
NGOs were involved with (CBO3R1) including several interviewed organisations (E-Tech 
International (NGO1R1); ProNaturaleza (NGO4R1-R2); DAR (NGO8R1)). This complements 
government-backed monitoring training sought out by some federations (NSI1R1a)236 but also 
helps to implement it in areas that still lack this mechanism (NGO1R1). ProNaturaleza has 
established environmental monitoring services in the Corrientes Cuenca for the last eight years 
which provides training and 
 
capability [through equipment including GPS and cameras] to the people in charge of 
monitoring the communities (elected by Assembly) … to be able to monitor … oil activity. 
The community monitoring programmes don’t replace [required company monitoring] but 
... complements it (NGO4R1). 
 
DAR was seeking to “improve their system of monitoring” by standardising the process 
across the various Regions (Amazonas, Loreto, Junin and Ucayali), invaluable work which will 
strengthen vital local civic-run dialogue and accountability mechansisms vis-à-vis REIs 
(NGO8R1).  
 
Secondly, the practical support that these institutions can provide is also incredibly useful 
for selva communities. Economic support is sometimes provided (CBO1R1) to improve 
community access but given their own Loreton operational costs (CBO3R1; NGO1R1; 
NGO6R1),237 it is probably minimal. Others (E-Tech International (NGO1R1); ProNaturaleza 
(NGO4R1-R2)) support selva pueblos through technical document production on a range of issues 
                                                          
236 In 2013, ANA was approached by FECONAT to provide environmental monitoring training for about 20 citizens 
who were taught how to use the GPS equipment (NSI1R1a). 
237 The E-Tech International interviewee recounted one instance where a single boat journey from Iquitos up the length 
of the Rio Pastaza cost $2,000 for the fuel (NGO1R1). Meanwhile, the Loreton indigenous federation ORPIO get to 
their representative indigenous communities “where we can, depending on the resources/possibilities …. as we aren’t 
the Government … we don’t have so much money, we can’t go that often” (CBO3R1). 
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surrounding hydrocarbon extraction (e.g. mercury levels in rivers) (NGO1R1) which can be used 
by the communities to “hand over to the government” (ibid.) and strengthen vocal dialogue with 
them. More basically, CBO/NGO groups can act as interpreters in asamblea meetings (CBO3R1; 
NGO1R1) and therefore support Vice Ministry of Interculturalism indigenous interpreters 
(CBO3R1). NGO actors can also review EIA proposals helping to improve the indigenous people’s 
language capacity and understanding of these complex procedures and documents (NGO1R1).238 
 
From a different angle, a former government employee with experience of the Prior 
Consultation process highlighted the difficulties of state and REI consultation with selva 
communities:  
 
[Indigenous people] … are given the … project …. who read nothing…. But obviously, 
the gravity … dimension … [and] the depth of the project … [means] they are incapable 
of understanding it. There is such a great gap in terms of the lack of comprehension and 
understanding, and the scope of the projects between these people here [state/REI] and 
these people here [indigenous citizens]. This is the problem (IUA1). 
 
This is particularly evident with “[o]il or mining companies [who] …. don’t have the most 
educational approach to inform communities about their activities …. [and] can use … technical 
words that people cannot relate [to]” (NGO5R1). Therefore, the verification of citizen 
comprehension of these processes (ibid.) and simplification of state and REI information that five 
interviewed NGOs provide (E-Tech International (NGO1R1); Earthwatch Institute (NGO3R1); 
ProNaturaleza (NGO4R2b); SPDA (NGO5R1); Alianza Arkana (NGO7R1)) is an invaluable 
activity.  
 
“When we have … a workshop with a community, we take [the] technical language and … 
put it into rural language” (NGO3R1). This often follows the official “technical … very dry … 
inaccessible … presentations with our own interpretations … present[ed] … in a way that can be 
understood by people in communities” (NGO1R1) including through the use of pictures and the 
provision of hard copies (NGO4R2b).239 Although the anthropologist at the Research Institute of 
                                                          
238 Despite Quechua being an official language in Peru (MRG 2016 p. 111), Spanish ‘is the language of commerce, 
education, and government’ (Cultural Survival no date). 
239 IUA1 stated that the state will simplify hydrocarbon activity information through “drawings, and schemes to make 
them understand” intercultural approaches which the state is trying to take into consideration (NGO5R1). However, 
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the Peruvian Amazon believes that “you cannot bridge this gap [between the state/REIs and 
indigenous people] with a workshop, or five workshops or a public audience” (IUA1), simplifying 
the information is extremely useful. “[W]hen you have something clear and simple and non-
controversial, everyone reacts to it very well, even the people who are … aligned with the oil 
company” (NGO1R1).240  
 
For these actions to prove beneficial, there needs to be a strong degree of community trust 
in these actors, otherwise they will not believe the simplified information (NGO7R1), an issue 
which limits state/REI ability to do this given the levels of indigenous mistrust. Interviewed NGOs 
overcome this by working with the “permission of the people” (NGO1R1) or those that seek them 
out for their expertise and support for grassroots initiatives (NGO1R1; NGO5R1; NGO6R1) whilst 
long term-relationships and/or frequent contact by the same staff (NGO1R1; NGO4R1; NGO5R1; 
NGO6R1) are key.241 Moreover, their efforts to make clear to communities “that they have the 
ability [and] brains to make their own decisions” (NGO1R1) build up this trust. 
 
These actors can also act as an accountability check for selva communities who are 
“concerned they are going to be fed nonsense” by the REIs or MIEM (ibid.). “[S]o when somebody 
from the oil company pipes up and says something completely ridiculous and technically 
unfeasible they [indigenous people] might not necessarily recognise it and so that’s why they want 
us there, to call them out on their nonsense” (ibid.). The Peru Mission spokesperson believed that 
the Palmas del Espino EIA in Maniti (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2) saw the local people given 
“inaccurate … false … [and] cobbled together” information (NGO2R1c). 242  Without the 
involvement of external actors, the state and REIs can falsify the information presented to citizens.  
 
                                                          
as the statement by the E-Tech International interviewee (NGO1R1) above shows, it is not always the case and 
“[d]epends a lot on the individual person [in government]” (NGO3R1). 
240 There are of course limits; “some issues, seismic for example – it’s very technical. And it seems like they [the state 
or REIs] didn’t find a way to make it in a simpler language” (NGO4R2b). 
241 In ProNaturaleza’s case, staff have “a 20/10 regime – 20 days in the field, ten days here [Iquitos]” (NGO4R2) 
whilst NCI staff live and work permanently in their respective locations (NGO6R1). SPDA staff travel to the 
communities each month and aside from their regional office now have one located in Alto Nanay District to provide 
easier follow-up access to local projects (NGO5R1). 
242 The citizens, many of whom “could barely read and write were laughing” at the presented information (NGO2R1c).  
 
 
270 
 
Lastly, some actors will seek “strategic alliances” (NGO5R1) from other organisations in 
the local, national or international arenas to promote local level human-rights or environmental 
issues (CBO3R1; CBO4R3; NGO5R1; NGO7R1). Alianza Arkana has worked with international 
partners including the press and film makers, one of whom produced a film (Pastaza) which 
explores indigenous peoples struggle over contamination and their search for justice (NGO7R1; 
see Chaikuni Institute and Alianza Arkana 2014). For Cuninico, the Catholic Church leaders sent 
journalists to document the spill (IRC7; CBO4R3) and increase public awareness of the event.  
 
From these sections, how much impact are these actors and their “social processes” 
(NGO7R1) having? Though some felt that they “can’t really measure what you’re doing” (ibid.), 
others expressed noticeable improvements. For DAR, “we see the changes. For example, in the 
[Ucayali] leadership …. there is a leader ….  now … very recognised in [hydrocarbon issues. We] 
see how … in three years [they know] how to make the letters to the government asking for their 
rights” (NGO8R1). Similarly, the DDP spokesperson who has had experience of the hydrocarbon 
industry and state dialogue processes evaluated that in seven years of Loreton employment “I have 
seen some evolution – there is more awareness … [and] empowerment for indigenous people. 
They know they have their rights and nobody can ignore them without being punished” (NSI4R1). 
 
The root of these positive changes is built both on the SCDV creating operational room for 
these actors and on a constructive relationship where the citizens and these actors share a similar 
agenda and vision. Problems arise when these do not align or when these actors impose their own 
selva visions on indigenous citizens (NGO7R1). For example, a ProNaturaleza interviewee 
acknowledged that in its  
 
conservation work and services [the establishment of environmental monitoring and the 
running of REI CSR projects], we have had some rejection [from indigenous communities]. 
Because when you go into a conservation project, they feel like you’re there to impose 
something to them or to restrict them (NGO4R1). 
 
Consequently, one finds that these visions are dependent on their “different intentions” (NSI2R1), 
focuses (NGO7R1), agendas (NGO2R1b; NGO3R1) and interests (CBO4R3; NSI4R1) which 
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have a significant impact on their representation of citizen voice, and their guidance over voice 
protest actions communities and their CBOs should use. 
 
Fundamentally, it can weaken and divide CBO voices like indigenous federations. For 
instance, Alianza Arkana, who has worked closely with PUINAMUDT, concluded that it was 
“falling apart” and had a false unity projected towards “the outside world” (NGO7R1). Two or 
three communities in FEDIQUEP (member of PUINAMUDT) no longer wished to participate 
“with [this federation] in the consulta previa” for Block 192 and were angry that the FEDIQUEP 
leader had signed the Historic Act (ibid.) on their behalf. Similarly, FECONACO (another 
PUINAMUDT member) signed the Historic Act while “one of their communities was having a 
30-day protest. So, they just ignored their community” (ibid.).   
 
Several points can be concluded from this. Firstly, the failure by federation leaders to 
communicate effectively with their cuenca pueblos about the stance taken regarding major events 
can lead to division and disunity within these organisations (ILP1; NGO2R1c; NGO7R1). At the 
same time, individual leaders will formulate their own opinion on issues which aren’t always 
shared by everyone at the grassroots level. So, whilst federations can achieve success (e.g. helping 
to pressure Pluspetrol into using reinjection technology) (NGO1R1), “these federations aren’t 
really [representative of] what’s going on in the communities” and this can lead to disconnection 
between local citizen/community voices and their federation leaders (NGO7R1). This is evidence 
of the argument that citizens risk “dispossession” of their voice when it occurs collectively through 
a spokersperson (Bourdieu 1986 pp. 301-302). 
 
The “differences in vision” (ibid/) can impact upon these actors’ efforts at working 
together. For instance, the Alianza Arkana interviewee found their Multi-sectoral Commission 
experience to be “a mess. It was just like chaos” partly due to asesoras involvement whose role 
was undefined (despite them being the most influential figures for the Apus) and led to confusion 
over what the other actors could contribute (NGO7R1). Meanwhile, in the Catholic Church’s 
experience, “Greenpeace never wanted to help” support their environmental and indigenous rights 
campaign as “it was not a priority for them” (CBO4R3). 
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The differences in vision can also mean that these collective voice actors have a great deal 
of influence over the type of citizen protest voice actions chosen and what their actions hope to 
achieve. Three examples illustrate this; private deals between community’s and/or their federations 
and REIs, radical voice and the search for legal justice.  
 
In an interview with the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator, they felt some 
indigenous advisors were “not so good” owing to their misguided advice (CBO4R1). Two 
interviewees (IJ1; NGO7R1) mention two NGOs (ProNaturaleza and SPDA) whose 
representatives were interviewed for this research (NGO4R1-R2 from ProNaturaleza and 
NGO5R1 from SPDA) which were described as “corporate … environmental organisation[s]” 
(IJ1) that “work together with the [companies and] …. have, other kind of ethics” (NGO7R1). “I 
wouldn’t touch them with a barge pole” (IJ1). To understand where these negative views stem 
from, one must explore the private negotiated settlements between indigenous 
communities/federations and REIs.  
 
The Alianza Arkana interviewee (NGO7R1) did not believe that these private deals should 
occur, yet other asesoras do advise this rather than legal action (NSI2R1; RGR1), a tactic which 
helps to exacerbate community division already occurring due to the lure of REI money 
(NGO4R2b).243 The difficulty is that whilst communities “deserve this compensation” for socio-
environmental damages, “the right way” (for some, not others) is through legal justice (NSI2R1). 
However, at the same time, Cuninico’s Catholic Church priest argued that 
 
[p]eople need money. Those are places [the selva] where money does not flow … then, the 
possibility of an oil company is the possibility of money flowing and people want that …. 
and we would be naive if we said that they don’t look for money .... You can’t live isolated 
[lives], saying, well, I don’t belong in the world … they realise it is poisoned money … 
but they need [it] (CBO4R3). 
 
                                                          
243 A recent illustration can be seen with Occidental Petroleum’s 30-year period of oil extraction operations in the 
Corrientes Cuenca and the resulting socio-environmental impacts on nearby Achuar residents (see Goldman, López 
and Ramos 2007).  In 2007, a legal case (Maynas Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum) was started on the behalf of 25 
indigenous plaintiffs by Amazon Watch and Earth Rights International in the Los Angeles U.S. Federal Court. 
Ultimately however, the case never came to trial as the parties reached a confidential mutual settlement in September 
2013, only publicly announcing it in March 2015 (Cultural Survival 2015b; Earth Rights International 2015).  
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Consequently, whilst some international NGOs such as Cultural Survival view successful cases 
like the Achuar – Occidental settlement (see Footnote 243) as ‘an inspiration to all Indigenous 
people seeking to defend their rights and territories’ (Cultural Survival 2015b), others label them 
as “desperate acts” (NSI2R1). This is caused by poor advice, some of which reflects the close 
relationships that some collective voice actors have to the hydrocarbon industry (e.g. 
ProNaturaleza) or their perceived view on justice.  
 
The use of radical voice is interesting. Though none of the interviewed institutions 
supported indigenous radical voice in the present day (NGO6R1; NGO7R1; NGO8R1), and in 
SPDA’s case attempted to avoid it (NGO5R1), Catholic Church priest interviewee CBO4R3 spoke 
of their backing of it in previous decades, primarily driven by the lack of wider national attention 
to or support for Loreton environmental problems. In CBO4R3’s case, the Catholic Church has 
been encouraging “the environmental topic” in the Marañón Cuenca for 20 years, “well ahead” of 
wider society who didn’t give it importance. Faced with this national environment, they 
encouraged the communities “[t]o keep protesting, to organise themselves, to look for external 
support [and] to claim their rights” taking part directly in these actions (CBO4R3).244 
 
With “a little bit of environmental concern” growing in the country (CBO4R3), a greater 
number of NGO’s involved on the ground (CBO1R1) and an increase in media environmental 
reporting (ILP1245; NGO2R1b) “our voice now … doesn’t have to be a protest” (CBO1R1). 
Instead, interviews with these actors indicate growth for pursuing “passive” and “proactive” legal 
support roles with selva communities and federations.  
 
NGO8R1 does not support (via advice or money) any illegal actions or support or pursue 
litigation cases. Instead, through passive legal support, they offer citizens advice in report 
preparation “according to the national legal framework” and check completed documentation, vital 
work due to the “gap” that exists for communities to access and afford legal justice (NGO8R1). In 
Alianza Arkana’s case, however, they take a proactive stance by working with other NGO’s to 
                                                          
244 As the interviewee noted “[y]ou can’t go to a community and tell them, you go protest and keep yourself behind” 
(CBO4R3). 
245 “I need to say there’s a radio “Voz de la selva” and they [indigenous people] can be heard with that” (ILP1). 
 
 
274 
 
initiate legal action against REIs (NGO7R1). Whilst they acknowledged that protests allow 
pressure to be put onto REIs, it’s “not responsible” to advise communities or federations to do this 
and instead believe advisors should suggest other mechanisms like legal action and campaigning 
(ibid.). 
 
For the Catholic Church, support and solidarity with communities for radical action can still be 
found, an indication of the civil community role which Catholic Church layman have and their 
long-running environmental campaigning. However, this would only appear to be for non-violent, 
legal demonstrations such as the 2014 Cocama 3-day “walk of sacrifice” (from the selva 
communities to Nauta by boat and then walking from Nauta to Iquitos) which the Catholic Church 
accompanied them on, provided basic provisions and held a religious service for (CBO4R1a). 
More importantly, the Catholic Church has now established the Comisión de Justicia y Paz - 
Derechos Humanos del Vicariato de Iquitos (Commission for Justice and Peace - Human Rights 
of the Vicariate of Iquitos) to provide legal support to “people or organisation[s] that feel 
vulnerable and don’t have a legal advisor” (CBO4R1a) and lack access to the legal system (IRC13) 
and were in 2015 supporting three claims (CBO4R2). Whilst Cuninico’s church leaders have 
played a part in supporting more radical indigenous voice actions, their pursuit of legal justice 
through this human-rights commission can be seen after the Cuninico oil spill.  
 
Given that CBO4R3 and their colleagues have been defending indigenous and 
environmental rights over the last 20 years, it is no surprise to find that post-spill, several residents 
(notably IRC6) contacted the Catholic Church who, after “wait[ing] some days to see if they’re 
serious or … simply want[ed] to negotiate [a private deal] with the oil company” (CBO4R3) 
became actively involved in Cuninico’s plight.  
 
The Catholic Church had an immediate positive impact. Upon arrival, they “wanted to 
stop these private meetings [with the IEVAs and] bring them out into the open” (IRC7) and prevent 
the town being bought (IRC24). The Catholic Church also encouraged Cuninico to “band together” 
with ACODECOSPAT, thereby further strengthening their collective voice and drawing in other 
actors that sought to help solve the environmental problem (CBO4R3).  
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The Catholic Church’s educational role combined with their legal support paid dividends 
in crucial events. At the final asamblea between Cuninico and Petroperu in December 2014, the 
engineer in charge “wanted us to sign something stating that we were pleased to let them leave 
like this” (IRC13), presumably legitimising the absence of promised development projects and/or 
ongoing provisions. However, the community “didn’t want to sign anything because we knew well 
that it was going to play against us” (ibid.). When residents subsequently locked the engineer in 
the Apu’s house (IRC13; IRC22; IRC23) and planned to “confiscate valuable things that they had 
here” until they resolved these issues, a telephone consultation between the Apu and the Catholic 
Church made clear to the pueblo that they couldn’t pressure Petroperu in this way “because they 
would say that we were threatening them” (IRC13), circumstances which would damage the 
Catholic Church’s legal case. 
 
Their role in Cuninico’s decision to pursue legal action was vital but it is interesting to 
explore how this option was reached. The “push” or “initiative” for this was theirs (the Catholic 
Church) without whom the pueblo “couldn’t have done it” (IRC19). However, in instances where 
there could be division in a community’s response, the Catholic Church “try and listen to” the 
various arguments and opinions of the whole community (i.e. wide participation) (Farrington et 
al. 1993) after which they attempt to reach a “consensus” (CBO4R1a). Efforts are made to make 
this a unified (100 per cent) consensus as its important “[t]hey … feel that what they get is for 
everyone’s benefit” (ibid.) but if there are any people not in favour of an agreed action, they retire 
from the process (NGO2R1 in CBO4R1-R2 interview; CBO4R1a). “Until now, we haven’t seen 
any disagreement or disunion” and this is because the Catholic Church doesn’t “do something they 
don’t want to do” (CBO4R1a). Testimonies (IRC6; IRC7) provide evidence of the Catholic Church 
talking to residents about the spill in a simple, clear way, whilst their provision of written 
information showing Petroperu’s lack of compliance with Peruvian laws (IRC9) and long-term 
education and training allowed residents “to be informed” (IRC6) and make a choice they more 
fully understood. Indeed, Cuninico interviewees “notic[ed] that it’s our right[s]” that were affected 
by the spill and were willing “to fight until we get it [justice]” (IRC18) by being “on the right path” 
(IRC6) showing that despite lacking the finances or tools necessary to pursue legal action, citizens 
understood why they could and should do so through the Catholic Church and were united in doing 
so (IRC8; IRC13). Once legal action was decided, several Catholic Church workshops were held 
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with Cuninico inhabitants so that community testimonies could be “translated … [into] a more 
legal language” (CBO4R1a). This is an example of an “invited dialogue space” in which 
‘opportunities to participate are made available’ to community members (p. 275; see also Cornwall 
2000) who regard participation ‘as a means to gain access to benefits or to improve their own 
access to services’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 275) both clearly evident in this case. 
 
It’s unsurprising to find that residents felt grateful and trustful of the Catholic Church 
(IRC6; IRC11; IRC13; IRC16; IRC20; IRC23), feelings not only reflecting their legal assistance 
and its co-ordinated (IRC1), inclusive (CBO4R1a) and proactive246 approach but also because they 
received more support from them “than the officials [the government], when this spill happened” 
(IRC8). “[T]he church is the only one, our only support … that would defend us” (IRC13) and so 
far, has been successful in doing so.  
 
The Catholic Church, along with its partner organisations (the Instituto de Defensa Legal 
(Institute of Legal Defence, IDL) and the Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the 
Northern Amazon of Peru (ORPIAN)) and Cuninico, formally requested a public hearing (the 158th 
Period of Sessions) at the IACHR. This was held on the 9th June 2016 in Santiago, Chile, attended 
by a Peruvian state delegation comprising representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Foreign 
Ministry and Petroperu’s Chairman. Here testimony from two Cuninico citizens (whose travel 
costs were funded by the Catholic Church and its partners) saw Petroperu for the first time admit 
responsibility for the oil spills which have affected communities like Cuninico (Peru Support 
Group 2016a; Varela 2016).   
 
Though the Catholic Church and its partners welcomed Petroperu’s public admission of 
guilt and the government’s invitation to the IACHR to visit the affected sites (which it accepted), 
these vocal commitments need to be followed up with concrete measures to ensure these 
communities have a safe future (Peru Support Group 2016a; Varela 2016). 247  Crucially, 
‘indigenous organisations have succeeded in placing the issues of systematic oil spillages on the 
                                                          
246  Residents are kept regularly updated about the legal case (IRC4; IRC8; IRC19) through the Apu who is 
“call[ed]…every week” and subsequently updates Cuninico (IRC13). Similarly, Catholic Church representatives visit 
the pueblo every fortnight each month (IRC11). 
247 See Peru Support Group (2016a) for the commitment list.  
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agenda of the IACHR’ (Varela 2016) and this has been able to occur through the Catholic Church 
and its partners’ support and access. 
 
Overall, one can see the positive Catholic Church role for Cuninico, helping to support and 
open voice opportunities that wouldn’t have been accessible to them. This was achieved through 
the creation of an invited dialogue space (Cornwall 2000; 2008) and a form of participation that 
combined elements of interactive and consultative participation. Interactive participation 
comprised interactive and structured learning processes and educational outcomes and consultative 
participation included local residents’ participation through consultation and information 
gathering sessions for the latter (Pretty 1995). One can also see that a wide and deep approach was 
taken to participation (Farrington et al. 1993). By doing so, this institution made participation a 
positive and slightly more equitable process, which helped lead to an optimum participation level 
(Cornwall 2008 p. 276) where citizen voice was significantly strengthened.   
 
As with any counterfactual situation, it is pure conjecture to summarise how Cuninico 
would have responded after the spill without the Catholic Church’s involvement. In terms of 
radical voice action, no testimonies mention this post-spill, possibly because Cocama indigenous 
people are “not as aggressive … or violent” (NGO3R1) as other indigenous groups. In relation to 
legal action, one resident stated that the pueblo had “the same idea [as CBO4R1] … but we needed 
people that supported us” (IRC8) as they had residents (IRC15; IRC23) and “authorities here [who] 
don’t have any knowledge” (IRC19) for legal action and wouldn’t have known “[w]hat to do [or] 
how to defend ourselves” (IRC23). “It can’t be said, but I suspect that without the [Catholic] 
Church’s action nothing would have happened …. It’s just that ... who do they go to? You have to 
know people to ask for help, so, who do they go to?” (CBO4R3). “Really, we would have been 
[an] … abandoned” (IRC6), “forgotten town” (IRC13). 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
 
“[I]f it wasn’t for the international cooperation the situation of the communities would be 
really bad, because the Government isn’t interested” (ORPIO interviewee CBO3R1). 
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Overall, what does this chapter show us? Firstly, the state’s SCDV and the important socio-
economic development offered by Petroperu has created a dependency culture evident within 
Barrio Florido’s permanent relationship and Cuninico’s short-term remediation work. These 
circumstances have enabled the company to create a climate of fear that sought deliberately to 
suppress citizen protest voice over Petroperu’s contamination events but also other issues such as 
working conditions and electricity provision. San José de Saramuro highlights that these are not 
unique scenarios but appear to be part of a wider stance taken by them and other Loreton REIs.  
 
The suppression of citizen voice also extends into their fragmentation of indigenous 
federations and their efforts to compromise its leaders (thereby undermining their credibility and 
authority) so that a stronger collective voice cannot occur so easily. Interestingly, an interviewed 
Loreton Regional Councillor stated that voice fragmentation was also used by the state concerning 
agreement for forthcoming oil projects and Prior Consultation engagements:  
 
The Peruvian government has generated a division among native organisations, generating 
federations and other organisations inside [indigenous federations]. It seems like they have 
a shared agreement [between the state and these new generated federations] but that is not 
necessarily true. They divide the [indigenous] social groups [creating new pro-
development groups] and that gives the impression they have an agreement [for the 
development] (RGR2).   
 
Although the interviewee provides no evidence for this claim, it nevertheless indicates that some 
Peruvians believe that the state is willing to subvert its own consultation and dialogue mechanisms 
in order to achieve the SHDV. This is further compounded by the horizontal authority structures 
within indigenous communities and the diverse community opinions based upon their different 
experiences of REI projects. There is a genuine sense then that indigenous collective responses to 
oil development run by strong, trusted (and therefore credible) authoritative figures can remain 
difficult to achieve in Loreto. The PPEDC legal representative thoughtfully compared Peru’s 
environmental politics to Brazil’s and felt that a crucial difference was that the latter had “a hero 
…. Chico Mendez …. [who] was someone representing something but in Peru we haven’t had 
that, if there was a Chico Mendez in Peru, there would be an environmental revolution” (NSI5R1). 
In this sense, the fragmentation of collective citizen voice has been successful.  
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Secondly, the state’s SCDV has been filled by a “whole spectrum” (IJ1) of NGOs and other 
actors who provide a plethora of educational and practical supportive measures to strengthen 
indigenous voice and knowledge of their rights (NSI4R1). The relationships built by some of these 
actors are achieved on a platform of patience and a willingness to listen (CBO4R1a), long-term, 
frequent, integrated engagement by staff to build up trust (CBO4R1a; NGO1R1; NGO4R1; 
NGO6R1), and an alignment of their vision and agenda. “We’re not just [going] come into a place 
because we think we should be there” (NGO1R1).  
 
Some communities like Barrio Florido, do not have any relationship with these actors, 
narrowing their voice and constricting them to community-based actions. Other communities are 
in a similar position, partly due to the impact of travel distance, cost, time and agendas of exterior 
actors,248 meaning that, alongside the absence of their own internal professional citizens, they 
remain “completely abandoned” (CBO3R1) and consequently unable to “legally claim” (RGR2) 
their rights. At the same time, other pueblos may have a relationship or contact with one or more 
of these actors. As the Catholic Prish priest for Cuninico notes, 
 
[i]n this area [the Marañón Cuenca], there are not isolated indigenous, they … have contact 
with western society … [but], it depends, people can have contact with the government but 
not with the [Catholic] Church, or with the Pentecostal Church but not with the Catholic. 
Each one decides what they want (CBO4R3).  
 
Thus, each selva community will have a unique relationship with these CBOs, NGOs and 
asesora’s based upon the latter’s topics or agendas (NGO8R1) which will shape citizen access, 
strength of voice, actions taken and the type of voice or participatory relationship sought.  
 
 However, the problem is that this cannot entirely fill the SCDV. For example, the NGO 
environmental monitoring programmes are very important mechanisms enabling people to voice. 
In ProNaturaleza’s case, they provide “more specialised access to” REIs by acting as an 
                                                          
248 CBO4R3 and a colleague’s Catholic Church work encompasses over 60 communities in the Marañón Cuenca, 
which meant that distance and time were their biggest issues. ORPIO’s indigenous federation was in a similar position; 
of the 300 represented communities, they lacked adequate access to an estimated 50 due to the distance and costs of 
reaching them (CBO3R1). CBO3R1 also noted that the Urarina people living along the Rio Chambira (Alto Nanay 
District, Maynas Province) do not have any NGOs working with them (possibly because no NGO mission or agenda 
has taken them there) which has left the local people highly isolated. 
 
 
280 
 
intermediary for this work through frequent (three monthly) REI contact and the production of 
reports based on the local situation (NGO4R2b). Their system also provides a boost for local 
access; citizens can deliver environmental reports to their regional office in Trompeteros and there 
“ask for coupons … for river or air access” (NGO4R2a) to improve their own acessibility to voice. 
Whilst this is a constructive system, it only occurs in the Corrientes Cuenca through 16 monitors 
observing different areas (NGO4R2b), reinforcing how different accessibility can be for selva 
communities and why CBO/NGO actors cannot entirely fill the SCDV. 
 
Thirdly, whilst indigenous people and their federations have “powerful people around” 
(NGO3R1), this is no guarantee that citizens’ voice will be strengthened or their objectives 
achieved. This is noticeable when these actors choose to impose their own selva visions on 
indigenous people unilaterally (NGO7R1) or there is conflict over their voice action aims. Equally, 
REIs also have huge power and influence over citizen voice and can prevent citizens from voicing. 
Indeed, José de Saramuro shows that this power and influence over citizen voice can supersede 
the power and influence of other CBO/NGO actors (NSI7R1) like the Catholic Church. 
 
Lastly, what of radical voice action? Why is it taken? There is no single answer to this but 
instead multiple interlinked reasons within the Loreton PEV. These include conflicted indigenous 
responses to the SHDV caused through their own poor educational levels and absence of 
professional capacities and the influence of collective voice and asesora actors on this action. 
However, an indigenous federation leader also made clear that radical voice is taken because “[w]e 
see that the government treats indigenous people differently” through their lack of compliance to 
remediation work (CBO3R1). The latter’s “extreme” (CBO3R1) “non-conformity” (NSI7R1) are 
a crucial mechanism to protect, defend and claim their rights (CBO3R1), particularly in the light 
of the state SHDV and SCDV and widespread discrimination. The ORPIO representative made 
clear that “these extreme measures … [would] decrease when the government starts demonstrating 
… interest, respect and compliance” (CBO3R1). Sadly, but rather predictably, the government 
labels radical voice as the work of “intransigents, even terrorists [with an] extremist ideology” 
(ibid.), thereby widening the gulf between state and indigenous citizens and reinforcing the need 
for radical voice action to be taken.   
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Chapter 9 Trying to be heard: voice, oil spills and justice  
 
 “And where is the justice? We talk so much about justice, no? But there isn’t any” 
(MRBF26). 
 
The previous four chapters have charted Loreton stakeholders’ PEV by focusing on the 
experiences of Barrio Florido and Cuninico and their state, Petroperu and collective-voice-based 
group relationships. An exploration of collective-voice actors own PEV surrounding the state and 
Petroperu has also been undertaken. This study was conducted to evaluate the extent to which 
Peruvian Loreton stakeholders can voice effectively and hold REIs, specifically Petroperu, 
accountable for environmental issues by analysing a range of political (power), social (position in 
society), economic (financial means) and access-based (geographical remoteness from key 
decision-making mechanisms, lack of ICT access) issues. The first six sections (9.1-9.6) 
summarise each research sub-questions’ findings which leads into a summary for the overarching 
research question (Section 9.7). This is followed by an evaluation of PEV and wider 
methodological processes (Section 9.8), self-reflection on this thesis’s outcomes (Section 9.9) and 
lastly prospective future research (Section 9.10).  
 
9.1 What is Peru’s national political environment’s freedom of voice level for 
stakeholders i.e. permissible level of voice? Are stakeholders constrained in any way 
by Peruvian laws or consultative (or lack thereof) mechanisms? 
 
From a national state perspective, Peru’s freedom of voice has improved but remains weak. 
Scrutinising the country’s entire post-1821 political history, one must acknowledge that it has 
undergone a positive transformation. Its tumultuous political history, seen through numerous 
short-lived governments and shaped predominantly by the military in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries gave way to a 2001 democratic transition which has been consolidated by 
successive free and fair elections. These political freedoms are an integral part of the country’s 
most recent constitution (1993, revised 2009) which sets out, in detail, individual and collective 
citizen rights to freedom of speech and expression and the defence of their health, family and 
community environment. This situation is a far cry from the regressive policies visible in Peru’s 
history e.g. the November 1895 reform of the 1860 constitution which disenfranchised non-literate 
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citizens that was subsequently reaffirmed in the 1920 and 1933 constitutions and the absence of 
universal female suffrage until 1955 (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 110; Acuña 2015 p. 3).  
 
Despite these advancements, BTI, EIU and World Bank governance indicators and 
interviewees make clear that Peru’s democracy remains flawed, particularly surrounding the scope 
and scale of civil liberties and their practical governance application by the state. Crucially, these 
two factors are seen clearly in relation to the national PEV environment for hydrocarbon and wider 
national development projects. In this context, a far more dangerous, inflexible and intolerant PEV 
environment for stakeholders is visible.  
 
As Chapter Three outlined, oil has long played a vital role in Peru’s economic policies. As 
growing domestic demand outstripped north-west oilfield production, successive Twentieth 
Century governments attempted to increase the scale of selva oilfield exploration and exploitation, 
a resource drive that typifies LIEO neoliberal policies. In contemporary Peru, this has culminated 
in the state’s constitutionally enshrined ownership of natural resources (via the 1993 constitution) 
and its ability to exploit them on protective reserves for people in voluntary isolation if deemed to 
be in the public interest (2006 Law for the Protection of Isolated Peoples in Voluntary Isolation, 
Law 28736). These statutes have helped to usher in a second hydrocarbon exploration boom that 
covers large swathes of the selva and significantly, a high number of territorial reserves for people 
in voluntary isolation. Consequently, though indigenous people have acquired universal electoral 
suffrage, the territorial rights and protection afforded to these and other citizens are wholly 
superseded by the state’s subsoil natural resource ownership allowing it to maintain its dominion 
over the way citizens’ land can be used and by whom.  
 
Yet this state natural resource ownership and second hydrocarbon boom are symptoms of 
a far larger plan for the selva, categorised as a SHDV. The Camisea Gas pipeline extension, 
Amazon Waterway project, possible Rio Marañón dam construction and the Myobamba-Iquitos 
electricity concession symbolise the state’s wider Loreton (non-societal-based) development drive. 
This represents an effort to overcome a geographical and perceived societal (i.e. indigenous) 
barrier to the region’s and wider country’s progress, the dominance of certain state actors 
(MINEM, Perupetro, Petroperu) and private interests (CONFIEP) and the weakness of others 
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(MINAM, OEFA). The fulfilment of this vision by the state fundamentally alters the PEV 
environment for stakeholders.  
 
A raft of laws, outlined in Chapter 5, Section 5.1, reflects the state’s militaristic approach 
to civil protest, particularly surrounding hydrocarbon issues. The inability to organise horizontal 
voice-based movements so freely is a huge issue for citizens as these are a necessary precondition 
for vertical voice dialogue (O’Donnell 1986 p. 251; Ravnborg and Gomez 2014 p. 73).  
Suppression rather than dialogue appears to be the mantra for Peruvian government responses to 
resource extraction unrest, as exemplified by the 2009 Andoas and 2015 Tia Maria and Las 
Bambas copper mine protests. Further evidence for this can be seen in the direct targeting (through 
death threats, smear campaigns, physical attacks and even killings) of environmental and human 
rights defenders seeking to defend citizens from extractive projects. The experiences of my 
interviewee CBO1R1 and Gregoria Santos are two examples that should not be regarded as 
isolated incidents but rather an indication of a wider government strategy to delegitimise these 
actors in the eyes of society due to the threat they pose to the implementation of the SHDV and 
wider neoliberal extraction policies and investment. It is, in effect, Peru’s own ‘green backlash’ 
(Rowell 1996). 
 
Unsurprisingly, it also has repercussions on the ability of environmental and human-rights 
collective voice-based stakeholders to access the government, especially key proponents of the 
SHDV (e.g. GOREL, MINEM), or specific government mechanisms (e.g. development round-
table discussions). These groups can be impeded by bureaucracy and the unwillingness of state 
representatives to forge alliances with these knowledgeable stakeholders. Indeed, their experience, 
local knowledge and technical expertise can mean that their scrutiny-based voices, which pose a 
potential threat to the state, are sidelined wherever possible. This, though, does not encompass the 
whole state apparatus; one NGO (E-Tech International, NGO1R1) had productive and positive 
relationships with some state actors (MINAM and OEFA), which, given their rationale, were 
happy to gain constructive advice on their technical work. At the same time, other NGOs, with 
work focused on (environmental) law and conservation and natural resource management, had 
very productive relationships with the state, especially GOREL, where lack of professional 
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competency (caused by contractual amiguismo work procurement) necessitated this help. 
Crucially however, these supportive voices enhanced rather than conflicted with the state’s SHDV. 
 
For citizens affected by hydrocarbon development, their ‘opportunity’ (Tilly 1978 p. 55) 
to voice is curtailed by a restrictive consultation and engagement process noted within two 
important mechanisms, the Law of Prior Consultation and EIAs. The ORPIO indigenous 
spokesperson acknowledged that these are “a meeting point/collusion of different interests. 
Indigenous peoples have their own interests ... that their rights are respected, that their territory is 
respected” (CBO3R1) whilst for the state it is the SHDV.  
 
Whilst vertical voice dialogue between citizens and state is always better than a lack of 
communication, it serves no purpose if the parameters of the exchanges set by the state occur 
through limited and irrevelant rubber-stamping tokenism (Arnstein 1969) forms of participation 
that are controlled by the state and which fail to listen to local people to gain their consent. ‘The 
dilemma for many authorities is that they both need and fear people’s participation. They need 
people’s agreement and support, but they fear that this wider involvement is less controllable, less 
precise and so likely to slow down the planning process (Pretty 1995 pp. 1251-1252). By doing 
so, such processes will undoubtedly lead to cases of NIMBYism (not in my back yard), but one 
can see that, in this case, the government’s aggressive SHDV stance wholly displaces its own 
citizens’ interests and fails to protect and strengthen Peru’s most marginalised and vulnerable 
communities. Little wonder that the country suffers from such high levels of social unrest 
surrounding hydrocarbon projects when state-orchestrated dialogue mechanisms are so regressive 
and restrictive for affected citizens who are denied the opportunity to be heard. Alongside the 
efforts by the state to present environmental and human-rights CBOs, NGOs and other individuals 
as “anti-development” and thus, by extension, anti-progress and anti-Peru, it is conceivable that 
some political elites are clearly intolerant of any local-level citizen and wider collective voices that 
raise concerns about the neoliberal economic and development choices which the country takes.  
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9.2 What impact do societal influences e.g. discrimination, different ontological 
views have upon the interactions and relationships between state and citizens, 
citizens and business and citizens and other actors (CBOs, NGOs)?  
 
Linked to this evaluation are the important influences which societal discrimination and racialised 
class consciousness continue to have within Peruvian society. The country’s Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century socio-political and economic mechanisms and values were shaped by the 
systematic discrimination of indigenous people residing in the sierra and selva, whose supposedly 
savage nature and uncultured, ignorant views made them inferior to the coastal criollo population 
and therefore targets for brutal exploitation. Peru’s contemporary social strata, from a former 
President down to interviewed government employees, academics and non-indigenous citizens, 
illustrate that these discriminatory opinions remain entrenched and widespread within the country, 
which reinforces the lack of respect and understanding that non-indigenous society has for 
indigenous people.  
 
Though a somewhat crude assessment, the notion of there being two realities for 
indigenous and non-indigenous selva people is, in a general sense, accurate. The former’s holistic 
cosmovision of creation built through lives spent in the selva stands in stark contrast to other 
Peruvian citizens, particularly urban political elites whose own nature/natural resource 
management ideas are shaped by LIEO values. There is a failure to comprehend and respect each 
other’s worldviews. Troublingly for indigenous people, societal discrimination and lack of cultural 
understanding are caught up in the wider neoliberal and development discourses established by 
successive governments that portray their subsistence livelihoods and beliefs as an impediment to 
the nation’s progress. This helps to reinforce historically-rooted prejudices that view these people 
as second-class, wholly inferior citizens and throws into doubt the state’s genuine commitment to 
improving its understanding of indigenous cultures through national and regional government 
intercultural departments.  
 
This indigenous inferiority feeds into the country’s racialised class consciousness and is 
visible in a wider, predominantly urban, socio-cultural and spiritual divorce from indigenous 
peoples. The complex questions surrounding hydrocarbon development vis-à-vis indigenous 
people become insensitively viewed as their own internal problems which higher urban class 
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citizens need not concern themselves with. “[I]t was, me here, you there, and let the problem fall 
on you” (IUA1). The non-white “other” accordingly becomes a symbol of Peruvian backwardness, 
from which urban citizens, despite their indigenous heritage, are keen to disassociate themselves. 
One can also see this in the way that professional educated classes interact with lower-class mestizo 
and indigenous citizens in everyday situations and more formalised methods of communication. 
The Peru Mission participant (NGO2R1) reported that they had easy access to the government due 
to their authoritative societal position but also conceivably due to their ethnic (white) status, which 
garnered them improved accessibility (NGO2R1b). Indeed, several participants drew attention to 
the belief that politicians were reluctant to engage with the population, particularly those residing 
in the selva, because of the environment (i.e. its humidity) and the inhabitants’ class, ethnicity and 
livelihoods, which generates a lack of sympathy and arrogant indifference for selva citizen 
concerns. Moreover, the state’s ‘persistent devaluation of indigenous people’ (Vilas 1997 p. 8) 
becomes one way in which it seeks to convert non-indigenous ‘citizens into isolated, wholly 
private, and narrowly self-centred individuals’ (Hirschman 1992 p. 82). This helps to prevent 
indigenous citizens’ from successfully projecting their voice into wider society to generate debate 
on selva hydrocarbon development (particularly as there remains only a limited indigenous 
political voice) (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 204) or the creation of a societal movement in support 
of indigenous peoples’ concerns.  
 
Petroperu, an SCNREI, i.e. a state controlled national resource extraction industry, not only 
reinforces but heightens the impact that these underlying influences have on state – indigenous 
citizen interaction. Their general treatment of Cuninico was heavily prejudiced by discrimination 
and perceived racial superiority and was evident in various ways; the absence of an apology for 
the spill, arrogant readiness to pay higher prices for foodstuffs, the failure to repair/replace the 
community’s generator and subsequent refusal to share electricity from their own machines, 
limited medical aid, five-month provision of meagre food and water, failure to pay residents for 
their hospitality and blatant falsehoods told to citizens about the remediation process and pollution 
impact. The starkest example is their employment of 150 Cuninico workers and four minors 
alongside another 350 Cocama workers from other villagers. Without any prior training or proper 
equipment, the Cocama were deliberately given some of the most dangerous manual and heavy 
labour tasks, working long hours with limited provisions and for almost a month without any 
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protective clothing. The provision of protective clothing proved ineffective, thereby exacerbating 
severe long-term health-related illnesses from illegal overexposure to the oil. This showed the 
indifference which Petroperu’s Peruvian oil workers had for their fellow indigenous citizens. 
Sadly, the employment of indigenous villagers, including unverified employment of indigenous 
minors in 2016 remediation work,249 confirms that Cuninico’s experience are not unique and that 
Petroperu has shown little interest in improving its operational practices away from the systematic 
abuse and exploitation of indigenous people.  
 
For other collective voice-based stakeholders, there was little sense of discriminatory views 
shaping their work with indigenous communities. Rather, it was their agendas which had the most 
significant impact. In some cases, NGO actors had constructive, supportive relationships and roles 
that sought to strengthen indigenous capacities (e.g. via education or through environmental 
monitoring mechanisms) and thus their voice. However, differences in vision e.g. over what 
constitutes justice, had a significant impact on the type of protest voice action utilised by local 
people, an issue outlined in Section 9.6. 
 
9.3 What level of state presence and engagement with civil society exists in Loreto, 
particularly with remote oil-producing areas? How does this impact upon the use of 
voice by stakeholders? 
 
The racialised class consciousness and discrimination within Peruvian society has several notable 
impacts on the state’s presence and development within Loreto and the voice access and type of 
actions utilised by the case-study communities. At first glance, the implementation of the SHDV 
suggests state acknowledgement of the need for greater focus on its often-forgotten Amazonian 
regions. However, the vision’s goals are not centred around improvements to selva-based citizens’ 
lives, a feature which reinforces the notion of a misplaced political will rather than the lack of one 
and resulting in the SCDV. At the same time, it also reflects the political disinterest which Peruvian 
elites have for the livelihoods of selva-based, predominantly indigenous citizens (evident in their 
failure to implement several socio-economic development remediation agreements250) a factor 
linked to racialised class consciousness and societal discrimination. Evidence for the SCDV is 
                                                          
249 See Chapter 7, Section 7.5, Footnote 219. 
250 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 78. 
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extensive. State presence is virtually non-existent in the 2,000 or so smaller towns and pueblos 
dotted along the multitude of Loreto’s waterways. The state focuses on Iquitos and to a lesser 
extent some of the other larger towns, leaving the rest of the region neglected, both in a physical 
infrastructural sense but also in relation to its engagement with selva pueblos and wider dialogue 
mechanisms which only a handful of national state entities are implementing in the selva.251   
 
Both pueblos lack access to clean water or basic sanitation amenities, electricity or internet 
connectivity, have limited educational facilities (primary but not secondary schools) and no law 
enforcement authorities or connections to the state judicial system. The situation for Cuninico was 
worse, however, as they do not have a medical posta, thus necessitating a 45-minute riverboat 
journey to the Urarinas District capital, Maypuco.  
 
 Interviewees made clear their sense of abandonment and the absence of meaningful 
assistance from the state which, crucially, was seen by citizens not to listen to their pueblos 
concerns. Dogged determination by Barrio Florido residents to request state support for various 
development projects has not proven successful. Their petitions have often been affected by state 
bureaucracy, a modus operandi which enables state representatives to filter development requests 
and conceivably delay or ignore those from communities based upon their ethnicity and/or lack of 
amiguismo government contact(s) or money to aid their petition’s progress.  
 
Crucially, the SCDV has a direct impact on these communities’ ability effectively to voice 
to the government due to inadequate transport and technology infrastructure. Barrio Florido and 
Cuninico’s non-existent IT access restricts their use of online governmental systems of 
accountability such as OEFA’s SINADA, which now plays a vital role in allowing citizens to 
report environmental pollution issues directly to the relevant government department. An 
electronic means of vertical orthodox voicing is therefore denied them. At the same time, the state 
requirement for highly formal typed introductory letters and affiliated documents can prove to be 
a barrier for citizens with weaker education and those without IT access. There is then a need for 
                                                          
251 This explains the Alaianza Arkana’s experience of Putumayo Province, in which local citizens wanted SERNANP 
to establish a protected conservation area in the Region because “it’s a kind of conveniencia [convenience] [to have a 
permanent state actor in the vicinity]. It’s the same ... with the [oil company]. You need them because there’s nobody 
there for you in cases of emergencies” (NGO7R1). 
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citizens to have the support of CBO/NGO groups (particularly as state – societal exchanges usually 
occur through an institutional – organisational format rather than an institutional – individual 
citizen interaction). However, as Barrio Florido shows, not every pueblo has contact with these 
organisations. These various IT issues narrow the citizens’ range of accessible orthodox formal 
voice options to report environmental problems and presents a major barrier to holding Loreton 
REIs like Petroperu accountable for pollution events.  
 
Citizen access is restricted further by the absence of a frequent and affordable Loreton 
public riverboat system, which hinders selva pueblo access to Iquitos, the centralised political heart 
of the region. This is not an issue for interviewed collective-voice based groups; their 
administrative location in Iquitos (bar E-Tech International (NGO1R1), which had the financial 
resources to travel there) provided geographically easier access to Loreto’s main political decision-
making site though not, as noted, resulting in easier contact.  
 
 Is Loreton public transport deliberately kept poor by the state? Certain interviewees 
seemed to believe so and one can understand why. One must remember that REIs have been 
operating in Loreto’s selva for over 40 years showing that the apparent geographical difficulties 
surrounding oil extraction have, to a certain extent, been overcome. In this light, interviewed state 
representatives alluding to the impact of geographical distance and the high transport costs vis-à-
vis selva government engagement cannot use this as a legitimate excuse. Instead, by hindering 
selva pueblo access to Iquitos, the state limits the extent to which indigenous selva i.e. rural protest 
voices reach GOREL and quell their ability to voice collectively through more radical actions. In 
sierra mining regions, more accessible transport allows easier access to regional government cities 
and Lima. Once there, collective radical voice actions have proven to be effective in garnering 
national and international media attention and making the mining industry a crucial feature of the 
2016 Peruvian presidential election and the incumbent administration’s domestic policy.  
 
  However, even with the limited Loreton public transport options Barrio Florido and 
Cuninico citizen poverty is a huge impediment for them to be able proactively to seek out 
interaction with the state. Despite Barrio Florido’s cheaper river transport costs owing to their 
proximity to Iquitos and their non-subsistence based employment, residents were still reliant on 
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their IEVAs to reach the state. The IEVAs themselves had to borrow money for transport and 
associated costs. This resident poverty, evident in their income levels, house construction and lack 
of basic amenities shows that the 12 soles return cost to Iquitos was money that could not be spared. 
The situation is worse for Cuninico. Their greater distance from state representatives in Maypuco 
but more significantly Iquitos, and the latter’s increased associated costs (45 or 90 soles one-way) 
and travel time (11 or 24 hours depending on the boat), meant that residents, most of whom are 
poor subsistence farmers, lacked the income or the time to visit state representatives, even to travel 
with their products to market. Consequently, this not only helps lead to rural citizen state 
disengagement but confirms that participation costs (time, effort and money) are more likely to be 
borne by middle and high-income citizens, who become the most effective interest groups in local 
politics (Dahl 1961 pp. 273, 282-283; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 188, cited in Laurian 
2004 p. 55). At the same time, it also leaves state engagement with these rural communities in the 
hands of politicians and other officials. 
 
Testimonies from both pueblos show that communication with the government (local, 
regional and national) is highly sporadic and often non-existent. Political disinterest, racialised 
class consciousness and discrimination are all underlying causes for this situation. Despite the 
SCDV, there is a degree of genuine political disinterest in the plight of these case-study selva 
pueblos (tied to racialised class and discrimination). This was also evident in the choice of Iquitos 
(but sometimes even Lima) for EIA Public Hearings and Informative Workshops and Prior 
Consultation meetings which limits their accessibility for affected Apus from remoter Loreton 
areas but allows politicians to remain within the confines of the urbanised, and in their eyes, more 
civilised environment.  
 
 An important caveat to their engagement was noted. Both Barrio Florido and Cuninico 
testimonies show that politicians were willing to visit occasionally when campaigning for 
approaching elections and in the former’s case, make appearances at celebratory event days. Given 
its geographical proximity to Iquitos, one would expect the former pueblo to have a higher level 
of state engagement but this does not appear to have been the case. Instead these self-serving 
community engagements, often accompanied by development promises (which subsequently go 
unfulfilled), show that the state, through its political representatives, can access selva pueblos but 
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choose to do so only when it serves their own electoral interests. The representatives’ appearance 
at Barrio Florido on celebratory days supports this notion, a tactic conceivably not used in 
Cuninico’s case due to the different indigenous cultural traditions, towards which some (one 
cannot say all) state representatives may feel ambivalence, misunderstanding, even hostility, 
owing to differences in ontology and worldview.  
 
The lack of a permanent civil service, contractual staff recruitment (amiguismo) and 
absence of institutional emails for government staff necessitates the need for citizens to have 
highly personalised knowledge of who to contact in government. In a country with strong 
racialised class consciousness and discrimination, this raises a major access barrier for citizens 
lacking these amiguismo contacts, particularly those who are marginalised, poor, uneducated and 
rurally located to formally voice to the state.  
 
These factors (racialised class consciousness and discrimination, political disinterest and 
self-serving infrequent dialogue) have two over-arching impacts for these two selva communities. 
Firstly, trust in the government was minimal, with political apathy and anger visible in 
participants’ opinions of the state, which in Cuninico’s case is unsurprising given the history of 
Peruvian indigenous discrimination and mistreatment. This high level of mistrust will inevitably 
impact upon both communities’ willingness to voice to the state with any degree of conviction or 
confidence (particularly for indigenous communities which are built upon cultural distrust) thus 
confirming the essential requirement of trust to foster higher participation levels (Docherty, 
Goodlad and Paddison 2001). Furthermore, it may in fact, given the environmental pollution 
context of this research, increase the possibility of radical or unorthodox informal forms of voice 
action rather than non-vocalisation i.e. silent non-exit (Barry 1974 p. 91).  
 
Secondly, both communities operate beyond the state system. While both pueblos’ 
informal systems of governance have different names, they operate in a similar manner, with 
IEVAs assuming roles left absent by the state’s SCDV which has induced lower-class citizens to 
organise their own solutions to social issues.252 Unfortunately, both communities’ poor social 
opportunity freedoms limit their effective participation in wider economic and political matters 
                                                          
252  See also Burt 2007 (pp. 50-51). 
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(Sen 2001) by reducing their ability to access formal channels of dialogue which in turn feeds into 
citizen mistrust of the state.  
 
Overall, the combination of these issues has major repercussions for citizens to be able to 
communicate with the state, establish positive relationships with its political representatives and 
importantly for this thesis, hold Petroperu accountable for oil pollution issues. Evidence of this 
was clear in the pueblos’ experiences surrounding oil pollution incidents.   
 
In Barrio Florido’s 2009 incident, two residents chose to phone the radio to denounce the 
refinery rather than first attempt government contact. This unorthodox informal voice response 
was used for several reasons which reaffirm the pueblo’s difficult access to and relationship with 
the state. Firstly, an interviewee established that Barrio Florido inhabitants were afraid to voice 
and express themselves due to a fear that their views would be rejected, a statement which appears 
to confirm their state mistrust and the impact that political disengagement and disinterest by 
politicians has had. This, in turn, would have pushed the two citizens to seek contact with other 
mechanisms they could easily access and whose response would potentially be more successful 
than the state’s bureaucratically slow process which had failed the pueblo in the past. Combined 
with inhabitants’ poverty and lack of access to electronic accountability systems, contacting the 
radio remotely alongside the refinery (discussed shortly) were cost-effective solutions. Lastly, the 
decision to contact the radio was based around their knowledge of other oil-related voice events in 
other Loreton locations and the perceived need to, in the words of IRC14, “make a racket” so that 
the government sits up and listens.  
 
Though this action successfully gained the attention and subsequent arrival of various civil 
servants from government departments, their response (arrogantly blaming residents for helping 
cause environmental pollution via waste disposal dumping despite the state’s failure to implement 
selva waste disposal services) did not help build a positive trusting relationship between citizens 
and state for the former to try and use orthodox formal voice channels in the future. Indeed, an 
indication of how distrustful the relationships is can be seen in the belief by one inhabitant that 
DIGESA’s water samples were not taken from polluted areas of the Rio Ramirez.  
 
 
 
293 
 
Notwithstanding this negative reaction, the use of radio had proven effective and was called 
upon again by residents in the 2011 incident, garnering press and some civil servant but scant 
political reaction. The DDP’s lack of co-ordination and communication with inhabitants over the 
possibility of commencing legal proceedings against Petroperu (if indeed there was a case to 
answer) would have done little to improve the commonplace societal view that the justice system 
is a corrupt and prejudiced mechanism that fails to adequately serve Peru’s poor and marginalised 
citizens effectively (Burt 2007 p. 50). 
 
For Cuninico’s 2014 oil spill, the population’s inability to contact the state was even more 
pronounced. Aside from their geographical proximity to Maypuco, which allowed them to travel 
there to alert the police and local government (the mayor) to the spill, they had no wider knowledge 
of whom to contact in the government at regional or national levels and lacked any technological 
(online) access to alert the state. Their indigenous reality, located in the heart of the Amazon, away 
from wider (urban) Peruvian civic society may have also been a reason why Loreton newspapers 
and radio stations were not contacted and were instead reliant on the Catholic Church informing 
the state.  
 
The reaction by civil servants and politicians to the spill highlights the influence of 
racialised class consciousness and discrimination, the absence of intercultural understanding and 
differences in cosmovision in their engagement with indigenous communities. There were positive 
aspects, noted in their swift arrival, consistent contact for four months (in OEFAs case) and 
community meetings, including by ANA, who were aware of the importance of nature in the 
indigenous cosmovision. However, resident testimonies show that they were not given data results, 
indicating that data presentations may have not been held with the whole pueblo and that precise 
information was not offered and/or understood by the Cocama. This would have increased the 
likelihood of rumours spreading about the spill and reinforced in their mind why the state isn’t “on 
their side.” Moreover, DIGESAs and DIRESAs lack of clean water was also troubling and 
indicates indifference to these citizens’ welfare, a capacity shortfall to deal with the crisis and, 
considering the amiguismo contractual state employment basis, their staffing competencies. 
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Politicians’ slow response, arriving two to five months after the spill (approximately 
August-October 2014), represented the only visit made by GOREL and national government 
politicians up to the time of my first Cuninico field trip (1-3 May 2015). None of these political 
representatives provided the Cocama with any information about the spill (of which, after several 
months, they would presumably have greater knowledge) or any long-term subsistence support 
(clean water and food) aside from through Petroperu’s limited provisions. Though GOREL and 
national political representatives cannot be expected to make fortnightly pueblo trips, it strongly 
insinuated that this pollution event was a nuisance for urban political elites that had no wish to 
enter the selva and engage with the community. Furthermore, their absence of long-term support 
testifies to their discrimination against this indigenous community which has undoubtedly 
damaged their limited pre-spill state engagement and trust. 
 
Together, the government response to the Barrio Florido and Cuninico spill events had 
several major impacts on the communities’ PEV in relation to the state. Firstly, both lacked access 
and high trust levels of the state which made it extremely difficult for them to formally voice to 
the government and, instead, forced citizens to utilise unorthodox informal voice dialogue (the 
radio) or contact with other actors (Catholic Church and Petroperu). Secondly, the state’s political 
response shows that they can reach the selva and interact with communities “but not to resolve the 
problems associated with oil companies” (CBO3R1) “because they don’t want the oil activity to 
stop” (NCSSC2) or their wider extractive policies to be endangered (CBO1R1; NGO1R1). “I have 
heard some communities saying that if it weren’t for their problems with the oil company, the state 
would never have come here” (NSI4R1). 
 
The subsequent absence of support or ongoing post-spill engagement makes it highly likely 
that both pueblos would be hesitant and lack confidence in voicing formally to the state if another 
pollution event were to occur, even if they were more aware of who to contact. This therefore 
raises the prospect that they would become dependent on radical or unorthodox informal voice 
actions which, given the state’s views on hydrocarbon protest, it would suppress rather than listen 
to. In turn, this reinforces the need for CBO/NGO group access or, in Barrio Florido’s case, pulls 
it closer to the refinery, which has become its main benefactor for employment, development and 
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civil events which has significant ramifications for the willingness of residents to voice 
individually and collectively.  
 
Collective voice-based stakeholders’ state access and relationships are influenced by 
different factors. The SCDV and political engagement do not have a bearing on collective voice-
based groups. Instead, the interlinked effects of their individual aims and voice types 
(supportive/conciliatory and scrutiny-based voice actors) are most significant. Supportive NGOs 
working on areas including environmental law, conservation and natural resource management 
have enabled them to form practical cooperative positive partnerships and projects and have their 
voice recognised and listened to by the state. Troublingly, scrutiny-based voice groups, the 
environmental and human-rights aims of which diverge from those of the SHDV, are denied this 
same level of access despite often fighting to protect and support the most marginalised citizens 
from the effects of this vision. 
 
9.4 Are REIs withholding or controlling the ability of stakeholder voices to be 
effectively used in decision-making mechanisms?  What are the REIs’ legal 
obligations surrounding consultation and communication with stakeholders and 
what is the on the ground reality in Loreto? 
 
As noted in Section 9.1, the Peruvian state has created a highly restrictive environment for citizens 
to voice over hydrocarbon issues. Petroperu has gone further than this by systematically attempting 
to control, via silencing, critical citizen stakeholder voices and protests (Hirschman 1981 p. 244) 
surrounding oil pollution issues. For Cuninico, despite the company’s relative closeness, the total 
dislocation of both parties prior to the spill shows that geographical proximity alone does not 
determine or improve access. Instead, it reveals how Petroperu had total power and control to set 
citizen access and engagement parameters which, were it not for the spill, would have remained 
inaccessible to local people. This had major repercussions on community members’ ability to 
directly voice to the company, as demonstrated in the 2014 oil pollution event, and thus hold them 
accountable for pollution issues. The Cocama were left unaware of the correct procedure to follow 
and lacked any form of contact information, indeed even which company operated the pipeline. 
This was only remedied by the resourceful thinking of residents to check a Petroperu-sponsored 
school book for a phone number, indicating their isolated status in this vertical voice situation. The 
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oil spill forced Petroperu to engage with Cuninico rather than any preconceived notion to do so. 
Their subsequent interaction with the pueblo shows Petroperu’s ongoing power and control to 
establish a climate of fear to suppress citizen voice and set minimal dialogue parameters and 
information provision.  
 
One can see evidence of these points in their initial decision to communicate solely through 
the Apu and his deputy in private meetings. This not only helped suppress the threat of collective 
citizen voices raised against the company, which were instead directed at the community’s leaders, 
but allowed them to pressurise its leaders into an agreement in which the pueblo was offered 
remediation work in exchange for their silence surrounding the spill. A climate of fear was 
established, supported wherever possible through deliberate disengagement and misinformation.  
 
The threat of job losses for voicing against Petroperu, combined with (for subsistence 
farmers) high pay levels, generated the necessary result; residents were afraid to voice. This 
reduced outspoken community members to a mere handful as opposed to a larger vocal collective 
group. As remediation work continued, IRC13’s sacking showed that these were not empty threats 
and would have helped maintain Cocama fear for speaking out about their working conditions and 
tasks.  
 
Yet, the climate of fear was supported by verbal promises which certain residents recalled 
were made to them in exchange for their silence. Whilst these in the end came to nothing, this web 
of falsehoods helped counter any immediate effort by the pueblo to voice and may have been aimed 
deliberately at certain more vocal citizens noted by Petroperu. It also underscores how initial 
interaction with the community was almost purely on the company’s terms; casual exchanges 
between oil workers and Cuninico inhabitants were shut down while the former resided in the 
pueblo and it took extreme citizen protestation and radical action to force two community 
asambleas to go ahead. The Catholic Church’s subsequent involvement did alter the power balance 
between the company and Cuninico (ending the secret dialogue between Petroperu and the IEVAs) 
but not enough to establish consistent dialogue which was resisted by Petroperu. This was evident 
in their dismissal of further citizen requests for meetings and abrupt 2014 Cuninico departure 
which established sole (and extremely poor) contact through the Apu and in relation to a Catholic 
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Church requested Catholic Church/Cuninico/Petroperu meeting which was conditioned by the 
company’s efforts to control precisely who attended.  
 
 Indeed, the Catholic Church’s participation did little to stem Petroperu’s continued efforts 
to control proceedings and limit the possible damage their actions during the oil spill remediation 
work could now have. Private financial arrangements with oil workers were intentionally 
undertaken to try and weaken their resolve to continue their Catholic Church relationship and add 
their testimonies to the Catholic Churchs’s legal case. Meanwhile, deliberate efforts to suppress 
knowledge about the full extent of the spill can be seen in their confiscation of Cuninico oil 
workers’ camera phones, their removal from the remediation site during inspections and 
Petroperu’s specific choice of inspection locations and use of chemicals to sink oil into the water 
and ground. The company’s subversion of Cuninico’s oil workers’ voices via job loss threats was 
equally effective and enabled them to disseminate their own version of events to wider Peruvian 
society through journalists and other media outlets sympathetic to their discourse that would act 
as a counter-narrative to the Catholic Church. Lastly, the information presented to inhabitants was 
negligible, which contributed to rumours which fed into wider tensions and paranoia that the spill 
had caused, evident in the claim of Petroperu informants.  
 
Despite the radically different context, Barrio Florido’s relationship with Petroperu shows 
many similarities to Cuninico. Once again, the actors’ geographical proximity, seen in their side-
by-side existence, has not translated into improved citizen voice access, though notably it has 
forced the company to have some measure of contact. However, Petroperu’s power, heightened by 
SCDV and the company’s important economic and energy roles, has helped them create an 
advantageous voice environment and relationship with the pueblo. This encompasses the 
frequency, location and composition of meetings, regulated and controlled through the 
formalisation of dialogue. This manifests itself in the everyday relationship with the community 
and in instances of protest voice.  
 
The everyday relationship can be described as infrequent, controlled cordiality between 
Petroperu and Barrio Florido, occurring through three formalised and refinery-controlled 
arrangements: six-monthly meetings with the community’s IEVAs held at the refinery and 
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occurring through a written formal appointment system, Petroperu’s invitation to the pueblo to 
attend a handful of annual resident themed low-cost events and finally, other non-specific calendar 
engagements and support including water provision for the reservoir tank roughly every week, 
occasional medical support and at least one asamblea meeting with inhabitants concerning 
protocol (i.e. whom to contact) in the event of environmental pollution.  
 
Despite this improved Petroperu-citizen interaction, it is important to note that only the 
community’s IEVAs had refinery access. This represents the lone consistent interaction in which 
non-casual dialogue took place (discussing Barrio Florido’s informal refinery work) and even then, 
the cordial nature of these exchanges had to be fought for by the IEVAs. Moreover, as Himley’s 
(2008) case study shows, it is Petroperu, not the Peruvian state that administers dialogue access. 
These meetings and wider everyday relationship have also rested to a great degree on the individual 
personalities of each refinery manager, some of whom have been more proactive in their 
engagement than others.  
 
Petroperu’s power remained extensive. This is evident in their dialogue construction in this 
everyday relationship and the ability of individual refinery managers, as opposed to Barrio 
Florido’s IEVAs, to shape the ongoing level of infrequent, controlled cordiality between both 
parties. Moreover, the SCDV has generated an unaccountable ‘bargaining momentum’ for REIs 
with communities (Vasquez 2014 p. 65) that has allowed the refinery to fill this vacuum at a local 
level. This has given it the capacity to dictate the precise nature of support for the pueblo, evident 
in their reneging on costly development initiatives suggested by residents and provision instead of 
low-cost support like the annual events.  
 
Whilst citizens’ only conventional option is to accede to individual refinery manager 
decisions and keep requesting more essential support, their possible use of unorthodox informal 
voice actions is constrained by refinery dependence surrounding employment, energy and income. 
Petroperu has used this situation to great effect in citizen protest voice events that test the 
company’s restrictive control of dialogue.  
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Unlike Cuninico, Petroperu is the main employment source for Barrio Florido via short-
term elementary occupational contracts and pipeline maintenance income as well as the pueblo’s 
electrical provider under the provisions of an informal agreement. These services are 
fundamentally important to Barrio Florido and Petroperu uses this situation to generate a climate 
of fear surrounding their possible termination which diminishes citizen voice. Interviewees 
confirmed that community refinery workers were hesitant about criticising any aspect of the 
everyday relationship for fear of job losses, rumours which were proven to be unfounded but had 
the desired effect of pacifying dissent. The pueblo’s three IEVAs, who incidentally work in the 
refinery, were also seen by residents to be affected by this, resulting in their quiet conformity and 
the prevention of these authoritative figures from implementing or leading collective protest voice 
groups. The pueblo’s close economic ties mean that impartial IEVAs are almost impossible, which 
raises clear conflict of interest for these individuals between their own job in the refinery (and the 
generated income) versus supporting community grievances via collective action protest. 
Understandably, given their economic poverty, economic self-interest has often prevailed, which 
is also apparent in the unverified willingness of some citizens to act as Petroperu informers. This 
not only imbues the refinery with an enhanced sense of power and control in the eyes of Barrio 
Florido but allows the seeds of mistrust and disunity to be sown that can fracture any collective 
voice strength the community sought to generate through action.  
 
 In non-oil pollution instances of protest voice, this climate of fear is one part of a calculated, 
suppressive formality response by Petroperu to disperse and diffuse any collective group arrayed 
against them; those within Barrio Florido considering collective community action are aware from 
their everyday engagement that only the IEVAs can initiate direct dialogue. Interestingly, though 
the climate of fear has been effective in dampening general support for critical citizen voice 
actions, one aspect (electricity provision) has in fact galvanised local people to question Petroperu 
as the 2013 incident showed. Even then, the climate of fear was still successful; rumours that 
Petroperu would take away electricity altogether, which ignored the long-established energy 
agreement, prevented a larger collective group from forming. Nevertheless, the resulting 
negotiations show how much control of proceedings the refinery had; while eight of the 20 
protesting residents gained refinery admittance (determined by Petroperu), only three (presumably 
the IEVAs) spoke on behalf of the pueblo, useful when their impartiality is compromised. It also 
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underscores the disparity in power between the pueblo and the company. Petroperu is under no 
legal obligation to offer electrical provision to Barrio Florido or any other community. This not 
only weakened the legitimacy of the protestors’ aims (24-hour electrical provision) but allowed 
the refinery almost total freedom to set the terms and conditions of negotiation. The resulting 
agreement (an improvement in electrical provision), placated the protestors and nullified the threat 
of further disturbances. Though the protestors’ radical voice action had been successful in gaining 
refinery dialogue and an improvement in the contract, there was little they could do to enforce 
Petroperu’s total accession to their demand, particularly for fear of the consequences i.e. a reversal 
of the agreement or an end to electrical provision altogether.  
 
  However, the climate of fear could not completely deter residents from voicing over 
environmental pollution issues, as the 2009 and 2011 events show. For the 2009 event, some oil 
workers and conceivably, the IEVAs, were unwilling to participate for fear of job losses. Phoning 
the radio suggests that the two residents lacked IEVA backing and therefore did not have 
alternative Petroperu access arrangements. However, it again underscores the powerful emotive 
feelings that environmental contamination can generate and the willingness of people, despite 
external actor pressures, to defend their quality of life regardless of their own socio-economic 
circumstances. One must acknowledge that, in this case, the external Petroperu pressure does not 
impact upon all residents as MRBF13, a housewife and one of the radio callers, was not employed 
at the refinery so could not be silenced through job loss fears.  
 
Nevertheless, even with subsequent journalist and DDP involvement, Petroperu continued 
to try to control citizen voice through suppression (not allowing them to speak) and counter-
narratives directed to the journalists on the causes of local pollution. Despite this, the citizen 
success in increasing the scrutiny surrounding the oil-spill was perhaps the cause of the unspecified 
date for the asamblea meeting held by Petroperu with inhabitants concerning protocol (i.e. who to 
contact) in the event of environmental pollution. Though the details of the meeting are 
unconfirmed, it is likely that they reiterated the need to avoid involving external actors. This idea 
is strengthened when one considers Petroperu’s reaction to the 2011 incident, in which the radio 
was again contacted, resulting in the likely culprit (MRBF13) being asked to visit the refinery 
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manager and politely be warned to not do so again. This action shows Petroperu’s clear intention 
to pressurise Barrio Florido citizens into silence rather than attempt accessing external actors.   
 
The experiences of collective-voice-based groups vis-à-vis REIs echo some of these pueblo 
access parameters but also the way that the state has managed interaction with critical and 
supportive collective voices. Like citizens, some collective voice actors (CBOs, environmental and 
human-rights NGOs) have weaker power vis-à-vis REIs which makes it difficult for them to 
establish dialogue unless it is proactively sought by oil companies. When dialogue does occur, 
REIs have attempted to control the engagement and limit protest voices within these groups, seen 
in Petroperu’s refusal to accept the presence of the Catholic Church’s legal professionals at a 
meeting with Cuninico residents. This hasn’t always been effective, notably when technical 
scrutiny-based voice organisations (e.g. NGO1R1) can bypass initial REI dialogue reluctance 
through insider (amiguismo) contacts.  
 
These types of collective voice groups haven’t been viewed favourably by REIs, 
particularly well-established operators, as their extraction industry technical and local knowledge 
poses a threat to their entrenched operational practices and thus does not lead to clear, honest 
discussion. As NGO1R1 noted, “I think we have an interesting dance with the companies” who 
are only willing to listen when it’s “in their best interests.” On the other hand, newer REIs like 
Gran Tierra have been more open to contact. This is partly due to their lack of local extractive 
knowledge and willingness to do things differently to other, more established operators. However, 
for a new regional operator, having positive relationships with these other experienced scrutiny-
based voice actors helps them to create a stable operating environment and reduces initial criticism 
of their operations by these collective voice groups.  
 
Other collective voice groups, especially indigenous federations which already have a very 
divided indigenous voice at local, regional and national levels, are deliberately weakened further 
by REIs. Federation leaders are bought off (an example of Hirschman’s (1981 p. 241 author’s 
emphasis) ‘special favours’) so that instances of protest voice are minimised or their resistance to 
oil development is quashed whilst at other times, rumours alluding to personal financial gain are 
generated, which together damage local citizen trust of its leaders and therefore, by extension, 
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these collective voice movements. Moreover, the emergence of new pro-oil, rival indigenous 
federation power structures in oil Blocks with links to various REIs is useful for companies as their 
establishment can legitimise oil company claims of operational consent from indigenous 
communities and local people. The creation of these smaller entities also generates intra- and inter-
community conflict that can prevent and destabilise stronger collective voices from occurring 
surrounding oil development and consequently helps leave each Loreton indigenous federation to 
deal with REIs in a more isolationist manner.  
 
This analysis reinforces the extent to which REIs control the scope of collective voice 
engagement which, like the state, is governed by self-interest. Whilst scrutiny collective voices 
pose a threat and can, in relation to some CBOs, be deliberately fragmented, REIs will choose 
proactively to form constructive working relationships with supportive voice actors whose work, 
skills and experience with selva communities can cover a whole host of incredibly useful functions 
for oil companies. These include their role as impartial intermediaries in the management of 
conflict between indigenous communities and REIs; REI investment in their CSR projects 
(therefore becoming the benign non-corporate face of the oil company for communities that may 
distrust them or with which the organisation has more experience); helping to identify pro- oil 
activity community members in order to advance the evangelisation (pro-oil development) process 
in a local area; and REI funding for community-based environmental monitoring programmes 
(which act as an REI alarm system by allowing the swift implementation of contingency plans to 
prevent social conflict issues from arising).  
 
Several points can be gleaned from Barrio Florido, Cuninico and collective-voice 
organisations’ experiences. Firstly, the communities show that Petroperu possesses extensive 
power to shape its operational approach to community resource management relations, which can 
be summarised as a responsive approach to dialogue occurring predominantly through 
authoritative citizen formal and infrequent contact. Meanwhile, oil company self-interest sees 
supportive collective voice organisations given greater access and engagement in comparison to 
scrutiny-based voice actors that threaten REI oil Block operations. There is no illegality in these 
actions; Peru’s EIAs lack specific regulation surrounding company – community, company – 
society communication levels and so consequently provide huge flexibility for each company to 
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determine the style and type of relationship they want. For Petroperu, limited, almost total 
disengagement from the selva and other scrutiny-based collective voices has been established 
mirroring the state SCDV. Though one must be careful to not extrapolate these Petroperu findings 
across the whole oil industry, interviewees nevertheless made clear that the company’s treatment 
of Cuninico and Barrio Florido were part of a wider REI trend to “decouple” (Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Backer 2007 pp. 33-34) their working relationship (i.e. oil Block management and 
interaction between oil workers and local people) from selva inhabitants. Reed’s (2002 p. 221) 
assertion that REIs have an unwillingness to incorporate local citizens into decision-making 
mechanisms does not go far enough in Peru’s Loreto Region; here there are systematic efforts to 
suppress critical citizen voices surrounding environmental pollution issues for them to try to avoid 
performance quality improvements (Hirschman 1981 p. 241). 
 
Still, the climate of fear was successfully punctuated in both communities by the strength 
of individual characters; the Barrio Florido housewife and another unknown resident and 
Cuninico’s Apu and Catholic Church organiser. It is these strong, confident individual figures, 
undaunted by the Petroperu climate of fear that has meant that the company ultimately failed to 
silence each community’s voice. While elections and leadership changes mean that strong 
individual leaders may not always be in place in each pueblo, Barrio Florido resident actions show 
that this doesn’t necessarily prevent citizens from voicing. For Cuninico, their community’s 
response to the pollution event was further aided by their knowledge of, and access to the Catholic 
Church, one CBO which has had a significant influence on the strength and chosen action of this 
community’s voice.   
 
9.5 Are REIs deliberately utilising sub-standard operational practices in 
geographically remote locations and/or against citizens who do not have the 
knowledge or the means to challenge them? 
  
The Barrio Florido, Cuninico and other non-case-study community (José de Saramuro) 
experiences and ongoing Oleoducto Norperuano environmental pollution problems enable an 
evaluative answer to be made regarding Petroperu’s Loreton operational practices. Petroperu’s 
presence at several selva oil sites and limited engagement with oil-based communities would have 
made the company imminently aware of the latter’s wholly marginalised lives, SCDV and reliance 
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on non-state authoritative power structures and links to the wider non-selva country through 
collective-voice actors. Therefore, the scrutiny and accountability of Petroperu’s operations by 
citizens becomes far more difficult, which, in turn, provides the company with an environment in 
which sub-standard practices can be consistently deployed without too much fear of the 
consequences.  
 
 This is most starkly evident in relation to the Oleoducto Norperuano, which has been 
neglected “year upon year” (IRC2) and is now in a state of chronic disrepair (CBO4R1a; CBO4R3; 
IRC1; IRC3; NGO7R1; NSI1R1b). The seven 2016 oil spills testify to the calculated indifference 
which Petroperu has for their selva operations. The question one must ask is whether this situation 
would be occurring if the oil and the pipeline were situated in the coastal region? It is, of course, 
pure conjecture. However, the presence of middle and higher class urban citizens and their 
improved transport accessibility and technological connectivity would have meant that Petroperu 
faced higher levels of scrutiny and vocal protest if oil spill(s) occurred. Consequently, the 
challenges faced by selva citizens and other collective-voice actors to maintain accountability of 
Petroperu’s sub-standard practices are considerably higher.   
 
9.6 What impact and influence do collective-voice organisations (CBOs and NGOs) 
have on citizen voice? 
 
Like Petroperu, these collective voice groups and other advisory figures are interconnected to selva 
citizen voice through the impact and influence they have on it. The combination of the state SCDV, 
indigenous uncertainty about hydrocarbon development and lack of knowledge vis-à-vis 
hydrocarbon development’s impact (partly caused by their own low educational levels), has 
generated a space in which these actors can impose their own ideas (selva visions) on indigenous 
people. Some of these actors have developed positive long-term relationships built through initial 
citizen and federation permission to work with them or alternatively contacted directly by them, 
and they undertake several roles, which make a hugely positive contribution to indigenous people 
and the strength of their voice. These include educational empowerment and federation capacity 
building (so that indigenous communities and their federations can more resolutely defend 
themselves and understand the implications, processes and procedures of hydrocarbon 
development and their wider indigenous rights) but also other types of capacity activities including 
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the establishment of environmental monitoring systems (critical for a region which continues to 
suffer high pollution levels). Smaller, but no less important practical support for indigenous-
state/REI engagement (acting as interpreters and accountability checks at asambleas, reviewing 
and simplifying hydrocarbon technical documents’ language and producing them for state or REI 
dialogue) and wider societal engagement (efforts at forging local, national and international 
alliances to promote local indigenous voice issues) are also carried out. 
 
What is significant to stress about these actors and their constructive work with indigenous 
communities and federations is the shared selva agenda and vision which aims to strengthen, rather 
than impose upon, indigenous people or their chosen voice action(s). However, the vast range of 
intentions, agendas and focuses which citizens, federations and other collective voice actors have 
means that the strengthenoing of citizen voice doesn’t always occur. One can see this manifest in 
citizen – federation relationships in which individual communities and their respective leaders may 
have opposing opinions, even amongst themselves, on hydrocarbon development in comparison 
to their respective federation. This can damage the prospect of a more unified national indigenous 
voice vis-à-vis hydrocarbon development, though one must acknowledge the difficulty in 
achieving this, owing to the wider horizontal authoritative structure within indigenous 
communities and the different community opinions based upon their experience of REI projects 
i.e. no local extraction, long-term exploitation etc. 
 
 Divergent selva visions can also occur amongst wider citizen/federation-NGO/advisor 
relationships, which can lead to difficulties forming a constructive partnership or indeed, any 
relationship at all, but also cause conflict over the type of advice given to citizens and their 
federations. In circumstances where collective voice actors seek to impose their own voice agendas 
onto citizens, there is a risk that the latter are dispossessed and deprived of their voice (Bourdieu 
1986 pp. 301-302) and have their own interests swallowed up by external interests, especially as 
citizens, particularly those who are marginalised and poorly educated, lack power to force 
‘downward accountability’ (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). This was evident in discussions 
surrounding the use of private financial deals between communities/federations and REIs and 
radical voice actions.  
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“Justice” (see Cole and Foster 2001; Wright 2003; Walker 2012; Nurse 2016) can mean 
different things for different people and there is scope for arguing that private monetary deals 
suggested and supported by some NGO/advisors provide communities with important 
compensation for environmental issues. Nevertheless, by doing so, the community are denied the 
opportunity to purse legal justice which can, beyond the community’s mere financial reward, help 
challenge and change REI operational practices in Peru and further abroad. Similarly, radical voice 
can prove to be highly effective in numerous ways (historically, creating wider societal knowledge 
about Loreton resource extraction impact, helping make the government and REIs visit the selva, 
maintaining pressure on these actors over a certain issue) but, by itself does not always necessarily 
guarantee success, i.e. making the state or REIs listen, particularly as the state can portray these 
radical actions as the work of ignorant, misguided natives whipped up by external NGO 
environmental terrorists. Thus, it remains important to consider whose interests are being served 
by these vocal responses and whether they have the best intentions of the local people at heart.  
 
Where the latter (i.e. best intentions) are more noticeable is in the legal passive and 
proactive roles and technical support undertaken by several interviewed CBO and NGO actors 
which provide the greatest assistance for selva citizens to vocally gain justice and serve their 
interest as opposed to the external actor’s own (NGO1R1). Unfortunately for Barrio Florido, they 
lacked the support of a CBO/NGO offering this passive/proactive legal support (or indeed any 
CBO/NGO) and, therefore, did not have the vocal strength to maintain access to, and pressure on, 
the legal system to achieve environmental justice. For Cuninico however, the Catholic Church has 
been the catalyst for the community’s vocal search for legal justice.   
 
 The Catholic Church’s encouragement of radical action in Loreto in the previous 20 years 
has transformed into proactive legal support for communities implemented through a Loreton 
human-rights based commission. Their regular and long-term contact with Cuninico and other 
Marañón communities, in a religious but also wider educational capacity, meant that this 
community had knowledge of and access to a supportive CBO actor and had community members 
who did not wish to maintain their silence.  
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Their impact was immediate; from helping end the secretive meetings between Petroperu 
staff and Cuninico’s IEVAs to strengthening the community’s wider collective voice by 
encouraging contact with its federation, ACODECOSPAT. But it is their push for Cuninico to take 
legal action, undertaken by discussing the spill in a simple clear way and aided by their long-term 
training and education about their rights, which meant that the whole pueblo reached a choice they 
fully accepted and crucially, understood. Residents were wholly part of the legal process, not only 
through the provision of consistent Catholic Church engagement and dialogue but also through the 
translation of their vocal testimonies into legal evidence in an invited dialogue space (Cornwall 
2000; 2008) and the appearance of two citizens at an IACHR public hearing in Santiago, Chile in 
June 2016. A participatory relationship was established which combined elements of interactive 
and consultative participation (Pretty 1995). This was implemented through a wide and deep 
approach (Farrington et al. 1993) that reached an optimum level of engagement (Cornwall 2008 p. 
276) which served to strengthen Cuninico’s voice. Residents admit that despite their initial 
willingness to pursue legal justice, without the Catholic Church’s involvement, access to this 
justice (from economic and professional-knowledge capacity perspectives) would have been 
impossible. This would have reduced wider knowledge of and interest in, the spill, reinforcing why 
the Catholic Church’s collective voice served the interests of Cuninico rather than their own 
(Lindell 2010b p. 11). Most importantly, the ability of Cuninico to hold Petroperu legally 
accountable for the oil spill would have been lost.  
 
To summarise the involvement of collective voice actors in the selva, there is a huge 
variation in the relationships they form with communities and federations and their impact upon 
their voice. Each community will have their own opinions on hydrocarbon development and 
pollution incidents which is influenced by the agendas of these other collective/advisory actors 
that will go on to shape the voice actions that they have access to and seek to take. It is therefore 
impossible to generalise their selva community impact but what is clear is that the SCDV is leaving 
selva communities with a lottery-based access to justice and the strengthening of their voice.  
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9.7 Summarising Peruvian Loreton stakeholders’ PEV 
 
Overall, one can summarise the extent to which the PEV of Peruvian stakeholders in Loreto can 
hold REIs, specifically Petroperu, accountable for environmental issues. The freedom of voice for 
Loreton stakeholders is severely affected by the state’s resolute SHDV implementation. This has 
led to the establishment of a dangerous, inflexible and intolerant PEV environment, visible in the 
citizen consultation processes and hostile discourse surrounding scrutiny-based NGOs and other 
human-rights and environmental defenders. There is, thus, an overarching national environment 
in which voices of protest are deliberately suppressed or obstructed whilst selva indigenous voices, 
cultures and societies remain misunderstood and discriminated against.  
 
From a practical perspective, this would appear to result in the deliberate creation of a state 
SCDV in which its predominantly indigenous citizens have “impossible” (NGO1R1) access to the 
state, evident in their inadequate transport, ICT and political engagement to report environmental 
pollution issues and their lack of internal professional and technical capacities to engage with 
hydrocarbon development. These communities are effectively living beyond the state. The 
combination of these factors means that rural citizens can struggle to voice through orthodox 
formal voice channels, therefore restricting their ability to hold REIs accountable for pollution 
issues.  
 
The absence of a strong and equitable state presence in these rural localities not only 
intensifies residents’ mistrust of this actor but also increases the likelihood of radical and 
unorthodox voice responses occurring. These should not be viewed as illegitimate political actions 
(Herring 1989 p. 139). Instead, radical or unorthodox informal voice actions highlight state 
inaccessibility and the self-interested approach to selva engagement (e.g. electoral or in response 
to social protests against extractive activities) which is not fulfilling its job (CBO4R3) and the 
absence of access ‘through parallel [amiguismo] channels’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47). The subsequent 
inability to access or secure justice, legal or otherwise, can increase the likelihood of radical action 
being taken (IRC2; IRC3; IRC4; IRC9; IRC24; IRC25).253 
                                                          
253 Despite Cocama not being as violent as other indigenous peoples (NGO3R1), Cuninico residents stated that if the 
legal route failed, they “would take drastic measures” including closing the river so that “no company would have 
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For Peru’s indigenous peoples, radical action represents an “extremely pragmatic” 
response, the “one thing they’ve got up their sleeve … their strong point … the card they can play” 
that “really terrifies the government” (IJ1). “The protests of Bagua were a key point for indigenous 
people: they saw what they can do and what they can claim [from] the state” (NSI4R1) but also 
represents a possible longing for inclusion (Zahar 2006 p. 39) in a country that has alienated them 
from society and left them unable to use their voice in any other way. It epitomises their anger at 
discrimination, injustice and perceived institutionalised indifference to their voice and wider 
environmental concerns, particularly as indigenous inhabitants have borne the brunt of Peru’s 
neoliberal extractive agenda. The state must apologise publicly, perhaps through a permanent 
monument, over its mistreatment of indigenous people (CBO1R1) and seek “to be more inclusive 
[and] open” in consultative mechanisms (ILP1) and remediation work (NGO1R1). Their must be 
greater respect of indigenous people (CBO3R1) and their cultures by ending the “relationship of 
exploiter and victims” (NSI7R1), an effort to comply with signed remediation agreements 
(CBO3R1; IUA3; NSI4R1) and take “exceptional measures” to promote indigenous political 
voices (IUS2). Until these points are achieved, trust between them will never be improved and oil 
“conflicts between the population and the state … [will be] almost permanent” (NSI7R1).   
 
This state SCDV has provided an open space for collective voice stakeholders and 
Petroperu to strengthen, shape and control citizen voice. Collective voice actors can do so through 
positive and negative impacts including strengthening and projecting their voice via access to 
formal legal mechanisms, educational empowerment and capacity building such as the 
establishment of grassroots environmental monitoring mechanisms. They can also represent 
citizens in dialogue with higher vertical national, regional and international actors, help support 
REI-aligned goals and contentiously seek to shape citizen/federations to pursue non-legal-based 
voice options, i.e. private financial deals and radical voice. In the Catholic Church’s case, the 
collective voice movement’s interests serve the Cuninico people rather than their own but, sadly, 
their work and presence alongside other organisations “aren’t everywhere” (CBO3R1) and so 
cannot entirely replace the state SCDV. Nonetheless, for rural citizens, these actors offer the 
                                                          
come here” (IRC25) and implementing “[a] strike …. [aimed at] the government” (IRC9) evident in the 2016 events 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.5).  
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greatest opportunity for citizens to successfully project and strengthen their voice so that they may 
try and hold REIs accountable for pollution.  
 
Petroperu has had an undeniably more negative suppressive influence on citizen voice, a 
deliberate strategy that incorporates the establishment of a climate of fear borne through 
community socio-economic and development dependency on their support, limited/total 
disengagement or decoupling from communities, hostility to citizen protest voice actions and more 
widely, the fragmentation and division of indigenous federations. Their power to shape citizen 
voice and prevent vocalisation appears to match, and in San José de Saramuro’s case, be far 
greater, than the influence that a positive constructive relationship with one or more 
CBO/NGO/advisors can have. How many other communities have had their voices suppressed in 
this manner? Though there is no accurate answer to this question, these case studies and other 
recent pipeline spillages indicate that Petroperu is utilising poor operational practices against 
citizens who lack the knowledge, amiguismo government contacts and access to challenge them 
through voice. Consequently, whilst the political and development arms of the state are not present 
in the selva, its dangerous, inflexible, intolerant and restrictive approach to hydrocarbon 
stakeholder voice is, which is fulfilled through the actions of Petroperu.  
 
9.8 Evaluating the effectiveness of PEV and wider methodological processes  
 
At the heart of this thesis has been the focus on accountability and power inequality, themes which 
helped steer the literature review into political ecology. This is focused predominantly on 
investigations into myriad forms of inequality within political, economic and social structures and 
relationships between actors at various spatial scales and their impacts on land-use and natural 
resources access and control over time (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a; 1987b;  
1987c; 1987d; 1987e; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Batterbury and Bebbington 1999 pp. 281-282; 
Simsik 2002; Molle 2007; Newmann 2005; Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Baird 2009; Ioris 2011; 
Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Watts 2015 pp. 32-35). At the same time, political ecology seeks 
to promote and contribute to positive transformations of these processes and actor relationships in 
order to counter the way in which they can come together in unjust ways (Bridge, McCarthy and 
Perreault 2015 p. 8; Bryant 2015b p. 22) and cause environmental pollution.  
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 Hirschman’s theory of voice has been explored in a vast array of concepts but never in 
relation to citizens or other stakeholders holding industry to account vis-à-vis environmental 
pollution. At the same time, despite a form of voice (i.e. discourse) being part of third generation 
post-structural political ecology, evident in efforts at ‘giv[ing] voice’ to marginalised and 
disadvantaged people concerning environmental issues (Ioris 2016 p. 180), the study of voice as 
an action, by whom it was taken and why, has not been undertaken. As Bryant (2015b p. 23) states, 
‘[g]aining voice is a struggle but so too is giving voice’ and in this spirit, it became clear that 
political ecology provides a natural basis for the study of voice in relation to environmental 
pollution issues. Combined with the framework’s lack of a ‘grand theory’ (Khan 2013 p. 460), 
there was academic space to establish PEV within political ecology. 
 
 PEV provides researchers with a theoretical framework that can explore the problems 
surrounding environmental pollution from multiple angles. By focusing on the macro and micro 
political, economic, social and geographical environments and the relationships between actors 
therein, a comprehensive review can be undertaken of the way that stakeholders operate and the 
unjust barriers they may face to voice. By doing so, the connections between micro and macro 
factors, which may not be immediately obvious, can be unmasked and more fully understood.  
 
Notwithstanding the impact of environmental pollution, Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s 
residents have remained in the same place and have not attempted to relocate i.e. exit, highlighting 
several interconnected factors that show PEV’s strength. Firstly, it shows that both communities 
lacked the wealth and income to relocate, corroborating exit’s unfair societal distribution 
(Hirschman 1978 pp. 95-96; Blaikie 1985 p. 3). Secondly, both pueblos had a degree of group and 
reformist loyalty influenced by life-world attachments (Zuindeau 2009; Castán Broto 2013 p. 4; 
Groves 2015 pp. 855-859) (economic, socio-cultural and spiritual) and reformist loyalty (Graham 
and Keeley 1992 p. 197) in which they have instead sought to correct and reverse the issues through 
voice as opposed to (vocal) exit. Lastly, it provides evidence of Hirschman’s argument that voice 
has an ‘occasional edge’ over exit in situations affecting public happiness (Hirschman 1981 p. 
217) or public interest (Hirschman 1982 pp. 6-7) like the environment. As the case studies show, 
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‘everyone has a strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station’ (Hirschman 1970 
p. 53). Accordingly, both case studies have utilised active rather than passive forms of voice. 
 
Overall, PEV has not only been able to apply Hirschman’s voice theory successfully onto 
a important public interest issue but incorporate it with and expand the political ecology framework 
so that “voice” as an action can become the central focus of analysis. Though the PEV framework, 
like political ecology, creates a broad academic space for researchers, PEV’s defined areas of 
exploration do offer a more cohesive, integrated means of investigation into the possible struggles 
and injustices faced in voicing. In this fashion, PEV can strengthen political ecology by enabling 
comparisons to be more easily and accurately made between different PEV studies within and/or 
amongst countries compared to those carried out purely through a political ecology lens. The 
investigation of voice through PEV can consequently take political ecology forward into new and 
exciting avenues of research. It is this framework which constitutes my main original contribution 
to political ecology and wider knowledge. 
 
PEV’s multi-faceted nature lent itself to multi-method (SSI and micro-geography analysis) 
qualitative research that sought to capture and understand participant voice in that time and 
environment. SSIs provided participants with the freedom to express themselves openly rather than 
through a more restrictive structured interview process which at the same time was beneficial for 
me as new topics, themes and perspectives emerged out of loosely scripted conversations. At the 
same time, the use of a loose research storyline, based around the PEV theoretical framework 
diagram (Diagram 2.6, Chapter 2, Section 2.9), enabled the participants’ voices to play a central 
role in the coding process. 
 
My own critical geographical philosophical outlook, particularly stemming from the 
geography of domination and resistance combined with my own emotional personal connections 
to the continent, meant that I felt a genuine commitment to uncovering the injustices faced by the 
two case-study communities and through my research help project their voices into the wider 
world. Despite this, I do not feel I was overly biased or gained insider status with any one 
stakeholder group. My researcher’s reflexive positionality meant that I could place myself in the 
‘spaces of inbetweenness’ (Kobayashi 1994, cited in Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138) vis-à-vis 
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stakeholder groups and recognise and respect each person’s individual voice which provided 
access (bar REIs) and interview opportunities with other non-case-study community stakeholders 
(CBOs/NGOs) and actors (the state). This commitment to inclusivity meant that, ethically, my 
work did not seek to discriminate against participants or their views, even if they were not my 
own, whilst my confidentiality levels meant that interviewees felt confident that they were 
unidentifiable in the research, thereby facilitating more open interviews.  
 
9.9 Self-reflecting upon the outcomes of the research 
 
In hindsight, the research has been altogether successful. Even with limited self-funding means, 
the fieldwork afforded me the time to conduct a detailed study of two Petroperu oil communities. 
However, there are limitations to the study. It would have been beneficial to contact and interview 
the national indigenous federation organisations and analyse a third or possibly even fourth 
Petroperu-based community (e.g. José de Saramuro) so that a stronger evaluative summary of their 
Loreton operations could have been made. Alternatively, a parallel focus on a different oil 
company, particularly a privately-operated company, would have provided initial indications of 
how widespread Petroperu’s actions vis-à-vis citizens were in the Loreton oil industry and allowed 
comparisons to be made between state and non-state industrial actors. This latter idea had crossed 
my mind during fieldwork but several problems prevented me from following it through: the lack 
of fieldwork contacts to reach non-Petroperu communities, their far more remote geographical 
locations which would have taken longer and cost more to reach and my limited fieldwork window, 
which became taken up with compiling data for my first two case studies and other stakeholders.  
 
Lastly, this thesis has considered voice almost exclusively through the use of SSI’s. 
Photograph 0.1 provides a clear indication of the other forms of non-voice protest in Loreto, which 
could have been catalogued and analysed alongside the SSI data. If I were to conduct the study 
again under the same fieldwork circumstances (i.e. self-funded time-frame), I would maintain 
focus on Petroperu but make at least one two-day visit, via the Catholic Church, to San José de 
Saramuro so that the collected interviewee experiences could have expanded the relevant points 
within this thesis. If possible, I would also seek to document non-verbal forms of voice protest to 
gauge their prevalence, impact and effectiveness. 
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9.10 Prospective future research 
 
This PEV research has thrown open several more avenues for further research which can be 
undertaken in Loreto or in Peru and other resource-rich EMaDEs. In Loreto, it would be interesting 
to explore the fragmentation of indigenous collective voice movements in greater depth to 
understand how widely and effectively this is utilised by oil companies. Similarly, investigation 
into José de Saramuro and other pollution affected communities would provide a far more 
authoritative picture of the way that Petroperu and the state deal with oil pollution incidents, the 
freedom of voice for these communities, their access/non-access to the state and role of exterior 
CBO/NGO/advisory groups. More widely, research into the Peruvian mining protests would give 
greater insight into the state’s approach to resource development and citizen consultation. 
However, in relation to environmental pollution, Loreto’s experiences appear to bear striking 
similarities to the issues within Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Here, the lack of state socio-economic 
development, the questions of resource ownership and income, ongoing environmental 
contamination and the growth of radical voice organisations provide a dispiriting PEV 
environment in which local people’s lives have not been valued or respected and their voices 
ignored.  
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Appendices 
  
Appendix 1a Loreton oil production: exploratory wells (Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 pp. 2,5; MINEM 2013 p. 16; 2015 pp. 15-16). 
 
Exploratory wells (as of October 2012) 223 with 28 drilled since 1998. Of these, 17 have 
encountered hydrocarbons  
Exploratory wells and corresponding Blocks (as of October 2012) Block 31E (shale gas) 
Block 39 (heavy oil) 
Block 64 (light oil) 
Block 67 (heavy oil) 
Block 95 (medium oil) 
Block 100 
Exploratory wells now in production (as of 2015) Blocks 31E, 64 and 67 
Non-producing exploratory wells proven, probable and possible 
estimated reserves (2015) 
Block 39: proven (0), probable (0), possible (0) 
Block 95: proven (0), probable (0), possible (0) 
Block 100: proven (0), probable (0), possible (0) 
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Appendix 1b Loreton oil production: active wells (Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 5; MINEM 2015 p. 15; Perupetro 2016). 
 
Production wells (as of October 2012) 219  
Production wells and corresponding Blocks with known percentage 
of production wells (as of October 2012) 
Block 1AB (now Block 192 since August 2015) (62.5 per 
cent) 
Block 8 (20.5 per cent) 
Block 31(17 per cent) 
Block 31E 
Block 64  
Block 67  
Main production wells proven, probable and possible reserves 
(2015) 
534, 259 proven, probable and possible oil barrels from 
production Blocks 
 
Blocks 1AB/192 and 8 account for just over quarter (26.8 per 
cent or 143,132 barrels) of this total. 
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Appendix 2 Participant categorisation (independent table columns).254 
                                                          
254 This table was used to document the data of all interviewees. The first four employment bands are based upon the ILO) International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO) and resolution ISCO-08. The fifth band was established to categorise those not within some form of employment.   
Gender Age Ethnicity Occupation  
Male  
 
Female  
16-29  
30-39  
40-49  
50+  
Mestizo (mixed-race 
people)  
Indigenous (mainly for 
the Andean ethnic 
groups Quechua and 
Aymara) (I) 
Other (including 
Asians)  
Whites  
Blacks (negro and 
zambo)  
(In order of ascending 
size) 
BAND 1 (two sub-groups):  
Managers (chief executives, senior officials and legislators, traditional chiefs and heads of villages) and 
Professionals (e.g. chemists, civil engineers, medical doctors, dentists and nurses, accountants, lawyers and 
judges, priests)  
BAND 2 (two sub-groups):  
Technical and associate professionals (e.g. chemical engineering technician, mining supervisor, petroleum and 
natural gas refining operator, midwife)  
clerical support workers (e.g. bank tellers, hotel receptionists, payroll clerks, cooks, shopkeeper, teacher’s aide, 
security guard) 
BAND 3 (four sub-groups):  
Service and sales workers (cooks, waiters and bartenders, hairdressers, travel attendants) 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers (market oriented skilled agricultural workers, subsistence 
farmers, fishers, hunters and gathers)  
Craft and related trade workers (building and related trade workers e.g. house builders, carpenters and joiners; 
metal and machine related trade workers e.g. blacksmiths; machinery mechanics and repairs; handicraft and 
printing workers; electrical and electronic trade workers; food processing, woodworking, garment and other craft 
related trade workers e.g. wood treaters, cabinet makers) 
Plant machine operators and assemblers (stationary plant and machine operators, assemblers, drivers and mobile 
plant operators 
Band 4 (one sub-group): 
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Elementary occupation (cleaners and helpers, agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers, labourers in mining, 
construction, manufacturing and transport, food preparation assistants, street and related sales and service 
workers, refuse and other elementary workers  
Band 5 (one sub-group): 
Unpaid positions (student, houseparent, retired, unemployed) 
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Appendix 3a Male interview participant categorisation by ethnicity, occupation, age group, residence and interview site.255 
                                                          
255 Each participant was given a coded category. This was based on a combination of their broad professional occupation, ethnicity, geographical location and the 
number of the organisation and interviewee (n). The main codes are as follows: mestizo (mixed-race) resident of Barrio Florido n (MRBFn), indigenous resident 
of Cuninico n (IRCn), national state institution n representative n (NSInRn), regional government representative n (RGRn), CBO n representative n (CBOnRn), 
NGO n representative n (NGOnRn). For other smaller groups of interviewed professionals and groups, the following codes have been used: Iquitos university 
academic n (IUAn), non-case study selva citizen n (NCSSCn), former Occidental Petroleum oil worker n (FOPOWn), Iquitos university student n (IUSn), Iquitos 
legal professional n (ILPn), Iquitos construction worker n (ICWn), Iquitos journalist n (IJn) and former indigenous resident of Cuninico n (FIRCn). This coding 
has been used in Appendix 3b and 4. 
Ethnicity \ age 16-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
Mestizo CBO2R3, CBO2R4, 
CBO2R5,  IUS1, IUS2, 
MRBF16, MRBF17, 
MRBF27 
MRBF6,  MRBF15, 
MRBF26, NCSSC2,  
NGO1R1,  NGO5R1,  
NSI4R1, NSI5R1   
IUA1, MRBF1, 
MRBF2,   MRBF12, 
MRBF23, MRBF30,   
NGO4R1, NSI3R1,  
RGR1 
FOPOW1, FOPOW2, 
FOPOW3,  ILP2, IUA2,  
IUA3, MRBF3, MRBF14, 
MRBF18, MRBF29,  
NCSSC1,  NSI7R1, RGR2,  
RGR3 
Indigenous IRC17, IRC18, IRC25 IRC13, IRC15, IRC19 CBO3R1, IRC1, IRC2, 
IRC3, IRC5, IRC8, 
IRC14 
IRC6, IRC9, IRC11,  IRC21, 
MRBF11,  NCSSC3  
Other (incl. Asian)     
White  IJ1 NGO2R1 CBO1R1, NGO3R1 
Black     
Occupation     
(Band 1) Manager  NSI4R1 CBO3R1,  IRC2,  IUA1,    
NGO2R1,  NGO4R1,   
NSI3R1, RGR1 
CBO1R1, RGR2 
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(Band 1) Professional  IJ1,  IRC15,  MRBF6, 
NCSSC2,  NGO5R1, 
NSI5R1 
IRC14,  MRBF2 CBO4R3, ILP2, IUA2,  
IUA3, MRBF3, NGO3R1, 
NSI7R1,  RGR3  
(Band 2) 
Technical/associate 
professionals  
IRC18 NGO1R1   
(Band 2) Clerical 
support 
  MRBF12  
(Band 3) Service and 
sales 
   MRBF18 
(Band 3) Skilled 
agriculture  
MRBF27  IRC3, IRC5 IRC6, IRC11,  IRC21, 
MRBF14,  NCSSC1, 
NCSSC3  
(Band 3) Craft/trade  MRBF15, MRBF16 MRBF1   
(Band 3) Plant, 
machine operator 
 MRBF26   
(Band 4) Elementary IRC17, MRBF16  IRC19   
(Band 5) Studying CBO2R3, CBO2R4, 
CBO2R5,  IUS1, IUS2, 
IRC25,  MRBF17 
   
(Band 5) Houseparent    IRC9 
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(Band 5) Retired    FOPOW1, FOPOW2, 
FOPOW3, MRBF11, 
MRBF29 
(Band 5) 
(Unemployed) 
  IRC1  
Residence      
Urban CBO2R3,  CBO2R4, 
CBO2R5,  IUS1, IUS2 
IJ1,  NGO5R1, 
NSI5R1, NSI4R1  
 
CBO3R1, IUA1,   
MRBF23, NGO2R1,  
NGO4R1, NSI3R1, 
RGR1 
CBO1R1,  CBO4R3, 
FOPOW1, FOPOW2,  
FOPOW3,  ILP2,  IUA2,  
IUA3, NGO3R1, NSI7R1   
RGR2,  RGR3 
Rural IRC17, IRC18, IRC25, 
MRBF16, MRBF17, 
MRBF27  
IRC13,  IRC15,  
IRC19, MRBF15, 
MRBF26   
 
IRC1, IRC2, IRC3, 
IRC5, IRC8,  IRC14, 
MRBF1, MRBF2, 
MRBF12, MRBF30 
IRC6, IRC9,  IRC21,  
IRC11,  MRBF3, MRBF11, 
MRBF14, MRBF18, 
MRBF29,  NCSSC1, 
NCSSC3  
Interview location     
Home  IRC25, IUS1, IUS2, 
MRBF16, MRBF17  
IRC13,  IRC19, 
MRBF6, MRBF15, 
MRBF26  
IRC5, IRC8, MRBF12, 
MRBF30,  NSI3R1 
 
CBO1R1, FOPOW3,  ILP2, 
IRC6, IRC9, IRC11,  IRC21, 
MRBF11, MRBF18, 
MRBF29,  NGO3R1,   
RGR3  
Public CBO2R3, CBO2R4, 
CBO2R5, IRC17, IRC18 
IJ1, IRC15, NCSSC2  IRC1, IRC2, IRC3, 
IRC14,  IUA1, MRBF1, 
MRBF2  
FOPOW1, FOPOW2, 
MRBF3,  NCSSC1, 
NCSSC3  
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*NGO6R1 (no age data taken but Band 1 (professional) and office interview) 
*ICW1 (no age data taken but 3 (craft/trade) and public interview) 
 
Office   NGO5R1, NSI4R1, 
NSI5R1  
CBO3R1, MRBF23,  
NGO2R1,  NGO4R1,  
RGR1 
CBO4R3,  IUA2, IUA3,   
MRBF14,  NSI7R1,  RGR2 
Electronic (Skype)  NGO1R1   
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Appendix 3b Female interview participant categorisation by ethnicity, occupation, age group, residence and interview site. 
Ethnicity \ age 16-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
Mestizo CBO2R1, CBO2R2, 
MRBF4, MRBF21, 
MRBF22 
 
CBO4R2, MRBF8,  
MRBF13, MRBF19, 
MRBF23,  NGO8R1,   
NSI1R1, NSI2R1   
CBO4R1, MRBF9, 
MRBF20, MRBF24, 
MRBF25,  NGO4R2, 
RGR4 
ILP1, MRBF5, MRBF7, 
MRBF10, MRBF28 
 
Indigenous IRC12, IRC16, IRC22 IRC20, IRC23, 
IRC24 
IRC4, IRC7, IRC10, 
IRC26 
FIRC1, IRC27, IRC28, 
IRC29 
Other (incl. Asian)     
White NSI6R1 NGO7R1   
Black     
Occupation     
(Band 1) Manager  NGO7R1,  NSI2R1 RGR4  
(Band 1) Professional  CBO4R2,  NGO8R1, 
NSI1R1  
CBO4R1 ILP1 
(Band 2) 
Technical/associate 
professionals  
  MRBF25, NGO4R2  
(Band 2) Clerical support     
(Band 3) Service and 
sales 
NSI6R1    
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(Band 3) Skilled 
agriculture  
    
(Band 3) Craft/trade     
(Band 3) Plant, machine 
operator 
    
(Band 4) Elementary    MRBF7 
(Band 5) Studying CBO2R1, CBO2R2    
(Band 5) Houseparent IRC12,  IRC16, 
IRC22, MRBF21, 
MRBF22  
IRC20, IRC23, 
IRC24, MRBF8, 
MRBF13, MRBF19, 
MRBF23  
IRC4, IRC7, IRC10,  
IRC26, MRBF9, MRBF20 
IRC27, IRC28, IRC29, 
MRBF5, MRBF10 
 
(Band 5) Retired    FIRC1, MRBF28 
 
(Band 5) (Unemployed) MRBF4    
Residence     
Urban CBO2R1, CBO2R2, 
NSI6R1 
CBO4R2,  NGO7R1, 
NGO8R1, NSI1R1,  
NSI2R1   
CBO4R1, NGO4R2, 
RGR4 
ILP1 
Rural IRC12,  IRC16, 
IRC22, MRBF4, 
MRBF21, MRBF22 
MRBF8, MRBF13, 
MRBF19, MRBF23  
IRC4, IRC7, IRC10,   
IRC26, MRBF9, MRBF20, 
MRBF24, MRBF25  
FIRC1, IRC27, IRC28, 
IRC29,  MRBF5, 
MRBF7, MRBF28 
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IRC20, IRC23, 
IRC24 
Interview location     
Home IRC12, IRC16, IRC22,  
MRBF4, NSI6R1 
IRC20, IRC23, 
IRC24, MRBF13, 
MRBF19, MRBF23, 
NGO7R,  NSI2R1 
IRC7, IRC10,  IRC26, 
MRBF9,  MRBF25, RGR4  
IRC27, IRC28, IRC29,  
MRBF5, MRBF7, 
MRBF10, MRBF28 
Public CBO2R1, CBO2R2, 
MRBF21, MRBF22 
 IRC4, MRBF20, MRBF24 FIRC1 
Office  CBO4R2, NSI1R1, 
NGO8R1 
CBO4R1, NGO4R2 ILP1 
Electronic (Skype)     
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Appendix 4 Grouping of interviews.  
 
Barrio Florido (30 citizens). Coded as: Mestizo resident of Barrio Florido n (MRBFn): 
MRBF1; MRBF2; MRBF3; MRBF4; MRBF5; MRBF6; MRBF7; MRBF8; MRBF9; 
MRBF10; MRBF11; MRBF12; MRBF13; MRBF14; MRBF15; MRBF16; MRBF17; 
MRBF18; MRBF19; MRBF20; MRBF21; MRBF22; MRBF23; MRBF24; MRBF25; 
MRBF26; MRBF27; MRBF28; MRBF29; MRBF30 
 
Cuninico (29 citizens). Coded as: Indigenous resident of Cuninico n (IRCn): IRC1; IRC2; 
IRC3; IRC4; IRC5; IRC6; IRC7; IRC8; IRC9; IRC10; IRC11; IRC12; IRC13; IRC14; 
IRC15; IRC16; IRC17; IRC18; IRC19; IRC20; IRC21; IRC22; IRC23; IRC24; IRC25; 
IRC26; IRC27; IRC28; IRC29 
Also three non-interviewed Cuninico citizens (two women and one man) who made passing 
comments in interviews but are not part of the interview total coded as:  Indigenous resident 
of Cuninico participant n (IRCPn): IRCP1; IRCP2; IRCP3 
 
State representatives (11):  
 
National government. Coded as: National state institution n representative n (NSInRn) 
 NSI1R1a, b. Autoridad Nacional del Agua (National Authority of Water) (ANA).  
ANA, located within the Ministry of Agriculture manages and monitors aquatic water 
sources except water for human consumption (ANA no date). 
 NSI2R1. Organismo de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental (National 
Environmental Monitoring Agency) (OEFA).  
OEFA is an environmental enforcement agency working as the governing body of the 
Sistema Nacional de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental (National System of 
Evaluation and Environmental Control, SINEFA) (OEFA no date a) located within 
MINAM (OEFA no date b). 
 NSI3R1. Servico Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado Servicio 
Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado (National Service of Protected 
Areas by the State) (SERNANP).  
SERNANP located within MINAM is the governing body of Servicio Nacional de 
Áreas Naturales Protegidas (National System of Protected Natural Areas by the State, 
SINANPE) and is in charge of the technical and administrative criteria for the 
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conservation of Áreas Naturales Protegidas (Natural Protected Areas (ANP) 
(SERNANP no date). 
 NSI4R1. Defensoria del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman) (DDP). 
This agency, enshrined within the Peruvian constitution is tasked with defending the 
constitution rights of Peruvian citizens and enforce state administrative responsibilities. 
Though it cannot issue sentences or impose fines or penalities it can instead produces 
reports for the authorities based on technical, ethical and legal arguments (DDP no date). 
 NSI5R1. Procurador Público Especializadi en Delitos Anticorrupción (PPEDC) 
descentralizado del Distrito Judicial de Loreto (Public Prosecutor Specialised in 
Crimes of Corruption for the dencentralised Judicial District of Loreto).  
Part of the Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos (Ministry of Justice and Human 
Rights) this agency operates in each of Peru’s Judicial Districts and is tasked with 
investigating issues of corruption and recovering assets (see Ministerio de Justicia y 
Derechos Humanos no date a, b). 
 NSI6R1. Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energia y Minería (Supervisory 
Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining) (OSINERGMIN). 
This institution is charged with regulating and supervising companies in the electricity, 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors to comply with Peruvian law (see OSINERGMIN no 
date). 
 NSI7R1. Judge (Justice), Superior Courts of Justice, Judicial District of Loreto.   
 
Loreto regional government (GOREL). Coded as: Regional government representative n 
(RGRn) 
 RGR1. GOREL Manager of Health and Environment. 
 RGR2. Loreto Regional Councillor.  
 RGR3. Loreto Municipal Councillor.  
 RGR4. GOREL regional development and intercultural advisor.  
 
CBO (four organisations). Coded as: CBO n representative n (CBOnRn) 
 CBO1R1. Red Ambiental Loretana.  
An indigenous environmental watch-dog organisation, it was established in Iquitos in 
2005. It originated from Corrientes and Tigres Cuenca indigenous communities 
 
 
408 
 
environmental concerns surrounding the oil industry and illegal logging. It helped to 
organise the campaign for the reinjection of Pluspetrol contaminated waters in 2004.  
 CBO2R1-4. Red de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes, (National Network of Children and 
Adolescents) (REDNNA).  
A national organisation, REDNNA has networks in each Peruvian region with the 
Loreton branch based in Iquitos. Its objective is to provide a forum in which young 
children and adolescents can come to discuss various development, social and 
environmental objectives to improve young their quality of life. Their discussions feed 
into the Consejo Asesor para Niños y Adolescentes (Advisory Council for Children and 
Adolescents (CCONNA)), a national body which is part of the Departamento de la 
Mujer y Desarrollo Social (Department of the Ministry of Women and Social 
Development (MIMDES)). 
 CBO3R1. La Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente, (Regional Organisation 
of Indigenous Peoples of the East) (ORPIO).  
ORPIO is a Loreton indigenous organisation that represents several smaller individual 
federations (ACODECOSPAT in the Marañón Cuenca, FECONAT in the Tigre 
Cuenca, FECONACO in the Corrientes Cuenca and FEDIQUEP in the Pastaza 
Cuenca. ORPIO provides a higher (vertical) level of indigenous dialogue with the 
government and other actors (notably REIs) surrounding indigenous issues as well as 
practical support such as the monitoring of the prior consultation mechanism. ORPIO’s 
work feeds the national indigenous body AIDESEP. 
 CBO4R1-3. Catholic Church. The Apostolic Vicariate of Iquitos. 
This is an ecclesiastical province comprising the provinces of Maynas and Loreto and 
operate in the regional capital but also the selva, notably the Marañón Cuenca. Aside 
from this, the Catholic Church also operates the Comisión de Justicia y Paz - Derechos 
Humanos del Vicariato de Iquitos (Commission for Justice and Peace - Human Rights 
of the Vicariate of Iquitos). This commission is based in Iquitos and provides legal 
support to citizens and federations surrounding human rights issues. 
 
NGO (eight organisations). Coded as: NGO n representative n (NGOnRn) 
 NGO1R1. E-Tech International.  
Based in New Mexico, USA, E-Tech International provides environmental technical 
support to communities in EMaDEs on the potential environmental impacts 
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surrounding development projects and capacity building including environmental 
monitoring projects. They work closely with local partners including indigenous 
federations, local, regional and national governments, civil society, academia and 
industrial professionals alongside companies conducting the development (E-Tech 
international no date). 
 NGO2R1a, b, c. The Peru Mission.  
Established in 2012, this charity has its roots in Catholic parishes and schools in the 
UK but now works with all Christian denominations and secular agencies. Based in 
Iquitos, its objective is to contribute to the betterment of conditions for the poorest 
members of Peruvian society in Loreto and further afield. Projects include medical 
support (e.g. UK volunteer medical interns work in Loreto whilst mosquito nets are 
purchased for selva communities) and educational/development help (building schools 
and classrooms and implementing skills training for young people in in poorer 
communities) (The Peru Mission no date). 
 NGO3R1. Earthwatch Institute.  
Established in 1971, Earthwatch has offices located in several countries including the 
USA, UK, Japan and Australia. Working in over 40 countries, their aim is to engage 
with people in scientific field research and education to promote the understanding and 
the need for a sustainable environment. Through their scientists, they implement field 
research experiences surrounding key themes including climate change, wildlife and 
ecosystems and ocean health. These are designed to benefit local communities who are 
consulted on and collaborate in these projects (Earthwatch institute 2017). 
 NGO4R1-2a, b. ProNaturaleza (Peruvian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature). 
A private Peruvian NGO established in 1984 with offices around the country including 
in Iquitos. Their work is financed through private donors (e.g. REIs), international 
cooperation and national funding sources. Their focus is on conservation and 
biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources. Project themes include 
participation in the management of protected natural areas (e.g. Loreto’s Pacaya 
Samiria Regional Conservation Area) and advocacy and implementation of socio-
environmental responsibility in extractive industries (e.g. running community 
environmental monitoring programmes) (ProNaturaleza no date). 
 NGO5R1. Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Peruvian Society of 
Environmental Law) (SPDA).  
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Established in 1986, its focus has been on the promotion of Peruvian environmental 
policies and legislation particularly surrounding development. They have offices in 
Lima, Iquitos and Puerto Maldonado (Madre de Dios regional capital). SPDA has three 
strategic areas of focus incorporating natural heritage (working towards the protection 
and sustainable use of the environment), institutions and legislation (promoting 
coherent and systematic environmental legislation) and crucially environmental justice 
(implementing environmental monitoring systems, environmental conflict prevention 
schemes) (SPDA no date). 
 NGO6R1. Naturaleza y Cultura Internacional (Nature and Culture International) 
(NCI).  
Established in 1996, NCI seek to protect biologically diverse ecosystems with the 
support of local people in Latin America. They now have 17 local offices in Ecuador, 
Peru and Mexico and operate in 20 biodiverse regions in Latin America including 
Loreto. In this region and wider Peru, NCI goals include environmental objectives 
(protection of Loreton Amazonian rainforest) and societal aims (working to improve 
and enhance selva community economic benefits through the sustainable use of natural 
resources, increasing their rights over resources and improving their benefits from 
conserving natural areas) (NCI no date). 
 NGO7R1. Alianza Arkana.  
A grassroots alliance, Alianza Arkana now work primarily with rural and urban-fringe 
Shipibo communities in the Ucayali region of the Peruvian Amazon but originally 
operated in Loreto. These are centred on the completion of development objectives 
including improving access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition and 
education. Each project is guided by each community and are run by the communities 
themselves. Aside from these development objectives, Alianza Arkana also work to 
raise national and international awareness about environmental and human rights 
issues in the Amazon, research into the socio-environmental impact of extractive 
industries, gather and document evidence of extractive industry illegalities and provide 
legal support for communities in defence of their rights (Alianza Arkana no date). 
 NGO8R1. Derecho Ambiental y Recursos Naturales (Law, Environment and Natural 
Resources) (DAR).  
DAR have offices in both Lima and Iquitos and aim to build governance, sustainable 
development and the promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights in the Amazon. In Loreto 
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they are focused on several objectives including indigenous environmental monitoring, 
co-management of Regional Conservation Areas, promoting good practice and 
transparency within the hydrocarbon industry and educational support for communities 
surrounding their hydrocarbon rights. (DAR no date). 
 
Other citizen voices (16)  
 Three academics. Coded as: Iquitos university academic n (IUAn):  
IUA1. Anthropologist researcher at Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonia 
Peruana, (Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon). Formerly government civil 
servant in the office of the Prime Minister. 
IUA2. Chemical engineering professor at Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia 
Peruana, (National University of the Peruvian Amazon).  
IUA3. Research director at Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon. 
 
 Three non-case study selva residents from three different pueblos. Coded as: non-case 
study selva citizen n (NCSSCn).  
NCSSC1. Farmer from Orellna (Vargas Guerra district capital), situated on the banks 
of the Rio Marañón. 
NCSSC2. Missionary father living with communities in Trompeteros District, Loreto 
Province.  
NCSSC3. Farmer from San Jorge (Nauta district, Loreto Province), a pueblo on the 
banks of the Rio Marañón. 
 
 Three former Occidental Petroleum oil workers. Coded as: former occidental 
Petroleum oil worker n (FOPOWn). 
FOPOW1. Mechanical engineer. 
FOPOW2. Former community relations officer.  
FOPOW3. Truck driver then plant operator. 
 
 Two university students. Coded as: Iquitos university student n (IUSn).  
IUS1; IUS2 
 
 Two legal professionals. Coded as: Iquitos legal professional n (ILPn). 
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ILP1. Iquitos teacher and human rights lawyer (working pro bono) for indigenous 
communities. 
ILP2. Iquitos lawyer. 
 
 One construction worker. Coded as: Iquitos construction worker n (ICWn).  
ICW1 
 
 One journalist. Coded as: Iquitos journalist n (IJn) 
IJ1. Environmental journalist for an international newspaper based in Iquitos. 
 
 One former Cuninico community member. Coded as: former indigenous resident of 
Cuninico n (FIRCn).  
FIRC1 
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Appendix 5 Template contact summary sheet (based on Miles and Huberman 1994 pp. 51-
52). 
 
Contact type:     Date:    Location: 
 
1. Summarise the information I gained for each of the interview guide themes. Which did the 
participant bear on most centrally? What struck me the most from these sections? 
 
 
Topic 2: The Peruvian state and stakeholder voice: 
 
Topic 3: Stakeholder voice actions and CBO/NGO use of individual citizen voice: 
 
Topic 4: Stakeholder voices and their relationship with REIs: 
 
 
2. What new hypotheses, speculations, or hunches were suggested by the participant? What 
struck me the most from this new information? 
 
 
3. Based on the above questions, are there new kinds of information (concepts) that need to 
be sought in future interviews?  
 
 
4. Are any alterations needed on the interview questions (e.g. through the inclusion of 
indigenous typologies)? 
 
 
 
5. How was my own performance in the interview?  Was I able to gain the level of 
information I wanted?
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Appendix 6 Citizen interview guide (created April 2015). 
 
Topic 1: Stakeholder citizen 
 
Citizen stakeholder possible questions: 
 
I wonder if you could start by telling me a little bit about yourself. Have you always lived here? 
What do you do for a living? 
 
Has the environment changed in the last ten years? (Why?) 
 
What do you think the environment will be like in the next ten years? (Why?) 
 
Topic 2: Stakeholder PEV: The Peruvian state 
 
How involved do you feel you are in the development of oil production in the selva?  
At what stage are you consulted by the government about potential oil development projects near 
your local community, i.e. does the government come and ask for your opinion before oil 
production starts?  
Has this consolation process got better or worse in the last ten years? 
What do you think the consultation process will be like in the next ten years?  
 
If you wanted to report an environmental problem (e.g. an oil spill) to the government who would 
you contact in the government and/or where would you go?  (What is your opinion about that?) 
 
How accessible are government officials like the District Mayor or the regional government to 
report these problems to? 
How prevalent is the problem of cronyism (“amiguismo”) and does it affect your ability to 
access government to report an environmental problem? Do indigenous people lack this 
nepotism access to government? 
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Do you believe that social class and status impact on your access to government and in what 
way? 
How often do the government visit selva communities? (If they don’t visit often, why do you 
think that is?) 
What are the problems in Peru’s political system? If there are any, does this impact upon 
you reporting an environmental problem?  
Has access to the government improved or deteriorated in the last ten years? 
Do you see your access to government changing in the next ten years? 
How could the government improve its presence in the selva? 
 
Where do meetings on the pollution issues occur in Loreto? In Iquitos, in Provincial selva capitals 
like Parnari, Santa Clotilde, Trompeteros or in your local community?  
How often do these meetings occur?  
Do you think the government could do more to improve this? 
Do the meetings occur in Spanish or in your local language? Does the community have an 
interpreter to help the meetings occur? 
 
What is your opinion on the EIAs (Environmental Impact Assessment) workshops that help ensure 
citizen participation? How do you think the government views them? (Have you ever had any 
experience with EIAs that you can tell me about? (Where was this?) (When?) (Who were you 
with?) (How does this make you feel as a citizen?) 
 
Do you believe that that the government is doing enough to monitor potential environmental 
problems like oil spills?  
 
How much trust do you have in the government to rectify an environmental problem if you reported 
it?  
Is your trust of government damaged by corruption and if so does this impact on the way 
you consult with the government over environmental problems? 
How does this affect your willingness to speak out about the environmental issue?  
Has your level of trust changed in the past ten years? 
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Will your trust in government change in the next ten years? 
Do you believe the issue of racism in Peru is one of the reasons why governments in Iquitos and 
Lima do not always listen to your voices and environmental concerns? 
Do you think that the state (national, regional, local government) need to publicly apologise to the 
selva communities for the contamination through a memorial ceremony with a promise of doing 
better for you to trust government? 
 
In these last ten years has your willingness to speak out and report an environmental problem 
changed at all?  
 
What do you think the next ten years will be like? (Why do you think that?)  
 
The indigenous leaders and the government recently agreed to a 50 million soles remediation 
figure. How was this figure arrived at? How open is the government and indigenous leaders 
in consulting and listening to individual citizens?  
 
Topic 3: Stakeholder PEV actions and CBO/NGO use of individual citizen PEV.  
 
In the last ten years, what sort of actions were you willing to use to complain about 
environmental pollution? For example, strikes, protests, deliberate sabotage (ask where, 
when, with who) 
 
What sort of actions do you use today? (Ask why change/why no change) 
 
Does your community ever travel to oil company offices in Iquitos to present your demands 
and concerns or do you prefer taking action against the oil sites near your community? Why 
is that?   
 
Do you believe that these actions (protests, strikes) bring about the change you want?  
(Why do you think that?)  
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What do you think to the government’s perception of and response to the direct action? Has 
the government responded with violent repression or has it been willing to suggest 
consultation through meetings and roundtable discussions? 
Has government violence damaged your relationship with the state? 
 
How do you use technology (mobile phones, cameras, video recording equipment, and 
internet) surrounding environmental problems? 
Do you use it to hold oil companies to account for pollution? 
Do you post images onto social media, through NGO websites or to newspapers? 
Do you try and connect with citizens from around the world to increase awareness?  
How effective do you find technology is in helping make the government in Iquitos and Lima 
and the oil company aware of the problems? 
 
Have you ever worked or been involved with organisations that try to protect the environment or 
support you in relation to the oil industry? 
(Which organisation was this with?) (Do you believe that they are effective at voicing your 
concerns to government than you would be?) (Why?) 
Do you find them a help or a hindrance in your efforts to understand the potential positive 
and negative aspects of development in the selva? Do you feel that they try and influence 
your opinions on the sort of actions to take?  
 
Has this relationship with these organisations changed in the past ten years?  
 
What do you foresee the next ten years to be like in your relationship with these organisations?  
 
Does your local community have an environmental monitor? Did they receive any oil 
company or government training for the job? Who do they report problems to? How often 
do they meet oil company or government officials? 
 
How often do you see the Apu leader of your federation? Do they keep you up to date on 
negotiations or actions to take surrounding environmental pollution?  
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Has this consultation with your community improved or deteriorated in the last ten years? 
What do you think the next ten years will be like? 
 
Topic 4: Stakeholder PEV and their relationship with REIs.  
 
If an oil company’s exploration activities caused an environmental problem, how would you go 
about raising this with the company?  
 
Which company have you had experience with? (If more than one; have you ever noticed a 
difference in their relationship and level of access for you?) 
 
If you are dealing with a company rather than the government does this change how you would 
liaise with them? (Why is that?) (Can you give me an example?) 
 
Do you think that you and other selva citizens can approach oil companies about 
environmental problems and request a consultation/meeting with them OR do you think 
companies dictate if/when this happens? Who has the power? Would the level of access be 
different for non-indigenous citizens? 
 
Who are these oil companies willing to work with from the local community?  
 
What form and how often do these meetings take?  
Where do the meetings occur? 
 
Depending on interviewee location;  
As you are downriver of REI site, have you ever had contact with the REI? How often? 
As you are adjacent to the REI site, have you ever had contact with the REI? How often? 
 
How has this situation or relationship changed in the last ten years with oil companies?  
(Why?)  (Can you provide me with an example?) 
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How do you perceive the situation will change in the next ten years?  
(Why?)  (Can you provide me with an example?) 
 
Have you ever found that international oil companies provide better/worse access to talk 
with than Petroperu? 
 
Do you think Peruvians should have the right to own the resources beneath their ground? Is 
this one of the underlying reasons underneath oil protests in the selva? 
 
Topic 5: Stakeholder citizen final questions  
 
May I ask how old are you? 
 
Do I have permission for part of this interview to be published in my work? As I stated, your name 
will be a pseudonym to prevent identification but please do not feel you must agree.  
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Appendix 7 Oral informed consent form. 
 
My name is Adrian Gonzalez and I am a research student at Royal Holloway University of London. 
I am conducting research in Peru’s Loreto region on its oil production and the way that Peruvian 
people and organisations respond to environmental pollution, who they report a problem to and 
their access to Peruvian government and oil company officials.  
Mi nombre es Adrián González y soy un estudiante de investigación en el Universidad Royal 
Holloway de Londres. Estoy llevando a cabo la investigación en la región de Loreto en Perú, 
relacionado a en su producción de petróleo y la forma en que las personas y organizaciones 
peruanas responden al area de la contaminación ambiental, quienes reportan problemas 
ocasionados al medio ambiente y a sus comunidades a y su acceso a los funcionarios del gobierno 
y de las compañías petroleras peruanas en general. 
 
Four key points on the interview: 
1. There are no right or wrong answers in this interview. I am interested in hearing your views 
and having you voice your thoughts about the above issue.   
2. Participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time 
without stating a reason or can refuse to answer any question. 
3. During this interview and with your permission I will record your answers in a journal and 
will tape the interview. I will only use this device with your permission.  
4. All material from this interview will be kept strictly confidential and any material used in 
publications or presentations will ensure that individuals cannot be identified. 
Cuatro puntos claves en la entrevista: 
1. No hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas en esta entrevista. Estoy muy interesado en 
escuchar sus ideas y opiniones acerca de los problemas de la contaminación ambiental de 
Loreto y áreas adyacentes. 
2.  La participación en esta entrevista es completamente voluntaria y usted puede retirarse 
o, abstenerse en cualquier momento y sin indicación de los motivos o puede negarse a 
contestar cualquier pregunta en particular. 
3. Durante esta entrevista, y con su permiso voy a grabar sus respuestas en un diario y cinta 
la entrevista. Sólo voy a usar este dispositivo con su permiso. 
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4. Todo el material de esta entrevista se mantendrá estrictamente confidencial y cualquier 
material utilizado en publicaciones o presentaciones se asegurará de que las personas no 
pueden ser identificados. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Oral consent checklist – please just answer yes or no to the following questions 
1. I understand that the interview is voluntary and that I may refuse to any a question or 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. My identity cannot be identified from this 
research. 
2. Do you agree to take part in this study? 
3. Do you agree that the interview can be tape recorded? 
¿Tiene alguna pregunta? 
Consentimiento oral – por favor, simplemente responder sí o no a las siguientes preguntas: 
1. Entiendo que la entrevista es voluntaria y que puedo negarme a cualquier pregunta o retirarse 
en cualquier momento sin dar una razón. Mi identidad no se puede identificar a partir de esta 
investigación 
2.  ¿Está de acuerdo en participar en este estudio? 
3. ¿Está de acuerdo que la entrevista puede ser suministrada con casete de cinta para grabar? 
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Appendix 8 Generic formal letter of introduction (Spanish copy). 
 
Adrián González BA (Hons) MA 
Hospedaje Aziyadé 
San Román 26 
Iquitos 
Cell: 999501270/ +51 (65) 222800 
Email: adrian.gonzalez.2013@live.rhul.acu.uk 
Sitio Web: http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/david-simon(69b08a6c-d133-4157-b1f2-
eb0036b4d6e6)/persons.html 
 
Estimado señor o señora, 
Mi nombre es Adrián González y soy un estudiante de doctorado en geografía de Reino 
Unido en la Universidad Royal Holloway de Londres que está siendo supervisado por el profesor 
David Simon. Estoy viviendo en Iquitos por poco menos de cuatro meses (de marzo a junio de 
2015) para llevar a cabo una investigación sobre producción de petróleo y la forma en que los 
ciudadanos y las organizaciones de peruanos responden aesta contaminación ambiental en la 
región de Loreto Perú, las cuales reportan problemas por la dificultad del acceso al Gobierno 
Peruano y las compañías petroleras funcionarios.  
 
Toda oportunidad de concertar una cita con su organización es bienvenida, en el momento que 
usted crea conveniente llevar a cabo con el fin de obtener una entrevista para mi investigación. 
 
• La entrevista tendrá una duración de aproximadamente 1 hora 
• La entrevista es estrictamente anónima y totalmente voluntaria con el entrevistado capaz de 
negarse a responder a cualquier pregunta o retirarse en cualquier momento. 
• Durante la entrevista Yo y con su permiso grabaré sus respuestas de la entrevista. 
• Por último, todo el material de la entrevista se mantendrá estrictamente confidencial y cualquier 
material utilizado en presentaciones o publicaciones se asegurará de que los personas no pueden 
ser identificadas. 
 
Estoy encantado de enviar por correo electrónico las preguntas de antemano para que usted pueda 
leerlas y enterarse los temas de la entrevista. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre esta entrevista o 
mi investigación por favor no dude en ponerse en contacto conmigo a través de la dirección de 
correo electrónico en la parte superior de esta carta o en persona en la dirección antes mencionada. 
 
Atentamente, 
 
 
 
Adrián González 
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Appendix 9 Hospedaje owner’s formal letter of introduction.  
 
SOLICITA: AUDIENCIA CON EL SR. PRESIDENTE DEL GOREL. 
 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO REGIONAL DE LORETO.  
Lic. Sr.  FERNANDO MELENDEZ CELIS. 
CARLOS ALBERTO LEÓN BLAS, de profesión Abogado, identificado con CAL N° 1319, 
con DNI N° 17982186, con domicilio Real y Procesal en la Avda. Abelardo Quiñones N° 
837 del distrito de Belén, Provincia de Maynas, Región Loreto; en representación del Sr. 
ADRIAN ALBERTO GONZALEZ, siendo estudiante de investigación en el ROYAL 
HOLLOWAY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON - REINO UNIDO, en representación Sr. 
FERNANDO HERNADEZ ORTIZ, siendo VICEPRESIDENTE DE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE 
EX TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS OXY REIVINDICACION, POR LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS - ASETRAPEOREIDH, ante Ud., nos presentamos y decimos: 
Que, previo saludo, deseándole éxitos en su gestión y siendo oportuno llevar a cabo una 
AUDIENCIA, por medio de la cual le SOLICITAMOS, se sirva fijarnos día y hora para 
una Audiencia para con su persona en su despacho del GOREL, nuestra comitiva 
está conformada por CINCO REPRESENTANTES, esto para ponerle en conocimiento 
sobre el proceso de investigación que se está realizando, por el cual solicitamos su apoyo 
incondicional, siendo estas indagaciones y / o consultas las Siguientes  
 
1.-  LA INVESTIGACION EN LA REGION LORETO –PERU, RELACIONADO A LA 
PRODUCCIÓN DE PETRÓLEO Y LAS FORMAS EN QUE LAS PERSONAS Y 
ORGANIZACIONES PERUANAS RESPONDEN AL AREA DE LA CONTAMINACIÓN 
AMBIENTAL. QUIENES REPORTAN PROBLEMAS OCASIONADOS AL MEDIO 
AMBIENTEY A SUS COMUNIDADES NATIVAS. 
2.-  LA INVESTIGACIÓN, RELACIONADO AL GRAVE DAÑO OCASIONADO POR LAS 
PETROLERAS DE TURNO EN LAS DIFERENTES CUENCAS DEL RIO CORRIENTES 
Y PASTAZA, TIGRE, ESPECIFICAMENTE EN LOS LOTES SAN JACINTO, 
SHIBIYACU, TAPAHUARI SUR. 
3.- LA INVESTIGACIÓN, CONCERNIENTE A ¿QUE ESTA HACIENDO EL ESTADO 
PARA REMEDIAR LOS DAÑOS OCASIONADOS POR LAS PETROLERAS DE 
TURNO? ¿SI LAS PETROLERAS DE TURNO CUMPLEN CON LA LEY DE CONSULTA 
PREVIA Y CON OTORGAR EL PAGO POR LOS DERECHOS DEL USO DE SUS 
TIERRAS? 
4.- LA INVESTIGACIÓN RESPECTO A LOS EXTRABAJADORES PETROLEROS – 
OXY, ¿SI SUS DERECHOS Y BENEFICIOS FUERÓN REIVINDICADOS, A RAIZ DE LA 
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INVESTIGACIÓN DIRIGIDA POR EL CONGRESO DE LA REPUBLICA EN EL AÑO 
2006, CON UN DICTAMEN FAVORABLE A LOS EXTRABAJADORES, AL INCUMPLIR 
CON EL PAGO TOTAL DE SUS OBLIGACIONES SOBRE SUS UTILIDADES Y 
BONIFICACIONES ESTIPULADO EN LOS CONTRATOS TRIPARTITOS? 
  
Este pedido tiene carácter de premura, en el entendido que DICHAS 
INVESTIGACIONES AYUDARAN A VERIFICAR SI EN ALGO ESTAMOS FALLANDO 
RESPECTO AL MEDIO AMBIENTE Y EL RECALENTAMIENTO GLOBAL, A 
SOLUCIONAR CONFLICTOS CON NUESTROS HERMANOS DE LAS 
COMUNIDADES NATIVAS, A CUMPLIR Y HACER CUMPLIR CON NUESTROS 
HERMANOS EX TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS, QUE SE ENCUENTRAN 
DESPROTEGIDOS POR EL PODER JUDICIAL, sin que hasta la fecha, se haya emitido 
una resolución favorable, otorgándoles sus derechos a los comunidades nativas 
asentadas en las diferentes cuencas de Loreto y ex trabajadores petroleros de OXY.  
 
POR LO EXPUESTO:  
                                        A Usted Sr. PRESIDENTE DEL GOREL, conocedores de su 
amplio espíritu altruista y de su ayuda a las INVESTIGACIONES DE LA UNIVERSITY 
OF LONDON – REINO UNIDO, referente al CALENTURA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE, le 
pedimos acceder a nuestro pedido. 
 
Iquitos, 20 de Marzo 2015. 
 
 
 
 
                  ...……………………………. 
                  ADRIAN ALBERTO GONZALEZ 
 
 
 
